Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-7 (section)

==== 7.2.6.2 Immobility and Resettlement in the Context of Climatic Risks ====

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''Immobility in the context of climatic risks can reflect vulnerability and lack of agency (an inability to migrate), but can also be a deliberate choice'' ( ''high confidence'' ) ''.'' Research since AR5 shows that immobility is best described as a continuum from people who are financially or physically unable to move away from hazards (involuntary immobility) to people who choose not to move (voluntary immobility) because of strong attachments to place, culture and people ( [[#Nawrotzki--2018|Nawrotzki and DeWaard, 2018]] ; [[#Adams--2016|Adams, 2016]] ; [[#Farbotko--2019|Farbotko and McMichael, 2019]] ; [[#Zickgraf--2019|Zickgraf, 2019]] ; [[#Neef--2018|Neef et al., 2018]] ; [[#Suckall--2017|Suckall et al., 2017]] ; [[#Ayeb-Karlsson--2018|Ayeb-Karlsson et al., 2018]] ; [[#Zickgraf--2018|Zickgraf, 2018]] ; [[#Mallick--2020|Mallick and Schanze, 2020]] ). Involuntary immobility is associated with individuals and households with low adaptive capacity and high exposure to hazard, and can exacerbate inequality and future vulnerability to climate change ( [[#Sheller--2018|Sheller, 2018]] ), including through impacts on health ( [[#Schwerdtle--2018|Schwerdtle et al., 2018]] ). Voluntary immobility represents an assertion of the importance of culture, livelihoods and people to well-being, and is of particular relevance for Indigenous Peoples ( [[#Suliman--2019|Suliman et al., 2019]] ).

Planned relocations by governments of settlements and populations exposed to climatic hazards are not presently commonplace, although the need is expected to grow in coming decades (Hino et al 2017). Examples include relocations of coastal settlements exposed to storm and erosion hazards as well as smaller numbers of cases of flood-prone settlements in river valleys; these examples suggest that organised relocations are expensive, contentious, create multiple challenges for governments and generate short- and longer-term disruptions for the people involved ( ''high agreement, medium evidence'' ) ( [[#Ajibade--2020|Ajibade et al., 2020]] ; [[#Henrique--2020|Henrique and Tschakert, 2020]] ; [[#Desai--2021|Desai et al., 2021]] ).

Examples of relocations of small indigenous communities in coastal Alaska and villages in the Solomon Islands and Fiji suggest that relocated people experience significant financial and emotional distress as cultural and spiritual bonds to place and livelihoods are disrupted ( [[#Albert--2018|Albert et al., 2018]] ; [[#Neef--2018|Neef et al., 2018]] ; [[#McMichael--2020|McMichael and Katonivualiku, 2020]] ; [[#McMichael--2020|McMichael and Katonivualiku, 2020]] ; [[#McMichael--2021|McMichael et al., 2021]] ; [[#Piggott-McKellar--2019|Piggott-McKellar et al., 2019]] ; [[#Bertana--2020|Bertana, 2020]] ). Voluntary relocation programmes offered by US state governments in communities damaged by Hurricane Sandy in 2012 have been subject to multiple studies, and these show longer-term economic outcomes, social connections and mental well-being vary for a range of reasons unrelated to the impacts of the hazard event itself ( [[#Bukvic--2017|Bukvic and Owen, 2017]] ; [[#Binder--2019|Binder et al., 2019]] ; Koslov and Merdjanoff, 2021).

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