Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-16 (section)

== 16.5 International Technology Transfer and Cooperation for Transformative Change ==

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This section covers international transfer and cooperation in relation to climate-related technologies, ‘the flows of know-how, experience and equipment for mitigating and adapting to climate change amongst different stakeholders’ ( [[#IPCC--2000|IPCC 2000]] ) as well as innovation to support transformative change compared to AR5 ( [[#IPCC--2014|IPCC 2014]] ) and the IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C (SR1.5) ( [[#IPCC--2018a|IPCC 2018a]] ). This complements the discussion on international cooperation on science and technology in Chapter 14.

This section first outlines the needs and opportunities for international transfer and cooperation on low-emission technologies. It then describes the main objectives and roles of these activities, and then reviews recent institutional approaches within and outside the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to support international technology transfer and cooperation. Finally, it discusses emerging ideas for international technology transfer and cooperation, and possible modifications to support the achievement of climate change and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), building up to [[#16.6|Section 16.6]] .

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=== 16.5.1 International Cooperation on Technology Development and Transfer: Needs and Opportunities ===

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With the submission of their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) as part of the Paris Agreement, most developing countries are now engaged in climate mitigation and adaptation. While technology is seen as one of the ‘means of implementation’ of climate action, developing countries often have relatively limited technology innovation capabilities, which requires them to access technologies developed in higher-income countries with stronger innovation systems ( [[#Popp--2011|Popp 2011]] ; [[#Binz--2012|Binz et al. 2012]] ; [[#Urban--2018|Urban 2018]] ). In many cases, these technologies require adaptation for the local context and needs ( [[#Sagar--2009|Sagar 2009]] ; [[#Anadon--2016b|Anadon et al. 2016b]] ), and innovation capabilities are required to suitably adapt these technologies for local use and also to create new markets and business models that are required for successful deployment ( [[#Sagar--2009|Sagar 2009]] ; [[#Ockwell--2015|Ockwell et al. 2015]] ; [[#Ockwell--2016|Ockwell and Byrne 2016]] ). This can lead to dependencies on foreign knowledge and providers ( [[#Ockwell--2016|Ockwell and Byrne 2016]] ), negative impacts in terms of higher costs ( [[#Huenteler--2016a|Huenteler et al. 2016a]] ), balance of payments constraints, and vulnerability to external shocks ( [[#Ebeling--2020|Ebeling 2020]] ).

The climate technology transition can also yield other development benefits, for instance better health, increased energy access, poverty alleviation and economic competitiveness ( [[#Deng--2018|Deng et al. 2018]] ), including industrial development, job creation and economic growth (Porter and Van der Linde 1995; [[#Altenburg--2017|Altenburg and Rodrik 2017]] ; [[#Lema--2020|Lema et al. 2020]] ; [[#Pegels--2020|Pegels and Altenburg 2020]] ) ( [[#16.6|Section 16.6]] ). The growing complexity of technologies and global competition have made technology development a globalised process involving the flow of knowledge and products across borders ( [[#Lehoux--2014|Lehoux et al. 2014]] ; [[#Koengkan--2020|Koengkan et al. 2020]] ). For instance, in electronics production, Asian economies have captured co-location synergies and dominate production and assembly of product components, whereas American firms have adopted ‘design-only’ strategies ( [[#Tassey--2014|Tassey 2014]] ). In the context of renewable energy technologies, ‘green global division of labour’ has been observed, with countries specialising in investments in research and development (R&amp;D), manufacturing or deployment of renewables ( [[#Lachapelle--2017|Lachapelle et al. 2017]] ). In the case of solar photovoltaic (PV), for example, while many technical innovations emerged from the USA, Japan and China emphasised the manufacture of physical modules ( [[#Deutch--2013|Deutch and Steinfeld 2013]] ) (Box 16.4).

Such globalisation of production and supply chains opens up economic development opportunities for developing countries ( [[#Lema--2020|Lema et al. 2020]] ). At the same time, not all countries benefit from the globalisation of innovation – barriers remain related to finance, environmental performance, human capabilities and cost ( [[#Weiss--2013|Weiss and Bonvillian 2013]] ; [[#Egli--2018|Egli et al. 2018]] ), with developing countries being particularly disadvantaged at leveraging these opportunities. The gap in low-carbon technology innovation between countries appears to have reduced only among OECD countries ( [[#Yan--2017|Yan et al. 2017]] ; [[#Du--2019|Du and Li 2019]] ; [[#Du--2019|Du et al. 2019]] ) and the lower-income countries are not able to benefit as much from low-carbon technologies. For instance, in the case of agriculture, [[#Fuglie--2018|Fuglie (2018)]] notes that international R&amp;D spillovers seem to have benefitted developed countries more than developing countries. [[#Gross--2018|Gross et al. (2018)]] also argue that the development timescales for new energy technologies can extend up to 70 years, even within one country. They recommend that innovation efforts be balanced between early-stage R&amp;D spending, and commercialising already low-emission technologies in the demonstration phase and diffusing them globally.

Thus international cooperation on technology development and transfer can enable developing countries to achieve their climate goals more effectively, while also addressing other SDGs – taking advantage, where possible, of the globalisation of innovation and production ( [[#Lema--2020|Lema et al. 2020]] ). Earlier assessments in AR5 and SR1.5 have made it clear that international technology transfer and cooperation could play a role in climate policy at both the international and the domestic policy level ( [[#Somanathan--2014|Somanathan et al. 2014]] ; [[#Stavins--2014|Stavins et al. 2014]] ; [[#IPCC--2018b|IPCC 2018b]] ) and for low-carbon development at the regional level (Agrawala et al. 2014). The Paris Agreement also reflects this view by noting that countries shall strengthen cooperative action on technology development and transfer regarding two main aspects: (i) promoting collaborative approaches to R&amp;D; and (ii) facilitating access to technology to developing country Parties ( [[#UNFCCC--2015|UNFCCC 2015]] ). Furthermore, both in literature and in UNFCCC deliberations, South-South technology transfer is highlighted ( [[#Khosla--2017|Khosla et al. 2017]] ) as a complement to the transfer of technology and know-how from the North to the South.

This is consistent with literature that suggests that greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation in developing countries can be enhanced by: (i) technology development and transfer collaboration and a ‘needs-driven’ approach; (ii) development of the specific types of capacity required across the entire innovation chain; and (iii) strengthening of the coordination and agendas across and between governance levels (including domestic and international levels) ( [[#Khosla--2017|Khosla et al. 2017]] ; [[#Zhou--2019|Zhou 2019]] ; [[#Upadhyaya--2020|Upadhyaya et al. 2020]] ).

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=== 16.5.2 Objectives and Roles of International Technology Transfer and Cooperation Efforts ===

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International efforts involving technology transfer can have different objectives and roles. These include access to knowledge and financial resources as well as promotion of new industries in both the developed and recipient country ( [[#Huh--2018|Huh and Kim 2018]] ). Based on an econometric analysis of international technology transfer factors and characteristics of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects, [[#Gandenberger--2016|Gandenberger et al. (2016)]] find that complexity and novelty of technologies explain whether a CDM project includes hardware technology transfer, and that factors like project size and absorptive capacity of the host country do not seem to be drivers. [[#Halleck%20Vega--2018|Halleck Vega and Mandel (2018)]] argue that ‘long-term economic relations’, for instance being part of a customs union, affect technological diffusion between countries in the case of wind energy, and indicate that this has resulted in low-income countries being largely overlooked.

There is some literature studying whether technology cooperation could complement or replace international cooperation based on emission reductions, such as in the Kyoto Protocol, and whether that would have positive impacts on climate change mitigation and compliance. A handful of papers conducted game-theoretic analysis on technology cooperation, sometimes as an alternative for cooperation on emission reductions, and found partially positive effects ( [[#Bosetti--2017|Bosetti et al. 2017]] ; [[#Narita--2017|Narita and Wagner 2017]] ; [[#Rubio--2017|Rubio 2017]] ; [[#Verdolini--2017|Verdolini and Bosetti 2017]] ). However, [[#Sarr--2017|Sarr and Swanson (2017)]] model that, due to the rebound effect, technology development and transfer of resource-saving technologies may not lead to envisioned emission reductions.

While technology cooperation can be aimed at emission reduction through mitigation projects, as indicated above, not all cooperative actions directly result in mitigation outcomes. Overall, technology transfer broadly has focused on: (i) enhanced climate technology absorption and deployment in developing countries; and (ii) enhanced research, development and demonstration (RD&amp;D) through cooperation and knowledge spillovers.

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==== 16.5.2.1 Enhancing Low-emission Technology Uptake in Developing Countries ====

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Real-world outcomes in terms of low-emission technology deployment in developing countries may vary significantly, depending on the nature of the international engagement and the domestic context. While there has been some success in the enhancement of technology deployment through technology transfer in some developing countries ( [[#de%20la%20Tour--2011|de la Tour et al. 2011]] ; [[#Zhang--2016|Zhang and Gallagher 2016]] ), many others, and particularly least-developed countries, are lagging behind ( [[#Glachant--2017|Glachant and Dechezleprêtre 2017]] ). [[#Glachant--2017|Glachant and Dechezleprêtre (2017)]] indicate that this is due to the lack of participation in economic globalisation and that climate negotiations could facilitate technology transfer to those countries through the creation of global demand for low-emission technologies through stronger mitigation targets that will result in lowering of costs and therefore enhanced technology diffusion. A broader perspective presents a host of other factors that govern technology diffusion and commercialisation in developing countries, including: investment; social, cultural and behavioural, marketing and market building; macroeconomics; and support policy ( [[#Bakhtiar--2020|Bakhtiar et al. 2020]] ). Ramos Mejía et al. (2018) indicate that the governance of low-emission technology transfer and deployment in developing countries is frequently negatively affected by a mixture of well- and ill-functioning institutions – for instance, in a context of market imperfection, clientelist and social exclusive communities and patrimonial and/or marketised states. Furthermore, existing interests, such as fossil fuel production, may also impede the deployment of low-emission technologies, as highlighted in case studies of Vietnam and Indonesia ( [[#Dorband--2020|Dorband et al. 2020]] ; [[#Ordonez--2021|Ordonez et al. 2021]] ). It is for such reasons that both domestic efforts and international engagement are seen as necessary to facilitate technology transfer as well as deployment in developing countries ( [[#Boyd--2012|Boyd 2012]] ). The same has been seen as true in the case of agriculture, where the very successful international research efforts of the CGIAR – with remarkably favourable benefit-cost ratios ( [[#Alston--2021|Alston et al. 2021]] ) – were complemented by the national agricultural research systems for effective uptake of high-yielding varieties of crops ( [[#Evenson--2003|Evenson and Gollin 2003]] ).

One key area for underpinning effective technology uptake in developing countries relates to capabilities for managing technological change. This includes the capabilities to innovate, implement, and undertake integrated planning. There is much research to indicate that the ability of a country’s firms to adopt new technologies is determined by its absorptive capacity, which includes its own R&amp;D activities, human capacity (e.g., technical personnel), government involvement (including institutional capacity), the infrastructure in the country ( [[#Kumar--1999|Kumar et al. 1999]] ), and knowledge and capacity as part of its ‘intangible assets’ or the ‘software’ ( [[#Ockwell--2015|Ockwell et al. 2015]] ; [[#da%20Silva--2019|da Silva et al. 2019]] ; [[#Corsi--2020|Corsi et al. 2020]] ). For sustainable development, the capacity to plan in an integrated way and implement the SDGs ( [[#Khalili--2015|Khalili et al. 2015]] ; [[#Elder--2016|Elder et al. 2016]] ), including using participatory approaches ( [[#Disterheft--2015|Disterheft et al. 2015]] ), is a conditional means of implementation. It also is argued that, if human capital were the focus of international climate negotiations as well as national climate policy, it could change the political economy in favour of climate mitigation, which is needed for developing such capabilities in advance to keep up with the required speed of transformation ( [[#Ockwell--2015|Ockwell et al. 2015]] ; [[#Hsu--2017|Hsu 2017]] ; [[#IPCC--2018b|IPCC 2018b]] ; [[#Upadhyaya--2020|Upadhyaya et al. 2020]] ). In a global analysis of wind energy using econometric analysis, Halleck-Vega et al. (2018) lend quantitative credibility to the claim that a technology skill base is a key determinant of technological diffusion. Activities to enhance capabilities include informational contacts, research activities, consulting, education and training, and activities related to technical facilities ( [[#Huh--2018|Huh and Kim 2018]] ; [[#Khan--2020|Khan et al. 2020]] ).

There are multiple studies drawing on empirical work that also support this conclusion. For South-South technology transfer between India and Kenya, not just technical characteristics, but also mutual learning on how to address common problems of electricity access and poverty, was suggested as an important condition for success ( [[#Ulsrud--2018|Ulsrud et al. 2018]] ). [[#Olawuyi--2018|Olawuyi (2018)]] discusses the specific capability gap in Africa, despite decades of technology transfer efforts under various mechanisms and programmes of the UNFCCC. The study suggests that barriers need to be resolved by African countries themselves, in particular: inadequate access to information about imported climate technologies; lack of domestic capacities to deploy and maintain imported technologies; the weak regulatory environment to stimulate clean technology entrepreneurship; the absence or inadequacy of climate change laws; and weak legal protection for imported technologies. Moreover, [[#Ziervogel--2021|Ziervogel et al. (2021)]] indicate that, for transformative adaptation, transdisciplinary approaches and capacity-building shifting, ‘the co-creation of contextual understandings’ instead of top-down transfer of existing knowledge would deliver better results. Despite the understanding of the importance of the capacity issue, significant gaps still remain on this front ( [[#TEC--2019|TEC 2019]] ) ( [[#16.5.4|Section 16.5.4]] ).

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==== 16.5.2.2 Enhancing RD&amp;D and Knowledge Spillovers ====

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As mentioned earlier, RD&amp;D can aid the development of new technologies as well as their adoption for new use contexts. Therefore, it is not surprising that international cooperation on RD&amp;D is identified as a mechanism to promote low-carbon innovation ( [[#Suzuki--2015|Suzuki 2015]] ; [[#Mission%20Innovation--2019|Mission Innovation 2019]] ; [[#TEC--2021|TEC 2021]] ). This has resulted in a variety of international initiatives to cooperate on technology in order to create knowledge spillovers and develop capacity. For example, the UNFCCC Technology Mechanism, among other things, aims to facilitate finance for RD&amp;D of climate technologies by helping with readiness activities for developing country actors. In particular preparing early-stage technologies for a smoother transition to deployment and commercialisation has been emphasised in the context of the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) ( [[#TEC--2017|TEC 2017]] ). There are numerous multilateral, bilateral and private programmes that have facilitated RD&amp;D, biased mostly towards mitigation (as opposed to adaptation) activities. Many programmes that seemed to be about RD&amp;D were in reality dialogues about research coordination ( [[#Ockwell--2015|Ockwell et al. 2015]] ). There are also a variety of possible bilateral and multilateral models and approaches for engaging in joint R&amp;D ( [[#Mission%20Innovation--2019|Mission Innovation 2019]] ). An update by the [[#TEC--2021|TEC (2021)]] reviewing good practices in international cooperation of technology confirmed the conclusions of [[#Ockwell--2015|Ockwell et al. (2015)]] , and moreover highlighted that most initiatives are led by the public sector, and that the private sector tended to get involved only in incubation, commercialisation and diffusion phases. It also concluded that, although participation of larger, higher-income developing countries seems to have increased, participation of least-developed countries is still very low.

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=== 16.5.3 International Technology Transfer and Cooperation: Recent Institutional Approaches ===

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The sections below discuss the literature on various categories of international technology cooperation and transfer.

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==== 16.5.3.1 UNFCCC Technology and Capacity-building Institutions ====

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Technology development and transfer have been a part of UNFCCC discussions and developments in the context of the international climate negotiations ever since its agreement in 1992, as assessed in AR5 ( [[#Stavins--2014|Stavins et al. 2014]] ). Support on ‘Technology Needs Assessment’ to developing countries was the first major action undertaken by the UNFCCC, and this has undergone different cycles of learning ( [[#Nygaard--2015|Nygaard and Hansen 2015]] ; [[#Hofman--2019|Hofman and van der Gaast 2019]] ). Since 2009, the UNFCCC discussions on technology development and transfer have focused on the Technology Mechanism under the Cancun Agreements of 2010, which can be seen as the global climate governance answer to redistributive claims by developing countries ( [[#McGee--2014|McGee and Wenta 2014]] ). The Technology Mechanism consists of the TEC and the Climate Technology Centre &amp; Network (CTCN). An independent review of CTCN, evaluated it on five dimensions – relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impacts and sustainability – and indicated that the organisation is achieving its mandate in all these dimensions, although there are some possible areas of improvement. The review also specifically noted that ‘the lack of predictability and security over financial resources significantly affected the CTCN’s ability to deliver services at the expected level, as did the CTCN’s lack of human and organizational resources and the capacity of NDEs [National Designated Entities].’ ( [[#TEC--2017|TEC 2017]] ). The CTCN has overcome some of the limitations imposed by resource constraints by acting as a matchmaker from an open-innovation perspective ( [[#Lee--2020|Lee and Mwebaza 2020]] ). The CTCN’s lack of financial sustainability has been a recurring issue, which may potentially be resolved by deepening the linkage between the CTCN and Green Climate Fund ( [[#Oh--2020|Oh 2020]] ). In the meanwhile, the Green Climate Fund is planning to establish the Climate Innovation Facility to support and accelerate early-stage innovations and climate technologies through the establishment of regional innovation hubs and climate accelerators as well as a climate growth fund ( [[#Green%20Climate%20Fund--2020|Green Climate Fund 2020]] ).

The ‘technology’ discussion has been further strengthened by the Paris Agreement, in which Article 10 is fully devoted to technology development and transfer ( [[#UNFCCC--2015|UNFCCC 2015]] ). However, the political discussions around technology continue to be characterised by viewing technology mostly as hardware ( [[#Haselip--2015|Haselip et al. 2015]] ), and relatively limited in scope ( [[#de%20Coninck--2017|de Coninck and Sagar 2017]] ). The workplans of the TEC and the CTCN do, however, indicate a broadening of the perspective on technology ( [[#CTCN--2019|CTCN 2019]] ; [[#TEC--2019|TEC 2019]] ).

Since the Kyoto Protocol’s CDM has been operational, studies have assessed its hypothesised contribution to technology transfer, including transfer of knowledge. Though not an explicit objective of the CDM, numerous papers have investigated whether CDM projects contribute to technology transfer ( [[#Michaelowa--2019|Michaelowa et al. 2019]] ). The literature varies in its assessment. Some find extensive use of domestic technology and hence lower levels of international technology transfer ( [[#Doranova--2010|Doranova et al. 2010]] ), while others indicate that around 40% of projects feature hardware or other types of international transfer of technology ( [[#Seres--2009|Seres et al. 2009]] ; [[#Murphy--2015|Murphy et al. 2015]] ), depending on the nature of technology, the host country and region ( [[#Cui--2020|Cui et al. 2020]] ) and the project type ( [[#Karakosta--2012|Karakosta et al. 2012]] ). The CDM was generally positively evaluated on its contribution to technology transfer. However, it was also regarded critically as the market-responsiveness and following of export implies a bias to larger, more advanced economies rather than those countries most in need of technology transfer ( [[#Gandenberger--2016|Gandenberger et al. 2016]] ), although some countries have managed to correct that by directing the projects, sub-nationally, to provinces with the greatest need ( [[#Bayer--2016|Bayer et al. 2016]] ). Also, the focus on hardware in evaluations of technology transfer under the CDM has been criticised ( [[#Haselip--2015|Haselip et al. 2015]] ; [[#Michaelowa--2019|Michaelowa et al. 2019]] ). Indeed, although many studies do go beyond hardware in their evaluations (e.g., [[#Murphy--2015|Murphy et al. 2015]] ), the degree to which the project leads to a change in the national system of innovation or institutional capacity development is not commonly assessed, or has been assessed as limited ( [[#de%20Coninck--2015|de Coninck and Puig 2015]] ).

There is significantly less literature on capacity building under the UNFCCC, especially as it relates to managing the technology transition. In a legal analysis, [[#D’Auvergne--2017|D’Auvergne and Nummelin (2017)]] indicate the nature, scope and principles of Article 11 on capacity building of the Paris Agreement as being demand- and country-driven, following a needs approach, fostering national, subnational and local ownership, and being iterative, incorporating the lessons learnt, as well as participatory, cross-cutting and gender-response. They also highlight that it is novel that least-developed countries and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) are called out as the most vulnerable and most in need of capacity building, and that it raises a ‘legal expectation’ that all parties ‘should’ cooperate to enhance the capacity in developing countries to implement the Paris Agreement. These aspects are reflected in the terms of reference of the Paris Committee on Capacity-building (PCCB) that was established in 2015 at the 21st Conference of the Parties ( [[#UNFCCC--2016|UNFCCC 2016]] ; [[#D’Auvergne--2017|D’Auvergne and Nummelin 2017]] ), and was extended by five years at the 25th Conference of the Parties in 2019 ( [[#UNFCCC--2020a|UNFCCC 2020a]] , b). In its work plan for 2020–2024, its aims include ‘identifying capacity gaps and needs, both current and emerging, and recommending ways to address them’.

An example of how innovative technologies combined with capacity development, and how institutional innovation is combined in the context of adaptation to extreme weather in SIDS can be found in Box 16.8.

From the broader assessment above, despite limitations of available information, it is clear that the number of initiatives and activities on international cooperation and technology transfer and capacity building seem to have been enhanced since the Cancun Agreements and the Paris Agreement ( [[#TEC--2021|TEC 2021]] ). However, much more can be done, given the complexity and magnitude of the requirements in terms of coverage of activities, the amount of committed funding, and its effectiveness. Some assessments of UNFCCC instruments specifically for technology transfer to developing countries have indicated that functions such as knowledge development, market formation and legitimacy in developing countries’ low-emission technological innovation systems would need much more support to fulfil the Paris Agreement goals ( [[#de%20Coninck--2015|de Coninck and Puig 2015]] ; [[#Ockwell--2015|Ockwell et al. 2015]] ); such areas would benefit from continued attention, given their role in the overall climate technology transition.

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==== 16.5.3.2 International RD&amp;D Cooperation and Capacity-building Initiatives ====

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Besides the UNFCCC mechanisms, there are numerous other initiatives that promote international cooperation on RD&amp;D as well as capacity building. Some of them are based on the notion of ‘mission-oriented innovation policy’ ( [[#Mazzucato--2017|Mazzucato and Semieniuk 2017]] ; [[#Mazzucato--2018|Mazzucato 2018]] ), which shapes markets rather than merely corrects market failures.

For instance, Mission Innovation is a global initiative consisting of 23 member countries and the European Commission working together to reinvigorate and accelerate global clean energy innovation with the objective to make clean energy widely affordable with improved reliability and secured supply of energy. The goal is to accelerate clean energy innovation in order to limit the rise in the global temperature to well below 2°C. The members seek to foster international collaboration among its members and increase public investments in clean energy R&amp;D with the engagement of the private sector. A recent assessment shows that, although expenditures are rising, the aims were not met by 2020 ( [[#Myslikova--2020|Myslikova and Gallagher 2020]] ). [[#Gross--2018|Gross et al. (2018)]] caution against too much focus on R&amp;D efforts for energy technologies to address climate change, including for Mission Innovation. They argue that, given the timescales of commercialisation, developing new technologies now would mean they would be commercially too late for addressing climate change. [[#Huh--2018|Huh and Kim (2018)]] discuss two ‘knowledge and technology transfer’ projects that were eventually not pursued beyond the feasibility study phase due to cooperation and commitment problems between national and local governments, and they highlight the need for ownership and engagement of local residents and recipient governments.

Intellectual property rights (IPR) regimes (Box 16.9) can be an enabler or a barrier to energy transition. For more background on IPR and impact on innovation, see [[#16.4.6|Section 16.4.6]] .

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=== Box 16.8 | Capacity Building and Innovation for Early Warning Systems in Small Island Developing States ===

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One of the areas of international cooperation on capacity building is adaptation, which has been highlighted by both the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) ( [[#Ockwell--2015|Ockwell et al. 2015]] ; [[#TEC--2015|TEC 2015]] ) and the Paris Committee on Capacity-building ( [[#UNFCCC--2020b|UNFCCC 2020b]] ) as an area where capacity gaps remain, especially in Small Island Developing States (SIDS).

While adaptation was initially conceived primarily in terms of infrastructural adjustments to long-term changes in average conditions (e.g., rising sea levels), a key innovation in recent years has been to couple such long-term risk management to existing efforts to manage disaster risk, specifically including early warning systems, enabling early action in the face of climate- and weather-risk at much shorter timescales ( [[#IPCC--2012|IPCC 2012]] ), with potentially significant rates of return ( [[#Rogers--2010|Rogers and Tsirkunov 2010]] ; [[#Hallegatte--2012|Hallegatte 2012]] ; [[#Global%20Commission%20on%20Adaptation--2019|Global Commission on Adaptation 2019]] ).

In recent years, deliberate international climate finance investments have focused on ensuring that developing countries (and especially SIDS and least-developed countries) have access to improvements in hydrometeorological observations, modelling, and prediction capacity, sometimes with a particular focus on the people intended to benefit from the information produced ( [[#CREWS--2016|CREWS 2016]] ). For instance, on the Eastern Caribbean SIDS of Dominica, researchers took a community-based approach to identify the mediating factors affecting the challenges to coastal fishing communities in the aftermath of two extreme weather events (in particular hurricane Maria in 2017) ( [[#Turner--2020|Turner et al. 2020]] ). Adopting an adaptive capacity framework ( [[#Cinner--2018|Cinner et al. 2018]] ), they identified ‘intangible resources’ that people relied on in their post-disaster response as important for starting up fishery, but also went beyond that framework to conclude that the response ability on the part of governmental organisations as well as other actors (e.g., fish vendors) in the supply chain is also a requirement for rebuilding and restarting income-generating activity ( [[#Turner--2020|Turner et al. 2020]] ). Numerous other studies have highlighted capacity-building as adaptation priorities ( [[#Basel--2020|Basel et al. 2020]] ; [[#Kuhl--2020|Kuhl et al. 2020]] ; [[#Sarker--2020|Sarker et al. 2020]] ; [[#Vogel--2020|Vogel et al. 2020]] ; [[#Williams--2020|Williams et al. 2020]] ).

One of several helpful innovations in these efforts is impact-based forecasting ( [[#Harrowsmith--2020|Harrowsmith et al. 2020]] ), which provides forecasts targeted at the impact of the hazard rather than simply the meteorological variable. This enables a much easier coupling to early action in response to the information, and a more appropriate response afterwards. Automatic responses to warnings have also been adopted in the humanitarian field for anticipatory action ahead of (rather than simply in response to) disasters triggered by natural hazards ( [[#Coughlan%20de%20Perez--2015|Coughlan de Perez et al. 2015]] ). This has resulted in a rapid scale-up of such anticipatory financing mechanisms to tens of countries over the past few years, and emerging evidence of its effectiveness. Still, the response is lacking in coherence and comprehensiveness, resulting in calls for a more systematic evidence agenda for anticipatory action ( [[#Weingärtner--2020|Weingärtner et al. 2020]] ).

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=== Box 16.9 | Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Regimes and Technology Transfer ===

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In the global context of climate mitigation technologies, it has been noted that technologies have been developed primarily in industrialised countries but are urgently required in fast-growing emerging economies ( [[#Dechezleprêtre--2011|Dechezleprêtre et al. 2011]] ). International technology transfers can take place via three primary channels: (i) trade in goods, where technology is embedded in products; (ii) Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), where enterprises transfer firm-specific technology to foreign affiliates; and (iii) patent licences, where third parties obtain the right to use technologies. IPRs are relevant for all these three channels.

Not surprisingly, the role of IPRs in international transfer of climate mitigation technologies has been much discussed but also described as particularly controversial ( [[#Abdel-Latif--2015|Abdel-Latif 2015]] ). The relationships between IPR, innovation, international technology transfer and local mitigation and adaptation are complex ( [[#Maskus--2010|Maskus 2010]] ; [[#Abdel-Latif--2015|Abdel-Latif 2015]] ; [[#Li--2020|Li et al. 2020]] ) and there is no clear consensus on what kind of an IPR regime will be most beneficial for promoting technology transfer.

Several studies argue that, particularly in developing nations, the global IPR regime has resulted in delayed access, reduced competition and higher prices ( [[#Littleton--2008|Littleton 2008]] ; [[#Zhuang--2017|Zhuang 2017]] ) and that climate-change-related technology transfer is insufficiently stimulated under the current IPR regime. Compulsory licensing (as already used in medicine) is one of the routes proposed to repair this ( [[#Littleton--2008|Littleton 2008]] ; [[#Abdel-Latif--2015|Abdel-Latif 2015]] ).

There is little systematic evidence that patents and other IPRs restrict access to environmentally-sound technologies, since these technologies are mostly in sectors based on mature technologies where numerous substitutes among global competitors are available ( [[#Maskus--2010|Maskus 2010]] ). This might, however, change in the future – for instance, with new technologies based on plants, via biotechnologies and synthetic fuels ( [[#Maskus--2010|Maskus 2010]] ), for which [[#Correa--2020|Correa et al. (2020)]] already find some evidence.

There is also literature suggesting that weak IPR regimes have a ‘strong and negative impact on the international diffusion of patented knowledge’ ( [[#Dechezleprêtre--2013|Dechezleprêtre et al. 2013]] ; [[#Glachant--2017|Glachant and Dechezleprêtre 2017]] ). Also, patents may support market transactions in technology, including international technology transfer, especially to middle-income countries and larger developing countries ( [[#Maskus--2010|Maskus 2010]] ; [[#Hall--2019|Hall and Helmers 2019]] ) but least-developed countries may be better served by building capacity to absorb and implement technology ( [[#Hall--2010|Hall and Helmers 2010]] ; [[#Maskus--2010|Maskus 2010]] ; [[#Sanni--2016|Sanni et al. 2016]] ; [[#Glachant--2017|Glachant and Dechezleprêtre 2017]] ) ''.'' It is also argued that it is not even clear that the patent system as it exists today is the most appropriate vehicle for encouraging international access ( [[#Hall--2010|Hall and Helmers 2010]] ; [[#Maskus--2010|Maskus 2010]] ; [[#Sanni--2016|Sanni et al. 2016]] ; [[#Glachant--2017|Glachant and Dechezleprêtre 2017]] ). Given the large variation in perspectives on the role of IPRs in technology transfer, there is a need for more evidence and analysis to better understand if, and under what conditions, IPR may hinder or promote technology transfer ( [[#TEC--2012|TEC 2012]] ).

In terms of ways forward to meet the challenge of climate change, different suggestions are made in the context of IPR that can help to further improve international technology transfer of climate mitigation technologies, including through the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, by making decisions on IPR to developing countries on a case-by-case basis, by developing countries experimenting more with policies on IPR protection, or through brokering or patent-pooling institutions ( [[#Littleton--2009|Littleton 2009]] ; [[#Maskus--2017|Maskus and Reichman 2017]] ; [[#Dussaux--2018|Dussaux et al. 2018]] ). Others also suggest that distinctions among country groups be made on the basis of levels of technological and economic development, with least-developed countries getting particular attention ( [[#Zhuang--2017|Zhuang 2017]] ; [[#Abbott--2018|Abbott 2018]] ).

[[File:c0ced309a8d4345abbbfdd33722426cb IPCC_AR6_WGIII_CCBox_12_Figure_1.png]]

'''Cross-Chapter Box 12, Figure 1 | Stages of socio-technical transition processes.'''

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=== 16.5.4 Emerging Ideas for International Technology Transfer and Cooperation ===

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As with the broader innovation literature ( [[#16.3|Section 16.3]] ), and drawing on such literature, there has been an emergence of a greater understanding of, and emphasis on, the role of innovation systems (at national, sectoral, and technological levels) as a way to help developing countries with the climate technology transition ( [[#TEC--2015|TEC 2015]] ; [[#Ockwell--2016|Ockwell and Byrne 2016]] ). This has given rise to several proposals, discussed here and summarised in Figure 16.3.

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[[File:e0e27f89ad209bef1739ceade0649cdf IPCC_AR6_WGIII_Figure_16_3.png]]

'''Figure 16.3 | Examples of recent mechanisms and emerging ideas (right column) in relation to level of maturity of the national or technological innovation system, objectives of international climate technology transfer efforts and current mechanisms and means.''' Sources: [[#Sagar--2009|Sagar (2009)]] ; [[#Ockwell--2016|Ockwell and Byrne (2016)]] ; [[#Khan--2020|Khan et al. (2020)]] ; [[#Oberthür--2021|Oberthür et al. (2021)]] .

Enhancing deployment and diffusion of climate technologies in developing countries would require a variety of actors with sufficient capabilities ( ''robust evidence'' , ''medium agreement'' ) ( [[#Kumar--1999|Kumar et al. 1999]] ; [[#Sagar--2009|Sagar et al. 2009]] ; [[#Ockwell--2018|Ockwell et al. 2018]] ). This may include strengthening existing actors ( [[#Malhotra--2021|Malhotra et al. 2021]] ), supporting science, technology, and innovation-based start-ups to meet social goals ( [[#Surana--2020b|Surana et al. 2020b]] ), and developing entities and programmes that are intended to address specific gaps relating to technology development and deployment ( [[#Sagar--2009|Sagar et al. 2009]] ; [[#Ockwell--2018|Ockwell et al. 2018]] ).

There is also an increasing emphasis on the relevance of participative social innovation, local grounding and policy learning as a replacement of the expert-led technological change ( [[#Chaudhary--2012|Chaudhary et al. 2012]] ; [[#Disterheft--2015|Disterheft et al. 2015]] ; [[#Kowarsch--2016|Kowarsch et al. 2016]] ). Others have suggested a shift to international innovation cooperation rather than technology transfer, which implies a donor-recipient relationship. The notion of innovation cooperation also makes more explicit the focus on innovation processes and systems ( [[#Pandey--2021|Pandey et al. 2021]] ). A broad transformative agenda therefore proposes that contemporary societal challenges are complex and multivariegated in scope and will require the actions of a diverse set of actors to formulate and address the policy, implying that social, institutional and behavioural changes next to technological innovations are the possible solutions ( [[#Geels--2004|Geels 2004]] ) (see also Cross-Chapter Box 12 in this chapter).

Several authors have proposed new mechanisms for international cooperation on technology. [[#Ockwell--2016|Ockwell and Byrne (2016)]] argue that a role for the UNFCCC Technology Mechanism could be to support Climate Relevant Innovation-system Builders (CRIBs) in developing countries, institutions locally that develop capabilities that ‘form the bedrock of transformative, climate-compatible, technological change and development’. [[#Khan--2020|Khan et al. (2020)]] propose a specific variant with universities in developing countries serving as ‘central hubs’ for capacity building to implement the NDCs as well as other climate policy and planning instruments; they also suggest that developing countries outline their capacity-building needs more clearly in their NDCs.

Building on an earlier discussion of technology-oriented and sectoral agreements ( [[#Meckling--2009|Meckling and Chung 2009]] ) and the potential for international cooperation in energy-intensive industry ( [[#Åhman--2017|Åhman et al. 2017]] ), where deep emission reduction measures require transformative changes (Chapter 11), [[#Oberthür--2021|Oberthür et al. (2021)]] propose that that a way forward for the global governance for energy-intensive industry could be through sub-sector ‘clubs’ that include governmental, private and societal actors ( [[#Oberthür--2021|Oberthür et al. 2021]] ).

Figure 16.3 summarises examples of emerging ideas for international cooperation on climate technology, their relation to the objectives and existing efforts, and the level of development of the innovation system around a technology ( [[#Hekkert--2007|Hekkert et al. 2007]] ; [[#Bergek--2008|Bergek et al. 2008]] ) or in nations ( [[#Lundvall--2009|Lundvall et al. 2009]] ).

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