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==== 8.4.5.2 Future risks, vulnerabilities, differentiated inequalities and livelihood shifts ==== <div id="h3-22-siblings" class="h3-siblings"></div> Overall, there is ''high agreement'' that future climate change impacts are going to worsen poverty and exacerbate inequalities within and between nations, with projections that by 2030 these will increase significantly ( [[#Olsson--2014|Olsson et al., 2014]] ; [[#Hallegatte--2017|Hallegatte and Rozenberg, 2017]] ; [[#Roy--2018|Roy et al., 2018]] ). In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic and consequences linked to measures to reduce the spreading of the virus are ''likely'' to increase poverty, particularly in regions already facing high levels of vulnerability and poverty ( [[#Laborde--2020b|Laborde et al., 2020b]] ; [[#Sumner--2020|Sumner et al., 2020]] ). Key risks due to future climate change, exposure and vulnerability are difficult to assess and are based on evidence from the past and ''likely'' future vulnerabilities and livelihood challenges. The assessment of Representative Key Risks (see [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-16#16.5.2.3|Section 16.5.2.3.4]] ) underscores that risks to living standards are potentially severe as measured by the magnitude of impacts in comparison to historical events or as inferred from the number of people currently vulnerable (see in detail Chapter 16). Table 8.4 provides an overview of what is known in the literature assessed about future risks, inequalities and particularly future vulnerabilities, including potential challenges for climate justice and adaptation barriers. For example, barriers for gender, ethnicity and class have been addressed for a long time yet need substantive intervention. Gender, along with many other structural inequalities (Table 8.4) that are deeply rooted, pose future threats to people and groups in vulnerable situations from, for example, the loss of land or assets, exposure to extreme events and so on. These people will also ''likely'' be highly exposed to future climate risks unless there are significant and new avenues for action on climate change now. For example, recent studies suggest that the total population of all countries classified as most highly vulnerable is projected to grow significantly. A study using five vulnerability categories globally concludes that the total population of all countries with very high vulnerability (see Figure 8.6) is projected to increase from 2019 numbers approximately by 102% by 2050 (i.e., roughly double) and 257% by 2100, while the population of all countries with very low vulnerability is projected to decrease by 9% by 2050 and 17% by 2100 (based on UN medium probabilistic projections). Another study estimates that the total population of all countries classified at most vulnerable (top two categories; using seven vulnerability categories globally) is predicted to increase by 82% by 2050 and 192% by 2100. In contrast the population of all countries classified as least vulnerable (bottom two categories) is projected to only increase by 9% by 2050 and 1% by 2100 (see in detail [[#UN-DESA--2019|UN-DESA, 2019]] ; [[#Birkmann--2021a|Birkmann et al., 2021a]] ; [[#Birkmann--2022|Birkmann et al., 2022]] ). '''Table 8.4 |''' Summary of interlocking categories differentiation future risks, vulnerabilities, inequality and adaptation {| class="wikitable" |- ! Future risks ! Inequalities ! Future vulnerabilities, future livelihood, future exposure (examples) ! References |- | Increasing risk of displacement and damage to women and girls in floods | Gender inequality leaves women and girls hidden, forgotten and exposed, resulting in displacement impacts and limited resources, including social capital and increasing risk of human trafficking. | Increasing future vulnerability of women and girls due to high hazard exposure; gender differentiated vulnerability to urban flooding (in India); increasing risk of human trafficking associated with exposure to future extreme events. | ( [[#Singh--2020|Singh, 2020]] ; CCB GENDER in Chapter 18) |- | Increasing risks of exacerbating inequalities and tensions | Differentiation based on ethnicity and race leads to groups in society being less visible, with fewer rights, particularly for livelihoods that expose them to extremes. Unequal access to adaptation opportunities and benefits. | Increasing future vulnerability of Indigenous Peoples due to exposure to extreme events. Communities of colour are ''likely'' to be exposed to increased climate change impacts, e.g., differentiated health impacts on black and Hispanic communities heat-related mortality rates and poverty for neighbourhoods in New York City. | [[#8.3|Section 8.3]] ; ( [[#Hsu--2021|Hsu et al., 2021]] ; [[#8.3|Section 8.3]] ) |- | Increasing risk of loss of homes and assets in the case of floods | Class differences in exposure and awareness of flood risks. Lower caste disproportionately impacted by climate change. | Increasing differentiated exposure among classes to events such as flooding. | ( [[#Jones--2011|Jones and Boyd, 2011]] ; [[#Fielding--2018|Fielding, 2018]] ) |- | Risks to loss of lives in cases where there is no agency | Religious beliefs impact experience of climate change. | Increasing vulnerability to climate change among different religious groups. | ( [[#Schuman--2018|Schuman et al., 2018]] ) |- | Risk of premature mortality, risk of loss of livelihoods in employment | Age and ageing populations. Elderly and young are disproportionately impacted by climate change, e.g., heatwave in France 2003 and Japan 2018. Youth underemployed or in vulnerable livelihoods could be vulnerable to climate-related risks, which adversely affects the economy. | Increasing future vulnerability among elderly, underage youth and children vulnerable to increasing risks of health impacts of pollutants, floods or heatwaves. | ( [[#Hsu--2021|Hsu et al., 2021]] ; [[#8.3|Section 8.3]] ) |- | Risks to mobility in a climate extreme | People with disabilities, for instance; evidence emerging in the disaster risk reduction and humanitarian sector. | Increasing risks to people with disabilities, who are disadvantaged when exposed to extreme events. | ( [[#King--2019|King et al., 2019]] ) |- | Risks of isolation for communities remote from centres of power | Geographical exposure. The location of people and societies within a particular territory is a determinant of inequality e.g., disruptions to food supplies to the Caribbean when there are climate extreme events. | Increasing risk and exposure among communities remote from urban centres, far from resources and exposed to climate impacts. | [[#8.3|Section 8.3]] ; Cross-Chapter Box GENDER in Chapter 18 |- | Risks of food insecurity | Differentiation of asset/ownership/access among groups where status is unclear. | Increasing risks to tenurial landless. If tenurial status is unclear, groups may experience loss of land and displacement. | [[#8.2|Section 8.2]] ; Cross-Chapter Box GENDER in Chapter 18. |} That means that, based on current population growth estimates and if vulnerability levels are not reduced significantly, more people will be living in more vulnerable context conditions in the future compared to those living in less vulnerable contexts. This is independent of the development of climatic hazard exposure. If significant reductions of vulnerability are achieved, this projection will change. However, the vulnerability and poverty of some regions and countries, such as Afghanistan or Haiti, has proved over decades to be persistent. Consequently, the estimated future population growth is another factor that points towards the urgent need to reduce vulnerability and to narrow the adaptation gap. While future adaptation options can also encompass measures or tools that emerge in future, most of the future adaptation options and their relevance for reducing vulnerability, poverty and inequality are known. Evidence exists that the importance of social networks that organise social protection and leverage resources in terms of reducing risks to climate change is increasing, particularly for most vulnerable people or groups in countries that have limited social security measures in place. <div id="8.4.5.3" class="h3-container"></div> <span id="future-limits-to-adaptation"></span>
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