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=== Box 10.6 | Critical Minerals and The Future of Electromobility and Renewables === <div id="h2-1-siblings" class="h2-siblings"></div> The global transition towards renewable energy technologies and battery systems necessarily involves materials, markets, and supply chains on a hitherto unknown scale and scope. This has raised concerns regarding mineral requirements central to the feasibility of the energy transition. Constituent materials required for the development of these low-carbon technologies are regarded as ‘critical’ materials ( [[#US%20Geological%20Survey--2018|US Geological Survey 2018]] ; [[#Commonwealth%20of%20Australia--2019|Commonwealth of Australia 2019]] ; [[#Lee--2020|Lee et al. 2020]] ; [[#Marinaro--2020|Marinaro et al. 2020]] ; [[#Sovacool--2020|Sovacool et al. 2020]] ). ‘Critical materials’ are critical because of their economic or national security importance, or high risk of supply disruption. Many of these materials and rare earth elements (REEs) as ‘technologically critical’, not only due to their strategic or economic importance but the risk of short supply or price volatility ( [[#Marinaro--2020|Marinaro et al. 2020]] ). In addition to these indicators, production growth and market dynamics are also incorporated into screening tools to assess emerging trends in material commodities that are deemed as fundamental to the well-being of the nation ( [[#NSTC--2018|NSTC 2018]] ). The critical materials identified by most nations are: REEs neodymium and dysprosium for permanent magnets in wind turbines and electric motors; lithium and cobalt, primarily for batteries though many other metals are involved; and, cadmium, tellurium, selenium, gallium and indium for solar PV manufacture ( [[#Valero--2018|Valero et al. 2018]] ; [[#Giurco--2019|Giurco et al. 2019]] ). Predictions are that the transition to a clean energy world will be significantly energy intensive (World Bank Group 2017; [[#Sovacool--2020|Sovacool et al. 2020]] ), putting pressure on the supply chain for many of the metals and materials required. Governance of the sustainability of mining and processing of many of these materials, in areas generally known for their variable environmental stewardship, remains inadequate and often a source for conflict. [[#Sovacool--2020|Sovacool et al. (2020)]] propose four holistic recommendations for improvement to make these industries more efficient and resilient: diversification of mining enterprises for local ownership and livelihood benefit; improved traceability of material sources and transparency of mining enterprises; exploration of alternative resources; and the incorporation of minerals into climate and energy planning by connecting to the NDCs under the Paris Agreement. '''Resource constraints?''' [[#Valero--2018|Valero et al. (2018)]] highlight that the demand for many of the REEs and other critical minerals will, at the current rate of renewable energy infrastructure growth, increase by 3000 times or more by 2050. Some believe this growth may reach constraints in supply ( [[#Giurco--2019|Giurco et al. 2019]] ). Others suggest that the minerals involved are not likely to physically run out ( [[#Sovacool--2020|Sovacool et al. 2020]] ) if well managed, especially as markets are found in other parts of the world (for example the transition away from lithium from brine lakes to hard rock sources). Lithium hydroxide, more suitable for batteries, now competes well, in terms of cost, when extracted from rock sources ( [[#Azevedo--2018|Azevedo et al. 2018]] ) due to the ability to more easily create high quality lithium hydroxide from rock sources, even though brines provide a cheaper source of lithium ( [[#Kavanagh--2018|Kavanagh et al. 2018]] ). Australia has proven resources of all the Li-ion battery minerals and has a strategy for their ethical and transparent production ( [[#Commonwealth%20of%20Australia--2019|Commonwealth of Australia 2019]] ). Changes in the technology have also been used to reduce need for certain critical minerals ( [[#Månberger--2018|Månberger and Stenqvist 2018]] ). Recycling of all the minerals is not yet well developed but is likely to be increasingly important ( [[#Habib--2014|Habib and Wenzel 2014]] ; World Bank Group 2017; [[#Giurco--2019|Giurco et al. 2019]] ; [[#Golroudbary--2019|Golroudbary et al. 2019]] ). '''International collaboration''' There have been many instances since the 1950s when the supply of essential minerals has been restricted by nations in times of conflict and world tensions, but international trade has continued under the framework of the World Trade Organization. Keeping access open to critical minerals needed for the low-carbon transition will be an essential role of the international community as the need for local manufacture of such renewable and electromobility technologies will be necessary for local economies. [[#Nassar--2020|Nassar et al. (2020)]] report that over the past 30 years the US has become increasingly reliant in imports to meet domestic demand for minerals, including REEs. In terms of heavy REEs, essential for permanent magnets for wind turbines, China has a near-monopoly on REE processing, though other mines and manufacturing facilities are now responding to these constrained markets (Stegen 2015; [[#Gulley--2018|Gulley et al. 2018]] ; [[#Gulley--2019|Gulley et al. 2019]] ; [[#Yan--2020|Yan et al. 2020]] ). China, on the other hand, is reliant on other nations for the supply of other critical metals, particularly cobalt and lithium for batteries. A number of critical materials strategies have now been developed by nations developing the manufacturing base of new power and transport technologies. Some of these strategies pay particular attention to the supply of lithium ( [[#Martin--2017|Martin et al. 2017]] ; [[#Hache--2019|Hache et al. 2019]] ). For example, Horizon 2020, a substantial EU Research and Innovation programme, couples research and innovation in science, industry, and society to foster a circular economy in Europe, thus reducing bottlenecks in the EU nations. Similarly CREEN (Canada Rare Earth Elements Network) is supporting the US–EU–Japan resource partnership with Australia ( [[#Klossek--2016|Klossek et al. 2016]] ). As renewables and electromobility-based development leapfrog into the developing world it will be important to ensure the critical minerals issues are managed for local security of supply as well as participation in the mining and processing of such minerals to enable countries to develop their own employment around renewables and electromobility ( [[#Sovacool--2020|Sovacool et al. 2020]] ). <div id="10.8.4" class="h2-container"></div> <span id="tools-and-strategies-to-enable-decarbonisation-of-the-transport-sector"></span>
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