Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-16 (section)

==== 16.5.3.1 UNFCCC Technology and Capacity-building Institutions ====

<div id="h3-25-siblings" class="h3-siblings"></div>

Technology development and transfer have been a part of UNFCCC discussions and developments in the context of the international climate negotiations ever since its agreement in 1992, as assessed in AR5 ( [[#Stavins--2014|Stavins et al. 2014]] ). Support on ‘Technology Needs Assessment’ to developing countries was the first major action undertaken by the UNFCCC, and this has undergone different cycles of learning ( [[#Nygaard--2015|Nygaard and Hansen 2015]] ; [[#Hofman--2019|Hofman and van der Gaast 2019]] ). Since 2009, the UNFCCC discussions on technology development and transfer have focused on the Technology Mechanism under the Cancun Agreements of 2010, which can be seen as the global climate governance answer to redistributive claims by developing countries ( [[#McGee--2014|McGee and Wenta 2014]] ). The Technology Mechanism consists of the TEC and the Climate Technology Centre &amp; Network (CTCN). An independent review of CTCN, evaluated it on five dimensions – relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impacts and sustainability – and indicated that the organisation is achieving its mandate in all these dimensions, although there are some possible areas of improvement. The review also specifically noted that ‘the lack of predictability and security over financial resources significantly affected the CTCN’s ability to deliver services at the expected level, as did the CTCN’s lack of human and organizational resources and the capacity of NDEs [National Designated Entities].’ ( [[#TEC--2017|TEC 2017]] ). The CTCN has overcome some of the limitations imposed by resource constraints by acting as a matchmaker from an open-innovation perspective ( [[#Lee--2020|Lee and Mwebaza 2020]] ). The CTCN’s lack of financial sustainability has been a recurring issue, which may potentially be resolved by deepening the linkage between the CTCN and Green Climate Fund ( [[#Oh--2020|Oh 2020]] ). In the meanwhile, the Green Climate Fund is planning to establish the Climate Innovation Facility to support and accelerate early-stage innovations and climate technologies through the establishment of regional innovation hubs and climate accelerators as well as a climate growth fund ( [[#Green%20Climate%20Fund--2020|Green Climate Fund 2020]] ).

The ‘technology’ discussion has been further strengthened by the Paris Agreement, in which Article 10 is fully devoted to technology development and transfer ( [[#UNFCCC--2015|UNFCCC 2015]] ). However, the political discussions around technology continue to be characterised by viewing technology mostly as hardware ( [[#Haselip--2015|Haselip et al. 2015]] ), and relatively limited in scope ( [[#de%20Coninck--2017|de Coninck and Sagar 2017]] ). The workplans of the TEC and the CTCN do, however, indicate a broadening of the perspective on technology ( [[#CTCN--2019|CTCN 2019]] ; [[#TEC--2019|TEC 2019]] ).

Since the Kyoto Protocol’s CDM has been operational, studies have assessed its hypothesised contribution to technology transfer, including transfer of knowledge. Though not an explicit objective of the CDM, numerous papers have investigated whether CDM projects contribute to technology transfer ( [[#Michaelowa--2019|Michaelowa et al. 2019]] ). The literature varies in its assessment. Some find extensive use of domestic technology and hence lower levels of international technology transfer ( [[#Doranova--2010|Doranova et al. 2010]] ), while others indicate that around 40% of projects feature hardware or other types of international transfer of technology ( [[#Seres--2009|Seres et al. 2009]] ; [[#Murphy--2015|Murphy et al. 2015]] ), depending on the nature of technology, the host country and region ( [[#Cui--2020|Cui et al. 2020]] ) and the project type ( [[#Karakosta--2012|Karakosta et al. 2012]] ). The CDM was generally positively evaluated on its contribution to technology transfer. However, it was also regarded critically as the market-responsiveness and following of export implies a bias to larger, more advanced economies rather than those countries most in need of technology transfer ( [[#Gandenberger--2016|Gandenberger et al. 2016]] ), although some countries have managed to correct that by directing the projects, sub-nationally, to provinces with the greatest need ( [[#Bayer--2016|Bayer et al. 2016]] ). Also, the focus on hardware in evaluations of technology transfer under the CDM has been criticised ( [[#Haselip--2015|Haselip et al. 2015]] ; [[#Michaelowa--2019|Michaelowa et al. 2019]] ). Indeed, although many studies do go beyond hardware in their evaluations (e.g., [[#Murphy--2015|Murphy et al. 2015]] ), the degree to which the project leads to a change in the national system of innovation or institutional capacity development is not commonly assessed, or has been assessed as limited ( [[#de%20Coninck--2015|de Coninck and Puig 2015]] ).

There is significantly less literature on capacity building under the UNFCCC, especially as it relates to managing the technology transition. In a legal analysis, [[#D’Auvergne--2017|D’Auvergne and Nummelin (2017)]] indicate the nature, scope and principles of Article 11 on capacity building of the Paris Agreement as being demand- and country-driven, following a needs approach, fostering national, subnational and local ownership, and being iterative, incorporating the lessons learnt, as well as participatory, cross-cutting and gender-response. They also highlight that it is novel that least-developed countries and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) are called out as the most vulnerable and most in need of capacity building, and that it raises a ‘legal expectation’ that all parties ‘should’ cooperate to enhance the capacity in developing countries to implement the Paris Agreement. These aspects are reflected in the terms of reference of the Paris Committee on Capacity-building (PCCB) that was established in 2015 at the 21st Conference of the Parties ( [[#UNFCCC--2016|UNFCCC 2016]] ; [[#D’Auvergne--2017|D’Auvergne and Nummelin 2017]] ), and was extended by five years at the 25th Conference of the Parties in 2019 ( [[#UNFCCC--2020a|UNFCCC 2020a]] , b). In its work plan for 2020–2024, its aims include ‘identifying capacity gaps and needs, both current and emerging, and recommending ways to address them’.

An example of how innovative technologies combined with capacity development, and how institutional innovation is combined in the context of adaptation to extreme weather in SIDS can be found in Box 16.8.

From the broader assessment above, despite limitations of available information, it is clear that the number of initiatives and activities on international cooperation and technology transfer and capacity building seem to have been enhanced since the Cancun Agreements and the Paris Agreement ( [[#TEC--2021|TEC 2021]] ). However, much more can be done, given the complexity and magnitude of the requirements in terms of coverage of activities, the amount of committed funding, and its effectiveness. Some assessments of UNFCCC instruments specifically for technology transfer to developing countries have indicated that functions such as knowledge development, market formation and legitimacy in developing countries’ low-emission technological innovation systems would need much more support to fulfil the Paris Agreement goals ( [[#de%20Coninck--2015|de Coninck and Puig 2015]] ; [[#Ockwell--2015|Ockwell et al. 2015]] ); such areas would benefit from continued attention, given their role in the overall climate technology transition.

<div id="16.5.3.2" class="h3-container"></div>

<span id="international-rdd-cooperation-and-capacity-building-initiatives"></span>