Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-7 (section)

==== 7.2.6.3 Connections Between Climate-Related Migration and Health ====

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The number of assessable peer-reviewed studies that make connections between climate-related migration and health and well-being is small. The health outcomes of migrants generally, and of climate-migrants in particular, vary according to geographical context, country and the particular circumstances of migration or immobility ( [[#Hunter--2017|Hunter and Simon, 2017]] ; [[#Hunter--2021|Hunter et al., 2021]] ; [[#Schwerdtle--2020|Schwerdtle et al., 2020]] ). Such linkages are ‘multi-directional’, with studies suggesting that healthy individuals may be more likely to migrate internationally in search of economic opportunities than people in poorer health, except during adverse climatic conditions when migration rates may change across all groups, and that migrants may have different long-term health outcomes than people born in destination areas, potentially displaying a range of positive and negative health outcomes compared to non-migrants ( [[#Kennedy--2015|Kennedy et al., 2015]] ; [[#Dodd--2017|Dodd et al., 2017]] ; [[#Hunter--2017|Hunter and Simon, 2017]] ; [[#Riosmena--2017|Riosmena et al., 2017]] ). Refugees and other involuntary migrants often experience higher exposure to disease and malnutrition, adverse indirect health effects of changes in diet or activity and increased rates of mental health concerns. These latter may be attributable to a sense of loss or fear ( [[#Schwerdtle--2018|Schwerdtle et al., 2018]] ; [[#Torres--2017|Torres and Casey, 2017]] ) as well as due to the interruption of healthcare; occupational injuries; sleep deprivation; non-hygienic lodgings and insufficient sanitary facilities; heightened exposure to vector- and WBDs; vulnerability to psychosocial, sexual and reproductive issues; behavioural disorders; substance abuse; and violence ( [[#Farhat--2018|Farhat et al., 2018]] ; [[#Wickramage--2018|Wickramage et al., 2018]] ) ''(high confidence)'' . Linkages between climate migration and the spread of infectious disease are bidirectional; migrants may be exposed to diseases at the destination to which they have lower immunity than the host community; in other cases, migrants could introduce diseases to the receiving community ( [[#McMichael--2015|McMichael, 2015]] ). Thus, receiving areas may have to pay greater attention to building migrant sensitive health systems and services ( [[#Hunter--2017|Hunter and Simon, 2017]] ). The risk of migration leading to disease transmission is exacerbated by weak governance and lack of policy to support public health measures and access to medicines ( [[#Pottie--2015|Pottie et al., 2015]] ).

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'''Cross-Chapter Box MIGRATE | Climate-Related Migration'''
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Authors: David Wrathall (USA, Chapter 8), Robert McLeman (Canada, Chapter 7), Helen Adams (United Kingdom, Chapter 7), Ibidun Adelekan (Nigeria, Chapter 9), Elisabeth Gilmore (USA/Canada, Chapter 14), François Gemenne (Belgium, Chapter 8), Nathalie Hilmi (Monaco, Chapter 18), Ben Orlove (USA, Chapter 17), Ritwika Basu (India/United Kingdom, Chapter 18), Halvard Buhaug (Norway, Chapter 16), Edwin Castellanos (Guatemala, Chapter 12), David Dodman (United Kingdom, Chapter 6), Felix Kanungwe Kalaba (Zambia, Chapter 9), Rupa Mukerji (Switzerland/India, Chapter 18), Karishma Patel (USA, Chapter 1), Chandni Singh (India, Chapter 10), Philip Thornton (United Kingdom, Chapter 5), Christopher Trisos (South Africa, Chapter 9), Olivia Warrick (New Zealand, Chapter 15), Vishnu Pandey (Nepal, Chapter 4)

'''Key messages on migration in this report'''
Migration is a universal strategy that individuals and households undertake to improve well-being and livelihoods in response to economic uncertainty, political instability and environmental change ( ''high confidence'' ). Migration, displacement and immobility that occur in response to climate hazards are assessed in general in Chapter 7, with specific sectoral and regional dimensions of climate-related migration assessed in sectoral and regional Chapters 5 to 15 (Table MIGRATE.1 in Chapter 7) and involuntary immobility and displacement being identified as representative key risks in [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-16|Chapter 16]] (Sections 16.2.3.8, 16.5.2.3.8). Since AR5 there has been a considerable expansion in research on climate–migration linkages, with five key messages from the present assessment report warranting emphasis.

''Climatic conditions, events and variability are important drivers of migration and displacement'' ( ''high confidence'' ) ''(Table MIGRATE.1 in Chapter 7), with migration responses to specific climate hazards being strongly influenced by economic, social, political and demographic processes'' ( ''high confidence'' ) ''(Sections 7.2.6, 8.2.1.3).'' Migration is among a wider set of possible adaptation alternatives and often emerges when other forms of adaptation are insufficient (Sections 5.5.1.1, 5.5.3.5, 7.2.6, 8.2.1.3, 9.7.2). Involuntary displacement occurs when adaptation alternatives are exhausted or not viable and reflects non-climatic factors that constrain adaptive capacity and create high levels of exposure and vulnerability ( ''high confidence'' ) (Cross-Chapter Box SLR in Chapter 3; Sections 4.3.7, 7.2.6; Box 8.1; [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-10#10.3|Section 10.3]] ; Box 14.7). There is strong evidence that climatic disruptions to agricultural and other rural livelihoods can generate migration ( ''high confidence'' ) (Sections 5.5.4, 8.2.1.3, 9.8.3; Box 9.8).

''Specific climate events and conditions may cause migration to increase, decrease or flow in new directions (high confidence), and the more agency migrants have (i.e., the degree of voluntarity and freedom of movement), the greater the potential benefits for sending and receiving areas'' ( ''high agreement, medium evidence'' ) ''(Sections 5.5.3.5, 7.2.6, 8.2.1.3; Box 12.2)'' . Conversely, displacement or low-agency migration is associated with poor outcomes in terms of health, well-being and socioeconomic security for migrants and returns fewer benefits to sending or receiving communities ( ''high agreement, medium evidence'' ) (Sections 4.3.7, 4.5.7; Box 8.1; Sections 9.7.2, 10.3; Box 14.7).

''Most climate-related migration and displacement observed currently takes place within countries'' ( ''high confidence'' ) ''(Sections 4.3.7, 4.5.7, 5.12.2, 7.2.6).'' The climate hazards most commonly associated with displacement are tropical cyclones and flooding in most regions, with droughts being an important driver in sub-Saharan Africa, parts of south Asia and South America ( ''high confidence'' ) (Sections 7.2.6.1, 9.7.2, 10.4.6.3, 11.4.1, 12.5.8.4, 13.8.1.3, 14.4.7.3). Currently, observed international migration associated with climatic hazards is considerably smaller relative to internal migration and is most often observed as flowing between states that are contiguous and have labour-migration agreements and/or longstanding cultural ties ( ''high agreement, robust evidence'' ) (Sections 4.3.7, 4.5.7, 5.12.2, 7.2.6).

''In many regions, the frequency and/or severity of floods, extreme storms and droughts is projected to increase in coming decades, especially under high-emissions scenarios (WGI AR6 [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-12|Chapter 12]] (Ranasinghe et al. 2021)), raising future risk of displacement in the most exposed areas'' ( ''high confidence'' ) ''( [[#7.3.2.1|Section 7.3.2.1]] ).'' The additional impacts of climate change anticipated to generate future migration and displacement include mean sea level rise that increases flooding and saltwater contamination of soil and/or groundwater in low-lying coastal areas and small islands ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#7.3.2.1|Section 7.3.2.1]] ; Cross-Chapter Box SLR in Chapter 3) and more frequent extreme heat events that threaten the habitability of urban centres in the tropics and arid/semiarid regions ( ''medium confidence'' ), although the causal links between heat and migration are less clear ( [[#7.3.2.1|Section 7.3.2.1]] ).

''There is growing evidence about the future prospects of immobile populations: groups and individuals that are unable or unwilling to move away from areas highly exposed to climatic hazards'' ( ''high confidence'' ) ''(Sections 4.6.9, 7.2.6.2; Box 8.1; Box 10.2).'' Involuntarily immobile populations may be anticipated to require government interventions to continue living in exposed locations or to relocate elsewhere ( ''high agreement, medium evidence)'' (Box 8.1). Managed retreat and organised relocations of people from hazardous areas in recent years have proven to be politically and emotionally charged, socially disruptive and costly ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#7.4.5|Section 7.4.5.4]] ).

'''Climate-migration interactions and outcomes'''
Figure MIGRATE.1 in [https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/chapter/chapter-7 Chapter 7] presents a simplified framework for understanding how migration and displacement may emerge from the interactions of climatic and non-climatic factors, based on the characteristic risk framework introduced in [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-1|Chapter 1]] ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-1#1.3|Section 1.3]] ). Voluntary migration can be used by households when adapting to climate hazards, while less voluntary forms of migration and displacement emerge when other forms of adaptation (referred to in Figure MIGRATE.1 in [https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/chapter/chapter-7 Chapter 7] as ''in situ'' adaptation) are inadequate. Migration outcomes—expressed in Figure MIGRATE.1 in [https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/chapter/chapter-7 Chapter 7] as changes in future risks to the well-being of migrants, sending communities and destination communities—are heavily influenced by the political, legal, cultural and socioeconomic conditions under which migration occurs. Groups and individuals that are involuntarily immobile may find that their exposure, vulnerability and risk increase over time. Table MIGRATE.1 in [https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/chapter/chapter-7 Chapter 7] summarises the range of potential migration outcomes that may emerge from this dynamic and indicates specific sections in sectoral and regional chapters of the report that describe examples of each.

[[File:16246073a934a256ab78d557dfdba8c5 IPCC_AR6_WGII_Figure_7_Migrate_1.png]]

'''Figure MIGRATE.1 |''' '''General interactions between climatic and non-climatic processes, adaptation, potential migration outcomes and implications for future risk.''' Adapted from [[#McLeman--2021|McLeman et al. (2021)]] .

'''Table MIGRATE.1 |''' Typology of climate-related migration and examples in sectoral and regional chapters of AR6.

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! '''Type of climate-related migration'''

! '''Characteristics'''

! '''Recent or current examples'''

! '''Examples in the literature'''

! '''References in AR6 WGII'''

|-
| Temporary and/or seasonal migration

| Frequently used as a risk-reduction strategy by rural households in less-developed regions with highly seasonal precipitation; includes transhumance

| Pastoralists in sub-Saharan Africa; seasonal farm workers in south Asia; rural–urban labour migration in Central America

| [[#Afifi--2016|Afifi et al. (2016)]] ; [[#Call--2017|Call et al. (2017)]] ; Piguet et al. (2018); [[#Borderon--2019|Borderon et al. (2019)]] ; [[#Cattaneo--2019|Cattaneo et al. (2019)]] ; [[#Hoffmann--2020|Hoffmann et al. (2020)]] ; [[#Lopez-i-Gelats--2015|Lopez-i-Gelats et al. (2015)]] ; [[#Lu--2016|Lu et al. (2016)]] [[#Kaczan--2020|Kaczan and Orgill-Meyer (2020)]]

| Sections 5.5.1.1, 5.5.3.5; [[#7.2.6|Section 7.2.6]] ; [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-8#8.2.1|Section 8.2.1.3]] ; [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-9#9.8.3|Section 9.8.3]] ; Box 13.2

|-
| Indefinite or permanent migration

| Less common than temporary or seasonal migration, particularly when the whole household permanently relocates

| Numerous examples in all regions

| See reviews listed in cell above

| [[#7.2.6|Section 7.2.6]] ; [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-8#8.2.1|Section 8.2.1.3]] ; Box 10.2

|-
| Internal migration

| Movements within state borders; most common form of climate-related migration

| Numerous examples in all regions

| See reviews listed in cell above

| [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-4#4.3.7|Section 4.3.7]] ; Sections 5.5.4, 5.10.1.1; [[#7.2.6|Section 7.2.6]] ; Sections 9.7.2, 9.11; Box 9.8; Sections 10.3.3, 10.4.6.3, Box 10.2; [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-11#11.4.1|Section 11.4.1]] ; [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-12#12.5.8.4|Section 12.5.8.4]] ; [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-13#13.8.1.3|Section 13.8.1.3]] ; [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-14#14.4|Section 14.4.7.3]] ; [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-15#15.3.4.6|Section 15.3.4.6]]

|-
| International migration

| Less common than internal migration; most often occurs between contiguous countries within the same region; often undertaken for purpose of earning wages to remit home

| Cross-border migration within south and Southeast Asia, sub-Saharan Africa

| See reviews listed in cell above; also [[#Veronis--2018|Veronis et al. (2018)]] ; [[#McLeman--2019|McLeman (2019)]] ; Cattaneo and G. (2016); [[#Missirian--2017|Missirian and Schlenker (2017)]] ; [[#Schutte--2021|Schutte et al. (2021)]]

| Sections 4.3.7, 4.5.7; [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-5#5.12.2|Section 5.12.2]] ; [[#7.2.6|Section 7.2.6]]

|-
| Rural–urban or rural–rural

| Typically internal but may also flow between contiguous states; may be for temporary or indefinite periods; migration may be undertaken by an individual household member or the entire household; may be followed by remittances

| Drought migration in Mexico, east Africa and south Asia

| See reviews in the cell above; also [[#Adger--2015|Adger et al. (2015)]] ; Gautier et al. (2016); [[#Nawrotzki--2017|Nawrotzki et al. (2017)]] ; Wiederkehr et al. (2018); Robalino et al. (2015); [[#Borderon--2019|Borderon et al. (2019)]] ; [[#Murray-Tortarolo--2021|Murray-Tortarolo and Martnez (2021)]]

| [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-5#5.13.4|Section 5.13.4]] ; [[#7.2.6|Section 7.2.6]] ; [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-6#6.2.4.3|Section 6.2.4.3]] ; [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-8#8.2.1|Section 8.2.1.3]] ; [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-9#9.8.1|Section 9.8.1.2]] ; [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-12#12.5.8.4|Section 12.5.8.4]] ; [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-14#14.4|Section 14.4.7.1]]

|-
| Displacement

| Households are forced to leave homes for temporary or indefinite period; typically occurs as a result of extreme events and starts with seemingly temporary evacuation; risk is expected to rise in most regions due to sea level rise and changes in associated coastal hazards

| Tropical cyclones in the Caribbean, Southeast Asia and Bay of Bengal region

| [[#Islam--2017|Islam and Shamsuddoha (2017)]] ; [[#Desai--2021|Desai et al. (2021)]] ; see Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre annual reports for global statistics

| Cross-Chapter Box SLR in Chapter 3; [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-4#4.3.7|Section 4.3.7]] ; 4.5.7; Cross-Chapter Box MOVING PLATE in Chapter 5; [[#7.2.6.1|Section 7.2.6.1]] ; Box 8.1; [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-9#9.7.2|Section 9.7.2]] ; [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-9#9.9.2|Section 9.9.2]] ; [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-10#10.3|Section 10.3]] ; Box 14.7; Sections 15.3.4.6;

[https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/7#CCP2.2 CCP2.2.2]

|-
| Planned and/or organised resettlement

| Initiated in areas where settlements become permanently uninhabitable; requires assistance from governments and/or institutions; government-sponsored sedentarisation of pastoral populations

| Fiji, Carteret Islands, Papua New Guinea, Gulf of Mexico coast and coastal Alaska, USA

| [[#Marino--2015|Marino and Lazrus (2015)]] ; Hino et al. (2017); [[#McNamara--2018|McNamara et al. (2018)]] ; [[#McMichael--2020|McMichael and Katonivualiku (2020)]] ; Tadgell et al. (2017); [[#Arnall--2014|Arnall (2014)]] ; [[#Wilmsen--2015|Wilmsen and Webber (2015)]]

| [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-4#4.6.9|Section 4.6.9]] ; Sections 5.14.1, 5.14.2; [[#7.4.4.4|Section 7.4.4.4]] ; [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-10#10.4|Section 10.4.6]] ; [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-15#15.5.3|Section 15.5.3]] ; [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/7#CCP2.2 CCP2.2.2] ; [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/7#CCP6.3.2 CCP6.3.2]

|-
| Immobility

| Adverse weather or climatic conditions warrant moving, but households are unable to relocate because of lack of resources or choose to remain because of strong social, economic or cultural attachments to place

| Examples in most regions

| [[#Adams--2016|Adams (2016)]] ; [[#Zickgraf--2018|Zickgraf (2018)]] ; [[#Nawrotzki--2018|Nawrotzki and DeWaard (2018)]] ; [[#Farbotko--2020|Farbotko et al. (2020)]]

| [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-4#4.6.9|Section 4.6.9]] ; [[#7.2.6.2|Section 7.2.6.2]] ; Box 8.1; Box 10.2

|}

'''Policy implications'''
''Future migration and displacement patterns in a changing climate will depend not only on the physical impacts of climate change, but also on future policies and planning at all scales of governance'' ( ''high confidence'' ) ''(4.6.9, 5.14.1, 5.14.1.2, 7.3.2, 7.4.4, 8.2.1.3; Box 8.1; [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/7#CCP6.3.2 CCP6.3.2] ).'' Policy interventions can remove barriers to and expand the alternatives for safe, orderly and regular migration that allows vulnerable people to adapt to climate change ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#7.2.6|Section 7.2.6]] ). With adequate policy support, migration in the context of climate change can result in synergies for both adaptation and development (Sections 5.12.2, 7.4.4, 8.2.1.3). Migration governance at local, national and international levels will influence the outcomes of climate-related migration for the migrants themselves as well as for receiving and origin communities (Sections 5.13.4, 7.4.4, 8.2.1.3). At the international level, a number of relevant policy initiatives and agreements, including Global Compacts for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and for the protection of Refugees; the Warsaw International Mechanism of the UNFCCC; the Sustainable Development Goals; the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction; and the Platform on Disaster Displacement, have already been established, merit continued pursuit and provide potential migration governance pathways ( [[#7.4.4|Section 7.4.4]] ). Policy and planning decisions at regional, national and local scales that relate to housing, infrastructure, water provisioning, schools and healthcare are relevant for successful integration of migrants into receiving communities (Sections 5.5.4, 5.10.1.1, 5.12.2, 9.8.3). Policies and practices on movements of people across international borders are also relevant to climate-related migration, with restrictions on movement having implications for the adaptive capacity of communities exposed to climate hazards ( [[#7.4.4.2|Section 7.4.4.2]] ; Box 8.1). Perceptions of migrants and the framing of policy discussions in receiving communities and nations are important determinants of the future success of migration as an adaptive response to climate change ( [[#7.4.4.3|Section 7.4.4.3]] ) ( ''high agreement, medium evidence'' ).

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Cross-Chapter Box MIGRATE

''Reducing the future risk of large-scale population displacements, including those requiring active humanitarian interventions and organised relocations of people, requires the international community to meet the requirements of the Paris Agreement and take further action to control future warming'' ( ''high confidence'' ) ''(Cross-Chapter Box SLR in Chapter 3; [[#7.3.1|Section 7.3.1]] ; Box 8.1).'' Current emissions pathways lead to scenarios for the period between 2050 and 2100 in which hundreds of millions of people will be at risk of displacement due to rising sea levels, floods, tropical cyclones, droughts, extreme heat, wildfires and other hazards, with land degradation exacerbating these risks in many regions ( [[#7.3.2|Section 7.3.2]] ; IPCC 2019b; Cross-Chapter Box SLR in Chapter 3). At high levels of warming, tipping points may exist, particularly related to sea level rise, that, if crossed, would further increase the global population potentially at risk of displacement (Ranasinghe et al. 2021). Populations in low-income countries and small-island states that have historically had low greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are at particular risk of involuntary migration and displacement due to climate change, reinforcing the urgency for industrialised countries to continue lowering GHG emissions, to support adaptive capacity-building initiatives under the UNFCCC and to meet objectives expressed in the Global Compacts regarding safe, orderly and regular migration and the support and accommodation of displaced people (Sections 4.3.7, 4.5.7, 5.12.2, 7.4.5.5, 8.4.2; Box 8.1; Cross-Chapter Box SLR in Chapter 3).

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'''Box 7.4 | Gender Dimensions of Climate-Related Migration'''
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Migration decision-making and outcomes—in both general terms and in response to climatic risks—are strongly mediated by gender, social context, power dynamics and human capital ( [[#Bhagat--2017|Bhagat, 2017]] ; [[#Singh--2020|Singh and Basu, 2020]] ; [[#Rao--2019a|Rao et al., 2019a]] ; [[#Ravera--2016|Ravera et al., 2016]] ). Women tend to suffer disproportionately from the negative impacts of extreme climate events for reasons ranging from caregiving responsibilities to lack of control over household resources to cultural norms for attire ( [[#Belay--2017|Belay et al., 2017]] ; [[#Jost--2016|Jost et al., 2016]] ). In many cultures, migrants are most often able-bodied, young men ( [[#Call--2017|Call et al., 2017]] ; [[#Heaney--2016|Heaney and Winter, 2016]] ). Women wait longer to migrate because of higher social costs and risks ( [[#Evertsen--2019|Evertsen and Van Der Geest, 2019]] ) and barriers such as social structures, cultural practices, lack of education and reproductive roles ( [[#Belay--2017|Belay et al., 2017]] ; [[#Afriyie--2018|Afriyie et al., 2018]] ; [[#Evertsen--2019|Evertsen and Van Der Geest, 2019]] ).

Research critiques the tendency to portray women as victims of climate hazards rather than recognising differences between women and the potential for women to use their agency and informal networks to negotiate their situations ( [[#Eriksen--2015|Eriksen et al., 2015]] ; [[#Ngigi--2017|Ngigi et al., 2017]] ; [[#Pollard--2015|Pollard et al., 2015]] ; [[#Rao--2019b|Rao et al., 2019b]] ; [[#Ravera--2016|Ravera et al., 2016]] ). Migration can change household composition and structure, which in turn affects the adaptive capacity and choices of those who do not move ( [[#Rao--2019a|Rao et al., 2019a]] ; [[#Rao--2019b|Rao et al., 2019b]] ; [[#Singh--2019|Singh, 2019]] ). For example, when only male household members move, the remaining members of the now female-headed household must take on greater workloads ( [[#Goodrich--2019|Goodrich et al., 2019]] ; [[#Rao--2019b|Rao et al., 2019b]] ; [[#Rigg--2015|Rigg and Salamanca, 2015]] ), leading to increased workload and greater vulnerability for those left behind ( [[#Arora--2017|Arora et al., 2017]] ; [[#Bhagat--2017|Bhagat, 2017]] ; [[#Flatø--2017|Flatø et al., 2017]] ; [[#Lawson--2019|Lawson et al., 2019]] ). It can, however, also increase women’s economic freedom and decision-making capacity, enhance their agency ( [[#Djoudi--2016|Djoudi et al., 2016]] ; [[#Rao--2019|Rao, 2019]] ) and alter the gendered division of paid work, care and intra-household relations ( [[#Rigg--2018|Rigg et al., 2018]] ; [[#Singh--2020|Singh and Basu, 2020]] ), a process that may reduce household vulnerability to extreme climate events ( [[#Banerjee--2019b|Banerjee et al., 2019b]] ).

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