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== 6.9 Governance and Policy Options, Risk Management, Including Disaster Risk Reduction and Enhancing Resilience == <span id="decision-making-for-abrupt-change-and-extreme-events"></span> === 6.9.1 Decision Making for Abrupt Change and Extreme Events === <div id="section-6-9-1decision-making-for-abrupt-change-and-extreme-events-block-1"></div> As outlined earlier in this report, several approaches exist for adaptive responses towards climate change impacts. Other sections that deal with adaptation responses to extremes include Section 1.5.2, Section 4.4 (SLR and coastal flooding), Cross Chapter Box 4 in Chapter 1 and Section 5.5.2.5 in Chapter 5 (adaptation limits for coastal infrastructure and ecosystems). Here, we address adaptation responses especially to abrupt and extreme changes (for responses to special abrupt changes (e.g., AMOC; see also Section 6.7). Since AR5, growing discussions have advocated for transformative adaptation, implying that they support fundamental societal shift towards sustainability and climate-resilient development pathways (Moloney et al., 2017; IPCC, 2018; Morchain, 2018). Successful adaptation to abrupt change and extreme events incorporates climate change concerns and the impact of climate extremes on vulnerable populations taking into account community participation and local knowledge (Tozier de la Poterie and Baudoin, 2015). These interventions reduce risk and enhance resilience, and contribute to the SDGs and social justice (Mal et al., 2018). Temporal scales denote before and after abrupt changes and extreme events (prevention and post-event response), long- and short-term adaptation measures, and the lag time between forecast, warning and event (Field et al., 2012; IPCC, 2012). Spatial dimensions include local risk management and adaptation as well as regional and international coordination to prepare for unexpected extremes tackling the impacts at multiple geographic scales (Devine-Wright, 2013; Barnett et al., 2014; Lyth et al., 2016; Barange et al., 2018). Decision making about abrupt change or extreme events is not autonomous; it is constrained by formal and informal institutional processes such as regulatory structures, property rights, as well as culture, traditions and social norms (Field et al., 2012; IPCC, 2012). Efforts in various countries and large cities to improve resilience and adaptation are growing, and these efforts are linked to a global network of research, information and best practices (e.g., Aerts et al., 2014). In both northern and southern high latitudes, extreme climatic conditions and remoteness from densely populated regions constrain human choices. The question is whether responses to extremes and abrupt changes require approaches that are different from the anticipatory management of adaptation to changes in climate and weather extremes. While there are several impact studies on extreme events and abrupt change, very few focus on the necessity of dedicated individual, governmental or business adaptive responses (Tol et al., 2006; Anthoff et al., 2010; Anthoff et al., 2016). Making appropriate decisions to manage abrupt change and extreme events given deep uncertainty is challenging (Weaver et al., 2013; see Cross-Chapter Boxes 4 and 5 in Chapter 1). This requires the construction of new models integrating different uncertainties under extreme or abrupt scenarios and evaluation of value for money (Weaver et al., 2013). Examples include the inclusion of rapid SLR for assessing coastal impacts and adaptation options (Ranger et al., 2013; Haasnoot et al., 2018; see Sections 6.4 and 6.7). Decision analysis frameworks such as ‘Robust Decision Making’, ‘Decision Scaling’, ‘Assess Risk of Policy’, ‘Info-gap’, ‘Dynamic Adaptation Policy Pathways’, ‘Dynamic Adaptive Pathways Planning’, ‘Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis’, ‘Real Options Analysis’ and ‘Context-First’ accommodate a wide range of uncertainties with subsequent socio-ecological impact (Weaver et al., 2013). The central question remains, however, how one can overcome path dependencies which may cause technical lock-ins in the current system. Monitoring systems of climatic and derived variables, in order to predict necessary shifts in adaptation policies are in development (Haasnoot et al., 2015). However, these frameworks have so far been mostly applied to more gradual shifts of climate change, rather than extreme events and abrupt changes. Request for the use of ‘actionable’ information and communication based on climate science and modelling will increase (McNie, 2007; Moser and Boykoff, 2013). Such information can only be effective when it is perceived as ‘credible, salient, and legitimate’ (Paton, 2007; Paton, 2008; Dilling et al., 2015). Since SREX (IPCC, 2012), there is ''medium confidence'' that trust in the information and the institution (Hardin, 2002; Townley and Garfield, 2013) that governs extreme events and abrupt change (Malka et al., 2009; Birkmann et al., 2011; Schoenefeld and McCauley, 2016) is important. Trust in expert and scientific knowledge helps people make sense of climate change impact and engage with adaptation measures (Moser and Boykoff, 2013; Yeh, 2016). Without such knowledge, people have little recourse to believe and evaluate relevant information (Bråten et al., 2011). Individuals who trust their government can be complacent and do not prepare for the consequences of extremes (Simpson, 2012; Edmondson and Levy, 2019), and shift the responsibility to the government (Edmondson and Levy, 2019). Familiarity with and information about hazards, community characteristics, as well as the relationship between people and government agencies influence the level of trust (Paton, 2007). Recent literature shows that there are crucial differences between the ethical challenges of mitigation and those of adaptation (Wallimann-Helmer, 2015; Wallimann-Helmer, 2016) in their dealings with Loss and Damage (L&D); and the ongoing analysis disputes how to distribute responsibilities between mitigation and adaptation based on climate justice criteria (Wallimann-Helmer et al., 2019). The Warsaw International Mechanism on L&D under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) addresses irreversible changes and limits to adaptation at the global scale (see also Cross-Chapter Box 1 in Chapter 1). This is in contrast to national and local policies, addressing impacts and adaptation. Within the SROCC report, several of the documented and projected irreversible or unavoidable and thus residual impacts beyond adaptation would potentially fall under this category (e.g., Warner and van der Geest, 2013; Huggel et al., 2019; Mechler et al., 2019), including impacts from SLR, land erosion and reduced freshwater resources on small islands, changes in high mountains and cryosphere changes, as well as changes in ocean species and resources. Apart from climate hazards, risks for L&D are also determined by increasing exposure and vulnerability (Birkmann and Welle, 2015). Such impacts can be assessed using conventional frameworks, but the debate on the precise scope of such impacts remains, including those from anthropogenic climate change impacts as well as natural climate variability and extremes (e.g., James et al., 2014). More work is required to explore the range of activities available for responding to L&D resulting from slow onset processes in the scope of the SROCC report such as ocean acidification (Harrould-Kolieb and Hoegh-Guldberg, 2019) and mountain cryosphere changes (Huggel et al., 2019). Under the same L&D mechanism, risk transfer mechanisms and insurance have been suggested as a specific adaptation policy option. Several forms of ‘climate change’ insurance have been proposed recently, but their potential for adaptation has met with criticism, importantly because of the costs of formal insurance and other risk transfer options, as well as issues with sustainability given the lack of loss prevention and adaptation (Surminski et al., 2016; Linnerooth-Bayer et al., 2019). A compensation mechanism for low-lying small islands inclusive of L&D proposal is in progress (Adelman, 2016). Insurance (see also Section 4.4.4) can help absorb extreme shocks for both individuals, using traditional insurance and parametric insurance. Sovereign insurance mechanisms can help governments absorb large losses (Linnerooth-Bayer et al., 2019), but eventually they need to be coupled with other incentives for adaptation and risk reduction measures to be cost-effective (Botzen, 2013) ( ''medium confidence'' ). There is a consensus that investing in disaster risk reduction has economic benefits, although there is ''medium evidence'' about the range of the estimated benefits which varies from a global estimate of two to four dollars saved for each dollar invested (Kull et al., 2013; Mechler, 2016) to about 400 EUR per invested 1 EUR in the case of flood early warning systems in Europe (Pappenberger et al., 2015). The US Federal Emergency Management Agency indicated that a 1% increase in annual investment in flood management decreases flood damage by 2.1% (Davlasheridze et al., 2017). Conserving ecosystems that provide services for risk reduction also has monetary benefits. Wetlands have been observed to reduce damages during storms. Wetlands and floodplains in Otter Creek (Vermont, USA) reduced damages caused by storms by 54–78% and 84–95%, respectively, for Tropical Storm Irene (Watson et al., 2016). For the whole of the USA, wetlands provide 23.2 billion USD yr -1 in storm protection services and the loss of 1 hectare of wetland is estimated to correspond to an average 33,000 USD increase in storm damage from specific storms (Costanza et al., 2008). Engineered structures are also expected to reduce risks. In Europe, to maintain the coastal flood loss constant relative to the size of the economy, flood defence structures need to be able to protect coastal areas for a projected increase of sea level between 0.5 – 2.5 m. Without these risk reduction actions, the expected damages from coastal floods could increase by two or three degrees of magnitude compared to the present (Vousdoukas et al., 2018). Although risk reduction actions are generally considered an effective way to reduce the damages by shifting the loss-exceedance curve, cost-benefit analysis of disaster risk reduction actions faces several challenges, including its limited role in informing decisions, spatial and temporal uncertainty scales, and discounting and choice of discount rate that affect cost-benefit analysis results heavily (Mechler, 2016). <span id="transformative-governance-and-integrating-disaster-risk-reduction-and-climate-change-adaptation"></span> === 6.9.2 Transformative Governance and Integrating Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation === <div id="section-6-9-2transformative-governance-and-integrating-disaster-risk-reduction-and-climate-change-adaptation-block-1"></div> Governance for effective adaptation defined as changes in practice, process and structure (Smit et al., 2001) considers equity, legitimacy and co-benefits (Patterson et al., 2018) appropriate to the issue (Young, 2002). Countries, sectors and localities place different values and perspectives on these categories, and they can change over time (Plummer et al., 2017; see Cross-Chapter Boxes 1 and 2 in Chapter 1). Transformative governance embraces a wider application of climate change-induced mitigation and adaptation strategies to generate fundamental change. It is society-wide and goes beyond the goals of climate change policies and measures (IPCC, 2013; Patterson et al., 2018). It is distinguished from conventional strategies and solutions, as it includes both natural and human systems and intertwines with the SDGs (Fleurbaey et al., 2014; Tàbara et al., 2019). Transformational adaptation is also needed when incremental adaptation to extreme events and abrupt changes are insufficient (Kates et al., 2012). Planned retreat from SLR and climate refugees illustrate the need for transformative governance as the current coastal and risk management regimes do not have the capacity to handle these issues adequately. Inclusion of bilateral and regional agreements related to climate-induced migration (McAdam, 2011), land use planning frameworks to respond to policy, institutional and cultural implications of migration (Matthews and Potts, 2018), and identification of beneficiaries of managed retreat (Hino et al., 2017) along with positive opportunities for migrants to diversify income and avoid being in harm’s way (Gemenne, 2015) are steps towards transformative governance. Retreat and migration entail local responses that include indigenous and local knowledges and perspectives that can be applied to solve these issues (Farbotko and Lazrus, 2012; Hilhorst et al., 2015; Tharakan, 2015; Iloka, 2016; Nunn et al., 2016; see also Cross-Chapter Boxes 2 and 5 in Chapter 1) . Another example is the Polar region which has started to pursue transformative governance given the potential for increased tourism and cooperation that require changed governance structure (see Sections 3.5.2; 3.5.5 and Table 3.7 in Chapter 3). Accountability for transformations and transitions has been identified as a crucial factor to support responsible action and strengthen climate governance (Edmondson and Levy, 2019). Though discourse abounds related to transformative governance, it falls short of its ideal in climate change action plans as it is unclear whether communities have the capacity to engage in substantive change to build low-carbon and resilient communities (Burch et al., 2014). The results of a study on the USA by Tang and Dessai (2012) indicate that climate adaptation and mitigation plans’ treatment of extreme climate conditions and disaster preparedness is limited. Moreover, risk communication with the public is part of an integrated disaster warning system, but behavioural response to disaster warnings are often governed by personal beliefs about the nature of the hazard; and ultimately swaying individual decisions to comply with or ignore the warning message (Mayhorn and McLaughlin, 2014). New approaches such as the ‘first mile’ of early warning systems, built on the specific needs from beneficiary communities instead of on technological progress, are being implemented (Zommers et al., 2017); but they have not yet been assessed. Coupling disaster risk reduction and management with climate change adaptation effort—following the set targets of UNFCCC and the Sendai Framework—has shown progress since SREX and AR5 (e.g., Lawrence and Saunders, 2017). Substantial literature exists on the topic, but there is little assessment of practices on the ground in the implementation of integrated disaster management and climate change adaptation (Nalau et al., 2016) including health (Banwell et al., 2018). Mainstreaming disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation within and across sectors is considered essential to ensure administrative coordination and coherence across sectoral plans and policies (Shimizu and Clark, 2015) ( ''medium confidence'' ). Financial and technological support and capacity building especially related to public works, savings or loans enable households to build assets and improve livelihoods (Ulrichs et al., 2019). No assessment is available so far of the efficiency and effectiveness of mainstreaming especially related to the integration of climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction, let alone for abrupt and extreme impacts. Case studies of integration note major problems, for example, weak coordination among government agencies (Seidler et al., 2018); lack of data and user-friendly information to guide decision making at the local level (Jones et al., 2017) and the need for the central governmental support for data availability (Putra et al., 2018); fragmentation due to competing local objectives (Forino et al., 2017); dependence on regional and international frameworks in the absence of a national framework (Rivera and Wamsler, 2014); limited availability of formal training in integration (Hemstock et al., 2017); and turf wars between responsible government agencies (Nemakonde and Van Niekerk, 2017). The case of Pacific islands such as Vanuatu is indicative of these problems. Though they have coupled disaster risk reduction with climate change adaptation, problems manifest in relationships, responsibilities, capacity and expectations between government agencies and other actors (e.g., international donors and non-governmental organisations), as analysed by Vanuatu’s response to the Category 5 TC Pam (Nalau et al., 2017). Some solutions are proposed such as getting all the actors on the same page and focusing on reducing vulnerability to longer-term environmental hazards (Schipper et al., 2016); focussing on specific goals, objectives and strategies (Organization of American States, 2014); assigning a single department to handle integration (APEC, 2016); and citing real-life decision examples in national guidelines (Bell et al., 2017). Place-based responses also entail the inclusion and the acknowledgement of indigenous and local knowledge for an enhanced resilience pathway (Hilhorst et al., 2015; Tharakan, 2015; Iloka, 2016; Nunn et al., 2016). Given the significance of disaster risk reduction to enhance climate change adaptation regardless of the integration of the two, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 focuses on seven targets and four priorities that foster participation beyond information sharing and include partnerships and collaborations within society (UNISDR, 2015). Inclusion of, and coordination between, different stakeholders is a key component for managing risks of extreme events, including in a changing climate ( ''medium confidence'' ). In the Wadden Sea coastal area, for example, crucial parts of coordinating disaster risk reduction, include (i) responsibility-sharing among authorities, sectors and stakeholders, (ii) all-of-society engagement and partnership with empowerment and inclusive participation, and (iii) development of international, regional, subregional and transboundary cooperation schemes (González-Riancho et al., 2017). In India, a change in the coordination structure was pivotal in reducing fatalities from over 10,000 to 45 between cyclones Orissa (Odisha) in 1999 and Phailin in 2013. In this case, the Disaster Management Act of 2005 established a comprehensive policy and command and control system during disaster response that empowered the most qualified government officials regardless of their rank. This system provides authority to and holds accountability for those in charge of ground operations. Though this rigid system may sometimes be questioned, a unified and top-down command structure works better when there is a lack of mature disaster management system (Pal et al., 2017). In sum, limiting the risk from the impact of extreme events and abrupt changes leads to successful adaptation to climate change if climate-affected sectors and disaster management relevant agencies coordinate well ( ''high confidence'' ). Transformative governance, including successful integration of disaster risk management and climate change adaptation, empowerment of vulnerable groups, accountability of governmental decisions, and longer-term planning promotes climate-resilient development pathways ( ''high confidence'' ). An enhanced understanding of the institutional capacity as well as the legal framework addressing abrupt changes and extreme events is especially important ( ''medium confidence'' ). Knowledge gaps limit the identification of the most relevant actions to achieve and pursue climate-resilient development pathways. Since SREX and AR5, there is little research on indirect impacts of climatic extremes on ecosystems and consequences on poverty and livelihoods critical to the SDGs. For example, adaptation solutions and limitations, including governance challenges, for the ocean do not include extreme events (Sections 5.5.2 and 5.5.3 in Chapter 5). Further, there is only scant literature on L&D, including non-economic impacts, resulting from well-documented processes such as MHWs (Section 6.4), SLR impacts on low-lying coasts (Section 4.3), and cryosphere changes (Section 2.3; Chapter 3) ( ''high confidence'' ). Limited information is available concerning the cost-benefit and effectiveness of risk-reduction measures. Coupling risk transfer and insurance mechanisms with risk reduction measures, for example, can enhance the cost-effectiveness of adapting to climate change ( ''medium confidence'' ). <span id="knowledge-gaps"></span>
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