Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-13 (section)

== 13.7 Integrated Policy Packages for Mitigation and Multiple Objectives ==

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Since AR5, the literature on climate policies and policymaking has expanded in two significant directions. First, there is growing recognition that mitigation policy occurs in the context of multiple climate and development objectives (Chapter 4). Different aspects of these linkages are discussed across the AR6 WGIII report, including concepts and framings ( [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-1#1.6.2|Section 1.6.2]] ), shifting sustainable development pathways ( [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-4#4.3|Section 4.3]] and Cross-Chapter Box 5 in Chapter 4), cross-sectoral interactions (Sections 12.6.1 and 12.6.2), evidence of co-impacts ( [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-17#17.3|Section 17.3]] ), links with adaptation ( [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-4#4.4.2|Section 4.4.2]] ) and accelerating the transition (Sections 13.9, 17.1.1, 17.4.5 and 17.4.6). While the concept of development pathways is salient in all countries, it may particularly resonate with policymakers in developing countries focused on providing basic needs and addressing poverty and inequality, including energy poverty ( [[#Ahmad--2009|Ahmad 2009]] ; [[#Fuso%20Nerini--2019|Fuso Nerini et al. 2019]] ; [[#Bel--2020|Bel and Teixidó 2020]] ; [[#Caetano--2020|Caetano et al. 2020]] ; [[#Röser--2020|Röser et al. 2020]] ). Consequently, some countries may frame policies predominantly in terms of accelerating mitigation, while in others a multiple objectives approach linked to development pathways may dominate, depending on their specific socio-economic contexts and priorities, governance capacities ( [[#McMeekin--2019|McMeekin et al. 2019]] ) and perceptions of historical responsibility ( [[#Winkler--2014|Winkler and Rajamani 2014]] ; [[#Friman--2015|Friman and Hjerpe 2015]] ; [[#Winkler--2015|Winkler et al. 2015]] ; [[#Pan--2017|Pan et al. 2017]] ).

Second, since AR5 there is growing attention to enabling transitions over time. Literature on socio-technical transitions, rooted in innovation studies, highlights the need for different policy focus at different stages of a transition ( [[#Geels--2017b|Geels et al. 2017b]] ,a; [[#Köhler--2019|Köhler et al. 2019]] ) ( [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-1#1.7.3|Section 1.7.3]] ). Other literature examines how broad patterns of development drive both social and mitigation outcomes through shifts in policies and a re-alignment of enabling conditions (Chapter 4). Explicit efforts to shift development pathways, for example by shifting patterns of energy demand and urbanisation, therefore offer broader mitigation opportunities (Cross-Chapter Box 5 in Chapter 4). Common to both approaches is an emphasis beyond the short term, and attention to enabling longer-term structural shifts in economies and societies.

Taking these trends into account, Figure 13.6 outlines the climate policy landscape, and how it maps to different parts of this Working Group III report. One axis of variation captures alternative framings of desired outcomes in national policymaking – mitigation versus multiple objectives, while the second captures the shift in policymaking from an initial focus on shifting incentives through largely individual policy instruments, to explicit consideration of how policies and economy-wide measures, including those that shift incentives, can combine to enable transitions. As a result, Figure 13.6 represents interconnected policy ideas, but backed by distinct strands of literature. Notably, each of these categories is salient to climate policymaking, although the balance may differ depending on country context.

This section particularly focuses on climate policymaking for transition – both socio-technical transitions and shifts in development pathways, while direct climate policies and co-benefits are addressed in other parts of the report, as indicated in Figure 13.6. This section focuses in particular on lessons for designing policy packages for transitions, and is complemented by discussion in [[#13.8|Section 13.8]] on integration between adaptation and mitigation, and [[#13.9|Section 13.9]] on economy-wide measures and the broader enabling conditions necessary to accelerate mitigation.

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=== 13.7.1 Policy Packages for Low-carbon Sustainable Transitions ===

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Since AR5 an emergent multidisciplinary literature on policy packages, or policy mixes, has emerged that examine how policies may be combined for sustainable low-carbon transitions ( [[#Rogge--2016|Rogge and Reichardt 2016]] ; [[#Kern--2019|Kern et al. 2019]] ). This literature covers various sectors including: energy ( [[#Rogge--2017|Rogge et al. 2017]] ); transport ( [[#Givoni--2013|Givoni et al. 2013]] ); industry ( [[#Scordato--2018|Scordato et al. 2018]] ); agri-food ( [[#Kalfagianni--2017|Kalfagianni and Kuik 2017]] ); and forestry ( [[#Scullion--2016|Scullion et al. 2016]] ).

A central theme in the literature is that transitions require policy interventions to address system level changes, thereby going beyond addressing market failures in two ways. First, structural system changes are needed for low-carbon transitions, including building low-carbon infrastructure (or example aligning electricity grids and storage with the requirements of new low-carbon technology), and adjusting existing institutions to low-carbon solutions (for example by reforming electricity market design) ( [[#Bak--2017|Bak et al. 2017]] ; [[#Patt--2018|Patt and Lilliestam 2018]] ). Second, explicit transformational system changes are necessary, including efforts at directing transformations, such as clear direction setting through the elaboration of shared visions, and coordination across diverse actors across different policy fields, such as climate and industrial policy, and across governance levels ( [[#Uyarra--2016|Uyarra et al. 2016]] ; [[#Nemet--2017|Nemet et al. 2017]] ).

There are some specific suggestions for policy packages: Van den Bergh et al. (2021) suggest that innovation support and information provision combined with a carbon tax or market, or adoption subsidy leads to both effective and efficient outcomes. Others question the viability of universally applicable policy packages, and suggest packages need to be tailored to local objectives ( [[#del%20Río--2014|del Río 2014]] ) Consequently, much of the literature focuses on broad principles for design of policy packages and mixes, as discussed below.

Comprehensiveness, balance and consistency are important criteria for policy packages or mixes ( ''robust evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Rogge--2016|Rogge and Reichardt 2016]] ; [[#Scobie--2016|Scobie 2016]] ; [[#Carter--2018|Carter et al. 2018]] ; [[#Santos-lacueva--2018|Santos-lacueva and González 2018]] ). Comprehensiveness assesses the extensiveness of policy packages, including the breadth of system and market failures it addresses ( [[#Rogge--2016|Rogge and Reichardt 2016]] ). For example, instrument mixes that include only moderate carbon pricing, but are complemented by policies supporting new low-carbon technologies and a moratorium on coal-fired power plants may not only be politically more feasible than stringent carbon pricing alone, but may also limit efficiency losses and lower distributional impacts ( [[#Bertram--2015b|Bertram et al. 2015b]] ). Balance captures whether policy instruments are deployed in complementary ways given their different purposes, combining for example technology-push approaches such as public R&amp;D with demand-pull approaches such as an energy tax. A combination of technology-push and demand-pull approaches has been shown to support innovation in energy efficient technologies in OECD countries ( [[#Costantini--2017|Costantini et al. 2017]] ). Consistency addresses the alignment of policy instruments among each other and with the policy strategy, which may have multiple and not always consistent objectives ( [[#Rogge--2019|Rogge 2019]] ). Consistency of policy mixes has been identified as an important driver of low-carbon transformation, particularly for renewable energy ( [[#Lieu--2018|Lieu et al. 2018]] ; [[#Rogge--2018|Rogge and Schleich 2018]] ). Box 13.14 summarises the economics literature on how policies interact, to inform design of packages.

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=== Box 13.14 | Policy Interactions of Carbon Pricing and Other Instruments ===

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The economics literature provides insights on policy interactions among the multiple overlapping policies that directly or indirectly affect GHG emissions, including when different levels of government are involved. Multiple mitigation policies can be theoretically justified if there are multiple objectives or market failures or to achieve distributional objectives and increase policy effectiveness ( [[#Stiglitz--2019|Stiglitz 2019]] ). Examples include the coexistence of the EU ETS with vehicle emission standards and energy efficiency standards ( [[#Rey--2013|Rey et al. 2013]] ), and the fact that 85% of the emissions covered by California’s ETS are also subject to other policies ( [[#Bang--2017|Bang et al. 2017]] ; [[#Mazmanian--2020|Mazmanian et al. 2020]] ). Policy interactions are also widespread among energy efficiency policies ( [[#Wiese--2018|Wiese et al. 2018]] ).

Interactive effects can influence the costs of policy outcomes. With multiple overlapping and possibly non-optimal policies, the effect on total cost is not clear. A modelling study of USA mitigation policy finds the costs of using heterogeneous sub-national policies to achieve decarbonisation targets is 10% higher than national uniform policies ( [[#Peng--2021|Peng et al. 2021]] ). When multiple policy goals are sought, such as mitigation and R&amp;D, a portfolio of optimal policies achieves the goals at significantly lower cost ( [[#Fischer--2008|Fischer and Newell 2008]] ). In some cases, overlapping mitigation policies can raise the cost of mitigation ( [[#Böhringer--2016|Böhringer et al. 2016]] ) while lowering the cost of achieving other goals, such as energy efficiency improvements and expansion of renewable energy ( [[#Rosenow--2016|Rosenow et al. 2016]] ; [[#Lecuyer--2019|Lecuyer and Quirion 2019]] ). It is possible that one or more of the policies is made redundant ( [[#Aune--2021|Aune and Golombek 2021]] ).

While overlapping policies may raise the cost of mitigation, they increase the likelihood of achieving an emission reduction goal. Policy overlap will lead to different optimal carbon prices across jurisdictions ( [[#Bataille--2018b|Bataille et al. 2018b]] ). The existence of overlapping policies will usually increase administrative and compliance costs. However, ''ex post'' analysis shows that transaction costs of mitigation policies are low and are not a decisive factor in policy choice ( [[#Joas--2016|Joas and Flachsland 2016]] ).

The effectiveness, as well as economic and distributional effects, of a given mitigation policy will depend on the interactions among all the policies that affect the targeted emissions. Because a market instrument interacts with every other policy that affects the targeted emissions, interactions tend to be more complex for market instruments than for regulations that mandate specific emission reduction actions by targeted sources independent of other policies.

An ETS scheme implemented with existing mitigation policies may be subject to the ‘waterbed effect’ – emission reductions undertaken by some emitters may be offset by higher emissions by other ETS participants due to overlapping mitigation policies ( [[#Schatzki--2012|Schatzki and Stavins 2012]] ). This reduces the impact of the ETS and lowers carbon trading prices ( [[#Perino--2018|Perino 2018]] ). However ''ex post'' assessments find net emissions reductions. ETS design features such as a price floor and ‘market stability reserve’ can limit the waterbed effect ( [[#Edenhofer--2017|Edenhofer et al. 2017]] ; [[#Kollenberg--2019|Kollenberg and Taschini 2019]] ; [[#Narassimhan--2018|Narassimhan et al. 2018]] ; [[#FSR%20Climate--2019|FSR Climate 2019]] ).

A carbon tax, unlike the allowance price, does not change in response to the effect of overlapping policies but those policies may reduce emissions by sources subject to the tax and so lower the emission reductions achieved by the tax ( [[#Goulder--2011|Goulder and Stavins 2011]] ).

Box 13.14

Policy interactions often occur with the introduction of new mitigation policy instruments. For example, in China several sub-national ETSs exist alongside policies to reduce emission intensity, increase energy efficiency and expand renewable energy supplies ( [[#Zhang--2015|Zhang 2015]] ). These quantity-based ETSs interact with many other policies ( [[#Duan--2017|Duan et al. 2017]] ), for example price-based provincial carbon intensity targets ( [[#Qian--2017|Qian et al. 2017]] ). They also interact with the level of market regulation; for example, full effectiveness of emissions pricing would require electricity market reform in China ( [[#Teng--2017|Teng et al. 2017]] ).

Policy packages aimed at low-carbon transitions are more effective when they include elements to enhance the phase out of carbon-intensive technologies and practices – often called exnovation – in addition to supporting low-carbon niches ( [[#Kivimaa--2016|Kivimaa and Kern 2016]] ; [[#David--2017|David 2017]] ). Such policies include stringent carbon pricing; changes in regime rules such as design of electricity markets; reduced support for dominant regime technologies such as removing tax deductions for private motor transport based on internal combustion engines; and changes in the balance of representation of incumbents versus new entrants in deliberation and advisory bodies. For example, CGE modelling for China’s fossil fuel subsidy reform found that integrating both creation and destabilisation policies is able to reduce rebound effects and make the policy mix more effective ( [[#Li--2017|Li et al. 2017]] ). Sweden’s pulp and paper industry shows that destabilisation policies including deregulation of the electricity market and a carbon tax were an important complement to support policies ( [[#Scordato--2018|Scordato et al. 2018]] ), and other studies show complementary results for Finland’s building sector ( [[#Kivimaa--2017b|Kivimaa et al. 2017b]] ) and Norway’s transport and energy sector ( [[#Ćetković--2019|Ćetković and Skjærseth 2019]] ).

Policy packages for low-carbon transitions are more successful if they take into account the potential for political contestation and resistance from incumbents who benefit from high-carbon systems ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Geels--2014|Geels 2014]] ; [[#Roberts--2018|Roberts et al. 2018]] ; [[#Kern--2018|Kern and Rogge 2018]] ; [[#Rosenbloom--2018|Rosenbloom 2018]] ). To do so, policies can be sequenced so as to address political obstacles, for example, by initially starting with policies to facilitate the entry of new firms engaged in low-carbon technologies ( [[#Pahle--2018|Pahle et al. 2018]] ). Such policies can generate positive feedbacks by creating constituencies for continuation of those policies, but need to be designed to do so from the outset ( [[#Edmondson--2019|Edmondson et al. 2019]] , 2020). For example, supporting renewable energies through feed-in tariffs can buttress coalitions for more ambitious climate policy, such as through carbon pricing ( [[#Meckling--2015|Meckling et al. 2015]] ). However, negative policy feedback may also arise from ineffective policy instruments that lose public support, or create concentrated losses that arouse oppositional coalitions ( [[#Edmondson--2019|Edmondson et al. 2019]] ). Feedback loops can operate through changes in resources available to actors; changes in expectations; and changes in government capacities ( [[#Edmondson--2019|Edmondson et al. 2019]] ).

Another promising strategy is to design short-term policies which might help to provide later entry points for more ambitious climate policy ( [[#Kriegler--2018|Kriegler et al. 2018]] ) and supportive institutions. The sequencing of policies can build coalitions for climate policy, starting with green industrial policy (e.g. supporting renewable energies through feed-in tariffs) and introducing or making carbon pricing more stringent when supportive coalitions of stringent climate policy have been formed ( [[#Meckling--2015|Meckling et al. 2015]] ). Similarly, investing in supportive institutions, with competencies compatible with low-carbon futures, are a necessary supportive element of transitions ( [[#Pahle--2018|Pahle et al. 2018]] ; [[#Rosenbloom--2019|Rosenbloom et al. 2019]] ; [[#Domorenok--2021|Domorenok et al. 2021]] ).

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=== 13.7.2 Policy Integration for Multiple Objectives and Shifting Development Pathways ===

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This sub-section assesses policy integration and packages required to enable shifts in development pathways, with a particular focus on sectoral scale transitions. However, because shifting development pathways requires broad transformative change, it complements discussion on broader shifts in policymaking such as fiscal, educational, and infrastructure policies (Cross-Chapter Box 5 in Chapter 4) and to the alignment of a wide range of enabling conditions required for system transitions ( [[#13.9|Section 13.9]] ).

In many countries, and particularly when climate policy occurs in the context of sustainable development, policymakers seek to address climate mitigation in the context of multiple economic and social policy objectives ( ''medium evidence'' , ''robust agreement'' ) ( [[#Halsnæs--2014|Halsnæs et al. 2014]] ; [[#Campagnolo--2019|Campagnolo and Davide 2019]] ; [[#Cohen--2019|Cohen et al. 2019]] ). Studies suggest that co-benefits of climate policies are substantial, especially in relation to air quality, and can yield better mitigation and overall welfare, yet these are commonly overlooked in policymaking ( ''robust evidence'' , ''robust agreement'' ) ( [[#Nemet--2010|Nemet et al. 2010]] ; [[#Ürge-Vorsatz--2014|Ürge-Vorsatz et al. 2014]] ; [[#von%20Stechow--2015|von Stechow et al. 2015]] ; [[#Mayrhofer--2016|Mayrhofer and Gupta 2016]] ; [[#Roy--2018|Roy et al. 2018]] ; [[#Bhardwaj--2019|Bhardwaj et al. 2019]] ; [[#Karlsson--2020|Karlsson et al. 2020]] ). Other studies have shown the existence of strong complementarities between the SDGs and realisation of NDC pledges by countries ( [[#McCollum--2018|McCollum et al. 2018]] ). An explicit attention to development pathways can enhance the scope for mitigation, by paying explicit attention to development choices that lock-in or lock-out opportunities for mitigation, such as around land use and infrastructure choices (Cross-Chapter Box 5 in Chapter 4). While the pay-offs are considerable to an approach to mitigation that takes into account linkages to multiple objectives and the opportunity to shift development pathways, there are also associated challenges with implementing this approach to policymaking.

First, spanning policy arenas and addressing multiple objectives places considerable requirements of coordination on the policymaking process (Howlett and del Rio 2015; [[#Obersteiner--2016|Obersteiner et al. 2016]] ). Climate policy integration suggests several steps should precede actual policy formulation, beginning with a clear articulation of the policy frame or problem statement ( [[#Adelle--2013|Adelle and Russel 2013]] ; [[#Candel--2016|Candel and Biesbroek 2016]] ). For example, a greenhouse gas limitation framework versus a co-benefits framing would likely yield different policy approaches. It is then useful to identify the range of actors and institutions involved in climate governance – the policy subsystem, the goals articulated, the level at which goals are articulated and the links with other related policy goals such as energy security or energy access ( [[#Candel--2016|Candel and Biesbroek 2016]] ). The adoption of specific packages of policy instruments should ideally follow these prior steps that define the scope of the problem, actors and goals.

In practice, integration has to occur in the context of an already existing policy structure, which suggests the need for finding windows of opportunity to bring about integration, which can be created by international events, alignments with domestic institutional procedures, and openings created by policy entrepreneurs ( [[#Garcia%20Hernandez--2020|Garcia Hernandez and Bolwig 2020]] ). Integration also has to occur in the context of existing organisational routines and cultures, which can pose a barrier to integration ( [[#Uittenbroek--2016|Uittenbroek 2016]] ). Experience from the EU suggests that disagreements at the level of policy instruments are amenable to resolution by deliberation, while normative disagreements at the level of objectives require a hierarchical decision structure ( [[#Skovgaard--2018|Skovgaard 2018]] ). As this discussion suggests, the challenge of integration operates in two dimensions: horizontal – between sectoral authorities such as ministries or policy domains such as forestry – or vertical – either between constitutional levels of power or within the internal mandates and interactions of a sector ( [[#Howlett--2015|Howlett and del Rio 2015]] ; [[#Di%20Gregorio--2017|Di Gregorio et al. 2017]] ). There are also important temporal dimensions to policy goals, as policy and benchmarks have to address not just immediate success but also indications of future transformation ( [[#Dupont--2012|Dupont and Oberthür 2012]] ; [[#Dupont--2015|Dupont 2015]] ).

Second policymaking for shifting development pathways has to account for inherent uncertainties in future development paths ( [[#Moallemi--2018|Moallemi and Malekpour 2018]] ; [[#Castrejon-Campos--2020|Castrejon-Campos et al. 2020]] ). These uncertainties may be greater in developing countries that are growing rapidly and where structural features of the economy including infrastructure and urbanisation patterns are fluid. For example, reviews of modelling studies of Chinese ( [[#Grubb--2015|Grubb et al. 2015]] ) and Indian emissions futures (Spencer and [[#Dubash--2021|Dubash 2021]] ) find that differences in projections can substantially be accounted for by alternative assumptions about future economic structural shifts. Consequently, an important design consideration is that policy packages should be robust, that is, perform satisfactorily for all key objectives under a broad range of plausible futures ( [[#Kwakkel--2016|Kwakkel et al. 2016]] ; [[#Maier--2016|Maier et al. 2016]] ; [[#Castrejon-Campos--2020|Castrejon-Campos et al. 2020]] ). Such an approach to decision-making can be contrasted with one that tries to design an optimal policy package for the ‘best guess’ future scenario ( [[#Maier--2016|Maier et al. 2016]] ). Moreover, policy packages can usefully be adapted dynamically to changing circumstances as part of the policy process ( [[#Haasnoot--2013|Haasnoot et al. 2013]] ; [[#Hamarat--2014|Hamarat et al. 2014]] ; [[#Maier--2016|Maier et al. 2016]] ) including by using exploratory modelling techniques that allow comparison of trade-offs across alternative future scenarios ( [[#Hamarat--2014|Hamarat et al. 2014]] ). Another approach is to link quantitative models with a participatory process that enables decision-makers to test the implications of alternative interventions ( [[#Moallemi--2018|Moallemi and Malekpour 2018]] ). [[#Rosenbloom--2019|Rosenbloom et al. (2019)]] suggest that because policy mixes should adapt to changing circumstances, instead of stability of a particular mix, transitions require embedding policies within a long-term orientation toward a low-carbon economy, including a transition agenda, social legitimacy for this agenda, and an appropriate ecosystem of institutions.

Third, achieving changes in development pathways requires engaging with place-specific context. It requires attention to existing policies, political interests that may gain or lose from a transition, and locally specific governance enablers and disablers. As a result, while there may be approaches that carry over from one context to another, implementation requires careful tailoring of transition approaches to specific policy and governance contexts. Cross-Chapter Box 9 in this chapter summarises case studies of sectoral transitions from other chapters in this report (Chapters 5 to 12) to illustrate this complexity. Broader macroeconomic transformative shifts are discussed in more detail in [[#13.9|Section 13.9]] .

Common to all the sectoral cases in Cross-Chapter Box 9 is a future-oriented vision of sectoral transition often focused on multiple objectives, such as designing tram-based public transport systems in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe to simultaneously stimulate urban centers, create jobs and enable low-carbon transportation. Sectoral transitions are enabled by policy mixes that bring together different combinations of instruments – including regulations, financial incentives, convening, education and outreach, voluntary agreements, procurement and creation of new institutions – to work together in a complementary manner. The effectiveness of a policy mix depends on conditions beyond design considerations and also rests on the larger governance context within which sector transitions occur, which can include enabling and disabling elements. Enabling factors illustrated in Cross-Chapter Box 9 include strong high level political support, for example to address deforestation in Brazil despite powerful logging and farmer interests, or policy design to win over existing private interests, for example, by harnessing distribution networks of kerosene providers to new LPG technology in Indonesia. Disabling conditions include local institutional contexts, such as the lack of tree and land tenure in Ghana, which, along with the monopoly of the state marketing board, posed obstacles to Ghana’s low-carbon cocoa transition. These examples emphasise the importance of attention to local context if policy integration and the design of policy mixes are to effectively lead to transitions guided by multiple climate and development objectives.

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=== Cross-Chapter Box 9 | Case Studies of Integrated Policymaking for Sector Transitions ===

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'''Authors:''' Parth Bhatia (India), Navroz K. Dubash (India), Igor Bashmakov (the Russian Federation), Paolo Bertoldi (Italy), Mercedes Bustamante (Brazil), Michael Craig (the United States of America), Stephane de la Rue du Can (the United States of America), Manfred Fischedick (Germany) Amit Garg (India), Oliver Geden (Germany), Robert Germeshausen (Germany), Siir Kilkis (Turkey), Susanna Kugelberg (Denmark), Andreas Loeschel (Germany), Cheikh Mbow (Senegal), Yacob Mulugetta (Ethiopia), Gert-Jan Nabuurs (the Netherlands), Vinnet Ndlovu (Zimbabwe/Australia), Peter Newman (Australia), Lars Nilsson (Sweden), Karachepone Ninan (India)

Real world sectoral transitions reinforce critical lessons on policy integration: a high-level strategic goal (Column a in Cross-Chapter Box 9, Table 1), the need for a clear sector outcome framing (column B), a carefully coordinated mix of policy instruments and governance actions (column C), and the importance of context-specific governance factors (column D). Illustrative examples, drawn from sectors, help elucidate the complexity of policymaking in driving sectoral transitions.

'''Cross-Chapter Box 9, Table 1 | Case studies of integrated policymaking for sector transitions.'''

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! '''A. Illustrative case'''

! '''B. Objective'''

! '''C. Policy mix'''

! colspan="2"| '''D. Governance context'''

|-
!
! '''Enablers'''

! '''Barriers'''

|-
| Shift in mobility service provision in Kolkata, India ''[Box 5.8]''

| – Improve system efficiency, sustainability and comfort

– Shift public perceptions of public transport

| – Strengthen coordination between modes

– Formalise and green auto-rickshaws

– Procure fuel efficient, comfortable, low-floor AC buses

– Ban cycling on busy roads

– Deploy policy actors as change-agents, mediating between interest groups

| – Cultural norms around informal transport sharing, linked to high levels of social trust

– Historically crucial role of buses in transit

– App-cab companies shifting norms and formalising mobility sharing

– Digitalisation and safety on board

| – Complexity: multiple modes with separate networks and meanings

– Accommodating and addressing legitimate concerns from social movements about the exclusionary effects of ‘premium’ fares, cycling bans on busy roads

|-
| LPG Subsidy (‘Zero Kero’) Program, Indonesia ''[Box 6.3]''

| Decrease fiscal expenditures on kerosene subsidies for cooking

| – Subsidise provision of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) cylinders and initial equipment

– Convert existing kerosene suppliers to LPG suppliers

| – Provincial government and industry support in targeting beneficiaries and implementation

– Synergies in kerosene and LPG distribution infrastructures

| – Continued user preference for traditional solid fuels

– Reduced GHG benefits as subsidy shifted between fossil fuels

|-
| Action Plan for Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon, Brazil ''[Box 7.9]''

| Control deforestation and promote sustainable development

| – Expand protected areas; homologation of indigenous lands

– Improve inspections, satellite-based monitoring

– Restrict public credit for enterprises and municipalities with high deforestation rates

– Set up a REDD+ mechanism (Amazon Fund)

| – Participatory agenda-setting process

– Cross-sectoral consultations on conservation guidelines

– Mainstreaming of deforestation in government programmes and projects

| – Political polarisation leading to erosion of environmental governance

– Reduced representation and independence of civil society in decision-making bodies

– Lack of clarity around land ownership

|-
| Climate Smart Cocoa (CSC) production, Ghana ''[Box 7.12]''

| – Promote sustainable intensification of cocoa production

– Reduce deforestation

– Enhance incomes and adaptive capacities

| – Distribute shade tree seedlings

– Provide access to agronomic information and agrochemical inputs

– Design a multi-stakeholder programme including MNCs, farmers and NGOs

| – Local resource governance mechanisms ensuring voice for smallholders

– Community governance allowed adapting to local context

– Private sector role in popularising CSC

| – Lack of secure tenure (tree rights)

– Bureaucratic and legal hurdles to register trees

– State monopoly on cocoa marketing, export

|-
| Coordination mechanism for joining fragmented urban policymaking in Shanghai, China ''[Box 8.3]''

| Integrate policymaking across objectives, towards low-carbon urban development

| – Combine central targets and evaluation with local flexibility for initiating varied policy experiments

– Establish a local leadership team for coordinating cross-sectoral policies involving multiple institutions

– Create a direct programme fund for implementation and capacity-building

| – Strong vertical linkages between Central and local levels

– Mandate for policy learning to inform national policy

– Experience with mainstreaming mitigation in related areas (e.g. air pollution)

| – Challenging starting point – low share of RE, high dependency on fossil fuels

– Continued need for high investments in a developing context

|-
| Policy package for building energy efficiency, EU ''[Box 9.SM.1]''

| Reduce energy consumption, integrating RE and mitigating GHG emissions from buildings

| – Energy performance standards, set at nearly zero energy for new buildings

– Energy performance standards for appliances

– Energy performance certificates shown during sale

– Long-term renovation strategies

| – Binding EU-level targets, directives and sectoral effort sharing regulations

– Supportive urban policies, coordinated through city partnerships

– Funds raised from allowances auctioned under ETS

| – Inadequate local technical capacity to implement multiple instruments

– Complex governance structure leading to uneven stringency

|-
| African electromobility – trackless trams with solar in Bulawayo and e-motorbikes in Kampala ''[Box 10.4]''

| – Leapfrog into a decarbonised transport future

– Achieve multiple social benefits beyond mobility provision

| – Develop urban centres with solar at station precincts

– Public-private partnerships for financing

– Sanction demonstration projects for new electric transit and new electric motorbikes (for freight)

| – ‘Achieving SDGs’ was an enabling policy framing

– Multi-objective policy process for mobility, mitigation and manufacturing

– Potential for funding through climate finance

– Co-benefits such as local employment generation

| – Economic decline in the first decade of the 21st century

– Limited fiscal capacity for public funding of infrastructure

– Inadequate charging infrastructure for e-motorbikes

|-
| Initiative for a climate-friendly industry in North Rhine Westphalia (NRW), Germany ''[Box 11.3]''

| Collaboratively develop innovative strategies towards a net zero industrial sector, while securing competitiveness

| – Build platform to bring together industry, scientists and government in self-organised innovation teams

– Intensive cross-branch cooperation to articulate policy/infrastructure needs

| – NRW is Germany’s industrial heartland, with an export-oriented industrial base

– Established government– industry ties

– Active discourse between industry and public

| Compliance rules preventing in-depth cooperation

|-
| Food2030 Strategy, Finland ''[Box 12.2]''

| – Local, organic and climate friendly food production

– Responsible and healthy food consumption

– A competitive food supply chain

| – Target funding and knowledge support for innovations

– Apply administrative means (legislation, guidance) to increase organic food production and procurement

– Use education and information instruments to shift behaviour (media campaigns, websites)

| – Year-long deliberative stakeholder engagement process across sectors

– Institutional structures for agenda-setting, guiding policy implementation and reflexive discussions

| – Weak role of integrated impact assessments to inform agenda-setting

– Monitoring and evaluation close to ministry in charge

– Lack of standardised indicators of food system sustainability

|}

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