Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-11 (section)

==== 11.3.5.3 Adaptation ====

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In cities and settlements, climate adaptation is under way and is being led and facilitated by state and local government leadership and facilitation, particularly in Australia ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Hintz--2018|Hintz et al., 2018]] ; [[#Newton--2018|Newton et al., 2018]] ) (Table 11.7, Supplementary Material Table SM11.1a).

Effective adaptations to urban heat include spatial planning, expanding tree canopy and greenery, shading, sprays and heat-resistant and energy-efficient building design, including cool materials and reflective or green roofs ( ''very high confidence'' ) ( [[#Broadbent--2018|Broadbent et al., 2018]] ; [[#Jacobs--2018b|Jacobs et al., 2018b]] ; [[#Haddad--2019|Haddad et al., 2019]] ; [[#Haddad--2020a|Haddad et al., 2020a]] ; [[#Yenneti--2020|Yenneti et al., 2020]] ; [[#Bartesaghi-Koc--2021|Bartesaghi-Koc et al., 2021]] ; [[#Tapper--2021|Tapper, 2021]] ). Reducing urban heat not only benefits human health but reduces the demand for, and cost of, air conditioning ( [[#Haddad--2020b|Haddad et al., 2020b]] ) and the risk of electricity blackouts (11.3.10).

Adaptation progress is being hampered by current urban redevelopment practice and statutory planning guidelines that are leading to the removal of critical urban green space ( [[#Newton--2020|Newton and Rogers, 2020]] ). Reform of approaches to urban redevelopment would facilitate adaptation ( [[#Newton--2020|Newton and Rogers, 2020]] ). Several cities in Australia and New Zealand are part of the 100 Resilient Cities global network, which helped facilitate the metropolitan Melbourne Urban Forest Strategy across councils ( [[#Fastenrath--2019|Fastenrath et al., 2019]] ; [[#Coenen--2020|Coenen et al., 2020]] ), and in New Zealand, restoration of the urban forest in Hamilton is reducing heat stressors ( [[#Wallace--2019|Wallace and Clarkson, 2019]] ). In peri-urban zones, adapting to fire risk is a contested issue, raising difficult trade-offs between heat management, ecological values and fuel reduction in treed landscapes ( [[#Robinson--2018|Robinson et al., 2018]] ).

The resilience of Australia’s major cities to flooding and drought has been advanced through a range of economic and physical interventions. Water-sensitive urban design irrigates vegetation with harvested storm water that improves water security, flood risk, carbon sequestration, biodiversity and air and water quality and delivers cooling that can save human lives in heatwaves ( [[#Wong--2020|Wong et al., 2020]] ). Stormwater harvesting is supported by some councils in New Zealand and can deliver recycled water for households ( [[#Attwater--2017|Attwater and Derry, 2017]] ), improving climate resilience and reducing water demand ( [[#White--2017|White et al., 2017]] ). Addressing infrastructure vulnerability is essential given the long lifetime of assets, criticality of services and high costs of maintenance ( [[#Chester--2020|Chester et al., 2020]] ; [[#Hughes--2021|Hughes et al., 2021]] ).

Climate risk management is evolving, but adaptive capacity, implementation, monitoring and evaluation are uneven across all scales of cities, settlements and infrastructure ( ''very high confidence'' ) (Table 11.15a and Table 11.15b; Supplementary Material Tables SM11.1a and SM11.1b) ''.'' There is increasing awareness of the need to move from incremental coping and defensive coastal strategies ( [[#Jongejan--2016|Jongejan et al., 2016]] ) to transformational adaptation, for example managed retreat ( [[#Torabi--2018|Torabi et al., 2018]] ; [[#Hanna--2019|Hanna, 2019]] ), and to consider the flow-on effects (e.g., for housing and employment) ( [[#Fatorić--2017|Fatorić et al., 2017]] ; [[#Torabi--2018|Torabi et al., 2018]] ). Strategies limited to building household and community self-reliance ( [[#Astill--2018|Astill and Miller, 2018]] ) are increasingly inadequate given systemic and interconnected stressors and cascading impacts across interdependent systems ( [[#Lawrence--2020b|Lawrence et al., 2020b]] ). Integrated approaches to climate change adaptation and emissions reduction have potential for addressing interdependent systems (e.g., nature-based approaches, climate-sensitive urban design, energy and transport systems) ( [[#Norman--2021|Norman et al., 2021]] ). Climate risk assessment and adaptation guidelines have been prepared for transport infrastructure authorities and organisations ( [[#Finlayson--2017|Finlayson et al., 2017]] ; [[#Byett--2019|Byett et al., 2019]] ; [[#Yenneti--2020|Yenneti et al., 2020]] ).

Infrastructure service vulnerability in New Zealand is supported by new institutional adaptations including the Infrastructure Commission to develop a 30-year national infrastructure strategy. The Climate Change Commission ( [[#Climate%20Change%20Commission--2020|Climate Change Commission, 2020]] ) has issued six principles for climate-relevant infrastructure investments and is mandated to monitor the National Climate Change Adaptation Plan based on the first National Climate Change Risk Assessment ( [[#MfE--2020a|MfE, 2020a]] ). A National Disaster Resilience Strategy addresses integrated planning for risk reduction and awareness-raising in New Zealand ( [[#Department%20of%20the%20Prime%20Minister%20and%20Cabinet--2019|Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2019]] ).

Successive inquiries and reviews highlight potential synergies between disaster risk management and climate resilience (11.5.1) ( [[#Smith--2018|Smith and Lawrence, 2018]] ; [[#Ruane--2020|Ruane, 2020]] ). In Australia, there is a National Disaster Risk Reduction Framework ( [[#CoA--2018b|CoA, 2018b]] ) and a National Recovery and Resilience Agency (CoA, 2021) that help underpin the development of national support systems for rural and regional emergency management and associated volunteer sectors ( [[#McLennan--2016|McLennan et al., 2016]] ) and wildfire smoke impacts ( [[#CoA--2020e|CoA, 2020e]] ). The National Heatwave Framework Working Group uses a Heatwave Forecast Service, and heatwave early-warning and adaptation systems that operate in Adelaide, Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane have reduced potential death rates ( [[#Nitschke--2016|Nitschke et al., 2016]] ).

Infrastructure planning is lagging behind international standards for climate resilience evaluation and guidance for adaptation to climate risk ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#CSIRO--2020|CSIRO, 2020]] ; [[#Kool--2020|Kool et al., 2020]] ; [[#Hughes--2021|Hughes et al., 2021]] ). Some companies have examined their exposure to climate risk and developed strategies to minimise their vulnerability ( [[#Climate%20Institute--2012|Climate Institute, 2012]] ) (11.3.8). Climate risk assessments have been conducted for the electricity sector in both Australia and New Zealand (11.3.10). Climate change is considered in Australian infrastructure plans for national and regional water supply security, water for irrigated agriculture, a coastal hazards adaptation strategy and the Tanami Road upgrade ( [[#Infrastructure%20Australia--2016|Infrastructure Australia, 2016]] ; [[#Infrastructure%20Australia--2019|Infrastructure Australia, 2019]] ; [[#Infrastructure%20Australia--2021|Infrastructure Australia, 2021]] )

Industry associations are beginning to facilitate climate adaptation for infrastructure, including the Australian Green Infrastructure Council ( [[#CoA--2015|CoA, 2015]] ), the Green Building Council of Australia Green Star Programme (GBCA, 2020), the Water Services Association of Australia, Climate Change Adaptation Guidelines ( [[#WSAA--2016|WSAA, 2016]] ) and the Australian Sustainable Built Environment Council Built Environment Adaptation Framework ( [[#ASBEC--2012|ASBEC, 2012]] ). The Infrastructure Sustainability Rating Scheme measures the social, environmental, governance and cultural outcomes delivered by more than AUD$160 billion worth of infrastructure, and it is projected to deliver a cost-benefit ratio of 1:1.6 to 1:2.4 during the period 2020–2040 ( [[#RPS--2020|RPS, 2020]] ). There is scope for engagement of industry in transitioning to a low-carbon green economy that is adapted to climate change, but less certainty on how to develop appropriate business cases ( [[#Newton--2015|Newton and Newman, 2015]] ).

There are tensions between settlement-scale adaptation options, such as managed retreat, that focus on the long term and people’s values, place attachments, needs and capacities ( [[#Gorddard--2016|Gorddard et al., 2016]] ; [[#Fatorić--2017|Fatorić et al., 2017]] ; [[#Graham--2018|Graham et al., 2018]] ; [[#O’Donnell--2019|O’Donnell, 2019]] ; [[#Norman--2021|Norman et al., 2021]] ). Tensions also exist between climate change adaptation and mitigation goals (e.g., current energy efficiency standards in Australian buildings can worsen their heat resistance and increase dependence on air-conditioning) ( [[#Hatvani-Kovacs--2018|Hatvani-Kovacs et al., 2018]] ). Where there is a lack of coordination between jurisdictions, there can be flow-on effects from failure to adapt, for example in coastal local government areas ( [[#Dedekorkut-Howes--2020|Dedekorkut-Howes et al., 2020]] ) (Box 11.6). There is limited information across the region on climate change impacts and adaptation options for telecommunications ( [[#NCCARF--2013|NCCARF, 2013]] ) (Table 11.7). There is an emerging recognition that implementing and evaluating the adaptation process (vulnerability and risk assessments, identification of options, planning, implementation, monitoring, evaluation and review) in local contexts can advance more effective adaptation ( [[#Moloney--2018|Moloney and McClaren, 2018]] ). For example, the Victorian state government has built monitoring, evaluation and adaptation components into its adaptation plan (Table 11.15a).

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'''Box 11.5 | New Zealand’s Land, Water and People Nexus under a changing climate'''
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New Zealand’s economy, dominated by the primary sector and the tourist industry (pre-COVID), relies upon a ‘clean green’ image of water, natural ecosystems and pristine landscapes ( [[#Foote--2015|Foote et al., 2015]] ; [[#Roche--2015|Roche and Argent, 2015]] ; [[#Hayes--2017|Hayes and Lovelock, 2017]] ). Water is highly valued by Māori for its mauri or life force and for its intrinsic values and multiple uses ( [[#Harmsworth--2016|Harmsworth et al., 2016]] ). Increasingly, these diverse values are coming into conflict ( [[#Hopkins--2015|Hopkins et al., 2015]] ) due to increasing pressures from how land is used and managed and the effects on water availability and quality. Such tensions will be further challenged as temperatures rise and extreme events intensify beyond what has been experienced, thus stressing current adaptive capacities ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Hughey--2014|Hughey and Becken, 2014]] ; [[#Cradock-Henry--2015|Cradock-Henry and McKusker, 2015]] ; [[#Hopkins--2015|Hopkins et al., 2015]] ; [[#MfE%20and%20Stats%20NZ--2021|MfE and]] [[#Stats%20NZ--2021|Stats NZ, 2021]] ) (11.2.2; 11.3.4).

Irrigation has increasingly been used to enhance primary sector productivity and regional economic development ( [[#Srinivasan--2017|Srinivasan et al., 2017]] ; [[#Fielke--2018|Fielke and Srinivasan, 2018]] ; [[#MfE%20and%20Stats%20NZ--2021|MfE and]] [[#Stats%20NZ--2021|Stats NZ, 2021]] ) ( [[#Srinivasan--2017|Srinivasan et al., 2017]] ; [[#Fielke--2018|Fielke and Srinivasan, 2018]] ; [[#MfE%20and%20Stats%20NZ--2021|MfE and]] [[#Stats%20NZ--2021|Stats NZ, 2021]] ). Pressure for long-term access to groundwater or large-scale water storage is increasing to ensure the ongoing viability of the primary sector as the climate changes. While investment in irrigation infrastructure may reduce climate change impacts in the short term, maladaptive outcomes cannot be ruled out longer term, which means that focusing attention now on adaptive and transformational measures can help increase climate resilience in areas exposed to increasing drought and climate extremes that disrupt production ( ''medium confidence'' ) ( [[#Abel--2016|Abel et al., 2016]] ; [[#Cradock-Henry--2019|Cradock-Henry et al., 2019]] ) ( [[#Yletyinen--2019|Yletyinen et al., 2019]] ).

Furthermore, overallocation raises further tensions from competing uses of water such as for horticulture and urban water supplies, as well as for ecological requirements. The deterioration of water quality and loss of places of social, economic, cultural and spiritual significance creates increasing tension for Māori in particular ( [[#Harmsworth--2016|Harmsworth et al., 2016]] ; [[#Salmon--2019|Salmon, 2019]] ; [[#MfE%20and%20Stats%20NZ--2021|MfE and]] [[#Stats%20NZ--2021|Stats NZ, 2021]] ). Public concern has increased over the deterioration of New Zealand’s waterways and the profiting of some land uses at the expense of environmental quality and human health—tensions that make adaptation to climate change more challenging ( [[#Duncan--2014|Duncan, 2014]] ; [[#Foote--2015|Foote et al., 2015]] ; [[#Scarsbrook--2015|Scarsbrook and Melland, 2015]] ; [[#McDowell--2016|McDowell et al., 2016]] ; [[#McKergow--2016|McKergow et al., 2016]] ; [[#Greenhalgh--2018|Greenhalgh and Samarasinghe, 2018]] ). A lack of precautionary governance of water resources linked to unsustainable land use practices degrading water quality ( [[#Scarsbrook--2015|Scarsbrook and Melland, 2015]] ; [[#Salmon--2019|Salmon, 2019]] ) highlights the role that foresight could play in managing the nexus between land, water and people in a changing climate (11.3.3). Adaptive planning holds potential for navigating these multi-dimensional challenges ( [[#Sharma-Wallace--2018|Sharma-Wallace et al., 2018]] ; [[#Cradock-Henry--2019|Cradock-Henry and Fountain, 2019]] ; [[#Hurlbert--2019|Hurlbert et al., 2019]] ) (11.7).

Furthermore, land and, in particular, plantation and native forests play a critical role in meeting New Zealand’s emissions reduction goals. However, the persistence of land and forests as a carbon sink is uncertain, and the sequestered carbon is at risk from future loss resulting from climate change impacts, including from increased fire, drought and pest incursions, storms and wind ( [[#IPCC--2019a|IPCC, 2019a]] ; [[#PCE--2019|PCE, 2019]] ; [[#Watt--2019|Watt et al., 2019]] ; [[#Anderegg--2020|Anderegg et al., 2020]] ) (11.3.4.3), underlining the importance of interactions between mitigation and adaptation policy and implementation. Integrated climate change policies across biodiversity, water quality, water availability, land use and forestry for mitigation can support the management of land use, water and people conflicts, but there is little evidence of such coordinated policies ( [[#Cradock-Henry--2018b|Cradock-Henry et al., 2018b]] ; [[#Wreford--2019|Wreford et al., 2019]] ). Implementation of the National Policy Statement for Freshwater Management 2020 ( [[#MfE--2020b|MfE, 2020b]] ) and the National Adaptation Plan (due out in August 2022) present opportunities for such interconnections and diverse values to be addressed, as well as enabling sector and community benefits to be realised across New Zealand ( [[#Awatere--2018|Awatere et al., 2018]] ; [[#Lawrence--2020b|Lawrence et al., 2020b]] ).

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'''Box 11.6 | Rising to the Sea Level Challenge'''
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Many of the region’s cities and settlements, cultural sites and place attachments are situated around harbours, estuaries and lowland rivers ( [[#Black--2010|Black, 2010]] ; [[#PCE--2015|PCE, 2015]] ; [[#Australia%20SoE--2016|Australia SoE, 2016]] ; [[#Rouse--2017|Rouse et al., 2017]] ; [[#Hanslow--2018|Hanslow et al., 2018]] ; [[#Birkett-Rees--2020|Birkett-Rees et al., 2020]] ) exposed to ongoing relative sea level rise (RSLR). RSLR includes regional variability in oceanic conditions ( [[#Zhang--2017|Zhang et al., 2017]] ) and vertical land movement along New Zealand’s tectonically dynamic coasts ( [[#Levy--2020|Levy et al., 2020]] ) and some Australian hotspots for subsidence ( [[#Denys--2020|Denys et al., 2020]] ; [[#King--2020|King et al., 2020]] ; [[#Watson--2020|Watson, 2020]] ).

'''Table Box 11.6.1 |''' Observed and projected impacts from higher mean sea level

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Impacts from increase in mean sea level

! References

|-
| Nuisance and extreme coastal flooding have increased from higher mean sea level in New Zealand. Projected SLR will cause more frequent flooding in Australia and New Zealand before mid-century ( ''very high confidence'' )

| ( [[#Hunter--2012|Hunter, 2012]] ; [[#McInnes--2016|McInnes et al., 2016]] ; [[#Stephens--2017|Stephens et al., 2017]] ; [[#Stephens--2020|Stephens et al., 2020]] ); ( [[#Steffen--2014|Steffen et al., 2014]] ; [[#PCE--2015|PCE, 2015]] ; [[#MfE--2017a|MfE, 2017a]] ; [[#Hague--2019|Hague et al., 2019]] ; [[#Paulik--2020|Paulik et al., 2020]] )

|-
| Squeeze in intertidal habitats ( ''high confidence'' )

| ( [[#Steffen--2014|Steffen et al., 2014]] ; [[#Peirson--2015|Peirson et al., 2015]] ; [[#Mills--2016a|Mills et al., 2016a]] ; [[#Mills--2016b|Mills et al., 2016b]] ; [[#Pettit--2016|Pettit et al., 2016]] ; [[#Rouse--2017|Rouse et al., 2017]] ; [[#Rayner--2021|Rayner et al., 2021]] )

|-
| Significant property and infrastructure exposure ( ''high confidence'' )

| ( [[#Steffen--2014|Steffen et al., 2014]] ; [[#PCE--2015|PCE, 2015]] ; [[#Harvey--2019|Harvey, 2019]] ; [[#LGNZ--2019|LGNZ, 2019]] ; [[#Paulik--2020|Paulik et al., 2020]] ) (Table Box 11.5.2 and Table Box 11.6.2)

|-
| Loss of significant cultural and archaeological sites and projected to compound with several hazards over this century ( ''medium confidence'' )

| ( [[#Bickler--2013|Bickler et al., 2013]] ; [[#Birkett-Rees--2020|Birkett-Rees et al., 2020]] ; NZ Archaeological Association, 2020)

|-
| Increasing flood risk and water insecurity with health and well-being impacts on Torres Strait Islanders ( ''high confidence'' )

| ( [[#Steffen--2014|Steffen et al., 2014]] ; [[#McInnes--2016|McInnes et al., 2016]] ; [[#McNamara--2017|McNamara et al., 2017]] )

|-
| Degradation and loss of freshwater wetlands ( ''high confidence'' )

| ( [[#Pettit--2016|Pettit et al., 2016]] ; [[#Bayliss--2018|Bayliss and Ligtermoet, 2018]] ; [[#Tait--2019|Tait and Pearce, 2019]] ; [[#Grieger--2020|Grieger et al., 2020]] ; [[#Swales--2020|Swales et al., 2020]] )

|}

Coastal shoreline position is driven by a complex combination of natural drivers, past and present human interventions, climate variability ( [[#Bryan--2008|Bryan et al., 2008]] ; [[#Helman--2018|Helman and Tomlinson, 2018]] ; Allis and Hicks, 2019) and variation in sediment flux ( [[#Blue--2017|Blue and Kench, 2017]] ; [[#Ford--2018|Ford and Dickson, 2018]] ). RSLR, to date, is a secondary factor influencing shoreline stability ( ''medium confidence'' ), and in Australia no definitive SLR signature is yet observed in shoreline recession, nor is one documented in New Zealand, due to variability in shoreline position responding to storms and seasonal, annual and decadal climate drivers ( [[#Australian%20Government--2009|Australian Government, 2009]] ; [[#McInnes--2016|McInnes et al., 2016]] ; [[#Sharples--2020|Sharples et al., 2020]] ).

The primary impacts of rising mean sea level (Table Box 11.6.1) are being compounded by climate-related changes in waves, storm surge, rising water tables, river flows and alterations in sediment delivery to the coast ( ''medium confidence'' ). The net effect is projected to increase erosion on sedimentary coastlines and flooding in low-lying coastal areas ( [[#McInnes--2016|McInnes et al., 2016]] ; [[#MfE--2017a|MfE, 2017a]] ; [[#Hanslow--2018|Hanslow et al., 2018]] ; [[#Wu--2018|Wu et al., 2018]] ). Waves are projected to be higher in southern Australasia and lower elsewhere ( [[#Morim--2019|Morim et al., 2019]] ) and storm surge slightly higher in the south, slightly lower further north in New Zealand ( [[#Cagigal--2019|Cagigal et al., 2019]] ) and small robust declines in southern Australia, with potentially larger changes in the Gulf of Carpentaria ( [[#Colberg--2019|Colberg et al., 2019]] ).

The cumulative direct and residual risk from RSLR and associated impacts are projected to continue for centuries, necessitating ongoing adaptive decisions for exposed coastal communities and assets ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#MfE--2017c|MfE, 2017c]] ; [[#Oppenheimer--2019|Oppenheimer et al., 2019]] ; [[#Tonmoy--2019|Tonmoy et al., 2019]] ).

Prevailing decision-making assumes shorelines can continue to be maintained and protected from extreme storms, flooding and erosion, even with RSLR ( [[#Lawrence--2019a|Lawrence et al., 2019a]] ). Rapid coastal development has increased exposure of coastal communities and infrastructure ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Helman--2018|Helman and Tomlinson, 2018]] ; [[#Paulik--2020|Paulik et al., 2020]] ), reinforcing perceptions of safety ( [[#Gibbs--2015|Gibbs, 2015]] ; [[#Lawrence--2015|Lawrence et al., 2015]] ) and creating barriers to retreat and nature-based adaptations ( ''very high confidence'' ) ( [[#Schumacher--2020|Schumacher, 2020]] ). The efficacy and increasing costs of protection and accommodation risk reduction approaches and rebuilding after extreme events have been questioned and have limits ( [[#PCE--2015|PCE, 2015]] ; [[#MfE--2017a|MfE, 2017a]] ; [[#Harvey--2019|Harvey, 2019]] ; [[#LGNZ--2019|LGNZ, 2019]] ; [[#Paulik--2020|Paulik et al., 2020]] ; [[#Haasnoot--2021|Haasnoot et al., 2021]] ). Future shoreline erosion is often signalled using defined coastal setback lines(s) and using probabilistic approaches to signal uncertainty ( [[#Ramsay--2012|Ramsay et al., 2012]] ; [[#Ranasinghe--2016|Ranasinghe, 2016]] ).

'''Table Box 11.6.2 |''' Observed relative SLR (variance-weighted average) with uncertainty range (standard deviation) and projected impacts on infrastructure and population of 1.1 m in Australia and 1 m in New Zealand. SLR projections for 2050 and 2090 are given in Table 11.3a and Table 11.3b.

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Country

! Observed relative sea level rise

! colspan="4"| Projected impacts of SLR (1.1 m Australia, 1.0 m New Zealand)

|-
!
! Value of coastal urban infrastructure

! Number of buildings exposed

! Number of residents exposed

! Public council assets exposed

|-
| Australia

| 2.2±1.8 mm/year to 2018 for four &gt;75-year records (or an average of 0.17 m over 75 years), 3.4 mm/year from 1993–2019 ( [[#Watson--2020|Watson, 2020]] )

| AUD$164 to &gt;226 billion ( [[#DCCEE--2011|DCCEE, 2011]] ; [[#Steffen--2019|Steffen et al., 2019]] )

111% rise in inundation cost from 2020 to 2100 ( [[#Mallon--2019|Mallon et al., 2019]] )

| 187,000 to 274,000 residential buildings, 5800 to 8600 commercial buildings, 3700 to 6200 light industrial buildings ( [[#DCCEE--2011|DCCEE, 2011]] )

| N/A

| 27,000 to 35,000 km roads and 1200 to 1500 km rail lines and tramways ( [[#DCCEE--2011|DCCEE, 2011]] )

|-
| New Zealand

| 1.8 mm/year from 1900–2018, 1.2 mm/year from 1900–1960 and 2.4 mm/year from 1961–2018 ( [[#Bell--2019|Bell and Hannah, 2019]] )

| NZD$25.5 billion ( [[#Paulik--2020|Paulik et al., 2020]] )

| 75,890 ( [[#Paulik--2020|Paulik et al., 2020]] )

| 105,580 ( [[#Paulik--2020|Paulik et al., 2020]] )

| 4000 km pipelines, 1440 km roads, 101 km rail, 72 km electricity transmission lines ( [[#Paulik--2020|Paulik et al., 2020]] )

NZD$5 billion (2018) (reserves, buildings, utility networks, roads) ( [[#LGNZ--2019|LGNZ, 2019]] )

|}

Flooding from high spring (‘king’) tides or storm tides during extreme weather events are raising public awareness of SLR (Green Cross Australia, 2012), including through media coverage ( [[#Priestley--2021|Priestley et al., 2021]] ). The use of adaptive decision tools (11.7.3.1; Table 11.17) is increasing the understanding of changing coastal risk ( [[#Bendall--2018|Bendall, 2018]] ; [[#Lawrence--2019b|Lawrence et al., 2019b]] ; [[#Palutikof--2019b|Palutikof et al., 2019b]] ) and how dynamic adaptive pathways and monitoring of them can aid implementation ( [[#Stephens--2018|Stephens et al., 2018]] ; [[#Lawrence--2020b|Lawrence et al., 2020b]] ). Collaborative governance between local governments and their communities, including with Māori tribal organisations, is emerging in New Zealand ( [[#OECD--2019b|OECD, 2019b]] ) assisted by national direction ( [[#DoC%20NZ--2010|DoC NZ, 2010]] ) and guidance on adaptive planning (Table 11.15b). This shift from reactive to pre-emptive planning is better suited to ongoing RSLR ( [[#Lawrence--2020b|Lawrence et al., 2020b]] ).

In Australia, adaptation to SLR remains uneven across jurisdictions in the absence of clear federal or state guidance, rendering Australia unprepared for flooding from SLR ( [[#Dedekorkut-Howes--2020|Dedekorkut-Howes et al., 2020]] ). Risk-averse coastal governance at the local level has led to shifts in liabilities to other actors and to future generations ( [[#Jozaei--2020|Jozaei et al., 2020]] ). Managed retreat has emerged as an adaptation option in New Zealand ( [[#Rouse--2017|Rouse et al., 2017]] ; [[#Hanna--2019|Hanna, 2019]] ; [[#Kool--2020|Kool et al., 2020]] ; [[#Lawrence--2020c|Lawrence et al., 2020c]] ), where protective measures are transitional ( [[#DoC%20NZ--2010|DoC NZ, 2010]] ) and where managed retreat has arisen from collaborative governance ( [[#Owen--2018|Owen et al., 2018]] ). Remaining adaptation barriers are social or cultural (the absence of licence and legitimacy) and institutional (the absence of regulations, policies and processes that support changes to existing property rights and the funding of retreat) ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#O’Donnell--2013|O’Donnell and Gates, 2013]] ; Tombs et al., 2018; [[#Grace--2019|Grace et al., 2019]] ; [[#O’Donnell--2019|O’Donnell et al., 2019]] ) ''.''

Legacy development, competing public and private interests, trade-offs among development and conservation objectives, policy inconsistencies, short- and long-term objectives and the timing and scale of impacts compound to create contestation over implementation of coastal adaptation ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Mills--2016b|Mills et al., 2016b]] ; [[#McClure--2018|McClure and Baker, 2018]] ; [[#Dedekorkut-Howes--2020|Dedekorkut-Howes et al., 2020]] ; [[#McDonald--2020|McDonald, 2020]] ; [[#Schneider--2020|Schneider et al., 2020]] ). Legal barriers to coastal adaptation remain ( [[#Schumacher--2020|Schumacher, 2020]] ) with a risk that the courts will become decision makers ( [[#Iorns%20Magallanes--2018|Iorns Magallanes et al., 2018]] ) due to legislative fragmentation, status quo leadership, lack of coordination between governance levels and agreement about who pays for what adaptation ( ''very high confidence'' ) ( [[#Waters--2014|Waters et al., 2014]] ; [[#Boston--2018|Boston and Lawrence, 2018]] ; [[#Palutikof--2019a|Palutikof et al., 2019a]] ; [[#Noy--2020|Noy, 2020]] ). The nexus of climate, law, place and property rights continues to expose people and assets to ongoing SLR ( [[#Johnston--2019|Johnston and France-Hudson, 2019]] ; [[#O’Donnell--2019|O’Donnell, 2019]] ), especially where the risks of SLR are not being reflected in property valuations ( [[#Cradduck--2020|Cradduck et al., 2020]] ). Risk signalling through land use planning, flooding events and changes in insurance availability and costs is projected to increase recognition of coastal risks ( ''medium confidence'' ) ( [[#Storey--2017|Storey and Noy, 2017]] ; [[#CCATWG--2018|CCATWG, 2018]] ; [[#Lawrence--2018a|Lawrence et al., 2018a]] ; [[#Harvey--2019|Harvey and Clarke, 2019]] ; [[#Steffen--2019|Steffen et al., 2019]] ; [[#Cradduck--2020|Cradduck et al., 2020]] ; [[#ICNZ--2021|ICNZ, 2021]] ). Proactive local-led engagement and strategy are key to effective adaptation and incentivising and supporting communities to act ( [[#Gibbs--2020|Gibbs, 2020]] ; [[#Schneider--2020|Schneider et al., 2020]] ). Adopting ‘fit for purpose’ decision tools that are flexible as sea levels rise (11.7.3) can build adaptive capacity in communities and institutions ( ''high confidence'' ) ''.''

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