Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-11 (section)

=== 11.3.10 Energy ===

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Australia’s energy generation is a mix of coal (56%), gas (23%) and renewables (21%) ( [[#DISER--2020|DISER, 2020]] ), with ageing coal-fired infrastructure being replaced by a growing proportion of renewable and distributed energy resources ( [[#AEMO--2018|AEMO, 2018]] ). In New Zealand, 60% of energy generation comes from hydro-electricity and 15% from geothermal (MBIE, 2021), with coal (2%) and gas (13%) generation capacity to be retired, and total renewable energy to increase from 82% in 2017 to around 95% by 2050, mostly through wind generation ( [[#MBIE--2019a|MBIE, 2019a]] ).

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==== 11.3.10.1 Observed Impacts ====

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The energy sector is highly vulnerable to climate change ( ''high confidence'' ). Oil and gas systems are vulnerable to storms, fires, drought, floods, sea level rise (SLR), extreme heat and fires, which can damage infrastructure, slow production and add to operational costs ( [[#Smith--2013|Smith, 2013]] ). The electricity system is vulnerable to high temperatures reducing generator and network capacity and increasing failure rates and maintenance costs ( [[#AEMO--2020a|AEMO, 2020a]] ). Fires (including those sparked by electrical distribution lines) pose risks to assets. Smoke can cause electricity transmission to trip, and high winds reduce wind-energy capacity and threaten the integrity of transmission lines. Low rainfall reduces hydro-energy capacity and increases the demand for desalination energy. Higher sea level may affect some low-lying generation, distribution and transmission assets, and compound extreme weather events can cause outages ( [[#Vose--2014|Vose and Applequist, 2014]] ; [[#Lawrence--2016|Lawrence et al., 2016]] ; [[#AEMO--2020b|AEMO, 2020b]] ; [[#AEMO--2020a|AEMO, 2020a]] ; [[#ESCI--2021|ESCI, 2021]] ). For example, in September 2016, a major windstorm in South Australia damaged 23 transmission towers and cut power to over 900,000 households. In February 2017, the South Australian energy system failed to cope with a heatwave-related jump in demand, causing power cuts to 40,000 homes ( [[#Steffen--2017|Steffen et al., 2017]] ). In April 2018, a storm over Auckland, New Zealand left 182,000 properties without power ( [[#Bell--2018|Bell, 2018]] ). The 2019/2020 Australian heatwaves and fires caused widespread blackouts that disrupted communications, transport and emergency response capacity (Box 11.1).

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==== 11.3.10.2 Projected Impacts ====

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Risks for the energy sector are projected to increase with climate change ( ''medium confidence'' ). Projected increases in the frequency and intensity of heatwaves, fires, droughts and wind-storms would increase risks for energy supply and demand ( [[#AEMO--2020b|AEMO, 2020b]] ; [[#ESCI--2021|ESCI, 2021]] ). Households are unevenly vulnerable to energy sector risks due to varying housing quality and health dependencies (11.3.6). In New Zealand, a warmer climate and increasing energy efficiency is projected to marginally reduce annual average peak electricity heating demand ( [[#Stroombergen--2006|Stroombergen et al., 2006]] ; [[#MBIE--2019a|MBIE, 2019a]] ). Winter and spring inflows to main hydro lakes are projected to increase 5–10% and may reduce hydroelectric energy vulnerability ( [[#McKerchar--2004|McKerchar and Mullan, 2004]] ; [[#Poyck--2011|Poyck et al., 2011]] ; [[#Stevenson--2018|Stevenson et al., 2018]] ). However, major electricity supply disruptions are projected to increase as dependence on electricity grows from 25% of total energy in 2016 to 58% in 2050 ( [[#Transpower--2020|Transpower, 2020]] ).

In Australia, the total heating and cooling energy demand of 5-star energy-rated houses is projected to change by 2100 ( [[#Wang--2010|Wang et al., 2010]] ). At 2°C global warming, the estimated change in demand is −27% in Hobart, −21% in Melbourne, +61% in Darwin, +67% in Alice Springs and +112% in Sydney. For a 4°C global warming, the changes are −48%, −14%, +135%, +213% and +350% respectively.

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==== 11.3.10.3 Adaptation ====

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Options to manage risks include adaptation of energy markets, integrated planning, improved asset design standards, smart-grid technologies, energy generation diversification, distributed generation (e.g., roof-top solar, microgrids), energy efficiency, demand management, pumped hydro storage, battery storage and improved capacity to respond to supply deficits and balance variable energy resources across the network (Table 11.8) ( ''high confidence'' ). With increasing electrification, diversification and resilience can contribute to security of supply as fossil fuels are retired from the energy mix ( [[#AEMO--2020b|AEMO, 2020b]] ). In Australia, the AEMO (2020) Integrated System Plan has evaluated various options, costs and benefits. Risks associated with an increasing reliance on weather-dependent renewable energy (e.g., solar, wind, hydro) ( [[#ESCI--2021|ESCI, 2021]] ) can be managed through strong long-distance interconnection via high-voltage powerlines and storage ( [[#Blakers--2017|Blakers et al., 2017]] ; [[#Blakers--2021|Blakers et al., 2021]] ; [[#Lu--2021|Lu et al., 2021]] ). However, implementation of adaptation options remains inadequate ( [[#Gasbarro--2016|Gasbarro et al., 2016]] ).

'''Table 11.8 |''' Adaptation options for energy sector.

{| class="wikitable"
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! Adaptation options

! References

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| Diversification of electricity supplies geographically and technically, including distributed energy resources and variable renewable energy

| ( [[#AEMO--2020b|AEMO, 2020b]] )

|-
| Integrated planning, improved asset design and management and disaster recovery to build resilience to more extreme weather

| ( [[#AEMO--2020b|AEMO, 2020b]] ; [[#Transpower--2020|Transpower, 2020]] )

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| Augmentation of transmission grid to support change in generation mix using interconnectors and renewable energy zones, coupled with energy storage, adds capacity and helps balance variable resources across the network

| ( [[#Blakers--2017|Blakers et al., 2017]] ; [[#ICCC--2019|ICCC, 2019]] ; [[#AEMO--2020b|AEMO, 2020b]] )

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| Climate change risks included in the design, location and rating of future infrastructure and consideration of the implications for future transmission developments

| ( [[#Bridge--2018|Bridge et al., 2018]] ; [[#AEMO--2020b|AEMO, 2020b]] )

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| Increased design and construction standards, flood defence measures, insurance, improved water efficiency, improved insulation of supercooled LNG processes, more efficient air conditioning and creating fire breaks for the oil and gas sector

| ( [[#Smith--2013|Smith, 2013]] ; [[#Gasbarro--2016|Gasbarro et al., 2016]] )

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| Technological developments to strengthen existing resilience under climate change that reinforce the relative advantage of western Australia and Tasmania for new wind energy installations

| ( [[#Evans--2018|Evans et al., 2018]] )

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| Energy generation diversity, demand management, pumped hydro storage and battery storage

| ( [[#Keck--2019|Keck et al., 2019]] ; [[#Transpower--2020|Transpower, 2020]] )

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| Tools and strategies to manage winter energy deficits and dry years alongside renewable electricity generation deployment

| ( [[#Transpower--2020|Transpower, 2020]] )

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| Improved insulation and heating of buildings and flexible electricity consumption to reduce significance of winter electricity demand peak

| ( [[#Stroombergen--2006|Stroombergen et al., 2006]] ; [[#MBIE--2019a|MBIE, 2019a]] ; [[#Transpower--2020|Transpower, 2020]] )

|}

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