Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-7 (section)

==== 7.2.7.2 Impacts of Climate Change and Violent Conflict ====

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''Positive temperature anomalies and average increases in temperature over time have been associated with collective violent conflict in certain settings'' ( ''medium agreement, low evidence'' ) ''.'' Helman and Zaitchik (2020) find statistical associations between temperature and violent conflict in Africa and the Middle East that are stronger in warmer places and identify seasonal temperature effects on violence. However, they are unable to detect the impact of regional temperature increases on violence. For Africa, Van Weezel (2019) found associations between average increases in temperature and conflict risk. Caruso et al. (2016) found an association between rises in minimum temperature and violence through the impact of temperature on rice yields (Box 9.4). However, the associations between temperature and violence are weak compared to those with political and social factors (e.g., Owain and Maslin (2018)) and research focuses on areas where conflict is already present and, as such, is sensitive to selection bias ( [[#Adams--2018|Adams et al., 2018]] ). There is a body of literature that finds statistical associations between temperature anomalies and inter-personal violence, crime and aggression in the Global North, predominantly in the USA (e.g., [[#Ranson--2014|Ranson (2014)]] ; [[#Mares--2019|Mares and Moffett (2019)]] ; [[#Tiihonen--2017|Tiihonen et al. (2017)]] ; [[#Parks--2020|Parks et al. (2020)]] ; [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-14#14.4|Section 14.4.8]] ). However, authors have cautioned against extrapolating seasonal associations into long-term trends and against focusing on individual crimes rather than wider social injustices associated with climate change and its impacts ( [[#Lynch--2020|Lynch et al., 2020]] ).

''Variation in availability of water has been associated with international political tension and intra-national collective violence'' ( ''low agreement, medium evidence'' ) ''.'' Drought conditions have been associated with violence due to impacts on income from agriculture and water and food security, with studies focusing predominantly on sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East ( [[#Ide--2015|Ide and Frohlich, 2015]] ; [[#De%20Juan--2015|De Juan, 2015]] ; [[#Von%20Uexkull--2016|Von Uexkull et al., 2016]] ; [[#Waha--2017|Waha et al., 2017]] ; [[#Abbott--2017|Abbott et al., 2017]] ; [[#D’Odorico--2018|D’Odorico et al., 2018]] ). A small set of published studies has argued inconclusively over the role of drought in causing the Syrian civil war ( [[#Gleick--2014|Gleick, 2014]] ; [[#Kelley--2015|Kelley et al., 2015]] ; [[#Selby--2017|Selby et al., 2017]] ; 16.2.3.9). In general, research stresses the underlying economic, social and political drivers of conflict. For example, research on conflict in the Lake Chad region has demonstrated that the lake drying was only one of many factors including lack of development and infrastructure ( [[#Okpara--2016|Okpara et al., 2016]] ; [[#Nagarajan--2018|Nagarajan et al., 2018]] ; [[#Tayimlong--2020|Tayimlong, 2020]] ). Fewer studies examine the relationship between flooding (excess water) and violence and often rely on migration as the causal factor (see below). However, some studies have shown an association between flooding and civil unrest ( [[#Ide--2020|Ide et al., 2020]] ; [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-4#4.3.6|Section 4.3.6]] ; [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-12#12.5.3|Section 12.5.3]] ; Box 9.4).

''Extreme weather events can be associated with increased conflict risk'' ( ''low agreement, medium evidence'' ) ''.'' There is the potential for extreme weather events and disasters to cause political instability and increase the risk of violent conflict, although not conclusively ( [[#Brzoska--2018|Brzoska, 2018]] ). Post-disaster settings can be used to intensify state repression ( [[#Wood--2016|Wood and Wright, 2016]] ) and to alter insurgent groups’ behaviour ( [[#Walch--2018|Walch, 2018]] ). Different stakeholders use disasters to establish new narratives and alter public opinion ( [[#Venugopal--2017|Venugopal and Yasir, 2017]] ). Some research has demonstrated how post-disaster activities have had positive impacts on the social contract between people and the state, reducing the risk of conflict by strengthening relations between government and citizens and strengthening the citizenship of marginalised communities (Siddiqi, 2018; [[#Pelling--2010|Pelling and Dill, 2010]] ; [[#Siddiqi--2019|Siddiqi, 2019]] ). However, post-disaster and disaster risk-related activities themselves have limited capacity to support diplomatic efforts to build peace ( [[#Kelman--2018|Kelman et al., 2018]] ).

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