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=== Box 10.5 | Governance Options for Shipping and Aviation === <div id="h2-1-siblings" class="h2-siblings"></div> Whenever borders are crossed, the aviation and shipping sector creates international emissions that are not assigned to states’ Nationally Declared Contributions under the Paris Agreement. Emissions from these segments are rapidly growing (apart from COVID-19 affecting aviation) and are projected to grow between 60% to 220% by 2050 ( [[#IPCC--2018|IPCC 2018]] ; [[#UNEP--2020|UNEP 2020]] ). Currently, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Marine Organization (IMO), specialised UN Agencies, are responsible for accounting and suggesting options for managing these emissions. '''Transformational goals?''' ICAO has two global aspirational goals for the international aviation sector: 2% annual fuel efficiency improvement through 2050; and carbon neutral growth from 2020 onwards. To achieve these goals, ICAO has established CORSIA – Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation, a market-based programme. In 2018, IMO adopted an Initial Strategy on the reduction of GHG emissions from ships. This strategy calls for a reduction of the carbon intensity of new ships through implementation of further phases of the energy efficiency design index (EEDI). The IMO calls for a 40% reduction of the carbon intensity of international shipping by 2030, and is striving for a 70% reduction by 2050. Such reductions in carbon intensity would result in an overall decline in emissions of 50% in 2050 (relative to 2008). These goals are likely insufficiently transformative for the decarbonisation of aviation or shipping, though they are moving towards a start of decarbonisation at a period in history where the options are still not clear, as set out in Sections 10.5 and 10.6. '''Regulations?''' The ICAO is not a regulatory agency, but rather produces standards and recommended practices that are adopted in national and international legislation. IMO does publish ‘regulations’ but does not have powers of enforcement. Non-compliance can be regulated by nation states if they so desire, as a ship’s MARPOL certificate, issued by the flag state of the ship, means there is some responsibility for states with global shipping fleets. '''Paris?''' Some authors in the literature have argued that emissions from international aviation and shipping should be part of the Paris Agreement ( [[#Gençsü--2015|Gençsü and Hino 2015]] ; [[#Lee--2018|Lee 2018]] ; [[#Traut--2018|Traut et al. 2018]] ; [[#Rayner--2021|Rayner 2021]] ), arguing that the shipping and aviation industries would prefer emissions to be treated under an international regime rather than a national-oriented regime. If international aviation and shipping emissions were a part of the Paris Agreement, it may remove something of the present ambiguity about responsibilities. However, inclusion in the Paris Agreement is unlikely to fundamentally change emissions trends unless targets and enforcement mechanisms are developed, by ICAO and IMO or by nation states through global processes. '''Individual nations?''' If international regulations are not made, then the transformation of aviation and shipping will be left to individual nations. In 2020, Switzerland approved a new CO 2 tax on flights ( [[#The%20Swiss%20Parliament--2020|The Swiss Parliament 2020]] ), with part of its revenues earmarked for the development of synthetic aviation fuels, to cover up to 80% of their additional costs compared to fossil jet fuel ( [[#Energieradar--2020|Energieradar 2020]] ). Appropriate financing frameworks will be a key to the large-scale market adoption of these fuels. [[#Egli--2019|Egli et al. (2019)]] suggest that the successful design of investment policies for solar and wind power over the past 20 years could serve as a model for future synthetic aviation fuels production projects ‘attracting a broad spectrum of investors in order to create competition that drives down financing cost’, and with state investment banks building ‘investor confidence in new technologies.’ These national investment policies would provide the key enablers for successful deployments. <div id="box-10.6" class="h2-container box-container"></div> <span id="box-10.6-critical-minerals-and-the-future-of-electromobility-and-renewables"></span>
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