Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-14 (section)

==== 14.5.1.2 Linkages with Sustainable Development, Adaptation, Loss and Damage, and Human Rights ====

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As discussed in Chapter 1, the emerging framing for the issue of climate mitigation is that it is no longer to be considered in isolation but rather in the context of its linkages with other areas. Adaptation, loss and damage, human rights and sustainable development are all areas where there are clear or potential overlaps, synergies, and conflicts with the cooperation underway in relation to mitigation.

The IPCC defines adaptation as: ‘in human systems, the process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects, in order to moderate harm or exploit beneficial opportunities. In natural systems, the process of adjustment to actual climate and its effect; human intervention may facilitate adjustment to expected climate and its effects’ (Annex I: Glossary).

Adaptation involves actions to lessen the harm associated with climate change, or take advantage of potential gains ( [[#Smit--2006|Smit and Wandel 2006]] ). It can seek to reduce present and future exposure to specific climate risks ( [[#Adger--2003|Adger et al. 2003]] ), mainstream climate information into existing planning efforts ( [[#Gupta--2010|Gupta et al. 2010]] ; [[#van%20der%20Voorn--2012|van der Voorn et al. 2012]] ; [[#van%20der%20Voorn--2017|van der Voorn et al. 2017]] ), and reduce vulnerability (or increase resilience) of people or communities to the effects of climate change ( [[#Kasperson--2001|Kasperson and Kasperson 2001]] ). There is a body of literature highlighting potential synergies and conflicts between adaptation actions – in any of the three areas above – and mitigation actions – and potential strategies for resolving them ( [[#Locatelli--2011|Locatelli et al. 2011]] ; [[#Casado-Asensio--2014|Casado-Asensio and Steurer 2014]] ; [[#Duguma--2014|Duguma et al. 2014]] ; [[#Suckall--2015|Suckall et al. 2015]] ; [[#Watkiss--2015|Watkiss et al. 2015]] ; [[#van%20der%20Voorn--2020|van der Voorn et al. 2020]] ). In a strategic context, this issue has been analysed in [[#Bayramoglu--2018|Bayramoglu et al. (2018)]] , [[#Eisenack--2016|Eisenack and Kähler (2016)]] and [[#Ingham--2013|Ingham et al. (2013)]] , among others. [[#Bayramoglu--2018|Bayramoglu et al. (2018)]] analyse the strategic interaction between mitigation, as a public good, and adaptation, essentially a private good, showing that the fear that adaptation will reduce the incentives to mitigate carbon emissions may not be justified. On the contrary, adaptation can reduce free-rider incentives (lead to larger self-enforcing agreements), yielding higher global mitigation levels and welfare, if adaptation efforts cause mitigation levels between different countries to be complements instead of strategic substitutes ( [[#Ingham--2013|Ingham et al. 2013]] ).

Distinct from project or programmatic level activities, however, international cooperation for adaptation operates to provide finance and technical assistance ( [[#Bouwer--2006|Bouwer and Aerts 2006]] ). In most cases it involves transboundary actions, such as in the case of transboundary watershed management ( [[#Wilder--2010|Wilder et al. 2010]] ; [[#Milman--2013|Milman et al. 2013]] ; [[#van%20der%20Voorn--2017|van der Voorn et al. 2017]] ). In others it involves the mainstreaming of climate change projections into existing treaties, such as for the protection of migratory species (Trouwborst et al. 2012).

International cooperation in mitigation and adaptation share many of the same challenges, including the need for effective institutions. The UNFCCC, for example, addresses international financial support for adaptation and for mitigation in the same general category, and subjects them to the same sets of institutional constraints ( [[#Peterson--2019|Peterson and Skovgaard 2019]] ). [[#Sovacool--2016|Sovacool and Linnér (2016)]] argue that the history of the UNFCCC and its sub-agreements has been shaped by an implicit bargain that developing countries participate in global mitigation policy in return for receiving financial and technical assistance for adaptation and development from industrialised countries and international green funds. [[#Khan--2013|Khan and Roberts (2013)]] contend that this played out poorly under the Kyoto framework: the Protocol’s basic architecture, oriented around legally binding commitments, was not amenable to merging the issues of adaptation and mitigation. Kuyper et al. [[#Kuyper--2018a|Kuyper et al. (2018a)]] argue that the movement from the Kyoto Protocol to the Paris Agreement represents a shift in this regard; the Paris Agreement was designed not primarily as a mitigation policy instrument, but rather one encompassing mitigation, adaptation, and development concerns. While this argument suggests that the Paris architecture, involving voluntary mitigation actions and a greater attention to issues of financial support and transparency, functions better to leverage adaptation support into meaningful mitigation actions, there are only few papers that examine this issue. Stua (2017a,b) explores the relevance of the so-called ‘share of proceeds’ included in Article 6 of the Paris Agreement as a key tool for leveraging adaptation though mitigation actions.

There are recognised limits to adaptation ( [[#Dow--2013|Dow et al. 2013]] ), and exceeding these limits results in loss and damage, a topic that is gathering salience in the policy discourse. [[#Roberts--2014|Roberts et al. (2014)]] focused on ‘loss and damage’, essentially those climate change impacts which cannot be avoided through adaptation. The Paris Agreement contains a free-standing article on loss and damage ( [[#UNFCCC--2015a|UNFCCC 2015a]] ), focused on cooperation and facilitation, under which Parties have established a clearing house on risk transfer, and a Task Force on Displacement ( [[#UNFCCC--2016a|UNFCCC 2016a]] ). The COP decision accompanying the Paris Agreement specifies that ‘Article 8 does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation’ ( [[#UNFCCC--2016a|UNFCCC 2016a]] ). There is range of views on the treatment of loss and damage in the Paris Agreement, how responsibility for loss and damage should be allocated ( [[#Lees--2017|Lees 2017]] ; [[#McNamara--2019|McNamara and Jackson 2019]] ), and how it could be financed ( [[#Roberts--2017|Roberts et al. 2017]] ; [[#Gewirtzman--2018|Gewirtzman et al. 2018]] ). Some scholars argue that there are continuing options to pursue compensation and liability in the climate change regime ( [[#Mace--2016|Mace and Verheyen 2016]] ; [[#Gsottbauer--2018|Gsottbauer et al. 2018]] ). There have also been efforts to establish accountability of companies – particularly ‘carbon majors’ – for climate damage in domestic courts ( [[#Ganguly--2018|Ganguly et al. 2018]] ; [[#Benjamin--2021|Benjamin 2021]] ). For states that have suffered loss and damage there is also the option to pursue ‘state responsibility’ claims under customary international law and international human rights law ( [[#Wewerinke-Singh--2018|Wewerinke-Singh 2018]] ; [[#Wewerinke-Singh--2020|Wewerinke-Singh and Salili 2020]] ).

One scholar argues that climate impacts are ‘incremental violence structurally over-determined by international relations of power and control’ that affect most those who have contributed the least to GHG emissions ( [[#Dehm--2020|Dehm 2020]] ). Calls for compensation or reparation for loss and damage are therefore a demand for climate justice ( [[#Dehm--2020|Dehm 2020]] ). Many small island states entered declarations on acceptance of the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement that they continue to have rights under international law regarding state responsibility for the adverse effects of climate change, and that no provision in these treaties can be interpreted as derogating from any claims or rights concerning compensation and liability due to the adverse effects of climate change.

The adoption in 2013 of the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage as part of the UNFCCC occurred despite the historic opposition of the United States to this policy. [[#Vanhala--2016|Vanhala and Hestbaek (2016)]] examine the roles of ‘frame contestation’ (contestations over different framings of loss and damage, whether as ‘liability and compensation’ or ‘risk management and insurance’ or other) and ambiguity in accounting for the evolution and institutionalisation of the loss and damage norm within the UNFCCC. However, there is little international agreement on the scope of loss and damage programmes, and especially how they would be funded and by whom ( [[#Gewirtzman--2018|Gewirtzman et al. 2018]] ). Moreover, non-economic loss and damage (NELD) forms a distinct theme that refers to the climate-related losses of items both material and non-material that are not commonly traded in the market, but whose loss is still experienced as such by those affected. Examples of NELD include loss of cultural identity, sacred places, human health and lives ( [[#Serdeczny--2019|Serdeczny 2019]] ). The Santiago Network is part of the Warsaw International Mechanism, to catalyse the technical assistance of relevant organisations, bodies, networks and experts, for the implementation of relevant approaches to avert, minimise and address loss and damage at the local, national and regional levels, in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change ( [[#UNFCCC--2020c|UNFCCC 2020c]] ).

There are direct links between climate mitigation efforts, adaptation and loss and damage – the higher the collective mitigation ambition and the likelihood of achieving it, the lower the scale of adaptation ultimately needed and the lower the scale of loss and damage anticipated. The liability of states, either individually or collectively, for loss and damage is contested, and no litigation has yet been successfully launched to pursue such claims. The science of attribution, however, is developing ( [[#Otto--2017|Otto et al. 2017]] ; [[#Skeie--2017|Skeie et al. 2017]] ; [[#Marjanac--2018|Marjanac and Patton 2018]] ; [[#Patton--2021|Patton 2021]] ) and while it has the potential to address the thorny issue of causation, and thus compensation ( [[#Stuart-Smith--2021|Stuart-Smith et al. 2021]] ), it could also be used to develop strategies for climate resilience ( [[#James--2014|James et al. 2014]] ).

There are also direct links between mitigation and sustainable development. The international agendas for mitigation and sustainable development have shaped each other, around concepts such as ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’, as well as the distinction – in the UNFCCC and later the Kyoto Protocol – between Annex I and non-Annex I countries ( [[#Victor--2011|Victor 2011]] ; [[#Patt--2015|Patt 2015]] ). The same implicit bargain that developing countries would support mitigation efforts in return for assistance with respect to adaptation also applies to support for development ( [[#Sovacool--2016|Sovacool and Linnér 2016]] ). That linkage between mitigation and sustainable development has become even more specific with the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, each of which explicitly pursues a set of goals that encompass both mitigation and development ( [[#Schmieg--2017|Schmieg et al. 2017]] ), reflecting the recognition that achieving sustainable development and climate mitigation goals are mutually dependent ( [[#Gomez-Echeverri--2018|Gomez-Echeverri 2018]] ). It is well accepted that the long-term effects of climate mitigation will benefit sustainable development. A more contested finding is whether the mitigation actions themselves promote or hinder short-term poverty alleviation. One study, analysing the economic effects of developing countries’ NDCs, finds that mitigation actions slow down poverty reduction efforts ( [[#Campagnolo--2019|Campagnolo and Davide 2019]] ). Other studies suggest possible synergies between low-carbon development and economic development ( [[#Hanger--2016|Hanger et al. 2016]] ; [[#Labordena--2017|Labordena et al. 2017]] ; [[#Dzebo--2019|Dzebo et al. 2019]] ). These studies typically converge on the fact that financial assistance flowing from developed to developing countries enhances any possible synergies or lessens the conflicts. However, mitigation measures can also have negative impacts on gender equality, and peace and justice ( [[#Dzebo--2019|Dzebo et al. 2019]] ). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has also taken on board the climate challenge and is examining the role of fiscal and macroeconomic policies to address the climate challenge for supporting its members with appropriate policy responses.

The literature also identifies institutional synergies at the international level, related to the importance of addressing climate change and development in an integrated, coordinated and comprehensive manner across constituencies, sectors and administrative and geographical boundaries ( [[#Le%20Blanc--2015|Le Blanc 2015]] ). The literature also stresses the important role that robust institutions have in making this happen, including in international cooperation in key sectors for climate action as well for development ( [[#Waage--2015|Waage et al. 2015]] ). Since the publication of AR5, which emphasised the need for a type of development that combines both mitigation and adaptation as a way to strengthen resilience, much of the literature has focused on ways to address these linkages and the role institutions play in key sectors that are often the subject of international cooperation – for example, environmental and soil degradation, climate, energy, water resources, and forestry ( [[#Hogl--2016|Hogl et al. 2016]] ). An assessment of thematic policy coherence between the voluntary domestic contributions regarding the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda should be integrated in national policy cycles for sustainable and climate policymaking to identify overlaps, gaps, mutual benefits and trade-offs in national policies ( [[#Janetschek--2020|Janetschek et al. 2020]] ).

It is only since 2008 that the relationship between climate change and human rights has become a focus of international law and policymaking. It is not just climate impacts that threaten the enjoyment of human rights but also the mitigation responses to climate change that affect human rights ( [[#Shi--2017|Shi et al. 2017]] ). The issue of human rights–climate change linkages was first taken up by the UN Human Rights Council in 2008, but has since rapidly gained ground with UN human rights treaty bodies issuing comments (e.g., [[#Human%20Rights%20Committee--2018|Human Rights Committee 2018]] ), recommendations (e.g., [[#Committee%20on%20the%20Elimination%20of%20Discrimination%20against%20Women--2018|Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 2018]] ) and even a joint statement ( [[#Office%20of%20the%20High%20Commissioner%20for%20Human%20Rights--2019|Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2019]] ) on the impacts of climate change on the enjoyment of human rights. Climate change effects and related disasters have the potential to affect human rights broadly, for instance, by giving rise to deaths, disease or malnutrition (right to life, right to health), threatening food security or livelihoods (right to food), impacting upon water supplies and compromising access to safe drinking water (right to water), destroying coastal settlements through storm surge (right to adequate housing), and in some cases forcing relocation as traditional territories become uninhabitable ( [[#UNGA--2019|UNGA 2019]] ). In addition, the right to a healthy environment, recognised in 2021 as an autonomous right at the international level by the Human Rights Council ( [[#UN%20Human%20Rights%20Council--2021|UN Human Rights Council 2021]] ), arguably extends to a right to a ‘safe climate’ shaped in part by the Paris Agreement ( [[#UNGA--2019|UNGA 2019]] ).

As the intersections between climate impacts and human rights have become increasingly clear, litigants have begun to use human rights arguments, with a growing receptivity among courts towards such arguments in climate change cases ( [[#Peel--2018|Peel and Osofsky 2018]] ; [[#Savaresi--2019|Savaresi and Auz 2019]] ; Macchi and van Zeben 2021). In the landmark Urgenda climate case in 2019, the Dutch Supreme Court interpreted the European Convention on Human Rights in light of customary international law and the UN climate change regime and ordered the state to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 25% by 2020 compared to 1990 ( [[#The%20Supreme%20Court%20of%20the%20Netherlands--2019|The Supreme Court of the Netherlands 2019]] ). In the Neubauer case in 2021, the German Federal Constitutional Court ordered the German legislature, in light of its obligations, including on rights protections, to set clear provisions for reduction targets from 2031 onward by the end of 2022 (German Constitutional Court 2021). There are cases in the Global South as well ( [[#Peel--2019|Peel and Lin 2019]] ; [[#Setzer--2020|Setzer and Benjamin 2020]] ), with the Supreme Court in Nepal in its 2018 decision in Shrestha ordering the government to amend its existing laws and introduce a new consolidated law to address climate mitigation and adaptation as this would protect the rights to life, food, and a clean environment, and give effect to the 2015 Paris Agreement ( [[#The%20Supreme%20Court%20of%20Nepal--2018|The Supreme Court of Nepal 2018]] ). There are dozens of further cases in national and regional courts, increasingly based on human rights claims, and this trend is only likely to grow ( [[#Shi--2017|Shi et al. 2017]] ; [[#Peel--2018|Peel and Osofsky 2018]] ; [[#Beauregard--2021|Beauregard et al. 2021]] ). These cases face procedural hurdles, such as standing, as well as substantive difficulties, for instance, with regard to the primarily territorial scope of state obligations to protect human rights ( [[#Boyle--2018|Boyle 2018]] ; [[#Mayer--2021|Mayer 2021]] ), however, there are increasing instances of successful outcomes across the world.

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