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=== 5.6.2 Policies to Strengthen Avoid-Shift-Improve === <div id="h2-30-siblings" class="h2-siblings"></div> There is high untapped potential of demand-side mitigation options if considered holistically within the domains of Avoid-Shift-Improve (Sections 5.3 and 5.4, Tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3a,b). Within the demand-side mitigation options opportunity space, policies currently focus more on efficiency and ‘Improve’ options and relatively less on ‘Shift’ and ‘Avoid’ options ( [[#Dubois--2019|Dubois et al. 2019]] ; [[#Moberg--2019|Moberg et al. 2019]] ). Current demand-side policies are fragmented, piecemeal and too weak to drive demand-side transitions commensurate with 1.5°C or 2°C climate goals ( [[#Wilson--2012|Wilson et al. 2012]] ; [[#Fawcett--2019|Fawcett et al. 2019]] ; [[#Mundaca--2019|Mundaca et al. 2019]] ; [[#Moberg--2019|Moberg et al. 2019]] ) ( ''high evidence, high'' ''agreement'' ). However, increasingly policy mix in a number of countries has seen a rise in prohibitions on fossil fuel use as a way to weaken lock-ins, for example, on fossil fuel heating in favour of low-carbon alternatives ( [[#Rosenbloom--2020|Rosenbloom et al. 2020]] ). Policies that are aimed at behaviour and lifestyle changes carry a perception of political risks for policymakers, which may explain why policy instruments focus more on information provision and adoption of incentives than on regulation and investment ( [[#Rosenow--2017|Rosenow et al. 2017]] ; [[#Moberg--2019|Moberg et al. 2019]] ). Acceleration of demand-side transitions would thus require both a broadening of demand-side options and the creation of comprehensive and targeted policy mixes ( [[#Kern--2017|Kern et al. 2017]] ; [[#Rosenow--2017|Rosenow et al. 2017]] ; [[#IPCC--2018|IPCC 2018]] ) that strengthen the five drivers of decision and action identified in [[#5.4|Section 5.4]] , Table 5.4 and in Tables 5.5–5.7 ( ''high evidence, high agreement'' ). Demand-side transitions in developing and emerging economies would also require stronger administrative capacity as well as technical and financial support ( [[#UN-Habitat--2013|UN-Habitat 2013]] ; [[#Creutzig--2016b|Creutzig et al. 2016b]] ). Systematic categorisation of demand-side policy options in different sectors and services through the Avoid-Shift-Improve framework enables identification of major entry points and possible associated social struggles to overcome for the policy instruments/interventions as discussed below. <div id="5.6.2.1" class="h3-container"></div> <span id="avoid-policies"></span> ==== 5.6.2.1 ‘Avoid’ Policies ==== <div id="h3-9-siblings" class="h3-siblings"></div> There is ''high evidence'' and ''high'' ''agreement'' that ‘Avoid’ policies that affect lifestyle changes offer opportunities for cost-effective reductions in energy use and emissions, but would need to overcome political sensitivities around government efforts to shape and modify individual-level behaviour ( [[#Rosenow--2017|Rosenow et al. 2017]] ; [[#Grubb--2020|Grubb et al. 2020]] ) (Table 5.5). These policies include ways to help avoid travel growth through integrated city planning or building retrofits to help avoid demand for transport, heating or cooling ( [[#Bakker--2014|Bakker et al. 2014]] ; [[#Lucon--2014|Lucon et al. 2014]] ; [[#de%20Feijter--2019|de Feijter et al. 2019]] ), which interact with existing infrastructure. Dense pedestrianised cities and towns and medium-density transit corridors are better placed to implement policies for car reductions than ‘sprawled’ cities characterised by low-density, auto-dependent and separated land uses ( [[#Seto--2014|Seto et al. 2014]] ; [[#Newman--2015|Newman and Kenworthy 2015]] ; [[#Newman--2017|Newman et al. 2017]] ; [[#Bakker--2014|Bakker et al. 2014]] ). Cities face pressing priorities like poverty reduction, meeting basic services and building human and institutional capacity. These are met with highly accessible walkable and cyclable cities, connected with public transit corridors, enabling equal accessibility for all citizens, and enabling a high level of service provisioning ( [[#UN-Habitat--2013|UN-Habitat 2013]] ; Creutziget al. 2016b). Infrastructure development costs less than for car dependent cities. However, it requires a mindset shift for urban and transport planners ( ''medium evidence, high agreement'' ). Policies that support the avoidance of higher-emission lifestyles and improve well-being are facilitated by the introduction of smart technologies, infrastructures and practices ( [[#Amini--2019|Amini et al. 2019]] ). They include regulations and measures for investment in high-quality ICT infrastructure and regulations to restrict number plates, as well as company policy around flexible working conditions ( [[#Lachapelle--2018|Lachapelle et al. 2018]] ; [[#Shabanpour--2018|Shabanpour et al. 2018]] ). Working-from-home arrangements may advantage certain segments of society such as male, older, higher-educated and highly-paid employees, potentially exacerbating existing inequalities in the labour market ( [[#Lambert--2020|Lambert et al. 2020]] ; [[#Bonacini--2021|Bonacini et al. 2021]] ). In the absence of distributive or other equity-based measures, the potential gains in terms of emissions reduction may therefore be counteracted by the cost of increasing inequality. This potential growth in inequality is likely to be more severe in poorer countries that will additionally suffer from a lack of international funding for achieving the SDGs ( ''high evidence, medium agreement'' ) ( [[#Barbier--2020|Barbier and Burgess 2020]] ; [[#UN--2020|UN 2020]] ). '''Table 5.5 | Examples of policies to enable ‘Avoid’ options.''' {| class="wikitable" |- | '''Mitigation option''' | '''Perceived struggles to overcome''' | '''Policy to overcome struggles (Incentives)''' |- | '''Reduce passenger km''' | – Existing paradigms and planning practices and car dependency ( [[#Rosenow--2017|Rosenow et al. 2017]] ; [[#Grubb--2020|Grubb et al. 2020]] ) – Financial and capacity barrier in many developing countries – Status dimension of private cars | – Integrated city planning to avoid travel growth, car reduction, building retrofits to avoid heating or cooling demand ( [[#Bakker--2014|Bakker et al. 2014]] ; [[#Lucon--2014|Lucon et al. 2014]] ; [[#de%20Feijter--2019|de Feijter et al. 2019]] ) – Public-private partnership to overcome financial barrier ( [[#Roy--2018b|Roy et al. 2018b]] ) (Box 5.8) – Taxation of status consumption; reframing of low-carbon transport as high status ( [[#Hoor--2020|Hoor 2020]] ; [[#Ramakrishnan--2021|Ramakrishnan and Creutzig 2021]] ) |- | '''Reduce/Avoid food waste''' | Little visible political and social momentum to prevent food waste in the Global North | Strengthen national nutrition guidelines for health safety; improve education/awareness on food waste; policies to eliminate ambiguous food labelling include well-defined and clear date labelling systems for food ( [[#Wilson--2017|Wilson et al. 2017]] ); policies to support R&D to improve packaging to extend shelf life ( [[#Thyberg--2016|Thyberg and Tonjes 2016]] ); charging according to how much food households throw away |- | '''Reduce size of dwellings''' | Size of dwellings getting larger in many countries | Compact city design, taxing residential properties with high per capita area, progressive taxation of high status consumption ( [[#Ramakrishnan--2021|Ramakrishnan and Creutzig 2021]] ) |- | '''Reduce/Avoid heating, cooling and lighting in dwellings''' | Change in individual behaviour in dress codes and working times | Temperature set point as norm; building energy codes that set building standards; bioclimatic and/or zero emissions buildings; cities and buildings that incorporate features like daylighting and increased building depth, height, and compactness ( [[#Steemers--2003|Steemers 2003]] ; [[#Creutzig--2016a|Creutzig et al. 2016a]] ) |- | '''Sharing economy for more service per product''' | Lack of inclusivity and involvement of users in design. Digital divide, unequal access and unequal digital literacy ( [[#Pouri--2018|Pouri and Hilty 2018]] ). Political or power relations among actors involved in the sharing economy ( [[#Curtis--2019|Curtis and Lehner 2019]] ) | Lower prices for public parking, and subsidies towards the purchase of electric vehicles for providers of electric vehicle sharing services ( [[#Jung--2018|Jung and Koo 2018]] ) |} <div id="5.6.2.2" class="h3-container"></div> <span id="shift-policies"></span> ==== 5.6.2.2 ‘Shift’ Policies ==== <div id="h3-10-siblings" class="h3-siblings"></div> As indicated in Table 5.6, ‘Shift’ policies have various forms such as the demand for low-carbon materials for buildings and infrastructure in manufacturing and services and shift from meat-based protein, mainly beef, to plant-based diets of other protein sources ( ''high evidence, high agreement'' ) ( [[#Springmann--2016|Springmann et al. 2016]] a; [[#Ritchie--2018|Ritchie et al. 2018]] ; [[#Willett--2019|Willett et al. 2019]] ). Governments also play a direct role beyond nudging citizens with information about health and well-being.While the effectiveness of these policies on behaviour change overall may be limited ( [[#Pearson-Stuttard--2017|Pearson-Stuttard et al. 2017]] ; [[#Shangguan--2019|Shangguan et al. 2019]] ), there is some room for policy to influence actors upstream, such as industry and supermarkets, which may give rise to longer-term, structural change. '''Table 5.6 | Examples of policies to enable ‘Shift’ options.''' {| class="wikitable" |- | '''Mitigation option''' | '''Perceived struggles to overcome''' | '''Policy to overcome struggles''' '''(Incentives)''' |- | '''More walking, less car use, train rather air travel''' | Adequate infrastructure may be absent, speed a part of modern life | – Congestion charges ( [[#Pearson-Stuttard--2017|Pearson-Stuttard et al. 2017]] ; [[#Shangguan--2019|Shangguan et al. 2019]] ); deliberate urban design including cycling lanes, shared micromobility, and extensive cycling infrastructure; synchronised/integrated transport system and timetable – Fair street space allocation ( [[#Creutzig--2020|Creutzig et al. 2020]] ) |- | '''Multifamily housing''' | Zonings that favour single family homes have been dominant in planning ( [[#Hagen--2016|Hagen 2016]] ) | Taxation, relaxation of single-family zoning policies and land use regulation ( [[#Geffner--2017|Geffner 2017]] ) |- | '''Shifting from meat to other protein''' | Minimal meat required for protein intake, especially in developing countries for population suffering from malnutrition and when plant-based protein is lacking ( [[#Garnett--2011|Garnett 2011]] ; [[#Sunguya--2014|Sunguya et al. 2014]] ; [[#Behrens--2017|Behrens et al. 2017]] ; [[#Godfray--2018|Godfray et al. 2018]] ); dominance of market-based instruments limits governments’ role to nudging citizens with information about health and well-being, and point-of-purchase labelling ( [[#Pearson-Stuttard--2017|Pearson-Stuttard et al. 2017]] ; [[#Shangguan--2019|Shangguan et al. 2019]] ) | – Tax on meat/beef in wealthier countries and/or households ( [[#Edjabou--2013|Edjabou and Smed 2013]] ; [[#Säll--2015|Säll and Gren 2015]] ) – Nationally recommended diets ( [[#Garnett--2011|Garnett 2011]] ; [[#Sunguya--2014|Sunguya et al. 2014]] ; [[#Behrens--2017|Behrens et al. 2017]] ; [[#Godfray--2018|Godfray et al. 2018]] ) |- | '''Material-efficient product design, packaging''' | Resistance by architects and builders who might perceive risks with lean designs. Cultural and social norms. Policy measures not keeping up with changes on the ground such as increased consumption of packaging | Embodied carbon standards for buildings ( [[#IEA--2019c|IEA 2019c]] ) |- | '''Architectural design with shading and ventilation''' | Lack of education, awareness and capacity for new thinking, local air pollution | Incentives for increased urban density and incentives to encourage architectural forms with lower surface-to-volume ratios and increased shading support ( [[#Creutzig--2016a|Creutzig et al. 2016a]] ) |} Mobility services is one of the key areas where a combination of market-based and command-and-control measures have been implemented to persuade large numbers of people to get out of their automobiles and take up public transport and cycling alternatives ( [[#Gehl--2011|Gehl et al. 2011]] ). Congestion charges are often complemented by other measures, such as company subsidies for bicycles, to incentivise the shift to public mobility services. Attracting people to public transport requires sufficient spatial coverage of transport with adequate level of provision, and good quality service at affordable fares ( [[#Sims--2014|Sims et al. 2014]] ; [[#Moberg--2019|Moberg et al. 2019]] ) ( ''high evidence, high agreement'' ). Cities such as Bogota, Colombia, Buenos Aires, Argentina, and Santiago, Chile, have seen rapid growth of cycling, resulting in a six-fold increase in cyclists ( [[#Pucher--2017|Pucher and Buehler 2017]] ). Broadly, the history and type of city determines how quickly the transition to public modes of transport can be achieved. For example, cities in developed countries enjoy an advantage in that there is a network of high-quality public transport predating the advent of automobiles, whereas cities in less developed countries are latecomers to large-scale network infrastructure ( [[#UN-Habitat--2013|UN-Habitat 2013]] ; [[#Gota--2019|Gota et al. 2019]] ). <div id="5.6.2.3" class="h3-container"></div> <span id="improve-policies"></span> ==== 5.6.2.3 ‘Improve’ Policies ==== <div id="h3-11-siblings" class="h3-siblings"></div> ‘Improve’ policies focus on the efficiency and enhancement of technological performance of services (Table 5.7). In mobility services, ‘Improve’ policies aim at improving vehicles, comfort, fuels, transport operations and management technologies; and in buildings, they include policies for improving efficiency of heating systems and retrofitting existing buildings. Efficiency improvements in electric cooking appliances, together with the ongoing decrease in prices of renewable energy technologies, are opening policy opportunities to support households to adopt electrical cooking at mass scale ( ''medium evidence, medium agreement'' ) ( [[#IEA--2017c|IEA 2017c]] ; [[#Puzzolo--2019|Puzzolo et al. 2019]] ). These actions towards cleaner energy for cooking often come with cooking-related reduction of GHG emissions, even though the extent of the reductions is highly dependent on context and technology and fuel pathways ( ''high evidence, high agreement'' ) ( [[#Martínez--2017|Martínez et al. 2017]] ; [[#Mondal--2018|Mondal et al. 2018]] ; [[#Rosenthal--2018|Rosenthal et al. 2018]] ; [[#Serrano-Medrano--2018|Serrano-Medrano et al. 2018]] ; [[#Dagnachew--2019|Dagnachew et al. 2019]] ) (Box 5.6). Table 5.7 highlights the significant progress made in the uptake of the electrical vehicle (EV) in Europe, driven by a suite of incentives and policies. Increased activity in widening electric vehicle use is also occurring in developing countries. The Indian Government’s proposal to reach the target of a 100% electric vehicle fleet by 2030 has stimulated investment in charging infrastructure that can facilitate diffusion of larger EVs ( [[#Dhar--2017|Dhar et al. 2017]] ). Although the proposal was not converted into a policy, India’s large and growing two-wheeler market has benefitted from the policy attention on EVs, showing a significant potential for increasing the share of electric two- and three-wheelers in the short term ( [[#Ahmad--2019|Ahmad and]] [[#Creutzig--2019|Creutzig 2019]] ). Similar opportunities exist for China, where e-bikes have replaced car trips and are reported to act as intermediate links in multimodal mobility ( [[#Cherry--2016|Cherry et al. 2016]] ). In recent years, policy interest has arisen to address the energy access challenge in Africa using low-carbon energy technologies to meet energy for poverty reduction and climate action simultaneously ( [[#Rolffs--2015|Rolffs et al. 2015]] ; [[#Fuso%20Nerini--2018|Fuso Nerini et al. 2018]] ; [[#Mulugetta--2019|Mulugetta et al. 2019]] ). This aspiration has been bolstered on the technical front by significant advances in appliance efficiency such as light-emitting diode (LED) technology, complemented by the sharp reduction in the cost of renewable energy technologies, and largely driven by market-stimulating policies and public R&D to mitigate risks ( ''high evidence, high agreement'' ) ( [[#Alstone--2015|Alstone et al. 2015]] ; [[#Zubi--2019|Zubi et al. 2019]] ). <div id="5.6.3" class="h2-container"></div> <span id="policies-in-transition-phases"></span>
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