Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-7 (section)

=== 7.2.7 Observed Impacts of Climate on Conflict ===

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==== 7.2.7.1 Introduction ====

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''In AR5, conflict was addressed in WGII [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-12|Chapter 12]] on human security. The chapter concluded that some of the factors that increase the risk of violent conflict within states are sensitive to climate change'' ( ''medium evidence, medium agreement'' ) '', that people living in places affected by violent conflict are particularly vulnerable to climate change'' ( ''medium confidence'' ) ''and that climate change will lead to new challenges to states and will increasingly shape both conditions of security and national security policies'' ( ''medium evidence, medium agreement'' ) ''.'' AR5 characterised a major debate within the field as: authors supporting an association between climate anomalies and conflict that can be extrapolated into the future (e.g., Hsiang et al. (2013); [[#Hsiang--2014|Hsiang and Marshall (2014)]] ; Burke et al. (2015a)) and authors arguing that these associations are not universal and break down when contextual, scale and political factors are introduced (e.g., [[#Buhaug--2014|Buhaug et al. (2014)]] ; Buhaug (2016)).

''Consistent with AR5 findings, there continues to be little observed evidence that climatic variability or change cause violent inter-state conflict. In intra-state settings, climate change has been associated with the onset of conflict, civil unrest or riots in urban settings'' ( ''high agreement, medium evidence'' ) ( [[#Ide--2020|Ide (2020)]] , ''and changes in the duration and severity of existing violent conflicts'' ( [[#Koubi--2019|Koubi, 2019]] ). Climate change is conceptualised as one of many factors that interact to raise tensions ( [[#Boas--2016|Boas and Rothe, 2016]] ) through diverse causal mechanisms ( [[#Mach--2019|Mach et al., 2019]] ; [[#Ide--2020|Ide et al., 2020]] ) and as part of the peace-vulnerability-development nexus ( [[#Barnett--2019|Barnett, 2019]] ; [[#Abrahams--2020|Abrahams, 2020]] ; [[#Buhaug--2021|Buhaug and von Uexkull, 2021]] ). New areas of the literature assessed in this report include the security implications of responses to climate change, the gendered dynamics of conflict and exposure to violence under climate change and civil unrest in urban settings. The impact of violent conflict on vulnerability is not addressed in this chapter but does arise in other chapters (Sections 8.3.2.3, 17.2.2.2). Other chapters address non-violent conflict over changing availability and distribution of resources, for example, competing land uses and fish stocks migrating to different territories (Sections 5.8.2.3; 5.8.3, 5.9.3, 5.13, 9.8.1.1, 9.8.5.1). A commonly used definition of armed conflict is conflicts involving greater than 25 battle-related deaths in a year; this number represents the Uppsala Conflict Data Program threshold for inclusion in their database, a core resource in this field.

''Climatic conditions have affected armed conflict within countries, but their influence has been small compared to socioeconomic, political and cultural factors ( [[#Mach--2019|Mach et al., 2019]] )'' ( ''high agreement, medium evidence'' ) ''.'' Inter-group inequality, and consequent relative deprivation can lead to conflict and the negative impacts of climate change lower the opportunity cost of involvement in conflict ( [[#Buhaug--2020|Buhaug et al., 2020]] ; [[#Vestby--2019|Vestby, 2019]] ). Potential pathways linking climate and conflict include direct impacts on physiology from heat or resource scarcity; indirect impacts of climatic variability on economic output, agricultural incomes, higher food prices and increasing migration flows; and the unintended effects of climate mitigation and adaptation policies ( [[#Koubi--2019|Koubi, 2019]] ; [[#Busby--2018|Busby, 2018]] ; [[#Sawas--2018|Sawas et al., 2018]] ). Relative deprivation, political exclusion and ethnic fractionalisation and ethnic grievances are other key variables ( [[#Schleussner--2016|Schleussner et al., 2016]] ; [[#Theisen--2017|Theisen, 2017]] ). Research shows that factors such as land tenure and competing land uses interacting with market-driven pressures and existing ethnic divisions produce conflict over land resources rather than a scarcity of natural resources caused by climate impacts such as drought ( ''high agreement, medium evidence'' ) ( [[#Theisen--2017|Theisen, 2017]] ; [[#Balestri--2017|Balestri and Maggioni, 2017]] ; [[#Kuusaana--2015|Kuusaana and Bukari, 2015]] ; Box 8.3).

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==== 7.2.7.2 Impacts of Climate Change and Violent Conflict ====

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''Positive temperature anomalies and average increases in temperature over time have been associated with collective violent conflict in certain settings'' ( ''medium agreement, low evidence'' ) ''.'' Helman and Zaitchik (2020) find statistical associations between temperature and violent conflict in Africa and the Middle East that are stronger in warmer places and identify seasonal temperature effects on violence. However, they are unable to detect the impact of regional temperature increases on violence. For Africa, Van Weezel (2019) found associations between average increases in temperature and conflict risk. Caruso et al. (2016) found an association between rises in minimum temperature and violence through the impact of temperature on rice yields (Box 9.4). However, the associations between temperature and violence are weak compared to those with political and social factors (e.g., Owain and Maslin (2018)) and research focuses on areas where conflict is already present and, as such, is sensitive to selection bias ( [[#Adams--2018|Adams et al., 2018]] ). There is a body of literature that finds statistical associations between temperature anomalies and inter-personal violence, crime and aggression in the Global North, predominantly in the USA (e.g., [[#Ranson--2014|Ranson (2014)]] ; [[#Mares--2019|Mares and Moffett (2019)]] ; [[#Tiihonen--2017|Tiihonen et al. (2017)]] ; [[#Parks--2020|Parks et al. (2020)]] ; [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-14#14.4|Section 14.4.8]] ). However, authors have cautioned against extrapolating seasonal associations into long-term trends and against focusing on individual crimes rather than wider social injustices associated with climate change and its impacts ( [[#Lynch--2020|Lynch et al., 2020]] ).

''Variation in availability of water has been associated with international political tension and intra-national collective violence'' ( ''low agreement, medium evidence'' ) ''.'' Drought conditions have been associated with violence due to impacts on income from agriculture and water and food security, with studies focusing predominantly on sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East ( [[#Ide--2015|Ide and Frohlich, 2015]] ; [[#De%20Juan--2015|De Juan, 2015]] ; [[#Von%20Uexkull--2016|Von Uexkull et al., 2016]] ; [[#Waha--2017|Waha et al., 2017]] ; [[#Abbott--2017|Abbott et al., 2017]] ; [[#D’Odorico--2018|D’Odorico et al., 2018]] ). A small set of published studies has argued inconclusively over the role of drought in causing the Syrian civil war ( [[#Gleick--2014|Gleick, 2014]] ; [[#Kelley--2015|Kelley et al., 2015]] ; [[#Selby--2017|Selby et al., 2017]] ; 16.2.3.9). In general, research stresses the underlying economic, social and political drivers of conflict. For example, research on conflict in the Lake Chad region has demonstrated that the lake drying was only one of many factors including lack of development and infrastructure ( [[#Okpara--2016|Okpara et al., 2016]] ; [[#Nagarajan--2018|Nagarajan et al., 2018]] ; [[#Tayimlong--2020|Tayimlong, 2020]] ). Fewer studies examine the relationship between flooding (excess water) and violence and often rely on migration as the causal factor (see below). However, some studies have shown an association between flooding and civil unrest ( [[#Ide--2020|Ide et al., 2020]] ; [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-4#4.3.6|Section 4.3.6]] ; [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-12#12.5.3|Section 12.5.3]] ; Box 9.4).

''Extreme weather events can be associated with increased conflict risk'' ( ''low agreement, medium evidence'' ) ''.'' There is the potential for extreme weather events and disasters to cause political instability and increase the risk of violent conflict, although not conclusively ( [[#Brzoska--2018|Brzoska, 2018]] ). Post-disaster settings can be used to intensify state repression ( [[#Wood--2016|Wood and Wright, 2016]] ) and to alter insurgent groups’ behaviour ( [[#Walch--2018|Walch, 2018]] ). Different stakeholders use disasters to establish new narratives and alter public opinion ( [[#Venugopal--2017|Venugopal and Yasir, 2017]] ). Some research has demonstrated how post-disaster activities have had positive impacts on the social contract between people and the state, reducing the risk of conflict by strengthening relations between government and citizens and strengthening the citizenship of marginalised communities (Siddiqi, 2018; [[#Pelling--2010|Pelling and Dill, 2010]] ; [[#Siddiqi--2019|Siddiqi, 2019]] ). However, post-disaster and disaster risk-related activities themselves have limited capacity to support diplomatic efforts to build peace ( [[#Kelman--2018|Kelman et al., 2018]] ).

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==== 7.2.7.3 Causal Pathways Between Climate Change Impacts and Violent Conflict ====

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''Increases in food prices due to reduced agricultural production and global food price shocks are associated with conflict risk and represent a key pathway linking climate variability and conflict'' ( ''medium confidence'' ) ''.'' Increases in food prices are associated with civil unrest in urban areas among populations unable to afford or produce their own food and in rural populations due to changes in availability of agricultural employment with shifting commodity prices ( [[#Martin-Shields--2019|Martin-Shields and Stojetz, 2019]] ). Under such conditions, locally specific grievances, hunger and social inequalities can initiate or exacerbate conflicts. Food price volatility in general is not associated with violence, but sudden food price hikes have been linked to civil unrest in some circumstances ( [[#Bellemare--2015|Bellemare, 2015]] ; [[#McGuirk--2020|McGuirk and Burke, 2020]] ; [[#Winne--2019|Winne and Peersman, 2019]] ). In urban settings in Kenya, Koren et al. (2021) found an association between food and water insecurity that is mutually reinforcing and associated with social unrest (although insecurity in either food or water on its own was not). Analysing the global food riots in 2007/2008 and 2011, [[#Heslin--2021|Heslin (2021)]] stresses the role of local politics and pre-existing grievances in determining whether people mobilise around food insecurity (Chapter 5).

''Climate-related internal migration has been associated with the experience of violence by migrants, the prolongation of conflicts in migrant receiving areas and civil unrest in urban areas'' ( ''medium agreement, low evidence'' ). Research points to the potential for conflict to serve as an intervening factor between climate and migration. However, the nature of the relationship is diverse and context specific. For example, displaced people and migrants may be associated with heightened social tensions in receiving areas through mechanisms such as ecological degradation, reduced access to services and a disturbed demographic balance in the host area ( [[#Rüegger--2020|Rüegger and Bohnet, 2020]] ). Ghimire et al. (2015) observed that an influx of flood-displaced people prolonged conflict by causing a lack of access to services for some of the host population and feelings of grievance. Further, migration from drought-stricken areas to local urban centres has been used to suggest a climate trigger for the Syrian conflict (e.g., [[#Ash--2020|Ash and Obradovich (2020)]] ). However, this link has been strongly contested by research that contextualises the drought in wider political economic approaches and existing migration patterns ( [[#De%20Châtel--2014|De Châtel, 2014]] ; [[#Fröhlich--2016|Fröhlich, 2016]] ; [[#Selby--2019|Selby, 2019]] ; 16.2.3.9).

''There is some evidence of an association between climate-related rural-to-urban migration and the risk of civil unrest'' ( ''medium agreement, low evidence'' ) ''.'' [[#Petrova--2021|Petrova (2021)]] found that while migration in general was associated with increased protests in urban receiving areas, the relationship did not hold for hazard-related migration. In other settings, the association of civil unrest with in-migration was found to depend on the political alignment of the host state with the capital ( [[#Bhavnani--2015|Bhavnani and Lacina, 2015]] ), previous experience of extreme climate hazards ( [[#Koubi--2021|Koubi et al., 2021]] ) and previous experience of violence among migrants ( [[#Linke--2018|Linke et al., 2018]] ). Climate-related migrants have reported higher levels of perception and experience of violence in their destination ( [[#Linke--2018|Linke et al., 2018]] ; [[#Koubi--2018|Koubi et al., 2018]] ). There has been no association established between international migration and conflict. The literature highlights how unjust racial logics may generate spurious links between climate migration and security ( [[#Fröhlich--2016|Fröhlich, 2016]] ; [[#Telford--2018|Telford, 2018]] ).

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==== 7.2.7.4 Gendered Dimensions of Climate-Related Conflict ====

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''Structural inequalities play out at an individual level to create gendered experiences of violence'' ( ''high agreement, medium evidence'' ) ''.'' Violent conflict is experienced differently by men and women because of gender norms that already exist in society and shape vulnerabilities. For example, conflict deepens gendered vulnerabilities to climate change related to unequal access to land and livelihood opportunities ( [[#Chandra--2017|Chandra et al., 2017]] ). Motivations for inter-group violence may be influenced by constructions of masculinity, for example the responsibility to secure their family’s survival or pay dowries ( [[#Myrttinen--2017|Myrttinen et al., 2017]] ), and gendered roles may incentivise young men to protest or to join non-state armed groups during periods of adverse climate ( [[#Myrttinen--2015|Myrttinen et al., 2015]] ; [[#Myrttinen--2017|Myrttinen et al., 2017]] ; [[#Anwar--2019|Anwar et al., 2019]] ; [[#Hendrix--2015|Hendrix and Haggard, 2015]] ; [[#Koren--2017|Koren and Bagozzi, 2017]] ). Research has found a positive correlation between crop failures and suicides by male farmers who could not adapt their livelihoods to rising temperatures (Bryant and Garnham 2015; [[#Kennedy--2014|Kennedy and King, 2014]] ; [[#Carleton--2017|Carleton, 2017]] ).

''Extreme weather and climate impacts are associated with increased violence against women, girls and vulnerable groups'' ( ''high agreement, medium evidence'' ) ''.'' During and after extreme weather events, women, girls and LGBTQI people are at increased risk of domestic violence, harassment, sexual violence and trafficking ( [[#Le%20Masson--2019|Le Masson et al., 2019]] ; [[#Nguyen--2019|Nguyen, 2019]] ; [[#Myrttinen--2015|Myrttinen et al., 2015]] ; [[#Chindarkar--2012|Chindarkar, 2012]] ). For example, early marriage is used as a coping strategy for managing the effects of extreme weather events ( [[#Ahmed--2019|Ahmed et al., 2019]] ) and women are exposed to increase risk of harassment and sexual assault as scarcity and gender-based roles cause them to walk longer distances to fetch water and fuel ( [[#Le%20Masson--2019|Le Masson et al., 2019]] ). Within the household, violent backlash or heightened tensions may arise from changing gender norms as men migrate to find work in post-disaster settings ( [[#Stork--2015|Stork et al., 2015]] ) and men’s use of negative coping mechanisms, such as alcoholism, when unable to meet norms of providing for the household ( [[#Anwar--2019|Anwar et al., 2019]] ; [[#Stork--2015|Stork et al., 2015]] ). Rates of intimate partner violence have been found to increase with higher temperatures ( [[#Sanz-Barbero--2018|Sanz-Barbero et al., 2018]] ).

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==== 7.2.7.5 Observed Impacts on Non-violent Conflict and Geopolitics ====

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''Climate adaptation and mitigation projects implemented without taking local interests and dynamics into account have the potential to cause conflict'' ( ''high agreement, medium evidence'' ) ''.'' Reforestation or forest management programmes driven by reducing emissions through deforestation, land zoning and managed retreat due to sea level rise have been identified as having the potential to cause friction and conflict within and between groups and communities ( [[#de%20la%20Vega-Leinert--2018|de la Vega-Leinert et al., 2018]] ; [[#Froese--2019|Froese and Schilling, 2019]] ). Conflict may arise when there is resistance to a proposed project, where interventions favour one group over another, or when projects undermine livelihoods or displace populations (e.g., [[#Nightingale--2017|Nightingale (2017)]] ; Sovacool et al. (2015); [[#Sovacool--2018|Sovacool (2018)]] ; Corbera (2017); Hunsberger (2018); Sections 4.6.8, 5.13.4, 14.4.7.3). In addition to conflict generated by the poor implementation of land-based climate mitigation and adaptation projects, [[#Gilmore--2021|Gilmore and Buhaug (2021)]] highlight the links between climate policy and conflict through the potential effects of unequal distribution of economic burdens and fossil fuel markets on economic growth. There is a small literature that draws attention to the potential security of nuclear proliferation, if nuclear energy is increasingly employed as a low-carbon energy source (e.g., Parthemore et al. (2018); Bunn, (2019)).

''Economic and social changes due to changes in sea ice extent in the Arctic are anticipated to be managed as part of existing governance structures'' ( ''high agreement, medium evidence'' ) ''.'' The opening-up of the Arctic and associated geopolitical manoeuvring for access to shipping routes and sub-sea hydrocarbons is often highlighted as a potential source of climate conflict (e.g., Koivurova (2009); [[#Åtland--2013|Åtland (2013)]] ; [[#Tamnes--2014|Tamnes and Offerdal (2014)]] ). Research assessed in AR5 focused on the potential for resource wars and Arctic land grabs. However, research since AR5 is less sensationalist in its approach to Arctic security, focusing instead on the practicalities of polycentric Arctic governance under climate change, the economic impacts of climate change, protecting the human security of Arctic populations whose autonomy is at risk ( [[#Heininen--2020|Heininen and Exner-Pirot, 2020]] ), understanding how different regions (e.g., the EU) are positioning themselves more prominently in the Arctic space (Raspotnik and Østhagen, 2019) and Arctic Indigenous Peoples’ understanding of security ( [[#Hossain--2016|Hossain, 2016]] ; Chapter 3; Chapter 14; CCP6).

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