Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-16 (section)

=== 16.5.2 Objectives and Roles of International Technology Transfer and Cooperation Efforts ===

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International efforts involving technology transfer can have different objectives and roles. These include access to knowledge and financial resources as well as promotion of new industries in both the developed and recipient country ( [[#Huh--2018|Huh and Kim 2018]] ). Based on an econometric analysis of international technology transfer factors and characteristics of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects, [[#Gandenberger--2016|Gandenberger et al. (2016)]] find that complexity and novelty of technologies explain whether a CDM project includes hardware technology transfer, and that factors like project size and absorptive capacity of the host country do not seem to be drivers. [[#Halleck%20Vega--2018|Halleck Vega and Mandel (2018)]] argue that ‘long-term economic relations’, for instance being part of a customs union, affect technological diffusion between countries in the case of wind energy, and indicate that this has resulted in low-income countries being largely overlooked.

There is some literature studying whether technology cooperation could complement or replace international cooperation based on emission reductions, such as in the Kyoto Protocol, and whether that would have positive impacts on climate change mitigation and compliance. A handful of papers conducted game-theoretic analysis on technology cooperation, sometimes as an alternative for cooperation on emission reductions, and found partially positive effects ( [[#Bosetti--2017|Bosetti et al. 2017]] ; [[#Narita--2017|Narita and Wagner 2017]] ; [[#Rubio--2017|Rubio 2017]] ; [[#Verdolini--2017|Verdolini and Bosetti 2017]] ). However, [[#Sarr--2017|Sarr and Swanson (2017)]] model that, due to the rebound effect, technology development and transfer of resource-saving technologies may not lead to envisioned emission reductions.

While technology cooperation can be aimed at emission reduction through mitigation projects, as indicated above, not all cooperative actions directly result in mitigation outcomes. Overall, technology transfer broadly has focused on: (i) enhanced climate technology absorption and deployment in developing countries; and (ii) enhanced research, development and demonstration (RD&amp;D) through cooperation and knowledge spillovers.

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==== 16.5.2.1 Enhancing Low-emission Technology Uptake in Developing Countries ====

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Real-world outcomes in terms of low-emission technology deployment in developing countries may vary significantly, depending on the nature of the international engagement and the domestic context. While there has been some success in the enhancement of technology deployment through technology transfer in some developing countries ( [[#de%20la%20Tour--2011|de la Tour et al. 2011]] ; [[#Zhang--2016|Zhang and Gallagher 2016]] ), many others, and particularly least-developed countries, are lagging behind ( [[#Glachant--2017|Glachant and Dechezleprêtre 2017]] ). [[#Glachant--2017|Glachant and Dechezleprêtre (2017)]] indicate that this is due to the lack of participation in economic globalisation and that climate negotiations could facilitate technology transfer to those countries through the creation of global demand for low-emission technologies through stronger mitigation targets that will result in lowering of costs and therefore enhanced technology diffusion. A broader perspective presents a host of other factors that govern technology diffusion and commercialisation in developing countries, including: investment; social, cultural and behavioural, marketing and market building; macroeconomics; and support policy ( [[#Bakhtiar--2020|Bakhtiar et al. 2020]] ). Ramos Mejía et al. (2018) indicate that the governance of low-emission technology transfer and deployment in developing countries is frequently negatively affected by a mixture of well- and ill-functioning institutions – for instance, in a context of market imperfection, clientelist and social exclusive communities and patrimonial and/or marketised states. Furthermore, existing interests, such as fossil fuel production, may also impede the deployment of low-emission technologies, as highlighted in case studies of Vietnam and Indonesia ( [[#Dorband--2020|Dorband et al. 2020]] ; [[#Ordonez--2021|Ordonez et al. 2021]] ). It is for such reasons that both domestic efforts and international engagement are seen as necessary to facilitate technology transfer as well as deployment in developing countries ( [[#Boyd--2012|Boyd 2012]] ). The same has been seen as true in the case of agriculture, where the very successful international research efforts of the CGIAR – with remarkably favourable benefit-cost ratios ( [[#Alston--2021|Alston et al. 2021]] ) – were complemented by the national agricultural research systems for effective uptake of high-yielding varieties of crops ( [[#Evenson--2003|Evenson and Gollin 2003]] ).

One key area for underpinning effective technology uptake in developing countries relates to capabilities for managing technological change. This includes the capabilities to innovate, implement, and undertake integrated planning. There is much research to indicate that the ability of a country’s firms to adopt new technologies is determined by its absorptive capacity, which includes its own R&amp;D activities, human capacity (e.g., technical personnel), government involvement (including institutional capacity), the infrastructure in the country ( [[#Kumar--1999|Kumar et al. 1999]] ), and knowledge and capacity as part of its ‘intangible assets’ or the ‘software’ ( [[#Ockwell--2015|Ockwell et al. 2015]] ; [[#da%20Silva--2019|da Silva et al. 2019]] ; [[#Corsi--2020|Corsi et al. 2020]] ). For sustainable development, the capacity to plan in an integrated way and implement the SDGs ( [[#Khalili--2015|Khalili et al. 2015]] ; [[#Elder--2016|Elder et al. 2016]] ), including using participatory approaches ( [[#Disterheft--2015|Disterheft et al. 2015]] ), is a conditional means of implementation. It also is argued that, if human capital were the focus of international climate negotiations as well as national climate policy, it could change the political economy in favour of climate mitigation, which is needed for developing such capabilities in advance to keep up with the required speed of transformation ( [[#Ockwell--2015|Ockwell et al. 2015]] ; [[#Hsu--2017|Hsu 2017]] ; [[#IPCC--2018b|IPCC 2018b]] ; [[#Upadhyaya--2020|Upadhyaya et al. 2020]] ). In a global analysis of wind energy using econometric analysis, Halleck-Vega et al. (2018) lend quantitative credibility to the claim that a technology skill base is a key determinant of technological diffusion. Activities to enhance capabilities include informational contacts, research activities, consulting, education and training, and activities related to technical facilities ( [[#Huh--2018|Huh and Kim 2018]] ; [[#Khan--2020|Khan et al. 2020]] ).

There are multiple studies drawing on empirical work that also support this conclusion. For South-South technology transfer between India and Kenya, not just technical characteristics, but also mutual learning on how to address common problems of electricity access and poverty, was suggested as an important condition for success ( [[#Ulsrud--2018|Ulsrud et al. 2018]] ). [[#Olawuyi--2018|Olawuyi (2018)]] discusses the specific capability gap in Africa, despite decades of technology transfer efforts under various mechanisms and programmes of the UNFCCC. The study suggests that barriers need to be resolved by African countries themselves, in particular: inadequate access to information about imported climate technologies; lack of domestic capacities to deploy and maintain imported technologies; the weak regulatory environment to stimulate clean technology entrepreneurship; the absence or inadequacy of climate change laws; and weak legal protection for imported technologies. Moreover, [[#Ziervogel--2021|Ziervogel et al. (2021)]] indicate that, for transformative adaptation, transdisciplinary approaches and capacity-building shifting, ‘the co-creation of contextual understandings’ instead of top-down transfer of existing knowledge would deliver better results. Despite the understanding of the importance of the capacity issue, significant gaps still remain on this front ( [[#TEC--2019|TEC 2019]] ) ( [[#16.5.4|Section 16.5.4]] ).

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==== 16.5.2.2 Enhancing RD&amp;D and Knowledge Spillovers ====

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As mentioned earlier, RD&amp;D can aid the development of new technologies as well as their adoption for new use contexts. Therefore, it is not surprising that international cooperation on RD&amp;D is identified as a mechanism to promote low-carbon innovation ( [[#Suzuki--2015|Suzuki 2015]] ; [[#Mission%20Innovation--2019|Mission Innovation 2019]] ; [[#TEC--2021|TEC 2021]] ). This has resulted in a variety of international initiatives to cooperate on technology in order to create knowledge spillovers and develop capacity. For example, the UNFCCC Technology Mechanism, among other things, aims to facilitate finance for RD&amp;D of climate technologies by helping with readiness activities for developing country actors. In particular preparing early-stage technologies for a smoother transition to deployment and commercialisation has been emphasised in the context of the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) ( [[#TEC--2017|TEC 2017]] ). There are numerous multilateral, bilateral and private programmes that have facilitated RD&amp;D, biased mostly towards mitigation (as opposed to adaptation) activities. Many programmes that seemed to be about RD&amp;D were in reality dialogues about research coordination ( [[#Ockwell--2015|Ockwell et al. 2015]] ). There are also a variety of possible bilateral and multilateral models and approaches for engaging in joint R&amp;D ( [[#Mission%20Innovation--2019|Mission Innovation 2019]] ). An update by the [[#TEC--2021|TEC (2021)]] reviewing good practices in international cooperation of technology confirmed the conclusions of [[#Ockwell--2015|Ockwell et al. (2015)]] , and moreover highlighted that most initiatives are led by the public sector, and that the private sector tended to get involved only in incubation, commercialisation and diffusion phases. It also concluded that, although participation of larger, higher-income developing countries seems to have increased, participation of least-developed countries is still very low.

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