Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-18 (section)

=== 18.4.4 Frontiers of Climate Action ===

<div id="h2-16-siblings" class="h2-siblings"></div>

After decades of limited government action and social inertia to reduce the risk of climate change, there is also increasing social dissent towards the current political, economic and environmental policies to address climate ( [[#Brulle--2019|Brulle and Norgaard, 2019]] ; [[#Carpenter--2019|Carpenter et al., 2019]] ). Social movements are demanding radical action as the only option to achieve the mobilisation necessary for deep societal transformation ( ''very high confidence'' ) ( [[#Hallam--2019|Hallam, 2019]] ; Berglund and Schmidt, 2020).

Prompted by SR1.5, new youth movements seek to use science-based policy to break with incremental reforms and demand radical climate action beyond emissions reductions ( [[#Hallam--2019|Hallam, 2019]] ; [[#Klein--2020|Klein, 2020]] ; [[#Thackeray--2020|Thackeray et al., 2020]] ; [[#Thew--2020|Thew et al., 2020]] ). Recent social movements and climate protests embrace new modalities of action related to political responsibility for climate injustice through disruptive collective political action ( [[#Young--2003|Young, 2003]] ; [[#Langlois--2014|Langlois, 2014]] ). This is complemented by a regenerative culture and ethics of care ( [[#Westwell--2020|Westwell and Bunting, 2020]] ). These new social movements are based on non-violent methods of resistance, including actions classified as dutiful, disruptive and dangerous dissent ( [[#O’Brien--2018|O’Brien, 2018]] ).

The new climate movement mixes messages of fear and hope to propel urgency and the need to respond to a climate emergency ( [[#Gills--2020|Gills and Morgan, 2020]] ). While some consider the mix between fear and hope as beneficial to success, depending on psychological factors ( [[#Salamon--2019|Salamon, 2019]] ) or political geography ( [[#Kleres--2017|Kleres and Wettergren, 2017]] ), others warn of the risks of a rhetoric of emergency and its political outcomes (Hulme and Apollo-University Of Cambridge Repository, 2019; [[#Slaven--2020|Slaven and Heydon, 2020]] ).

Research shows that new climate movements have increased public awareness, and also stimulated unprecedented public engagement with climate change ( ''very high confidence'' ) ( [[#Lee--2020|Lee et al., 2020]] ; [[#Thackeray--2020|Thackeray et al., 2020]] ) and has helped rethink the role of science with society ( [[#Isgren--2019|Isgren et al., 2019]] ). Such movements may represent new approaches to accelerate social transformation and have resulted in notable political successes, such as declarations of climate emergency at the national and local level, as well as in universities. Their methods have also proven effective to end fossil fuel sponsorship ( [[#Piggot--2018|Piggot, 2018]] ). Social demands for radical action are likely to continue to grow, as there is growing discontent with political inertia and a rejection of reformist positions ( [[#Stuart--2020|Stuart et al., 2020]] ).

<div id="box-18.8:-the-role-of-the-private-sector-in-climate-resilient-development-via-climate-finance,-investments-and-innovation" class="h2-container box-container"></div>

'''Box 18.8: The Role of the Private Sector in Climate Resilient Development via Climate Finance, Investments and Innovation'''
<div id="h2-17-siblings" class="h2-siblings"></div>

Climate finance broadly refers to resources that catalyse low-carbon and climate resilient development. It covers the costs and risks of climate action, supports an enabling environment and capacity for adaptation and mitigation, and encourages research and development (R&amp;D) and deployment of new technologies. Climate finance can be mobilised through a range of instruments from a variety of sources, international and domestic, public and private ( [[#18.4.2.2|Section 18.4.2.2]] ).

The private sector has particular competencies which can make significant contributions to adaptation, through innovative technology, design of resilient infrastructure, development and implementation of improved information systems, and the management of major projects. The private sector can be seen as a ‘supplier of innovative goods and services’ to meet the adaptation priorities of developing countries with expertise in technology and service delivery ( [[#Biagini--2013|Biagini and Miller, 2013]] ).

Future investment opportunities in climate resilient development (CRD) are in water resources, agriculture and environmental services. Provision of clean water is another opportunity, requiring investment in water purification and treatment technologies such as desalination and wastewater treatment. Weather and climate services are a possible area for private investment. ( [[#Hov--2017|Hov et al., 2017]] ; [[#Hewitt--2020|Hewitt et al., 2020]] ).

<div id="18.5" class="h1-container"></div>

<span id="sectoral-and-regional-synthesis-of-climate-resilient-development"></span>