Editing IPCC:AR6/SRCCL/Chapter-7 (section)

=== 7.4.9 Barriers to implementing policy responses ===

<div id="section-7-4-9-barriers-to-implementing-policy-responses-block-1"></div>

There are barriers to implementing the policy instruments that arise in response to the risks from climate-land interactions. Such barriers to climate action help determine the degree to which society can achieve its sustainable development objectives (Dow et al. 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r924|924]]</sup> ; Langholtz et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r925|925]]</sup> ; Klein et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r926|926]]</sup> ). However, some policies can also be seen as being designed specifically to overcome barriers, while some cases may actually create or strengthen barriers to climate action (Foudi and Erdlenbruch 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r927|927]]</sup> ; Linnerooth-Bayer and Hochrainer-Stigler 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r928|928]]</sup> ). The concept of barriers to climate action is used here in a sense close to that of ‘soft limits’ to adaptation (Klein, et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r929|929]]</sup> ). ‘Hard limits’ by contrast are seen as primarily biophysical. Predicted changes in the key factors of crop growth and productivity – temperature, water, and soil quality – are expected to pose limits to adaptation in ways that affect the world population’s ability to get enough food in the future (Altieri et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r930|930]]</sup> ; Altieri and Nicholls 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r931|931]]</sup> ).

This section assesses research on barriers specific to policy implementation in adaptation and mitigation respectively, then addresses the cross-cutting issue of inequality as a barrier to climate action, including the particular cases of corruption and elite capture, before assessing how policies on climate and land can be used to overcome barriers.

<div id="section-7-4-9-1-barriers-to-adaptation"></div>

<span id="barriers-to-adaptation"></span>
==== 7.4.9.1 Barriers to adaptation ====

<div id="section-7-4-9-1-barriers-to-adaptation-block-1"></div>

There are human, social, economic, and institutional barriers to adaptation to land-climate challenges as described in Table 7.4 ( ''medium evidence, high agreement'' ). Considerable literature exists around changing behaviours through response options targeting social and cultural barriers (Rosin 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r932|932]]</sup> ; Eakin 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r933|933]]</sup> ; Marshall et al. 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r934|934]]</sup> ) (Chapter 6).

Since the publication of the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) (IPCC 2014), research is emerging, examining the role of governance, institutions and (in particular) policy instruments, in creating or overcoming barriers to adaptation to land and climate change in the land-use sector (Foudi and Erdlenbruch 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r935|935]]</sup> ; Linnerooth-Bayer and Hochrainer-Stigler 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r936|936]]</sup> ). Evidence shows that understanding the local context and targeted approaches are generally most successful (Rauken et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r937|937]]</sup> ). Understanding the nature of constraints to adaptation is critical in determining how barriers may be overcome. Formal institutions (rules, laws, policies) and informal institutions (social and cultural norms and shared understandings) can be barriers and enablers of climate adaptation (Jantarasami et al. 2010 <sup>[[#fn:r938|938]]</sup> ).

Governments play a key role in intervening and confronting existing barriers by changing legislation, adopting policy instruments, providing additional resources, and building institutions and knowledge exchange (Ford and Pearce 2010 <sup>[[#fn:r939|939]]</sup> ; Measham et al. 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r940|940]]</sup> ; Mozumder et al. 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r941|941]]</sup> ; Storbjörk 2010 <sup>[[#fn:r942|942]]</sup> ). Understanding institutional barriers is important in addressing barriers ( ''high confidence'' ). Institutional barriers may exist due to the path-dependent nature of institutions governing natural resources and public good, bureaucratic structures that undermine horizontal and vertical integration (Section 7.6.2), and lack of policy coherence (Section 7.4.8).

<div id="section-7-4-9-1-barriers-to-adaptation-block-2"></div>

<span id="table-7.4"></span>
<!-- START TABLE -->
'''Table 7.4'''

<span id="soft-barriers-and-limits-to-adaptation."></span>
'''Soft barriers and limits to adaptation.'''

<!-- TABLE -->
{| class="wikitable"
|-

Category

Description

References

|-

Human

– Cognitive and behavioural obstacles – Lack of knowledge and information

Hornsey et al. 2016; Prokopy et al. 2015; Wreford et al. 2017

|-

Social

– Undermined participation in decision-making and social equity

Burton et al. 2008; Laube et al. 2012

|-

Economic

– Market failures and missing markets: transaction costs and political economy; ethical and distributional issues

– Perverse incentives<br />
– Lack of domestic funds; inability to access international funds

Chambwera et al. 2014b; Wreford et al. 2017; Rochecouste et al. 2015; Baumgart-Getz et al. 2012

|-

Institutional

– Mal-coordination of policies and response options; unclear responsibility of actors and leadership; misuse of power; all reducing social learning

– Government failures<br />
– Path-dependent institutions

Oberlack 2017; Sánchez et al. 2016; Greiner and Gregg 2011

|-

Technological

– Systems of mixed crop and livestock – Polycultures

Nalau and Handmer 2015

|}
<!-- END TABLE -->

<div id="section-7-4-9-2-barriers-to-land-based-climate-mitigation"></div>

<span id="barriers-to-land-based-climate-mitigation"></span>
==== 7.4.9.2 Barriers to land-based climate mitigation ====

<div id="section-7-4-9-2-barriers-to-land-based-climate-mitigation-block-1"></div>

Barriers to land-based mitigation relate to full understanding of the permanence of carbon sequestration in soils or terrestrial biomass, the additionality of this storage, its impact on production and production shifts to other regions, measurement and monitoring systems and costs (Smith et al. 2007 <sup>[[#fn:r943|943]]</sup> ). Agricultural producers are more willing to expand mitigation measures already employed (including efficient and effective management of fertiliser, including manure and slurry) and less favourable to those not employed, such as using dietary additives, adopting genetically improved animals, or covering slurry tanks and lagoons (Feliciano et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r944|944]]</sup> ). Barriers identified in land- based mitigation include physical environmental constraints such as lack of information, education, and suitability for size and location of farm. For instance, precision agriculture is not viewed as efficient in small-scale farming (Feliciano et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r945|945]]</sup> ).

Property rights may be a barrier when there is no clear single- party land ownership to implement and manage changes (Smith et al. 2007 <sup>[[#fn:r946|946]]</sup> ). In forestry, tenure arrangements may not distribute obligations and incentives for carbon sequestration effectively between public management agencies and private agents with forest licences. Including carbon in tenure and expanding the duration of tenure may provide stronger incentive for tenure holders to manage carbon as well as timber values (Williamson and Nelson 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r947|947]]</sup> ). Effective policy will require answers as to the current status of agriculture in regard to GHG emissions, the degree that emissions are to change, the best pathway to achieve the change, and an ability to know when the target level of change is achieved (Smith et al. 2007 <sup>[[#fn:r948|948]]</sup> ). Forest governance may not have the structure to advance mitigation and adaptation. Currently top-down traditional modes do not have the flexibility or responsiveness to deal with the complex, dynamic, spatially diverse, and uncertain features of climate change (Timberlake and Schultz 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r949|949]]</sup> ; Williamson and Nelson 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r950|950]]</sup> ).

In respect of forest mitigation, two main institutional barriers have been found to predominate. First, forest management institutions do not consider climate change to the degree necessary for enabling effective climate response, and do not link adaptation and mitigation. Second, institutional barriers exist if institutions are not forward looking, do not enable collaborative adaptive management, do not promote flexible approaches that are reversible as new information becomes available, do not promote learning and allow for diversity of approaches that can be tailored to different local circumstances (Williamson and Nelson 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r951|951]]</sup> ).

Land-based climate mitigation through expansions and enhancements in agriculture, forestry and bioenergy has great potential but also poses great risks; its success will therefore require improved land- use planning, strong governance frameworks and coherent and consistent policies. ‘Progressive developments in governance of land and modernisation of agriculture and livestock and effective sustainability frameworks can help realise large parts of the technical bioenergy potential with low associated GHG emissions’ (Smith et al. 2014b, p. 97 <sup>[[#fn:r952|952]]</sup> ).

<div id="section-7-4-9-3-inequality"></div>

<span id="inequality"></span>
==== 7.4.9.3 Inequality ====

<div id="section-7-4-9-3-inequality-block-1"></div>

There is ''medium evidence'' and ''high agreement'' that one of the greatest challenges for land-based adaptation and SLM is posed by inequalities that influence vulnerability and coping and adaptive capacity – including age, gender, wealth, knowledge, access to resources and power (Kunreuther et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r953|953]]</sup> ; IPCC 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r954|954]]</sup> ; Olsson et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r955|955]]</sup> ). Gender is the dimension of inequality that has been the focus of most research, while research demonstrating differential impacts, vulnerability and adaptive capacity based on age, ethnicity and indigeneity is less well developed (Olsson et al. 2015a <sup>[[#fn:r956|956]]</sup> ). Cross-Chapter Box 11 in Chapter 7 sets out both the contribution of gender relations to differential vulnerability and available policy instruments for greater gender inclusivity.

One response to the vulnerability of poor people and other categories differentially affected is effective and reliable social safety nets (Jones and Hiller 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r957|957]]</sup> ). Social protection coverage is low across the world and informal support systems continue to be the key means of protection for a majority of the rural poor and vulnerable (Stavropoulou et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r958|958]]</sup> ) (Section 7.4.2). However, there is a gap in knowledge in understanding both positive and negative synergies between formal and informal systems of social protection and how local support institutions might be used to implement more formal forms of social protection (Stavropoulou et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r959|959]]</sup> ).

<div id="section-7-4-9-4-corruption-and-elite-capture"></div>

<span id="corruption-and-elite-capture"></span>
==== 7.4.9.4 Corruption and elite capture ====

<div id="section-7-4-9-4-corruption-and-elite-capture-block-1"></div>

Inequalities of wealth and power can allow processes of corruption and elite capture (where public resources are used for the benefit of a few individuals in detriment to the larger populations) which can affect both adaptation and mitigation actions, at levels from the local to the global that, in turn, risk creating inequitable or unjust outcomes (Sovacool 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r960|960]]</sup> ) ( ''limited evidence, medium agreement'' ). This includes risks of corruption in REDD+ processes (Sheng et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r961|961]]</sup> ; Williams and Dupuy 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r962|962]]</sup> ) and of corruption or elite capture in broader forest governance (Sundström 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r963|963]]</sup> ; Persha and Andersson 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r964|964]]</sup> ), as well as elite capture of benefits from planned adaptation at a local level (Sovacool 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r965|965]]</sup> ).

Peer-reviewed empirical studies that focus on corruption in climate finance and interventions, particularly at a local level, are rare, due in part to the obvious difficulties of researching illegal and clandestine activity (Fadairo et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r966|966]]</sup> ). At the country level, historical levels of corruption are shown to affect current climate polices and global cooperation (Fredriksson and Neumayer 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r967|967]]</sup> ). Brown (2010) <sup>[[#fn:r968|968]]</sup> sees three likely inlets of corruption into REDD+: in the setting of forest baselines, the reconciliation of project and natural credits, and the implementation of control of illegal logging. The transnational and north-south dimensions of corruption are highlighted by debates on which US legislative instruments (e.g., the Lacey Act, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act) could be used to prosecute the northern corporations that are involved in illegal logging (Gordon 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r969|969]]</sup> ; Waite 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r970|970]]</sup> ).

Fadairo et al. (2017) <sup>[[#fn:r971|971]]</sup> carried out a structured survey of perceptions of households in forest-edge communities served by REDD+, as well as those of local officials, in south eastern Nigeria. They report high rates of agreement that allocation of carbon rights is opaque and uncertain, distribution of benefits is untimely, uncertain and unpredictable, and the REDD+ decision-making process is vulnerable to political interference that benefits powerful individuals. Only 35% of respondents had an overall perception of transparency in REDD+ process as ‘good’. Of eight institutional processes or facilities previously identified by the government of Nigeria and international agencies as indicators of commitment to transparent and equitable governance, only three were evident in the local REDD+ office as ‘very functional’ or ‘fairly functional’.

At the local level, the risks of corruption and elite capture of the benefits of climate action are high in decentralised regimes (Persha and Andersson 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r972|972]]</sup> ). Rahman (2018) discusses elicitation of bribes (by local-level government staff) and extortion (by criminals) to allow poor rural people to gather forest products. The results are a general undermining of households’ adaptive capacity and perverse incentives to over-exploit forests once bribes have been paid, leading to over-extraction and biodiversity loss. Where there are pre-existing inequalities and conflict, participation processes need careful management and firm external agency to achieve genuine transformation and avoid elite capture (Rigon 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r973|973]]</sup> ). An illustration of the range of types of elite capture is given by Sovacool (2018) <sup>[[#fn:r974|974]]</sup> for adaptation initiatives including coastal afforestation, combining document review and key informant interviews in Bangladesh, with an analytical approach from political ecology. Four processes are discussed: enclosure, including land grabbing and preventing the poor establishing new land rights; exclusion of the poor from decision-making over adaptation; encroachment on the resources of the poor by new adaptation infrastructure; and entrenchment of community disempowerment through patronage. The article notes that observing these processes does not imply they are always present, nor that adaptation efforts should be abandoned.

<div id="section-7-4-9-5-overcoming-barriers"></div>

<span id="overcoming-barriers"></span>
==== 7.4.9.5 Overcoming barriers ====

<div id="section-7-4-9-5-overcoming-barriers-block-1"></div>

Policy instruments that strengthen agricultural producer assets or capital reduce vulnerability and overcome barriers to adaptation (Hurlbert 2018b, 2015b <sup>[[#fn:r975|975]]</sup> ). Additional factors like formal education and knowledge of traditional farming systems, secure tenure rights, access to electricity and social institutions in rice-farming areas of Bangladesh have played a positive role in reducing adaptation barriers (Alam 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r976|976]]</sup> ). A review of more than 168 publications over 15 years about adaptation of water resources for irrigation in Europe found the highest potential for action is in improving adaptive capacity and responding to changes in water demands, in conjunction with alterations in current water policy, farm extension training, and viable financial instruments (Iglesias and Garrote 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r977|977]]</sup> ). Research on the Great Barrier Reef, the Olifants River in Southern Africa, and fisheries in Europe, North America, and the Antarctic Ocean, suggests that the leading factor in harnessing the adaptive capacity of ecosystems is to reduce human stressors by enabling actors to collaborate across diverse interests, institutional settings, and sectors (Biggs et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r978|978]]</sup> ; Schultz et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r979|979]]</sup> ; Johnson and Becker 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r980|980]]</sup> ). Fostering equity and participation are correlated with the efficacy of local adaptation to secure food and livelihood security (Laube et al. 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r981|981]]</sup> ). In this chapter, we examine the literature surrounding appropriate policy instruments, decision-making, and governance practices to overcome limits and barriers to adaptation.

Incremental adaptation consists of actions where the central aim is to maintain the essence and integrity of a system or process at a given site, whereas transformational adaptation changes the fundamental attributes of a system in response to climate and its effects; the former is characterised as doing different things and the latter, doing things differently (Noble et al. 2014). Transformational adaptation is necessary in situations where there are hard limits to adaptation or it is desirable to address deficiencies in sustainability, adaptation, inclusive development and social equity (Kates et al. 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r982|982]]</sup> ; Mapfumo et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r983|983]]</sup> ). In other situations, incremental changes may be sufficient (Hadarits et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r984|984]]</sup> ).

<div id="section-7-4-9-5-overcoming-barriers-block-2" class="box"></div>

<span id="ccb11-gender-in-inclusive-approaches-to-climate-change-land-and-sustainable-development"></span>