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==== 13.6.5.2 Information Programmes ==== <div id="h3-18-siblings" class="h3-siblings"></div> Information programmes, including energy efficiency labels, energy audits, certification, carbon labelling and information disclosure, are in wide use in particular for energy consumption. They can reduce GHG emissions by promoting voluntary technology choices and behavioural changes by firms and households. Energy efficiency labelling is in widespread use, including for buildings, and for end users products including cars and appliances. Carbon labelling is used for example for food ( [[#Camilleri--2019|Camilleri et al. 2019]] ) and tourism ( [[#Gössling--2016|Gössling and Buckley 2016]] ). Information measures also include specific information systems such as smart electricity meters (Zangheri et al. 2019). Chapters 5 and 9 provide detail. Information programmes can correct for a range of market failures related to imperfect information and consumer perceptions ( [[#Allcott--2016|Allcott 2016]] ). Alongside mandatory standards (13.6.4), information programmes can nudge firms and consumers to focus on often overlooked operating cost reductions ( [[#Carroll--2022|Carroll et al. 2022]] ). For example, consumers who are shown energy efficiency labels on average buy more energy efficient appliances than those who are not ( [[#Stadelmann--2018|Stadelmann and Schubert 2018]] ). Information policies can also support the changing of social norms about consumption choices, which have been shown to raise public support for pricing and regulatory policy instruments ( [[#Gössling--2020|Gössling et al. 2020]] ). Energy audits provide tailored information about potential energy savings and benchmarking of best practices through a network of peers. Typical examples include the United States Better Buildings Challenge that has provided energy audits to support USA commercial and industrial building owners, energy savings have been estimated at 18% to 30% ( [[#Asensio--2017|Asensio and Delmas 2017]] ); and Germany’s energy audit scheme for SMEs achieving reductions in energy consumption of 5–70% ( [[#Kluczek--2017|Kluczek and Olszewski 2017]] ). Consumption-oriented policy instruments seek to reduce GHG emissions by changing consumer behaviour directly, via retailers or via the supply chain. Aspects that hold promise are technology lists, supply chain procurement by leading retailers or business associations, a carbon-intensive materials charge and selected infrastructure improvements ( [[#Grubb--2020|Grubb et al. 2020]] ). The information provided to consumers in labelling programmes is often not detailed enough to yield best possible results ( [[#Davis--2016|Davis and Metcalf 2016]] ). Providing information about running costs tends to be more effective than providing data on energy use ( [[#Damigos--2020|Damigos et al. 2020]] ). Sound implementation of labelling programmes requires appropriate calculation methodology and tools, training and public awareness ( [[#Liang%20Wong--2017|Liang Wong and Krüger 2017]] ). In systems where manufacturers self-report performance of their products, there tends to be misreporting and skewed energy efficiency labelling ( [[#Goeschl--2019|Goeschl 2019]] ). A new form of information programmes are financial accounting standards as frameworks to encourage or require companies to disclose how the transition risks from shifting to a low-carbon economy and physical climate change impacts may affect their business or asset values (Chapter 15). The most prominent such standard was issued in 2017 by the Financial Stability Board’s Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures. It has found rapid uptake among regulators and investors ( [[#O’Dwyer--2020|O’Dwyer and Unerman 2020]] ). Traditionally, corporate reporting has treated climate risks in a highly varied and often minimal way ( [[#Foerster--2017|Foerster et al. 2017]] ). Disclosure of climate-related risks creates incentives for companies to improve their carbon and climate change exposure, and ultimately regulatory standards for climate risk ( [[#Eccles--2018|Eccles and Krzus 2018]] ). Disclosure can also reinforce calls for divestment in fossil fuel assets predominantly promoted by civil society organisations ( [[#Ayling--2017|Ayling and Gunningham 2017]] ), raising moral principles and arguments about the financial risks inherent in fossil fuel investments ( [[#Green--2018|Green 2018]] ; [[#Blondeel--2019|Blondeel et al. 2019]] ). <div id="13.6.5.3" class="h3-container"></div> <span id="public-procurement-and-investment"></span>
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