Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-4 (section)

=== 4.5.6 Projected Risks to Water-Related Conflicts ===

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AR5 concluded with ''medium confidence'' that climate change can indirectly increase the risks of violent conflicts, though the link to hydrological changes were not spelled out ( [[#Jiménez%20Cisneros--2014|Jiménez Cisneros et al., 2014]] ). Furthermore, according to IPCC SR1.5 ( [[#Hoegh-Guldberg--2018|Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018]] ), if the world warms by 2°C–4°C by 2050, rates of human conflict could increase, but again, the role of hydrological change in this was not explicit ( ''medium confidence'' ).

The impact of climate change on shared water resources might increase tensions among states, particularly in the absence of strong institutional capacity ( [[#Petersen-Perlman--2017|Petersen-Perlman et al., 2017]] ; [[#Dinar--2019|Dinar et al., 2019]] ). On the other hand, although the mere existence of formal agreements does not necessarily reduce the risks of conflicts, robust treaties and institutions can promote cooperative events, even under hydrological stress ( [[#Link--2016|Link et al., 2016]] ) ''.'' Yet, since both conflictive and cooperative events are possible under conditions of climatic variability, whether conflict arises or increases depends on several contextual socioeconomic and political factors, including the adaptive capacity of the riparian states ( [[#Koubi--2019|Koubi, 2019]] ), the existence of power asymmetries ( [[#Dinar--2019|Dinar et al., 2019]] ) and pre-existing social tensions ( ''medium confidence'' ).

At the intra-state level, analysis suggests that additional climate change will increase the probability of conflict risks, with 13% increase probability at the 2°C GWL and 26% probability at the 4°C GWL scenario ( [[#Mach--2019|Mach et al., 2019]] ). However, to date, other factors are considered more influential drivers of conflict, including lack of natural resource use regulations ( [[#Linke--2018b|Linke et al., 2018b]] ), societal exclusion ( [[#von%20Uexkull--2016|von Uexkull et al., 2016]] ; [[#van%20Weezel--2019|van Weezel, 2019]] ), poor infrastructures and a history of violent conflict ( [[#Detges--2016|Detges, 2016]] ) ( ''high confidence'' ). In addition, ''medium-high evidence'' exists that climate change imposes additional pressures on regions that are already fragile and conflict-prone ( [[#Matthew--2014|Matthew, 2014]] ; [[#Earle--2015|Earle et al., 2015]] ) ( ''medium agreement'' ).

Recent research indicates that climatic change can multiply tensions in regions dependent on agriculture when coupled with other socioeconomic and political factors ( [[#Koubi--2019|Koubi, 2019]] ), including a low level of human development ( [[#Ide--2020|Ide et al., 2020]] ) and deterioration of individual living conditions ( [[#Vestby--2019|Vestby, 2019]] ). On the other side, intergroup cohesion ( [[#De%20Juan--2020|De Juan and Hänze, 2020]] ) and policies that improve societal development and good governance reduce the risk of conflict associated with the challenges to adaptation to climate change ( [[#Hegre--2016|Hegre et al., 2016]] ; [[#Witmer--2017|Witmer et al., 2017]] ) ( ''medium confidence'' ) at both the intra-state and inter-state level.

Increased risk of conflict between different sectors (agriculture, industry, domestic) and needs (urban, rural) is projected to arise in several river basins due to climate change and socioeconomic developments, including urbanisation ( [[#Flörke--2018|Flörke et al., 2018]] ). Future climatic conditions and population growth are expected to exert additional pressures on managing already stressed basins such as the Nile, the Indus, Colorado, the Feni, the Irrawaddy, the Orange and the Okavango ( [[#Farinosi--2018|Farinosi et al., 2018]] ). In addition, recent scenario analysis in global transboundary basins supports the finding that there is more potential for conflict in areas already under water stress, such as central Asia and the northern parts of Africa ( [[#Munia--2020|Munia et al., 2020]] ) ( ''medium confidence'' ).

In summary, the impact of climate change on water resources might increase tensions, particularly in the absence of strong institutional capacity. However, whether conflict arises or increases depends on several contextual socioeconomic and political factors. Evidence exists that climate change imposes additional pressures on regions already under water stress or fragile and conflict-prone ( ''medium confidence'' ).

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