Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-7 (section)

==== 7.2.7.3 Causal Pathways Between Climate Change Impacts and Violent Conflict ====

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''Increases in food prices due to reduced agricultural production and global food price shocks are associated with conflict risk and represent a key pathway linking climate variability and conflict'' ( ''medium confidence'' ) ''.'' Increases in food prices are associated with civil unrest in urban areas among populations unable to afford or produce their own food and in rural populations due to changes in availability of agricultural employment with shifting commodity prices ( [[#Martin-Shields--2019|Martin-Shields and Stojetz, 2019]] ). Under such conditions, locally specific grievances, hunger and social inequalities can initiate or exacerbate conflicts. Food price volatility in general is not associated with violence, but sudden food price hikes have been linked to civil unrest in some circumstances ( [[#Bellemare--2015|Bellemare, 2015]] ; [[#McGuirk--2020|McGuirk and Burke, 2020]] ; [[#Winne--2019|Winne and Peersman, 2019]] ). In urban settings in Kenya, Koren et al. (2021) found an association between food and water insecurity that is mutually reinforcing and associated with social unrest (although insecurity in either food or water on its own was not). Analysing the global food riots in 2007/2008 and 2011, [[#Heslin--2021|Heslin (2021)]] stresses the role of local politics and pre-existing grievances in determining whether people mobilise around food insecurity (Chapter 5).

''Climate-related internal migration has been associated with the experience of violence by migrants, the prolongation of conflicts in migrant receiving areas and civil unrest in urban areas'' ( ''medium agreement, low evidence'' ). Research points to the potential for conflict to serve as an intervening factor between climate and migration. However, the nature of the relationship is diverse and context specific. For example, displaced people and migrants may be associated with heightened social tensions in receiving areas through mechanisms such as ecological degradation, reduced access to services and a disturbed demographic balance in the host area ( [[#Rüegger--2020|Rüegger and Bohnet, 2020]] ). Ghimire et al. (2015) observed that an influx of flood-displaced people prolonged conflict by causing a lack of access to services for some of the host population and feelings of grievance. Further, migration from drought-stricken areas to local urban centres has been used to suggest a climate trigger for the Syrian conflict (e.g., [[#Ash--2020|Ash and Obradovich (2020)]] ). However, this link has been strongly contested by research that contextualises the drought in wider political economic approaches and existing migration patterns ( [[#De%20Châtel--2014|De Châtel, 2014]] ; [[#Fröhlich--2016|Fröhlich, 2016]] ; [[#Selby--2019|Selby, 2019]] ; 16.2.3.9).

''There is some evidence of an association between climate-related rural-to-urban migration and the risk of civil unrest'' ( ''medium agreement, low evidence'' ) ''.'' [[#Petrova--2021|Petrova (2021)]] found that while migration in general was associated with increased protests in urban receiving areas, the relationship did not hold for hazard-related migration. In other settings, the association of civil unrest with in-migration was found to depend on the political alignment of the host state with the capital ( [[#Bhavnani--2015|Bhavnani and Lacina, 2015]] ), previous experience of extreme climate hazards ( [[#Koubi--2021|Koubi et al., 2021]] ) and previous experience of violence among migrants ( [[#Linke--2018|Linke et al., 2018]] ). Climate-related migrants have reported higher levels of perception and experience of violence in their destination ( [[#Linke--2018|Linke et al., 2018]] ; [[#Koubi--2018|Koubi et al., 2018]] ). There has been no association established between international migration and conflict. The literature highlights how unjust racial logics may generate spurious links between climate migration and security ( [[#Fröhlich--2016|Fröhlich, 2016]] ; [[#Telford--2018|Telford, 2018]] ).

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