Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-6 (section)

=== 6.4.1 Adaptation Experiences in Cities, Settlements and Infrastructures ===

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Since AR5, there is increasing evidence that successful adaptation to climate change is context-specific and responsive to the particular needs of urban locations. This section assesses the contributions of key urban actors, local government, civil society and the local private sector, in enabling adaptation. Wider influences from national government cross cut this and are discussed with the role of international agencies, and finance which is assessed in [[#6.4.5|Section 6.4.5]] .

The literature on the governance of adaptation has grown since the AR5, though with few cases from cities and settlements in the Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia and former USSR countries. Potential reasons for the continued lack of studies in these areas include the centralised character of decision making systems in countries in these regions and the early stage of adaptation planning in these urban areas ( [[#Clar--2019|Clar, 2019]] ; [[#Mitchell--2019|Mitchell and Laycock, 2019]] ; Olazabal et al., 2019a).

Flexible institutions that allow for both top-down and bottom-up action can bring capacities together from across levels of government and actors within a settlement (Sharifi and Yamagata, 2017). Predominant planning and capacity-building strategies, however, lack the flexibility to address the needs of a rapidly changing environment (Carter et al., 2015; [[#Dhar--2017|Dhar and Khirfan, 2017]] ; Juhola, 2016). Efforts to adapt to new challenges may have to speed up. This is especially true in urban areas and settlements with lower levels of development and experiencing rapid urbanisation, growing inequality and exposure to multiple hazards ( [[#Dulal--2019|Dulal, 2019]] ; Grafakos et al., 2019; Solecki et al., 2018). Even within cities that share similar characteristics, there are considerable differences in the level of investment in adaptation (Georgeson et al., 2016). There is also a danger that uncoordinated actions for climate change mitigation and adaptation may constrain future adaptation opportunities or create maladaptation (Juhola et al., 2016). The evidence emerging since the AR5 suggests that institutional change can be accelerated by closer collaboration between the diverse actors and deployment of the diverse approaches that can deliver adaptation.

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==== 6.4.1.1 Experiences of Adaptation Action in Sub-national Governments ====

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The assessment of cases of local adaptation demonstrates that most urban adaptation is led by local governments (although the local government is also a heterogeneous category and local governance arrangements may vary across administrative and political contexts) ( ''high confidence'' ) (Amundsen et al., 2018; Lesnikowski et al., 2021). Local government reform at different levels can improve local adaptation, whether this is by strengthening specific teams or building cross-departmental linkages ( ''high confidence'' ) (Paterson et al., 2017; [[#Shi--2019|Shi, 2019]] ; [[#Wamsler--2018|Wamsler and Raggers, 2018]] ). Adaptation success often depends on having political champions driving the adaptation agenda alongside measures such as access to a knowledge base, resources at hand, political stability and the presence of dense social networks that can be supported through local government reform (Pasquini et al., 2015). Aligning adaptation objectives with other potential benefits of sustainable development also supports adaptation. Specifically, policies and plans that link adaptation to the objectives of Agenda 2030 supports action at the local level ( [[#UN-Habitat--2016b|UN-Habitat, 2016b]] ). Showing the economic benefits of adaptation is a strategy for local institutions to gain support for adaptation action. For example, local governments in Surat, Indore and Bhubaneswar in India linked adaptation to local development needs in experiments that facilitated accessing human and finance resources, at the local, national and international levels ( [[#Chu--2016|Chu, 2016]] ). However, linking adaptation to co-benefits may also divide efforts and reduce the effectiveness of adaptation actions. For example, urban land use planning and management in Ambo town, Ethiopia, resulted in the implementation of urban greening projects, but these projects did not directly address the climate-related disaster risks affecting the settlement, including urban flooding, water stress, water shortages, increased urban heat, wind and dust storms (Ogato et al., 2017).

Multi-level governance measures that support local governments can foster robust adaptation approaches and address risks and vulnerabilities across scales ( ''high confidence'' ) (Westman, Broto and Huang, 2019; Hardoy et al., 2014; [[#Romero-Lankao--2015|Romero-Lankao and Hardoy, 2015]] ). Effective action by local government requires national government’s support ( ''medium confidence'' ). For example, [[#Araos--2017|Araos et al. (2017)]] documents the case of Dhaka, Bangladesh, where a national plan prioritises measures for protecting coasts and agricultural production. In this context, the local government has minimal access to human and financial resources. Without national support, the local government struggles to coordinate action among different stakeholders. National urban adaptation directives can influence municipal governments’ action and planning, but evidence suggests that national policy alone is not sufficient to deliver action on the ground without understanding local conditions ( ''high confidence'' ) (Archer et al., 2014; Lehmann et al., 2015).

There are barriers for municipal adaptation plans to deliver effective adaptation outcomes and implemented actions often diverge from plans (see [[#6.4.6|Section 6.4.6]] ). For example, a comparison of adaptation plans and budget expenditures of six metropolitan cities in South Korea between 2012 and 2016 showed that the implementation of adaptation programmes diverged substantially from the original plans, both in terms of total and sector-specific spending ( [[#Lee--2018|Lee and Kim, 2018]] ). Often, a focus on institutional change and reform limits attention to more practical aspects of adaptation that improve communities’ resilience (Castán Broto and Westman, 2020). Adaptation actions, even where financed effectively, do not always deliver positive outcomes ( ''high confidence'' ) (Reckien et al., 2015; [[#Woodruff--2016|Woodruff and Stults, 2016]] ; [[#Uittenbroek--2016|Uittenbroek, 2016]] ; Aguiar et al., 2018; Reckien et al., 2018a; Olazabal et al., 2019b; Campello Torres et al., 2021) (see also [[#6.4.7|Section 6.4.7]] ).

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==== 6.4.1.2 The Role of Non-State Actors in Local Adaptation ====

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There are multiple actors, other than local governments, that can deliver adaptation action, including businesses, not for profit organisations and trade unions ( ''high confidence'' ) (Giordano et al., 2020; Eakin et al., 2021). Empirical evidence since the AR5 highlights the role of communities, universities, the private sector and transnational networks in adaptation (Hunter et al., 2020; Bäckstrand et al., 2017). Non-state actors are particularly important in enabling adaptation by linking government agencies with low-income and marginalised communities, including those living in informal settlements (Kuyper, Linnér and Schroeder, 2018; [[#Khosla--2019|Khosla and Bhardwaj, 2019]] ).

Since AR5, civil society and private actors have emerged as core knowledge holders and drivers of experimentation, even succeeding in changing public policy in the process (Klein, Juhola and Landauer, 2017; [[#McKnight--2016|McKnight and Linnenluecke, 2016]] ; [[#Mees--2017|Mees, 2017]] ). Previous IPCC Assessment Reports noted that civil society actors enable local risk awareness, sensitisation and adaptive capacity, and generate locally based innovation (e.g., through community based adaptation programmes).

Community based adaptation includes a range of initiatives that put communities at the centre of planning for adaptation, often led by communities themselves ( [[#Reid--2016|Reid, 2016]] ). Community based adaptation is a comprehensive and effective strategy to deliver resilience at a human scale (Trogal et al., 2018; Greenwalt et al., 2020). Many community based responses to climate impacts represent coping strategies developed within households with a small effect on adaptation capacities beyond incremental improvements. Residents adopt private coping strategies to reduce exposure to and the impacts of heat, floods, flash floods, landslides, storms and diseases on their lives ( [[#Hambati--2018|Hambati and Yengoh, 2018]] ). These coping strategies include the construction of physical protection against flooding, reforestation, the construction of terraces, flood diversion measures and interventions to protect houses (such as raised doorsteps or use of sandbags and adoption of building techniques for making homes resilient to storms and landslides), ventilation of houses, urban agriculture and redefinition of daily practices and livelihoods (Navarro et al., 2020; [[#Malabayabas--2017|Malabayabas and Baconguis, 2017]] ; [[#Apreda--2016|Apreda, 2016]] ; [[#de%20Andrade--2020|de Andrade and Szlafsztein, 2020]] ; [[#Sahay--2018|Sahay, 2018]] ; Bausch, Eakin and Lerner, 2018).

Individual coping strategies are generally ineffective in reducing extreme risks and they rarely address the underlying structural causes of vulnerability ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Sahay--2018|Sahay, 2018]] ; Rözer et al., 2016; Jay et al., 2021). Expending resources on private coping strategies in some cases may divert resources and capacity for wider community adaptation efforts ( [[#de%20Andrade--2020|de Andrade and Szlafsztein, 2020]] ). However, individual coping strategies can provide foundations for the implementation of collaborative action in communities, building on people’s experiences, in ways which may have a longer-term, durable impact on developing resilience ( ''high confidence'' ) (McEwen et al., 2018). Community based adaptation can be effective at different scales, whether this is to manage transboundary issues (Limthongsakul, Nitivattananon and Arifwidodo, 2017), support the replication of local solutions (Danière et al., 2016), increase the uptake of adaptation measures (Liang et al., 2017) or inform the design of more effective policies for resilience (Berquist, Daniere and Drummond, 2015; [[#Odemerho--2015|Odemerho, 2015]] ). Community action may be mediated by NGOs or third sector organisations who play a coordinating or enabling role, particularly where other local government mechanisms are absent.

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==== 6.4.1.3 The Role of the Private Sector in Local Adaptation ====

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There is weak evidence of private sector involvement in urban adaptation ( [[#Pauw--2015|Pauw, 2015]] ; [[#Heurkens--2016|Heurkens, 2016]] ). The absence of private sector investment in adaptation is particularly visible in rapidly urbanising countries (Nagendra et al., 2018). Business continuity describing private sector preparedness notes that firms underestimate the impacts of climate risks on their business models (Goldstein et al., 2019; [[#Forino--2021|Forino and von Meding, 2021]] ; [[#Korber--2017|Korber and McNaughton, 2017]] ; Crick et al., 2018b). There is little research on how businesses can play a leading role in urban adaptation (Klein et al., 2018). A global assessment of the private sector’s role in urban adaptation using data from 402 cities shows that most adaptation projects focus on the public sector and do not address private sector concerns or local people’s participation (Klein et al., 2018). Recorded private sector action is recognised through partnerships and participation ( [[#Peterson--2017|Peterson and Hughes, 2017]] ; [[#Hughes--2018|Hughes and Peterson, 2018]] ). There are a few examples of studies of private sector-led adaptation action which adopts a national focus (Crick et al., 2018a; Crick et al., 2018b). This lack of evidence contrasts with a well-developed body of literature on private sector-led mitigation (Averchenkova et al., 2016).

Businesses have an essential role in urban adaptation actions, through the collective formulation of adaptation strategies, the provision of critical adaptive interventions and collaboration in partnerships. Businesses in the property sector, such as real estate developers, are on the frontline of climate change impacts but display differing attitudes toward climate adaptation. A study of property businesses in cities in Australia (Taylor et al., 2012) showed that speeding up planning approval processes facilitated adaptation actions, and joint private–public decision-making was the preferred mode of governance for responding to climate concerns. Property businesses in cities in Sweden had a limited and reactive engagement in climate issues and resisted regulation ( [[#Storbjörk--2018|Storbjörk et al., 2018]] ). Corporate, private sector interventions in urban risk reduction more broadly remain limited, with a mix of public and private responsibility for planning, implementing and maintaining adaptations in the built environment, and yet limited engagement of private sector actors in providing healthcare measures for heat prevention ( ''medium confidence'' ) ( [[#Mees--2017|Mees, 2017]] ).

There is little published literature documenting the heterogeneity of business and the private sector’s responses to climate impacts (Linnenluecke, Birt and Griffiths, 2015; Doh, Tashman and Benischke, 2019). Firms have varying abilities to introduce climate adaptation measures related to staff availability, levels of awareness, perceptions of responsibility and duration of contracts (short-term projects implies less interest in adaptation outcomes) (Shearer et al., 2016). The impact of COVID-19 has serious but uncertain implications for both access to finances for sustainable development by LMICs and sub-national governments, and the possibility of stimulating maladaptive infrastructure and policy responses (OECD, 2020; Sovacool, Del Rio and Griffiths, 2020). The response of businesses to disasters influences the resilience in the communities in which they operate ( [[#McKnight--2016|McKnight and Linnenluecke, 2016]] ; [[#Linnenluecke--2017|Linnenluecke and McKnight, 2017]] ). However, at the same time there is a growing literature that warns against the conflict interests that businesses may have in their adaptation strategies. For example, real estate responses to flooding have led to processes of climate gentrification, whereby lower income populations are displaced toward higher risk areas which stablishes racialised and class-based patterns of inequality of exposure to risk, with hard evidence rapidly growing specially in US cities (Keenan, Hill and Gumber, 2018a; Shokry, Connolly and Anguelovski, 2020; [[#De%20Koning--2020|De Koning and Filatova, 2020]] ; Aune, Gesch and Smith, 2020). Private-sector participation in adaptation solutions depend on having mechanisms to enable transparency and open reporting on the nature of support and the solutions proposed. For example, businesses adopting ‘community-centric’ disaster management strategies can assist local recovery efforts by protecting employment, provision of emergency supplies and participation in reparations ( [[#McKnight--2016|McKnight and Linnenluecke, 2016]] ). Private sector actors engaged in community climate responses can play a role in funding and managing programmes that address public health and education concerns. The potential of ecopreneurship, social enterprises, cooperatives and other sustainability-oriented business models (Schaltegger, Hansen and Lüdeke-Freund, 2016; Lopes et al., 2020; Battaglia, Gragnani and Annesi, 2020) for urban adaptation remains under-explored in the literature on urban climate governance.

The private sector also constitutes a key stakeholder group involved in collaborative processes to develop adaptation strategies. The inclusion of private sector actors in deliberative policy-making processes in urban adaptation can lead to higher procedural legitimacy levels, as witnessed in Rotterdam’s case (Mees, Driessen and Runhaar, 2014). Rotterdam has created an institutional environment that favours eco-innovation ( [[#Huang-Lachmann--2016|Huang-Lachmann and Lovett, 2016]] ). The municipal government works directly with the private sector to enhance protection against flooding constructing a marketing strategy around a ‘floating city’ concept. A ‘floating housing’ market has expanded, with benefits for the local real estate and construction industries and knowledge-exporting businesses that provide consultation expertise, delta technologies and architectural models. Nevertheless, these new trends raise new governance challenges to deliver adaptation.

There are obstacles associated with reconciling private sector interests with public priorities and justice agendas in local climate programmes. The involvement of the private sector in adaptation actions may lead to the appropriation of land and natural resources, and to the exclusion of vulnerable populations (Anguelovski et al., 2016; [[#Rumbach--2017|Rumbach, 2017]] ; [[#Scoppetta--2016|Scoppetta, 2016]] ) (see also [[#6.4.4|Section 6.4.4.2]] ). Navigating the inclusion of businesses in urban planning processes requires local authorities to engage in ongoing negotiations, to reflect on constantly shifting power balances and to move delicately between the role of regulator and facilitator in the process of defining and maintaining long-term objectives (Storbjörk, Hjerpe and Glaas, 2019b; Storbjörk, Hjerpe and Glaas, 2019a).

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==== 6.4.1.4 Partnerships for Adaptation ====

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Multi-level governance remains an influential paradigm that recognises government institutions’ influence at different scales and the diversification of actors intervening in public issues from the private sector and civil society ( ''robust evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ). Establishing linkages between multiple organisations can help deliver coordinated action. Multi-level governance includes mechanisms for multiple actors to engage in local adaptation strategies through collaborative processes of planning, learning, experimentation, capacity building, construction of coalitions and communication channels ( [[#Barton--2013|Barton, 2013]] ; [[#Jaglin--2013|Jaglin, 2013]] ; Reed et al., 2015; Restemeyer, van den Brink and Woltjer, 2017; Melica et al., 2018). Many of these studies directly focus on institutional arrangements that facilitate interaction between communities and civil society, experts, government representatives, firms and international organisations. Box 6.5 demonstrates the decisive role that community activists can play in building resilience over long periods.

Institutional fragmentation reduces the capacity to deliver adaptation ( [[#Den%20Uyl--2018|Den Uyl and Russel, 2018]] ) Multi-level governance shows a commitment to tackling fragmented and complex policy issues through collaboration between national governments and non-state actors, as explained in the 2030 Development Agenda, especially SDG17 (‘Revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development’). Multi-level governance is particularly important to deliver adaptation at the metropolitan scale, that require coordinating actions across different institutions in inter-municipal institutions ( [[#Lundqvist--2016|Lundqvist, 2016]] ). Gaps in knowledge remain regarding the effectiveness of multi-level governance actions in different contexts and the extent to which multi-level governance strategies transfer the brunt of responsibility for adaptation action to less-resourced local governments (Hale et al., 2021).

Public–private partnerships are increasingly relevant for collaborative development of urban adaptation (Klein et al., 2018). Partnerships can deliver infrastructure, coordinate policy and support learning. The main limitation of partnerships is scale, as partnership action is usually limited to discrete projects or objectives. Partnerships tend to be linked to reactive (rather than proactive) adaptation projects and the deviation of objectives away from adaptation concerns (Harman, Taylor and Lane, 2015). Partnerships can support capacity building in public and private organisations and facilitate networking efforts that extend beyond the private sector to communities and NGOs (Bauer and Steurer, 2014; Castán Broto et al., 2015). Public actors can benefit from the private sector’s innovation and implementation capacity, and businesses can de-risk investments. Still, partnerships can also strengthen the ideologies of growth and managerialism within the operations of the local government (Taylor et al., 2012). Reconciling divergent norms and routines within public and private organisations remains one of the challenges to establishing successful public–private partnerships for adaptation ( [[#Lund--2018|Lund, 2018]] ). Administrative and political culture influences the nature of interactions between public and private sector actors in urban adaptation agendas (Bauer and Steurer, 2014), with negative consequences such as the imposition of vertical chains of commands on horizontal collaborations, and the need to formalise contractual relations ( [[#Klein--2018|Klein and Juhola, 2018]] ).

Local authorities are an important enabling actor that can guide the private sector and communities to take responsibility for creating policy and regulatory environments that encourage private sector participation aligned with the SDGs’ equity and ecological sustainability principles ( ''high confidence'' ). For example, Frantzeskaki et al. (2014) report a port relocation project in the Netherlands where sustainability principles drove private sector participation. Klein et al. (2017) cite examples from two cities—Helsinki and Copenhagen, where local authorities have shifted adaptation responsibilities to private actors through regulation and public problem ownership. In Mombasa, private companies provide green infrastructure to match local government requirements, in what has frequently been cited as an example of NBS ( [[#Kithiia--2010|Kithiia and Dowling, 2010]] ; [[#Kitha--2011|Kitha and Lyth, 2011]] ).

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==== 6.4.1.5 Trans-national Municipal Networks ====

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Since the late 1990s, transnational municipal networks (TMNs) have increased awareness of climate change and served as a bridge for cities to access critical financial resources from private and philanthropic sources ( [[#Rashidi--2018|Rashidi and Patt, 2018]] ; [[#Fünfgeld--2015|Fünfgeld, 2015]] ). Recently, TMNs have taken on more programmatic functions, working with cities to strategise, plan and incrementally improve their organisation functions in the face of climate change. For example, the Rockefeller Foundation’s 100 Resilient Cities program (2014–2019) provided a two-year salary for a Chief Resilience Officer (CRO) to be situated in a municipal authority to bridge silos, incentivise change and develop development strategies for resilience ( [[#Bellinson--2019|Bellinson and Chu, 2019]] ; [[#Spaans--2017|Spaans and Waterhout, 2017]] ). In these cases, external actors have enabled broad organisation change, resource mobilisation pathways and alternative forms of agenda-setting in cities (Chu, 2018; [[#Hakelberg--2014|Hakelberg, 2014]] ) (see also Case Study 6.2, Semarang).

A range of TMNs also support and encourage cities and settlements to plan and implement adaptation actions. ICLEI-Local Governments for Sustainability has developed protocols and implemented projects for member cities. The C40 Climate Leadership Group has facilitated the coordination of both local governments and business actors at a global scale ( [[#Gordon--2020|Gordon, 2020]] ). Policy coordination has been central to the signatories of the Covenant of Mayors (Domorenok et al., 2020). Such networks can encourage the sharing of information about appropriate practices between urban areas; contribute to goal setting; support experimentation and development of new policy instruments; enhance stakeholder engagement; institutionalise climate agendas; and encourage policy integration across governance levels and sectors ( [[#Bellinson--2019|Bellinson and Chu, 2019]] ; Busch, Bendlin and Fenton, 2018; [[#Fünfgeld--2015|Fünfgeld, 2015]] ; [[#Busch--2015|Busch, 2015]] ; [[#Papin--2019|Papin, 2019]] ; [[#Rashidi--2018|Rashidi and Patt, 2018]] ). However, participation in TMNs is biased toward cities in the Global North (Bansard, Pattberg and Widerberg, 2017; [[#Haupt--2019|Haupt and Coppola, 2019]] ). A recent comparative study of 337 cities found out that cities that participation in TNMs are more likely to take adaptation action and that being part of multiple networks leads to higher levels of adaptation planning (Heikkinen et al., 2020).

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'''Box 6.5 | Building Water Resilience in Urban Areas through Community Action and Activism'''
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In Bengaluru, India, communities have traditionally managed a network of water tanks of immense ecological importance. However, in the last half-century, urban development has increasingly threatened this blue network ( [[#Unnikrishnan--2015|Unnikrishnan and Nagendra, 2015]] ). Today’s Bengaluru depends on long-distance water transfers that create political conflict and a dense network of private boreholes that are depleting the city’s water resources. The restoration of the existing community managed water tanks network offers a more sustainable and socially just alternative for managing water resources.

Unnikrishnan et al. (2018) have documented how the colonial and postcolonial history of water management in Bengaluru shapes the water infrastructure and provision systems today. Water access inequalities can be traced to the patterns of spatial development developed by colonial policies. Records from the sixth century onwards show how city rulers invested in an interconnected, community managed network of tanks and open wells, regularly recharged through harvested rainwater. The water system was changed at the end of the 18th century, as first the colonial state, then the post-independence government of Karnataka took responsibility for water management. Ideas of modernist planning influenced the development of new water infrastructure and piped networks, including the first piped infrastructure, bringing water from sources 30 km away, including the Hesaraghatta and then the TG Halli reservoirs. The old network of tanks gradually deteriorated as tanks became disused, polluted or built over. More prolonged and costly water transfers took place in the post-colonial period, delivering water from the Cauvery River in a massive engineering project with a high energetic cost and enmeshed in inter-state conflicts over water use ( [[#Castán%20Broto--2019|Castán Broto and Sudhira, 2019]] ). Scarcity is still a problem in Bengaluru. The citizen response has been an activist movement to reclaim the city’s tanks, accompanied by a plea to reconsider current water uses within the city, including actions to protect and rejuvenate water wells ( [[#Nagendra--2016|Nagendra, 2016]] ). Unnikrishnan et al. (2018) document different actions led by citizen-led collectives, including projects for lake rejuvenation, filtering technologies to treat sewage, recovering the value of lakes through a share of photos and art projects, and involvement of local knowledge in-tank restoration. Those efforts suggest an untapped potential to deliver adaptive green spaces through the recovery of Bengaluru’s tanks.

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