Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-17 (section)

==== 17.4.5.4 Catalysing Agents ====

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Individuals and organisations often serve as catalysing agents of climate risk decision-making. They promote greater levels of new forms of climate action by communicating the urgency of climate action and by developing coalitions which undertake action. Agents include individuals, organisations or collectives, or multiple organisations linked together.

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===== 17.4.5.4.1 Social movements and other mobilisations =====

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Recent studies of climate-related social movements show that they can act as catalysing agents which promote action to manage climate-related risks ( ''medium confidence'' ). However, these studies use varying definitions of climate movements within the broader context of environmental movements. A prominent topic of research is the rapidity and the large scale of the proliferation of these movements around the world, primarily in urban settings but also in rural and Indigenous contexts ( [[#Claeys--2017|Claeys and Delgado Pugley, 2017]] ).

These movements usually focus on climate mitigation but sometimes include adaptation. Their social bases include groups which had not previously been active in climate politics, notably children and youth, as well as sectors with long traditions of environmental activism, such as women and Indigenous Peoples (see Cross-Chapter Boxes GENDER and INDIG in Chapter 18). Much of the literature on youth movements traces the emergence of the movements themselves ( [[#Sanson--2019|Sanson et al., 2019]] ; [[#Treichel--2020|Treichel, 2020]] ), their framings of climate change as a social justice issue ( [[#Holmberg--2019|Holmberg and Alvinius, 2019]] ) and their presence in demonstrations and on social media ( [[#Boulianne--2020|Boulianne et al., 2020]] ). Climate action catalysed by youth and other climate movements include visible international events such as the signing of Declaration on Children, Youth, and Climate Action at COP25 in Madrid 2019 ( [[#Han--2020|Han and Ahn, 2020]] ), as well as national efforts, including lawsuits, and local events such as in tree-planting and waste reduction initiatives ( [[#Bandura--2019|Bandura and Cherry, 2019]] ).

A recent review examines 2743 cases around the world of mobilisations for environmental justice causes ( [[#Scheidel--2020|Scheidel et al., 2020]] ); roughly half the cases occurred between 1970 and 2007, and half between 2008 and 2019. Of these environmental mobilisations, 17% are directly related to climate and energy, and others are related to climate-sensitive issues (15% for biomass and land use, 14% for water management). This study reports the proportion of positive outcomes for different strategies, defined as meeting the goals of the movements, which generally align with climate adaptation and sustainable resource management. These rates vary from 10% for negotiated solutions to 34% for court decisions. It notes the corresponding higher rates of failure, as well as the costs borne by the movements, which include criminalisation (20% of cases), violence (18%) and assassination (13%). These costs are significantly higher for Indigenous communities that engage in these mobilisations.

At a global scale, climate movements succeeded in pressing for the greater recognition of the importance of Indigenous knowledge within international agreements ( [[#Tormos-Aponte--2018|Tormos-Aponte and García-López, 2018]] ) but did not achieve the major reforms of climate finance which they sought ( [[#Khan--2019a|Khan et al., 2019a]] ); these differing outcomes reflect the sensitivity of the issues and the formation of coalitions which supported or opposed the movements. At national and local scales, one review of US cases reports limited effectiveness of climate movements because of the ability of governmental agencies to co-opt them ( [[#Pulido--2016|Pulido et al., 2016]] ), while another review in Pakistan shows a number of successes, because the movements were able to build alliances with other public sector and community groups ( [[#Shawoo--2020|Shawoo and McDermott, 2020]] ).

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===== 17.4.5.4.2 Policy leaders and entrepreneurs =====

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Policy leaders, often described as policy entrepreneurs within the scholarly literature, are individuals in positions of leadership who set agendas and build coalitions to drive decision-making processes, and hence can function as catalysers of climate adaptation ( [[#Petridou--2020|Petridou and Mintrom, 2020]] ). Political leaders who have taken on climate change as a key policy issue function as policy entrepreneurs at international, national and sub-national levels. City officials, including mayors and other executives, often play the role of climate policy entrepreneurs, while the absence of effective leadership negatively affects adaptation success ( [[#Becker--2019|Becker and Kretsch, 2019]] ). Such entrepreneurs can be important forces for change in both reactive contexts following an extreme or focusing event and in proactive context. They can be effective especially in contexts where they navigate and link together formal and informal networks of complex climate governance systems ( [[#Tanner--2019|Tanner et al., 2019]] ). Their capacity to act has been increased when they and their institutions are embedded within partnership networks ( [[#Bellinson--2019|Bellinson and Chu, 2019]] ). It is in these contexts that the leadership and position of a policy entrepreneur becomes even more catalytic when operating at the interface of formal and informal networks ( [[#Mintrom--2019|Mintrom, 2019]] ; [[#Stone--2019|Stone, 2019]] ).

Sub-national actors and city officials including mayors and other executives are among the individuals most often described and assessed as climate policy entrepreneurs ( [[#Kalafatis--2017|Kalafatis and Lemos, 2017]] ). City-level climate policy entrepreneurs often operate using their own experience, connections and persistence to address issues of importance to their constituency. Climate risk concerns are often inherently local, and in turn local decision makers perceive it as being appropriate to engage. Conversely, the absence of effective leadership negatively affects adaptation success ( [[#Kalafatis--2017|Kalafatis and Lemos, 2017]] ; [[#Becker--2019|Becker and Kretsch, 2019]] ). Urban climate policy entrepreneurs operate in four key spheres of policy development and implementation: attention and support seeking strategies; linking strategies (e.g., coalition building); relational management strategies (e.g., networking and trusting building); and arena strategies including timing ( [[#Brouwer--2018|Brouwer and Huitema, 2018]] ). The presence and operation of urban climate policy entrepreneurs is positively associated in settings with multiple jurisdictions and across differing spatial scales ( [[#Kalafatis--2017|Kalafatis and Lemos, 2017]] ; [[#Renner--2018|Renner and Meijerink, 2018]] ). It is in these contexts that their capacity to operate simultaneously at the interface of multiple networks is particularly valuable for promoting climate action. Urban climate policy entrepreneurs can directly engage with a range of constituent groups and offer and promote climate adaptation strategies that can have direct impact on the daily lives of these residents and their interests.

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