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=== 5.5.1 Demand-side Transitions as Multi-dimensional Processes === <div id="h2-24-siblings" class="h2-siblings"></div> Several integrative frameworks including social practice theory ( [[#Røpke--2009|Røpke 2009]] ; [[#Shove--2014|Shove and Walker 2014]] ), the energy cultures framework ( [[#Stephenson--2015|Stephenson et al. 2015]] ; [[#Jürisoo--2019|Jürisoo et al. 2019]] ) and socio-technical transitions theory ( [[#McMeekin--2012|McMeekin and Southerton 2012]] ; [[#Geels--2017|Geels et al. 2017]] ) conceptualise demand-side transitions as multi-dimensional and interacting processes ( ''high evidence, high agreement'' ). Social practice theory emphasises interactions between artefacts, competences, and cultural meanings ( [[#Røpke--2009|Røpke 2009]] ; [[#Shove--2014|Shove and Walker 2014]] ). The energy cultures framework highlights feedbacks between materials, norms, and behavioural practices ( [[#Stephenson--2015|Stephenson et al. 2015]] ; [[#Jürisoo--2019|Jürisoo et al. 2019]] ). Socio-technical transitions theory addresses interactions between technologies, user practices, cultural meanings, business, infrastructures, and public policies ( [[#McMeekin--2012|McMeekin and Southerton 2012]] ; [[#Geels--2017|Geels et al. 2017]] ) and can thus accommodate the five drivers of change and stability discussed in [[#5.4|Section 5.4]] . [[#5.4|Section 5.4]] shows with ''high evidence'' and ''high agreement'' that the relative influence of different drivers varies between demand-side solutions. The deployment of ‘Improve’ options like LEDs and clean cookstoves mostly involves technological change, adoption by consumers who integrate new technologies in their daily life practices ( [[#Smith--1993|Smith et al. 1993]] ; [[#Sanderson--2014|Sanderson and Simons 2014]] ; [[#Franceschini--2016|Franceschini and Alkemade 2016]] ), and some policy change. Changes in meanings are less pertinent for those ‘Improve’ options that are primarily about technological substitution. Other ‘Improve’ options, like clean cookstoves, involve both technological substitution and changes in cultural meanings and traditions. Deployment of ‘Shift’ options like enhanced public transport involves substantial behavioural change and transitions to new or expanded provisioning systems, which may include new technologies (buses, trams), infrastructures (light rail, dedicated bus lanes), institutions (operational licences, performance contracts), financial arrangements, and new organisations (with particular responsibilities and oversight) ( ''high evidence, high agreement'' ) ( [[#Deng--2011|Deng and Nelson 2011]] ; [[#Turnheim--2019|Turnheim and Geels 2019]] ). Changes in cultural meanings can facilitate ‘Shift’ options. Shifts towards low-meat diets, for instance, are motivated by costs and by beliefs about the undesirability of meat that relate more to issues like health, nutrition and animal welfare than climate change ( [[#De%20Boer--2014|De Boer et al. 2014]] ; [[#Mylan--2018|Mylan 2018]] ). ‘Avoid’ options that reduce service levels (e.g., sufficiency or downshifting) imply very substantial behavioural and cultural changes that may not resonate with mainstream consumers ( [[#Dubois--2019|Dubois et al. 2019]] ). Other ‘Avoid’ options like teleworking also require changes in cultural meanings and beliefs (about the importance of supervision, coaching, social contacts, or office politics), as well as changes in behaviour, institutions, business, and technology (including good internet connections and office space at home). Because these interconnected changes were not widespread, teleworking remained stuck in small niches and did not diffuse widely before the COVID-19 crisis ( [[#Hynes--2014|Hynes 2014]] ; [[#Hynes--2016|Hynes 2016]] ; [[#Belzunegui-Eraso--2020|Belzunegui-Eraso and Erro-Garcés 2020]] ; [[#Stiles--2020|Stiles 2020]] ). As preferences change, new infrastructures and social settings can also elicit new desires associated with emerging low-energy demand service provisioning systems ( [[#5.4.5|Section 5.4.5]] ). Demand-side transitions involve interactions between radical social or technical innovations (such as the Avoid-Shift-Improve options discussed in [[#5.3|Section 5.3]] ) and existing socio-technical systems, energy cultures, and social practices ( ''high evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Stephenson--2015|Stephenson et al. 2015]] ; [[#Geels--2017|Geels et al. 2017]] ). Radical innovations such as teleworking, plant-based burgers, car sharing, vegetarianism, or electric vehicles initially emerge in small, peripheral niches ( [[#Kemp--1998|Kemp et al. 1998]] ; [[#Schot--2008|Schot and Geels 2008]] ), constituted by R&D projects, technological demonstration projects ( [[#Borghei--2016|Borghei and Magnusson 2016]] ; [[#Rosenbloom--2018b|Rosenbloom et al. 2018b]] ), local community initiatives or grassroots projects by environmental activists (Hargreaves et al. 2013a; [[#Hossain--2016|Hossain 2016]] ). Such niches offer protection from mainstream selection pressures and nurture the development of radical innovations ( [[#Smith--2012|Smith and Raven 2012]] ). Many low-carbon niche innovations, such as those described in [[#5.3|Section 5.3]] , face uphill struggles against existing socio-technical systems, energy cultures, and social practices that are stabilised by multiple lock-in mechanisms ( ''high evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Klitkou--2015|Klitkou et al. 2015]] ; [[#Seto--2016|Seto et al. 2016]] ; [[#Clausen--2017|Clausen et al. 2017]] ; [[#Ivanova--2018|Ivanova et al. 2018]] ). Demand-side transitions therefore do not happen easily and involve interacting processes and struggles on the behavioural, socio-cultural, institutional, business and technological dimensions ( [[#Nikas--2020|Nikas et al. 2020]] ) ( [[#5.4|Section 5.4]] ). <div id="5.5.2" class="h2-container"></div> <span id="phases-in-transitions"></span>
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