Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-18 (section)

==== 18.4.3.2 Political and Government Arenas ====

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CRD is embedded in social systems, in the political economy and its underlying ideologies, interests and institutions ( [[#18.4.1|Section 18.4.1]] ). The pursuit of CRD, and shifting development pathways away from prevailing trends, unfolds in an array of political arenas, from the offices of bureaucrats to parliament buildings, sidewalks and streets, to discursive arenas in which governance actors interact—from the village level to global forums ( [[#Jørgensen--2017|Jørgensen et al., 2017]] ; [[#Montoute--2019|Montoute et al., 2019]] ; [[#Sørensen--2019|Sørensen and Torfing, 2019]] ; [[#Pasquini--2020|Pasquini, 2020]] ). Paradoxically, the post-AR5 literature suggests that political arenas are often used to shut down efforts to explore the solution space for climate change and sustainable development ( ''medium agreement, robust evidence'' ) (e.g., [[#Kenis--2012|Kenis and Mathijs, 2012]] ; [[#Kenis--2014|Kenis and Mathijs, 2014]] ; [[#Beveridge--2016|Beveridge and Koch, 2016]] ; [[#Kenis--2016|Kenis and Lievens, 2016]] ; [[#Driver--2018|Driver et al., 2018]] ; [[#Meriluoto--2018|Meriluoto, 2018]] ; [[#Swyngedouw--2018|Swyngedouw, 2018]] ; [[#Mocca--2019|Mocca and Osborne, 2019]] ). Power relationships among different actors create opportunities for people to be included or excluded in collective action ( [[#Siméant-Germanos--2019|Siméant-Germanos, 2019]] ) (Sections 18.3.1.6, 18.4.3.5). Therefore, as evidenced by examples from the UK ( [[#MacGregor--2019|MacGregor, 2019]] ) and China ( [[#Huang--2020|Huang and Sun, 2020]] ), small-scale collective environmental action has transformative potential in part owing to its ability to increase levels of cooperation among different actors ( ''medium agreement'' , ''limited evidence'' ) ( [[#Green--2020|Green et al., 2020]] ; [[#Blühdorn--2021|Blühdorn and Deflorian, 2021]] ).

In addition to the ‘arm’s length’ acts of voting, social mobilisation, protest and dissent can be critical catalysts for transformative change ( [[#Porta--2020|Porta, 2020]] ). These are competitions for recognition, power and authority ( [[#Nightingale--2017|Nightingale, 2017]] ) that take place in settings. This is evidenced by experiences from the energy sector in Bangladesh which became a contested national policy domain and where social movements eventually transformed the nation’s energy politics ( [[#Faruque--2017|Faruque, 2017]] ). Similarly, in Germany, the nation’s energy transition led to marked changes in agency and legal frameworks, and energy markets drove the proliferation of so-called municipalisations of energy systems—a reversal of years of system privatisation ( [[#Becker--2016|Becker et al., 2016]] ). Meanwhile, experience in Bolivia demonstrate that the transformative potential of political conflict depends on transcending narrow issues to form broad coalitions with a collective identity that challenge prevailing development objectives and trajectories ( [[#Andreucci--2019|Andreucci, 2019]] ). Such examples illustrate the power of the communities as a vanguard against environmentally destructive practices ( [[#Villamayor-Tomas--2018|Villamayor-Tomas and García-López, 2018]] ). Social movements have been successful at countering fossil fuel extraction ( [[#Piggot--2018|Piggot, 2018]] ) and open up political opportunities in the face of increasing efforts to capture natural resources ( [[#Tramel--2018|Tramel, 2018]] ) and are bolstered by resistance from within some corporations and/or their shareholders ( [[#Fougère--2016|Fougère and Bond, 2016]] ; [[#Swaffield--2017|Swaffield, 2017]] ; [[#Walton--2018|]] [[#Walton--2018|Walton, 2018]] a; [[#Walton--2018|]] [[#Walton--2018|Walton, 2018]] b).

Coincident with these social movements targeting climate change and sustainability has been a rise of political conservatism and populism as well as growth in misinformation ( ''high agreement'' , ''medium evidence'' ) ( [[#Mahony--2016|Mahony and Hulme, 2016]] ; [[#Swyngedouw--2019|Swyngedouw, 2019]] ). This reflects efforts to maintain the status quo by actors in positions of power in the face of rising social inertia for climate action ( [[#Brulle--2019|Brulle and Norgaard, 2019]] ). Political arenas of the future could include a new body politic that integrates non-humans and a new geo-spatial politics ( [[#Latour--2018|Latour et al., 2018]] ).

As introduced in the discussion of governance as an enabling condition ( [[#18.4.2.1|Section 18.4.2.1]] ), a wide range of actors are involved in successful adaptation, mitigation, and sustainability policy and practice including national, regional and local governments, communities and international agencies ( [[#Lwasa--2015|Lwasa, 2015]] ). As of 2018, 197 countries had between them over 1500 laws and policies addressing climate change as compared with 60 countries with such legislation in 1997 when the Kyoto Protocol was agreed upon ( [[#Nachmany--2017|Nachmany et al., 2017]] ; [[#Nachmany--2018|Nachmany and Setzer, 2018]] ). In judicial branches, climate change litigation is increasingly becoming an important influence on policy and corporate behaviour among investors, activists and local and state governments ( [[#Setzer--2019|Setzer and Byrnes, 2019]] ). There is enhanced action on climate change at both national and sub-national levels, even in cases where national policies are inimical, as in the USA ( [[#Carmin--2012|Carmin et al., 2012]] ; [[#Hansen--2013|Hansen et al., 2013]] ).

The strong role of governments in climate action has implications for the nature of democracy, the relationship between the local and the national state, and between citizens and the state ( [[#Dodman--2015|Dodman and Mitlin, 2015]] ). More integration of government policy and interventions across scales, accompanied by capacity building to accelerate adaptation is needed ( ''very high confidence'' ). Key needs include enhanced funding, clear roles and responsibilities, increased institutional capability, strategic approaches, community engagement and judicial integrity ( [[#Lawrence--2015|Lawrence et al., 2015]] ). More resources, and more active involvement of the private sector and civil society can help maintain adaptation on the policy agenda. Multi-level adaptation approaches are also relevant in low-income countries where local governments have limited financial resources and human capabilities, often leading to dependency on national governments and donor organisations (Donner et al., 2016; [[#Adenle--2017|Adenle et al., 2017]] ).

Unlike mitigation, adaptation has traditionally been viewed as a local process, involving local authorities, communities and stakeholders ( [[#Preston--2015|Preston et al., 2015]] ). The literature on the governance of adaptation continues to emphasise that local governments have demonstrated leadership in implementation by collaborating with the private sector and academia. Local governments can also play a key role ( [[#Melica--2018|Melica et al., 2018]] ; [[#Romero-Lankao--2018|Romero-Lankao et al., 2018]] ) in converging mitigation and adaptation strategies, coordinating and developing effective local responses, enabling community engagement and more effective policies around exposure and vulnerability reduction ( [[#Fudge--2016|Fudge et al., 2016]] ). Local authorities are well-positioned to involve the wider community in designing and implementing climate policies and adaptation implementation ( [[#Slee--2015|Slee, 2015]] ; [[#Fudge--2016|Fudge et al., 2016]] ). Local governments also help deliver basic services and protect their integrity from climate impacts ( [[#Austin--2015|Austin et al., 2015]] ; [[#Cloutier--2015|Cloutier et al., 2015]] ; [[#Nalau--2015|Nalau et al., 2015]] ; [[#Araos--2017|Araos et al., 2017]] ). However, the resource limitations of local governments as well as their small geographic sphere of influence suggests the need for more funding for this from higher levels of government, particularly national governments, to address adaptation gaps ( ''very high confidence'' ) ( [[#Dekker--2020|Dekker, 2020]] ). Local adaptation implementation gaps can be linked to limited political commitment at higher levels of government and weak cooperation between key stakeholders ( [[#Runhaar--2018|Runhaar, 2018]] ). Incongruities and conflicts can exist between adaptation agendas pursued by national governments and the spontaneous adaptation practices of communities. There may be grounds for re-evaluating current consultative processes integral to policy development, if narrow technical approaches emerge as the norm for adaptation ( [[#Smucker--2015|Smucker et al., 2015]] ).

Therefore, the traditional view of adaptation as a local process has now widened to recognise it as a multi-actor process that transcends scales from the local and sub-national to national and even international ( ''very high confidence'' ) ( [[#Mimura--2014|Mimura et al., 2014]] ). Many of the impacts of climate change are both local and transboundary, so that local, bilateral and multilateral cooperation is needed ( [[#Nalau--2015|Nalau et al., 2015]] ; Donner et al., 2016; [[#Magnan--2016|Magnan and Ribera, 2016]] ; [[#Tilleard--2016|Tilleard and Ford, 2016]] ; [[#Lesnikowski--2017|Lesnikowski et al., 2017]] ). National policies and transnational governance should be seen as complementary, especially where they favour transnational engagement with sub- and non-state actors ( [[#Andonova--2017|Andonova et al., 2017]] ). National governments typically act as a pivot for adaptation coordination, planning, determining policy priorities, and distributing financial, institutional and sometimes knowledge resources. National governments are also accountable to the international community through international agreements. National governments have helped enhance adaptive capacity through building awareness of climate impacts, encouraging economic growth, providing incentives, establishing legislative frameworks conducive to adaptation and communicating climate change information ( [[#Berrang-Ford--2014|Berrang-Ford et al., 2014]] ; [[#Massey--2014|Massey et al., 2014]] ; [[#Austin--2015|Austin et al., 2015]] ; [[#Huitema--2016|Huitema et al., 2016]] ).

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