Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-12 (section)

=== 12.5.4 Governance of Land-related Impacts of Mitigation Options ===

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The land sector (Chapter 7) contributes to mitigation via emissions reduction and enhancement of land carbon sinks, and by providing biomass for mitigation in other sectors. Key challenges for governance of land-based mitigation include social and environmental safeguards ( [[#Duchelle--2017|Duchelle et al. 2017]] ; [[#Sills--2017|Sills et al. 2017]] ; [[#Larson--2018|Larson et al. 2018]] ); insufficient financing ( [[#Turnhout--2017|Turnhout et al. 2017]] ); capturing co-benefits; ensuring additionality; addressing non-permanence of carbon sequestration; monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) of emissions reduction and carbon dioxide removals; and avoiding leakage or spillover effects. Governance approaches to addressing these challenges are discussed in [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-7#7.6|Section 7.6]] , and include MRV systems and integrity criteria for project-level emissions trading; payments for ecosystem services; land-use planning and land zoning; certification schemes, standards and codes of practice.

With respect to renewable energy options that occupy land, the focus of governance has been directed to technological adoption and public acceptance ( [[#Sequeira--2018|Sequeira and Santos 2018]] ), rather than land use. Recent work has found that spatial processes shape the emerging energy transition, creating zones of friction between global investors, national and local governments, and civil society ( [[#Jepson--2017|Jepson and Caldas 2017]] ; [[#McEwan--2017|McEwan 2017]] ). For example, [[#Yenneti--2016|Yenneti et al. (2016)]] have argued that hydropower and ground-based solar parks in India, which have involved enclosure of lands designated as degraded, displacing pastoral use by vulnerable communities, have constituted forms of spatial injustice. Hydropower leads to dam-induced displacement, and though this can be addressed through compensation mechanisms, governance is complicated by a lack of transparency in resettlement data ( [[#Kirchherr--2016|Kirchherr et al. 2016]] ; [[#Kirchherr--2019|Kirchherr et al. 2019]] ). Renewable energy production is resulting in new land conflict frontiers where degraded land is framed as having mitigation value such as for palm oil production and wind power in Mexico ( [[#Backhouse--2020|Backhouse and Lehmann 2020]] ); land use conflict as well as impacts on wildlife from large-scale solar installations have also emerged in the southwestern United States ( [[#Mulvaney--2017|Mulvaney 2017]] ). The renewable energy transition also involves the extraction of critical minerals used in renewable energy technologies, such as lithium and cobalt. Governance challenges include the lack of transparent greenhouse gas accounting for mining activities ( [[#Lee--2020a|Lee et al. 2020a]] ), and threats to biodiversity from land disturbance, which require strategic planning to address ( [[#Sonter--2020a|Sonter et al. 2020a]] ). Strategic spatial planning is needed more generally to address trade-offs between using land for renewable energy and food: for example, agriculture can be co-located with solar photovoltaics ( [[#Barron-Gafford--2019|Barron-Gafford et al. 2019]] ) or wind power ( [[#Miller--2018a|Miller and Keith 2018a]] ). Integrative spatial planning can integrate renewable energy with not just agriculture, but mobility and housing ( [[#Hurlbert--2019|Hurlbert et al. 2019]] ). Integrated planning is needed to avoid scalar pitfalls, and local and regional contextualised governance solutions need to be sited within a planetary frame of reference ( [[#Biermann--2016|Biermann et al. 2016]] ). Greater planning and coordination are also needed to ensure co-benefits from land-based mitigation (Box 12.3) as well as from CDR and efforts to reduce food systems emissions.

In emerging domains for governance such as land-based mitigation, global institutions, private sector networks and civil society organisations are playing key roles in terms of norm-setting. The shared languages and theoretical frameworks, or cognitive linkages ( [[#Pattberg--2018|Pattberg et al. 2018]] ), that arise with polycentric governance can not only be helpful in creating expectations and establishing benchmarks for (in)appropriate practices where enforceable ‘hard law’ is missing ( [[#Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen--2018|Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen et al. 2018]] ; [[#Gajevic%20Sayegh--2020|Gajevic Sayegh 2020]] ), they can also form the basis of voluntary guidelines or niche markets (Box 12.3) However, the ability to apply participatory processes for developing voluntary guidelines and other participatory norm-setting endeavours varies from place to place. Social and cultural norms shape the ability of women, youth, and different ethnic groups to participate in governance fora, such as those around agroecological transformation ( [[#Anderson--2019|Anderson et al. 2019]] ). Furthermore, establishing new norms alone does not solve structural challenges such as lack of access to food, nor does it confront power imbalances, or provide mechanisms to deal with uncooperative actors ( [[#Morrison--2019|Morrison et al. 2019]] ).

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