Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-17 (section)

=== 17.4.5 Enabling Condition 4: Catalysing Conditions ===

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A clear difference between enabling conditions and catalysing conditions is emerging in the climate mitigation literature ( [[#Hermwille--2019|Hermwille et al., 2019]] ; [[#Michaelowa--2021|Michaelowa et al., 2021]] ), with some examples in the adaptation literature as well ( [[#Madsen--2019|Madsen et al., 2019]] ; [[#Booysen--2019a|Booysen et al., 2019a]] ; [[#Bolorinos--2020|Bolorinos et al., 2020]] ). Though enabling conditions are necessary pre-conditions that allow response options to be formulated and implemented, their presence alone does not guarantee that these response options will occur in a timely fashion or at a scale commensurate with the risk, or even that they will occur at all. Catalysing conditions address this deficit in advancing action. They serve to overcome the inertia that often operates as a barrier to action and motivate individuals and organisations to initiate or accelerate action. Different forms of catalysing conditions, described below, lead individuals and organisations to weigh more seriously the costs of delaying action or keeping action at low levels. Catalysing conditions focus the attention of individuals and organisations on particular risks, leading actors to augment their decision-making processes and to allocate financial and social resources to respond to those risks. This attention and deliberation can lead to more frequent and potentially substantial adaptations, whether through more extensive action on existing forms of adaptation or through the adoption of entirely new adaptations ( [[#Bolorinos--2020|Bolorinos et al., 2020]] ).

The first two catalysing conditions described below address the costs of delaying action. Urgency increases the awareness of individuals and organisations of such costs, while windows of opportunity, including extreme events, are time-bound periods during which certain actions are possible, but after which they are more difficult or impossible. The other two conditions stimulate new forms or levels of action by promoting or directing step changes from one policy or management regime to another ( [[#Solecki--2017|Solecki et al., 2017]] ). Litigation over adaptation issues, for example, can open new lines of action or close off old ones, while catalysing agents advance action through a variety of means (e.g., communicating the urgency of climate action, revising agendas for action, expanding coalitions which undertake action). As detailed below, these four catalysing conditions can operate together as well as separately to promote more prompt and extensive adaptations.

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==== 17.4.5.1 Urgency ====

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Urgency can catalyse action for individuals and organisations. A moderate level of urgency serves as an important driver of climate action, but both high and low levels of urgency impede response ( ''high confidence'' ). [[#Wilson--2021|Wilson and Orlove (2021)]] review 5 experimental and 20 observational papers that examine the relationship between urgency and levels of response in climate decision-making, across a range of settings: from individuals and households to communities, managed ecosystems, sub-national regions and international river basin. Urgency in the papers is defined primarily through objective and subjective time pressure, including the recognition of the costs of delaying action and the importance of using windows of opportunity during which new forms and higher levels of response are possible. All the experimental papers and all but three of the observational papers provide support for an inverted U-shaped relationship between urgency and response intensity (including motivation and action), with higher levels of response at intermediate levels of urgency and lower levels of response at low or high levels of urgency (Figure 17.9). The general shape of this relationship also is supported for other decision domains by a well-established line of research within psychology ( [[#Heitz--2014|Heitz, 2014]] ; [[#Zakay--2014|Zakay, 2014]] ; [[#Prem--2017|Prem et al., 2017]] ).

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'''Figure 17.9 |''' '''A moderate level of urgency serves as an important driver of climate action, but both high and low levels of urgency impede response (derived from [[#Wilson--2021|Wilson and Orlove, 2021]] ).'''

The synthesis of the studies on urgency offers two central lessons for policymakers, community groups and others involved in addressing climate change. First, greater levels of response to climate change-induced challenges can be motivated by communication strategies that move decision makers from low to moderate levels of urgency ( ''high confidence'' ). In the case of drought, a number of studies show that urgent messages promote water conservation, especially when these messages are repeated, perceived as trustworthy and linked to concrete suggestions for action ( [[#Gonzales--2017|Gonzales and Ajami, 2017]] ; [[#Joubert--2019|Joubert and]] [[#Ziervogel--2019|Ziervogel, 2019]] ; [[#Kam--2019|Kam et al., 2019]] ; [[#Booysen--2019a|Booysen et al., 2019a]] ; [[#Booysen--2019b|Booysen et al., 2019b]] ; [[#Bolorinos--2020|Bolorinos et al., 2020]] ). These effects are also demonstrated in experimental studies of adaptation planning in contexts including European flood preparations ( [[#Madsen--2019|Madsen et al., 2019]] ; [[#Pot--2019|Pot et al., 2019]] ) and Pacific Island coastal planning ( [[#Donner--2014|Donner and Webber, 2014]] ).

Second, very high levels of urgency are a barrier to effective action ( ''medium confidence'' ) because last-minute actions to reduce risk during crises can create haste and panic, often leading to insufficient deliberation. In these cases, decision makers fail to consider a full range of alternative actions, make rash choices and poorly mobilise available resources ( [[#Asfaw--2019|Asfaw et al., 2019]] ; [[#Robins--2019|Robins, 2019]] ; [[#Gee--2020|Gee, 2020]] ). Given that climate decision makers in many regions and sectors are experiencing greater pressure to act, this finding suggests the existence of windows for planning and action during which climate risks have led to moderate levels of urgency, but before these risks have resulted in urgency exceeding some upper threshold ( [[#17.4.5.2|Section 17.4.5.2]] ).

In addition, these studies point to potential weaknesses as well as strengths in strategic communication to modulate urgency. Such messages may instead lead to lower levels of response if they induce very high levels of urgency ( [[#Asfaw--2019|Asfaw et al., 2019]] ), though this effect may be somewhat mitigated by messages that simultaneously increase recipients’ sense of self-efficacy or they are experienced in the specific risk domain discussed in the messages ( [[#Bodin--2019|Bodin et al., 2019]] ). Future research on the relationships between urgency and effective risk management could help refine the measurement of urgency, how the relationship varies in different contexts, the role of different forms of messaging about urgency and action ( [[#Fesenfeld--2021|Fesenfeld and Rinscheid, 2021]] ), and the effects of urgency on decision-making by high-level decision makers within polities and by climate social movements.

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==== 17.4.5.2 Windows of Opportunity ====

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Windows of opportunity are time-bounded periods during which conditions are present for advancing and often accelerating climate adaptation strategies. They can act as significant catalysing conditions for climate action and are connected to a range of possible outcomes from small incremental shifts to larger-scale more profound transformation adaptations ( [[#Novalia--2020|Novalia and Malekpour, 2020]] ).

Windows can open because of extreme weather events ( [[#Birkmann--2008|Birkmann and Fernando, 2008]] ), political shifts, such as new institutions, new laws and regulations, and presence of a new policy entrepreneur or new policies ( [[#Haasnoot--2013|Haasnoot et al., 2013]] ; [[#Bell--2015|Bell and Morrison, 2015]] ), relevant and achievable policy goals, and emergence of new knowledge ( [[#Abunnasr--2013|Abunnasr et al., 2013]] ), and close after the initial causes recede and become less efficacious. They also serve as focusing events whereby a coalition of groups address specific policy questions or response options ( [[#Rudel--2019|Rudel, 2019]] ). Recognising that windows of opportunity often catalyse action does not mean that action outside such windows is insignificant or impossible.

Extreme events such as disasters often act as proximate drivers of windows of opportunity ( [[#Birkmann--2008|Birkmann and Fernando, 2008]] ; [[#McSweeney--2011|McSweeney and Coomes, 2011]] ). Climate disasters in a specific location become significant windows for new debate, policymaking and financing ( [[#McSweeney--2011|McSweeney and Coomes, 2011]] ). Extreme events also can facilitate change at locations distant from the most impacted site when remote actors gain perspective on their own risks ( [[#Friedman--2019|Friedman et al., 2019]] ; [[#Solecki--2019|Solecki et al., 2019]] ). Factors that facilitate extreme events driving proactive as opposed to reactive responses include access to relevant risk and vulnerability data, pre-existing experience with similar events, and appropriate governance ( [[#Brown--2017a|Brown et al., 2017a]] ). [[#Page--2020|Page and Dilling (2020)]] find that worldview or ideology plays a central role in sense-making and in shaping what organisational decision makers ‘see’ in terms of acceptable actions in response to an extreme event.

Significant variation is present across the mix and intensity of conditions that promote action through a window of opportunity. Capacity to respond to is a function of the presence of enabling conditions as well as tools and methods to aid decision-making (Shi et al., 2015). Political activism provides windows of opportunity for climate adaptation ( [[#Lauer--2016|Lauer and Eguavoen, 2016]] ; see also [[#17.4.5.3|Section 17.4.5.3.1]] ).

Sudden shifts in institutions and legal framework can also catalyse climate action. For example, the year 2015 included a series of international frameworks such as the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 ( [[#van%20Niekerk--2020|van Niekerk et al., 2020]] ; [[#Hofmann--2021|Hofmann, 2021]] ), the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which established the Sustainable Development Goals ( [[#Sanchez%20Rodriguez--2018|Sanchez Rodriguez et al., 2018]] ), and the Paris Climate Agreement, which dramatically enhanced the promotion and implementation of altered the conditions under which climate adaptation occurred.

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==== 17.4.5.3 Climate Litigation on Adaptation ====

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Litigation for Loss and Damage from climate change was first noted as a potential motivator for emissions reduction in AR4, and AR5 noted that litigation was pending but not tested and that, while legal systems were beginning to define the boundaries of responsibility for climate change, it was ‘unclear liability exists’. The SR1.5 ( [[#IPCC--2018a|IPCC, 2018a]] ) reported, with ''high confidence'' , that litigation risks of government and business had increased, and the SRCCL ( [[#IPCC--2019b|IPCC, 2019b]] ) noted that recent developments in climate attribution improve the ability to detect human influence on climate and broaden liability.

Since AR5 there has been growing recognition of the potential of litigation for failure to take measures to adapt to climate change to drive climate risk management ( [[#Banda--2017|Banda and Fulton, 2017]] ; [[#Peel--2017|Peel et al., 2017]] ; [[#Bouwer--2018|Bouwer, 2018]] ). Litigation cases on adaptation and loss and damage account for about one-third of those covered in the literature ( [[#Setzer--2019|Setzer and Vanhala, 2019]] ). Reasons for this growth are: (i) the growing gap between projected climate change impacts and current adaptation efforts ( [[#Stezer--2019|Stezer and Byrnes, 2019]] ) and (ii) expanded legal duty of government, business and others to manage foreseeable harms ( [[#Marjanac--2018|Marjanac and Patton, 2018]] ). Climate change litigation is expanding geographically into the Americas, Asia (and the Pacific region) and Europe, with several cases brought in low- and middle-income countries ( [[#Stezer--2019|Stezer and Byrnes, 2019]] ) (Table 17.6).

Lawsuits against private entities contribute to articulating climate change as a legal and financial risk ( ''medium confidence'' ) ( [[#Peel--2015|Peel and Osofsky, 2015]] ; [[#Ganguly--2018|Ganguly et al., 2018]] ; [[#McCormick--2018|McCormick et al., 2018]] ; [[#Peel--2018|Peel and Osofsky, 2018]] ). Even if unsuccessful, [[#Estrin--2016|Estrin (2016)]] concludes they are important in underlining the high level of public concern.

Climate-related, legal, financial disclosure requirements are improving investment decision-making of corporations as well as augmenting ''ex post'' liability for failure to consider climate change risk in decision-making. Organisations are required to disclose governance around climate-related risks (impact of climate change on businesses, products, services, supply or value chain, adaptation and mitigation activities, investment in research and development and operations). This functions as a vehicle for identifying climate-related risk and the organisation’s resilience strategy taking into consideration different climate- related scenarios including a 2°C or lower scenario ( [[#Sarra--2018|Sarra, 2018]] ). Institutions such as the G20 ( [[#Carney--2019|Carney, 2019]] ), the American Bar Association ( [[#Brammer--2019|Brammer and Chakrabarti, 2019]] ) and the European Commission ( [[#Zadek--2018|Zadek, 2018]] ) have adopted or endorsed these standards.

'''Table 17.6 |''' Examples of types of climate-related litigation.

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Litigation type

! Detail and examples

! Supporting literature

|-
| Challenge government decisions for not considering climate change risks

| Challenging government or administrative planning decisions for failure to consider, or adequately address, climate change in relation to developing and protecting coastal zones, water-stressed regions, flood-prone areas or decisions affecting endangered species whose habitat is at risk. For example, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal in Australia rejected a planned housing project in a coastal area, citing the risks from climate change (Gippsland Coastal Bd. v. South Gippsland Sc &amp; Ors (No2), 2008).

| [[#Banda--2017|Banda and Fulton (2017)]] ; Peel et al. (2017); [[#Bouwer--2018|Bouwer (2018)]] ; [[#Clarke--2018|Clarke and Hussain (2018)]]

|-
| Petitions to act

| Constitutional petitions to force governments to take adaptation measures. As an example, in Leghari v. Pakistan a farmer initiated public interest litigation against federal and provincial governments for failure to develop climate change resilience through adaptation to floods, droughts and other impacts because it violated his rights to life and dignity. The High Court of Lahore found for Mr. Leghari and created a commission to develop and implement a wide range of adaptation actions.

| [[#Banda--2017|Banda and Fulton (2017)]] ; Ashgar Leghari v. Federation of Pakistan (April 2015); Ashgar Leghari v. Federation of Pakistan (September 2015)

|-
| Regulatory proceedings

| Environmental groups and city and state officials intervened in the application of the electric utility serving New York City, Consolidated Edison Company, to the New York State Public Service Commission for a rate increase. The intervenors argued that the company was not adequately preparing for flooding, heatwaves and other climate-related impacts. As a result, the Commission directed the company to undertake a study of its vulnerability to climate change, and write and implement a plan to address these risks.

| [[#Consolidated%20Edison%20Co.--2019|Consolidated Edison Co. (2019)]]

|-
| Failure to act by public authorities

| Liability of public authorities for failure to undertake necessary adaptation actions to avoid damage to life or property, especially where statutory framework is proven ineffective or out of step with international commitments; in some areas these are class action suits. An example is private lawsuits for failure of a built environment to consider adaptation needs in a built environment (energy efficiency works, overheating because of increased temperatures).

| [[#Banda--2017|Banda and Fulton (2017)]] ; Peel et al. (2017); [[#Bouwer--2018|Bouwer (2018)]]

|-
| Failure by private sector to consider climate change adaptation in their business practice

| Examples include: (i) a citizen suit against ExxonMobil for failure to adapt Everett Terminal to the impacts of climate change including increased precipitation, sea level rise and storm surges occurring with increasing frequency; (ii) a citizen suit against Shell Oil Products US alleging Shell failed to incorporate climate risks in its investment in a bulk storage and fuel terminal in Rhode Island, USA; (iii) shareholder action against ExxonMobil for failure to report climate risks or complying with recommendations to do so and for issuing misleading corporate disclosure relied on by investors; (iv) a suit brought an NGO, the Conservation Law Foundation, against Exxon Mobil alleging that the company had taken insufficient precautions to protect a major oil tank farm near Boston, USA, from coastal storms that are worsened by climate change, creating a danger of an oil spill into Boston Harbour. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit ruled in 2021 that the lawsuit could proceed, and that the NGO could attempt to make out its case that Exxon Mobil should take greater precautions.; (v) government and citizen claims for public nuisance against fossil fuel companies for the costs of adaptation such as infrastructure to protect against sea level rise.

| [[#Benjamin--2017|Benjamin (2017)]] ; [[#Stezer--2019|Stezer and Byrnes (2019)]] ; [[#Street--2019|Street and Jude (2019)]] ; [[#Wasim--2019|Wasim (2019)]] ; [[#Conservation%20Law%20Foundation%20v.%20Exxon%20Mobil%20Corporation--2021|Conservation Law Foundation v. Exxon Mobil Corporation (2021)]]

|-
| Youth public trust claims

| Government inter-generational liability for inadequate climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts. Our Children’s Trust (a non-profit organisation) and others brought an action against the USA and several executive branch individuals in 2015 claiming damages for their loss of the environment and the defendant’s failure to preserve a habitable climate system by the governments’ affirmative actions that actively cause and worsen the climate crisis. Similarly, a public trust claim could be brought in a coastal town for failure to adapt to climate change.

| Schneider et al. (2017); [[#Bouwer--2018|Bouwer (2018)]]

|-
| Human rights claims

| Human rights may be a powerful tool for organising and unifying adaptation decision-making, especially for the most vulnerable, through enforcement mechanisms of progressive realisation as well as ''ex post'' liability (Chapter 8). For example, a persons’ right to food implores state parties to take necessary actions to alleviate hunger caused by climate change; during natural and other disasters, rights to water and life are impacted; sea level rise and storm surges impact many coastal settlements and the right to adequate housing and an adequate standard of living. This is in part due to increasing acceptance of the impact of climate change on health, livelihoods, shelter and fundamental rights.

| [[#Hall--2012|Hall and Weiss (2012)]] ; [[#Peel--2018|Peel and Osofsky (2018)]] ; [[#Setzer--2019|Setzer and Vanhala (2019)]] ; [[#Stezer--2019|Stezer and Byrnes (2019)]]

|}

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==== 17.4.5.4 Catalysing Agents ====

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Individuals and organisations often serve as catalysing agents of climate risk decision-making. They promote greater levels of new forms of climate action by communicating the urgency of climate action and by developing coalitions which undertake action. Agents include individuals, organisations or collectives, or multiple organisations linked together.

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===== 17.4.5.4.1 Social movements and other mobilisations =====

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Recent studies of climate-related social movements show that they can act as catalysing agents which promote action to manage climate-related risks ( ''medium confidence'' ). However, these studies use varying definitions of climate movements within the broader context of environmental movements. A prominent topic of research is the rapidity and the large scale of the proliferation of these movements around the world, primarily in urban settings but also in rural and Indigenous contexts ( [[#Claeys--2017|Claeys and Delgado Pugley, 2017]] ).

These movements usually focus on climate mitigation but sometimes include adaptation. Their social bases include groups which had not previously been active in climate politics, notably children and youth, as well as sectors with long traditions of environmental activism, such as women and Indigenous Peoples (see Cross-Chapter Boxes GENDER and INDIG in Chapter 18). Much of the literature on youth movements traces the emergence of the movements themselves ( [[#Sanson--2019|Sanson et al., 2019]] ; [[#Treichel--2020|Treichel, 2020]] ), their framings of climate change as a social justice issue ( [[#Holmberg--2019|Holmberg and Alvinius, 2019]] ) and their presence in demonstrations and on social media ( [[#Boulianne--2020|Boulianne et al., 2020]] ). Climate action catalysed by youth and other climate movements include visible international events such as the signing of Declaration on Children, Youth, and Climate Action at COP25 in Madrid 2019 ( [[#Han--2020|Han and Ahn, 2020]] ), as well as national efforts, including lawsuits, and local events such as in tree-planting and waste reduction initiatives ( [[#Bandura--2019|Bandura and Cherry, 2019]] ).

A recent review examines 2743 cases around the world of mobilisations for environmental justice causes ( [[#Scheidel--2020|Scheidel et al., 2020]] ); roughly half the cases occurred between 1970 and 2007, and half between 2008 and 2019. Of these environmental mobilisations, 17% are directly related to climate and energy, and others are related to climate-sensitive issues (15% for biomass and land use, 14% for water management). This study reports the proportion of positive outcomes for different strategies, defined as meeting the goals of the movements, which generally align with climate adaptation and sustainable resource management. These rates vary from 10% for negotiated solutions to 34% for court decisions. It notes the corresponding higher rates of failure, as well as the costs borne by the movements, which include criminalisation (20% of cases), violence (18%) and assassination (13%). These costs are significantly higher for Indigenous communities that engage in these mobilisations.

At a global scale, climate movements succeeded in pressing for the greater recognition of the importance of Indigenous knowledge within international agreements ( [[#Tormos-Aponte--2018|Tormos-Aponte and García-López, 2018]] ) but did not achieve the major reforms of climate finance which they sought ( [[#Khan--2019a|Khan et al., 2019a]] ); these differing outcomes reflect the sensitivity of the issues and the formation of coalitions which supported or opposed the movements. At national and local scales, one review of US cases reports limited effectiveness of climate movements because of the ability of governmental agencies to co-opt them ( [[#Pulido--2016|Pulido et al., 2016]] ), while another review in Pakistan shows a number of successes, because the movements were able to build alliances with other public sector and community groups ( [[#Shawoo--2020|Shawoo and McDermott, 2020]] ).

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===== 17.4.5.4.2 Policy leaders and entrepreneurs =====

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Policy leaders, often described as policy entrepreneurs within the scholarly literature, are individuals in positions of leadership who set agendas and build coalitions to drive decision-making processes, and hence can function as catalysers of climate adaptation ( [[#Petridou--2020|Petridou and Mintrom, 2020]] ). Political leaders who have taken on climate change as a key policy issue function as policy entrepreneurs at international, national and sub-national levels. City officials, including mayors and other executives, often play the role of climate policy entrepreneurs, while the absence of effective leadership negatively affects adaptation success ( [[#Becker--2019|Becker and Kretsch, 2019]] ). Such entrepreneurs can be important forces for change in both reactive contexts following an extreme or focusing event and in proactive context. They can be effective especially in contexts where they navigate and link together formal and informal networks of complex climate governance systems ( [[#Tanner--2019|Tanner et al., 2019]] ). Their capacity to act has been increased when they and their institutions are embedded within partnership networks ( [[#Bellinson--2019|Bellinson and Chu, 2019]] ). It is in these contexts that the leadership and position of a policy entrepreneur becomes even more catalytic when operating at the interface of formal and informal networks ( [[#Mintrom--2019|Mintrom, 2019]] ; [[#Stone--2019|Stone, 2019]] ).

Sub-national actors and city officials including mayors and other executives are among the individuals most often described and assessed as climate policy entrepreneurs ( [[#Kalafatis--2017|Kalafatis and Lemos, 2017]] ). City-level climate policy entrepreneurs often operate using their own experience, connections and persistence to address issues of importance to their constituency. Climate risk concerns are often inherently local, and in turn local decision makers perceive it as being appropriate to engage. Conversely, the absence of effective leadership negatively affects adaptation success ( [[#Kalafatis--2017|Kalafatis and Lemos, 2017]] ; [[#Becker--2019|Becker and Kretsch, 2019]] ). Urban climate policy entrepreneurs operate in four key spheres of policy development and implementation: attention and support seeking strategies; linking strategies (e.g., coalition building); relational management strategies (e.g., networking and trusting building); and arena strategies including timing ( [[#Brouwer--2018|Brouwer and Huitema, 2018]] ). The presence and operation of urban climate policy entrepreneurs is positively associated in settings with multiple jurisdictions and across differing spatial scales ( [[#Kalafatis--2017|Kalafatis and Lemos, 2017]] ; [[#Renner--2018|Renner and Meijerink, 2018]] ). It is in these contexts that their capacity to operate simultaneously at the interface of multiple networks is particularly valuable for promoting climate action. Urban climate policy entrepreneurs can directly engage with a range of constituent groups and offer and promote climate adaptation strategies that can have direct impact on the daily lives of these residents and their interests.

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