Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/TS (section)

=== TS.4.1 Mitigation and Development Pathways in the Near- to Mid-term ===

<div id="h2-1-siblings" class="h2-siblings"></div>

'''An emissions gap persists, exacerbated by an implementation gap, despite mitigation efforts including those in Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs).''' In this report the ''emissions gap'' is understood as the difference between projected global emissions with Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) in 2030, and emissions in 2030 if mitigation pathways consistent with the Paris temperature goals were achieved. The term ''implementation gap'' refers to the gap between NDC mitigation pledges and the expected outcome of existing policies.

'''Pathways consistent with the implementation and extrapolation of countries’ current''' ''[[#footnote-020|13]]'' '''policies see GHG emissions reaching 57 (52–60) GtCO''' ''2'' '''-eq yr''' ''–1'' '''by 2030 and to 46–67 GtC''' '''O''' ''2'' '''-e''' '''q yr''' ''–1'' '''by 2050, leading to a median global warming of 2.4°C to 3.5°C by 2100 (''' '''''medium confidence''''' ''').''' NDCs with unconditional and conditional elements [[#footnote-019|14]] lead to 53 (50–57) and 50 (47–55) GtCO ''2'' -eq, respectively ( ''medium confidence'' ) {Table 4.1} . This leaves median estimated ''emissions gaps'' of 14–23 GtCO ''2'' -eq to limit warming to 2°C and 25–34 GtCO ''2'' -eq to limit warming to 1.5°C relative to mitigation pathways. (Figure TS.9) {Cross-Chapter Box 4, Figure 1 in Chapter 4}

<div id="_idContainer028" class="Basic-Text-Frame"></div>

[[File:0a0e2c5a45b52e5657817f3f22aa7cb1 IPCC_AR6_WGIII_Figure_TS_9.png]]

'''Figure TS.''' '''9 |''' '''Aggregate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of global mitigation pathways (coloured funnels and bars) and projected emission outcomes from current policies and emissions implied by unconditional and conditional elements of NDCs, based on updates available by 11 October 2021 (grey bars).''' Shaded areas show GHG emission medians and 25–75th percentiles over 2020–2050 for four types of pathways in the AR6 scenario database: (i) pathways with near-term emissions developments in line with current policies and extended with comparable ambition levels beyond 2030; (ii) pathways ''likely'' to limit warming to 2°C with near-term emissions developments reflecting 2030 emissions implied by current NDCs followed by accelerated emissions reductions; (iii) pathways ''likely'' to limit warming to 2°C based on immediate actions from 2020 onwards; (iv) pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot. Right-hand panels show two snapshots of the 2030 and 2050 emission ranges of the pathways in detail (median, 25–75th and 5–95th percentiles). The 2030 snapshot includes the projected emissions from the implementation of the NDCs as assessed in Section 4.2 (Table 4.1; median and full range). Historic GHG emissions trends as used in model studies are shown for 2010–2015. GHG emissions are in CO 2 -equivalent using GWP100 values from AR6. {3.5, Table 4.1, Cross-Chapter Box 4 in Chapter 4}

'''Projected global emissions from aggregated NDCs place limiting global warming to 1.5°C beyond reach and make it harder after 2030 to limit warming to 2°C (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Pathways following NDCs until 2030 show a smaller reduction in fossil fuel use, slower deployment of low-carbon alternatives, and a smaller reduction in CO 2 , CH 4 and overall GHG emissions in 2030 compared to immediate action scenarios. This is followed by a much faster reduction of emissions and fossil fuels after 2030, and a larger increase in the deployment of low-carbon alternatives during the medium term in order to get close to the levels of the immediate action pathways in 2050. Those pathways also deploy a larger amount of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) to compensate for higher emissions before 2030. The faster transition during 2030 to 2050 entails greater investment in fossil fuel infrastructure and lower deployment of low-carbon alternatives in 2030, which adds to the socio-economic challenges in realising the higher transition rates. (TS.4.2) {3.5}

'''Studies evaluating up to 105 updated NDCs''' [[#footnote-018|15]] '''indicate that emissions in NDCs with conditional elements have been reduced by 4.5 (2.7–6.3) GtCO''' 2 '''-eq.''' This closes the emission gaps by about one third to 2°C and about 20% to 1.5°C compared to the original NDCs submitted in 2015/16 ( ''medium confidence'' ) {4.2.2, Cross-Chapter Box 4 in Chapter 4} . An ''implementation gap'' also exists between the projected emissions with ‘current policies’ and the projected emissions resulting from the implementation of the unconditional and conditional elements of NDCs; this is estimated to be around 4 and 7 GtCO 2 -eq in 2030, respectively ( ''medium confidence'' ) {4.2.2} . Many countries would therefore require additional policies and associated action on climate change to meet their autonomously determined mitigation targets as specified under the first NDCs ( ''limited evidence'' ). The disruptions triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic increase uncertainty over the range of projections relative to pre-COVID-19 literature. As indicated by a growing number of studies at the national and global level, how large near- to mid-term emissions implications of the COVID-19 pandemic are, to a large degree depends on how stimulus or recovery packages are designed. {4.2}

'''There is a need to explore how accelerated mitigation – relative to NDCs and current policies – could close both emission gaps and implementation gaps.''' There is increasing understanding of the technical content of accelerated mitigation pathways, differentiated by national circumstances, with considerable, though uneven, literature at country-level ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ). Transformative technological and institutional changes for the near term include demand reductions through efficiency and reduced activity, rapid decarbonisation of the electricity sector and low-carbon electrification of buildings, industry and transport ( ''robust evidence'' , ''medium agreement'' ). A focus on energy use and supply is essential, but not sufficient on its own – the land sector and food systems deserve attention. The literature does not adequately include demand-side options and systems analysis, and captures the impact from non-CO 2 GHGs ( ''medium confidence'' ). {4.2.5}

'''If obstacles to accelerated mitigation are rooted in underlying structural features of society, then transforming such structures can support emission reductions {4.2.6} .''' Countries and regions will have different starting points for transition pathways. Some critical differences between countries include climate conditions resulting in different heating and cooling needs, endowments with different energy resources, patterns of spatial development, and political and economic conditions {4.2.5} . The way countries develop determines their capacity to accelerate mitigation and achieve other sustainable development objectives simultaneously ( ''medium confidence'' ) {4.3.1, 4.3.2} . Yet meeting ambitious mitigation and development goals cannot be achieved through incremental change ( ''robust evidence'' , ''medium agreement'' ). Though development pathways result from the actions of a wide range of actors, it is possible to shift development pathways through policies and enhancing enabling conditions ( ''limited evidence'' , ''medium agreement'' ).

'''''Shifting development pathways towards sustainability''''' '''offers ways to broaden the range of levers and enablers that a society can use to accelerate mitigation and increases the likelihood of making progress simultaneously on climate action and other development goals (Box TS.3) {Cross-Chapter Box 5 in Chapter 4, Figure 4.7, 4.3} .''' There are practical options to shift development pathways in ways that advance mitigation and other sustainable development objectives, support political feasibility, increase resources to meet multiple goals, and reduce emissions ( ''limited evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ). Concrete examples, assessed in [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapters/chapter-4 Chapter 4] of this report, include high-employment and low-emissions structural change; fiscal reforms for mitigation and social contract, combining housing policies to deliver both housing and transport mitigation; and changed economic, social and spatial patterns of agriculture sector development, providing the basis for sustained reductions in emissions from deforestation. {4.4.1, 4.4, 1.10}

'''Table TS.''' '''2 |''' '''Comparison of key characteristics of mitigation pathways with immediate action towards limiting warming to 1.5-2°C vs. pathways following NDCs announced prior to COP26 until 2030.''' Key characteristics are reported for five groups of mitigation pathways: (i) immediate action to limit warming to 1.5°C (&gt;50%) with no or limited overshoot (C1 in Table TS.3; 97 scenarios), (ii) near term action following the NDCs until 2030 and returning warming to 1.5°C (&gt; 50%) by 2100 after a high overshoot (subset of 42 scenarios following the NDCs until 2030 in C2), (iii) immediate action to limit warming to 2°C (&gt;67%), (C3a in Table TS.3; 204 scenarios), (iv) near term action following the NDCs until 2030 followed by post-2030 action to limit warming to 2°C (&gt;67%) (C3b in Table TS.3; 97 scenarios). Also shown are the characteristics for (v) the combined class of all scenarios that limit warming to 2°C (&gt;67%). The groups (i), (iii), and the combination of (ii) and (iv) are depicted in Figure TS.9. Reported are median and interquartile ranges (in brackets) for selected global indicators. Numbers are rounded to the nearest five, with the exception of cumulative net negative CO 2 emissions rounded to the nearest 10. Changes from 2019 are relative to modelled 2019 values. Emissions reductions are based on harmonised model emissions used for the climate assessment. {Section 3.5} {Table 3.6}

{| class="wikitable"
|-
| rowspan="2"| Global indicators

| '''1.5°C (&gt;50%)'''

| 1.5°C (&gt;50%) by 2100

| colspan="3"| 2°C (&gt;67%)

|-
| Immediate action, with no or limited overshoot

| NDCs until 2030, with overshoot before 2100

| ''Immediate action''

| NDCs until 2030

| All

|-
| Cumulative net negative CO 2 emissions

until 2100 (GtCO 2 )

| 220 (70,430)

| 380 (300,470)

| 30 (0,130)

| 60 (20,210)

| 40 (10,180)

|-
| Change in GHG emissions in 2030 (% rel to 2019)

| –45 (–50,–40)

| –5 (–5,0)

| –25 (–35,–20)

| –5 (–10,0)

| –20 (–30,–10)

|-
| in 2050 (% rel to 2019)

| –85 (–90,–80)

| –75 (–85,–70)

| –65 (–70,–60)

| –70 (–70,–60)

| –65 (–70,–60)

|-
| Change in CO 2 emissions in 2030 (% rel to 2019)

| –50 (–60,–40)

| –5 (–5,0)

| –25 (–35,–20)

| –5 (–5,0)

| –20 (–30,–5)

|-
| in 2050 (% rel to 2019)

| –100 (–105,–95)

| –85 (–95,–80)

| –70 (–80,–65)

| –75 (–80,–65)

| –75 (–80,–65)

|-
| Change in net land use CO 2 emissions in 2030 (% rel to 2019)

| –100 (–105,–95)

| –30 (–60,–20)

| –90 (–105,–75)

| –20 (–80,–20)

| –80 (–100,–30)

|-
| in 2050 (% rel to 2019)

| –150 (–200,–100)

| –135 (–165,–120)

| –135 (–185,–100)

| –130 (–145,–115)

| –135 (–180,–100)

|-
| Change in CH 4 emissions in 2030 (% rel to 2019)

| –35 (–40,–30)

| –5 (–5,0)

| –25 (–35,–20)

| –10 (–15,–5)

| –20 (–25,–10)

|-
| in 2050 (% rel to 2019)

| –50 (–60,–45)

| –50 (–60,–45)

| –45 (–50,–40)

| –50 (–65,–45)

| –45 (–55,–40)

|-
| Change in primary energy from coal in 2030 (% rel to 2019)

| –75 (–80,–65)

| –10 (–20,–5)

| –50 (–65,–35)

| –15 (–20,–10)

| –35 (–55,–20)

|-
| in 2050 (% rel to 2019)

| –95 (–100,–80)

| –90 (–100,–85)

| –85 (–100,–65)

| –80 (–90,–70)

| –85 (–95,–65)

|-
| Change in primary energy from oil in 2030 (% rel to 2019)

| –10 (–25,0)

| 5 (5,10)

| 0 (–10,10)

| 10 (5,10)

| 5 (0,10)

|-
| in 2050 (% rel to 2019)

| –60 (–75,–40)

| –50 (–65,–35)

| –30 (–45,–15)

| –40 (–55,–20)

| –30 (–50,–15)

|-
| Change in primary energy from gas in 2030 (% rel to 2019)

| –10 (–30,0)

| 15 (10,25)

| 10 (0,15)

| 15 (10,15)

| 10 (0,15)

|-
| in 2050 (% rel to 2019)

| –45 (–60,–20)

| –45 (–55,–30)

| –10 (–35,15)

| –30 (–45,–5)

| –15 (–40,10)

|-
| Change in primary energy from nuclear in 2030 (% rel to 2019)

| 40 (10,70)

| 10 (0,25)

| 35 (5,50)

| 10 (0,30)

| 25 (0,45)

|-
| in 2050 (% rel to 2019)

| 90 (15,295)

| 100 (45,130)

| 85 (30,200)

| 75 (30,120)

| 80 (30,140)

|-
| Change in primary energy from modern biomass in 2030 (% rel to 2019)

| 75 (55,130)

| 45 (20,75)

| 60 (35,105)

| 45 (20,80)

| 55 (35,105)

|-
| in 2050 (% rel to 2019)

| 290 (215,430)

| 230 (170,420)

| 240 (130,355)

| 260 (95,435)

| 250 (115,405)

|-
| Change in primary energy from non-biomass renewables in 2030 (% rel to 2019)

| 225 (155,270)

| 100 (85,145)

| 150 (115,190)

| 115 (85,130)

| 130 (90,170)

|-
| in 2050 (% rel to 2019)

| 725 (545,950)

| 665 (535,925)

| 565 (415,765)

| 625 (545,700)

| 605 (470,735)

|-
| Change in carbon intensity of electricity in 2030 (% rel to 2019)

| –75 (–80,–70)

| –30 (–40,–30)

| –60 (–70,–50)

| –35 (–40,–30)

| –50 (–65,–35)

|-
| in 2050 (% rel to 2019)

| –100 (–100,–100)

| –100 (–100,–100)

| –95 (–100,–95)

| –100 (–100,–95)

| –95 (–100,–95)

|}

'''Box TS.3 |''' '''Shifting Development Pathways to Increase Sustainability and Broaden Mitigation Options'''

In this report, ''development pathways'' refer to the patterns of development resulting from multiple decisions and choices made by many actors in the national and global contexts. Each society whether in developing or developed regions follows its own pattern of growth (Figure TS.13). Development pathways can also be described at smaller scales (e.g., for regions or cities) and for sectoral systems.

Development pathways are major drivers of GHG emissions {1, 2} . There is compelling evidence to show that continuing along existing development pathways will not achieve rapid and deep emission reductions. In the absence of shifts in development pathways, conventional mitigation policy instruments may not be able to limit global emissions to a degree sufficient to meet ambitious mitigation goals or they may only be able to do so at very high economic and social costs.

Policies to shift development pathways, on the other hand, make mitigation policies more effective. Shifting development pathways broadens the scope for synergies between sustainable development objectives and mitigation. Development pathways also determine the enablers and levers available for adaptation {AR6 WGII TS.E.1.2} and for achieving other SDGs.

There are many instances in which reducing GHG emissions and moving towards the achievement of other development objectives can go hand in hand {Chapter 3, Figure 3.33, Chapters 6–12, and 17} . Integrated policies can support the creation of synergies between ''action to combat climate change and its impacts'' (SDG 13 – climate action) and other SDGs. For example, when measures promoting walkable urban areas are combined with electrification and clean renewable energy, there are several co-benefits to be attained. These include reduced pressures on agricultural land from reduced urban growth, health co-benefits from cleaner air, and benefits from enhanced mobility {8.2, 8.4, 4.4.1} . Energy efficiency in buildings and energy poverty alleviation through improved access to clean fuels also deliver significant health benefits. {9.8.1 and 9.8.2}

However, decisions about mitigation actions, and their timing and scale, may entail trade-offs with the achievement of other national development objectives in the near, mid- and long term {Chapter 12} . In the near term, for example, regulations may ban vehicles from city centres to reduce congestion and local air pollution but reduce mobility and choice. Increasing green spaces within cities without caps on housing prices may involve trade-offs with affordable housing and push low-income residents outside the city {8.2.2} . In the mid- and long term, large-scale deployment of biomass energy raises concerns about food security and biodiversity conservation {3.7.1, 3.7.5, 7.4.4, 9.8.1, 12.5.2, 12.5.3} . Prioritising is one way to manage these trade-offs, addressing some national development objectives earlier than others. Another way is to adopt policy packages aimed at shifting development pathways towards increased sustainability (SDPS) as they expand the range of tools available to simultaneously achieve multiple development objectives and accelerate mitigation. (Box TS.3, Figure 1)

'''What does shifting development pathways towards increased sustainability entail?'''

Shifting development pathways towards increased sustainability implies making transformative changes that disrupt existing developmental trends. Such choices would not be marginal, but include technological, systemic and socio-behavioural changes {4.4} . Decision points also arise with new infrastructure, sustainable supply chains, institutional capacities for evidence-based and integrated decision-making, financial alignment towards low-carbon socially responsible investments, just transitions and shifts in behaviour and norms to support shifts away from fossil fuel consumption. Adopting multi-level governance modes, tackling corruption where it inhibits shifts to sustainability, and improving social and political trust are also key for aligning and supporting long-term environmentally just policies and processes. {4.4, Cross-Chapter Box 5 in Chapter 4}

'''How can development pathways be ‘shifted’?'''

Shifting development paths is complex. Changes that involve ‘dissimilar, unfamiliar and more complex science-based components’ take more time, acceptance and legitimation and involve complex social learning, even when they promise large gains. Despite the complexities of the interactions that result in patterns of development, history also shows that societies can influence the direction of development pathways based on choices made by decision-makers, citizens, the private sector, and social stakeholders. Shifts in development pathways result from both sustained political interventions and bottom-up changes in public opinion. Collective action by individuals as part of social movements or lifestyle changes underpins system change. {5.2.3, 5.4.1, 5.4.5}

Sectoral transitions that aim to shift development pathways often have multiple objectives and deploy a diverse mix of policies and institutional measures. Context-specific governance conditions can significantly enable or disable sectoral transitions. {Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 16}

The necessary transformational changes are anticipated to be more acceptable if rooted in the development aspirations of the economy and society within which they take place and may enable a new social contract to address a complex set of interlinkages across sectors, classes, and the whole economy. Taking advantage of windows of opportunity and disruptions to mindsets and socio-technical systems could advance deeper transformations.

'''How can shifts in development pathways be implemented by actors in different contexts?'''

Shifting development pathways to increased sustainability is a shared aspiration. Yet since countries differ in starting points (e.g., social, economic, cultural, political) and historical backgrounds, they have different urgent needs in terms of facilitating the economic, social, and environmental dimensions of sustainable development and, therefore, give different priorities {4.3.2, 17.1} . The appropriate set of policies to shift development pathways thus depends on national circumstances and capacities.

Shifting development pathways towards sustainability needs to be supported by multilateral partnerships to strengthen suitable capacity, technological innovation (TS.6.5), and financial flows (TS.6.4). The international community can play a particularly key role by helping ensure the necessary broad participation in climate-mitigation efforts, including by countries at different development levels, through sustained support for policies and partnerships that support shifting development pathways towards sustainability while promoting equity and being mindful of different transition capacities. {4.3, 16.5, 16.6}

[[File:1644156a5bd2d9e7f0da578b914a336e IPCC_AR6_WGIII_Box_TS_3_Figure_1.png]]

'''Box TS.3, Figure 1 |''' '''Shifting development pathways to increased sustainability: choices by a wide range of actors at key decision points on development pathways can reduce barriers and provide more tools to accelerate mitigation and achieve other Sustainable Development Goals.''' {4.7}

'''Policies can''' '''''shift''''' '''development pathways. There are examples of policies implemented in the pursuit of overall societal development objectives, such as job creation, macroeconomic stability, economic growth, and public health and welfare.''' In some countries, such policies are framed as part of a ''Just Transition'' (Box TS.3), however, they can have major influence on mitigative capacity, and hence can be seen as tools to broaden mitigation options ( ''medium confidence'' ) {4.3.3} . Coordinated policy mixes would need to orchestrate multiple actors – individuals, groups and collectives, corporate actors, institutions and infrastructure actors – to deepen decarbonisation and shift pathways towards sustainability. Shifts in one country may spill over to other countries. Shifting development pathways can jointly support mitigation and adaptation {4.4.2} . Some studies explore the risks of high complexity and potential delay attached to shifting development pathways. (Box TS.4, Figure TS.11) {4.4.3}

'''An increasing number of mitigation strategies up to 2050 (mid-term) have been developed by various actors. A growing number of such strategies aim at net zero GHG or CO''' 2 '''emissions, but it is not yet possible to draw global implications due to the limited size of sample (''' '''''medium evidence, low agreement''''' ''') {4.2.4} .''' Non-state actors are also engaging in a wide range of mitigation initiatives. When adding up emission reduction potentials, sub-national and non-state international cooperative initiatives could reduce emissions by up to about 20 GtCO 2 -eq in 2030 ( ''limited evidence'' , ''medium agreement'' ) {4.2.3} . Yet perceived or real conflicts between mitigation and other SDGs can impede such action. If undertaken without precaution, accelerated mitigation is found to have significant implications for development objectives and macroeconomic costs at country level. The literature shows that the employment effect of mitigation policies tends to be limited on aggregate but can be significant at sectoral level ( ''limited evidence'' , ''medium agreement'' ). Detailed design of mitigation policies is critical for distributional impacts and avoiding lock-in ( ''high confidence'' ), though further research is needed in that direction. {4.2.6}

'''The literature identifies a broad set of enabling conditions that can both foster''' '''''shifting development pathways''''' '''and''' '''''accelerated mitigation''''' '''(''' '''''medium evidence, high agreement''''' ''').''' Policy integration is a necessary component of shifting development pathways, addressing multiple objectives. To this aim, mobilising a range of policies is preferable to single policy instruments ( ''high confidence'' ). {4.4.1} . Governance for climate mitigation and shifting development pathways is enhanced when tailored to national and local contexts. Improved institutions and effective governance enable ambitious action on climate and can help bridge implementation gaps ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ). Given that strengthening institutions may be a long-term endeavour, it needs attention in the near term {4.4.1} . Accelerated mitigation and shifting development pathways necessitates both redirecting existing financial flows from high- to low-emissions technologies and systems, and providing additional resources to overcome current financial barriers ( ''high confidence'' ) {4.4.1} . Opportunities exist in the near term to close the finance gap {15.2.2} . At the national level, public finance for actions promoting sustainable development helps broaden the scope of mitigation ( ''medium confidence'' ). Changes in behaviour and lifestyles are important to move beyond mitigation as incremental change, and when supporting shifts to more sustainable development pathways will broaden the scope of mitigation ( ''medium confidence'' ). {4.4.1, Figure 4.8}

'''Some enabling conditions can be put in place relatively quickly while some others may take time to establish underscoring the importance of early action (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Depending on context, some enabling conditions such as promoting innovation may take time to establish. Other enabling conditions, such as improved access to financing, can be put in place in a relatively short time frame, and can yield rapid results {4.4, Figure 5.14, 13.9, 14.5, 15.6, 16.3, 16.4, 16.5, Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 16} . Focusing on development pathways and considering how to shift them may also yield rapid results by providing tools to accelerate mitigation and achieve other sustainable development goals {4.4.1} . Charting just transitions to net zero may provide a vision, which policy measures can help achieve (Boxes TS.4 and TS.8).

'''Equity can be an important enabler, increasing the level of ambition for accelerated mitigation (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''') {4.5} .''' Equity deals with the distribution of costs and benefits and how these are shared, as per social contracts, national policy and international agreements. Transition pathways have distributional consequences such as large changes in employment and economic structure ( ''high confidence'' ). The ''Just Transition'' concept has become an international focal point tying together social movements, trade unions, and other key stakeholders to ensure equity is better accounted for in low-carbon transitions (Box TS.4). The effectiveness of cooperative action and the perception of fairness of such arrangements are closely related in that pathways that prioritise equity and allow broad stakeholder participation can enable broader consensus for the transformational change implicit in the need for deeper mitigation ( ''robust evidence'' , ''medium agreement'' ). (Box TS.4) {4.5, Figure 4.9}

'''Box TS.4 | Just Transition'''

The Just Transition framework refers to a set of principles, processes and practices aimed at ensuring that no people, workers, places, sectors, countries or regions are left behind in the move from a high-carbon to a low-carbon economy. It includes respect and dignity for vulnerable groups; creation of decent jobs; social protection; employment rights; fairness in energy access and use and social dialogue and democratic consultation with relevant stakeholders.

The concept has evolved, becoming prominent in the United States of America in 1980, related to environmental regulations that resulted in job losses from highly polluting industries. Traced from a purely labour movement, trade union space, the Just Transition framework emphasises that decent work and environmental protection are not incompatible. During COP 24, with the Just Transition Silesia Declaration, the concept gained in recognition and was signed by 56 heads of state.

Implicit in a Just Transition is the notion of well-being, equity and justice – the realisation that transitions are inherently disruptive and deliberate effort may be required to ensure communities dependent on fossil-fuel based economies and industries do not suffer disproportionately {Chapter 4} . ‘Just Transitions’ are integral to the European Union as mentioned in the EU Green Deal, the Scottish Government’s development plans and other national low-carbon transition strategies. The US Green New Deal Resolution puts structural inequality, poverty mitigation, and ‘Just Transitions’ at its centre. There is a growing awareness of the need for shifting finance towards Just Transition in the context of COVID-19, in particular, public finance and governance have a major role in allowing a Just Transition more broadly {Chapter 15} .

In the immediate aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, low oil prices created additional financial problems for fossil fuel producer countries faced with loss of revenue and reduced fiscal latitude and space. Public spending and social safety nets associated with the proceeds from producer economies can be affected as assets become stranded and spending on strategic sustainable development goals such as free education and health-care services are neglected. Fiscal challenges are intricately linked to ‘Just Transitions’ and the management associated with sustainable energy transition. There is no certainty on how energy systems will recover post-COVID-19. However, ‘Just Transitions’ will have equity implications if stimulus packages are implemented without due regard for the differentiated scales and speeds and national and regional contexts, especially in the context of developing countries.

A Just Transition entails targeted and proactive measures from governments, agencies, and other non-state authorities to ensure that any negative social, environmental, or economic impacts of economy-wide transitions are minimised, whilst benefits are maximised for those disproportionally affected. These proactive measures include eradication of poverty, regulating prosperity and creating jobs in ‘green’ sectors. In addition, governments, polluting industries, corporations, and those more able to pay higher associated taxes, can pay for transition costs by providing a welfare safety net and adequate compensation to people, communities, and regions that have been impacted by pollution, or are marginalised, or are negatively impacted by a transition from a high- to low-carbon economy and society. There is, nonetheless, increased recognition that resources that can enable the transition, international development institutions, as well as other transitional drivers such as tools, strategies and finance, are scarce. A sample of global efforts is summarised in Box TS.4, Figure 1.

[[File:b7c6d02de94ae24737c33ceb48344863 IPCC_AR6_WGIII_Box_TS_4_Figure_1.png]]

'''Box TS.4 Figure 1 |''' '''Just Transitions around the world, 2020. Panel (a)''' shows commissions, task forces, and dialogues behind a Just Transition in many countries. '''Panel (b)''' shows the funds related to the Just Transition within the European Union Green Deal. '''Panel (c)''' shows the European Union’s Platform for Coal Regions in Transition. {Figure 4.9}

<div id="TS.4.2" class="h2-container"></div>

<span id="ts.4.2-long-term-mitigation-pathways"></span>