Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-4 (section)

== 4.8 Enabling Principles for Achieving Water Security, Sustainable and Climate Resilient Development Through Systems Transformations ==

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Sustainable development is a global policy priority and commitment, as is keeping temperatures well below 2°C as per the Paris Agreement. Water is central to almost all SDGs (Box 4.1). Water is explicitly referred to in SDG6 (clean water and sanitation) and SDG11 (sustainable communities and cities) ( [[#UN--2015|UN, 2015]] ) ( [[#4.1|Section 4.1]] ). SDG1 (no poverty) is statistically linked to SDG6 (clean water and sanitation) ( [[#Pradhan--2019|Pradhan, 2019]] ), since reducing poverty can help increase adaptive capacity in line with the Paris Agreement adaptation goals (see [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-1|Chapter 1]] and Chapter 18). SDG2 (zero hunger) cannot be achieved without access to adequate water for agriculture. Meeting SDG3 (health and well-being) will rely on access to basic infrastructure like water and sanitation ( [[#Delany-Crowe--2019|Delany-Crowe et al., 2019]] ; see Cross-Chapter Box HEALTH in Chapter 7, Sections 4.3.3, 4.3.5), while SDG7 (affordable and clean energy) will need water for hydropower production under a changing climate ( [[#Berga--2016|Berga, 2016]] ; [[#Byers--2016|Byers et al., 2016]] ) ( [[#4.5.2|Section 4.5.2]] ). Meeting SDG11 (sustainable cities and communities) will require reducing the impacts from water-related disasters.

Water is also fundamental to all systems transitions, namely, transitions in energy, industrial, land and ecosystem and urban systems. Within energy and industrial system transitions, water stress for electricity generation has already caused impacts ( [[#4.3.2|Section 4.3.2]] ). Therefore, water efficiency measures are increasingly applied in both energy and industrial systems with benefits for mitigation and adaptation ( [[#4.6.3|Section 4.6.3]] ). Water is inextricably entwined with land and ecosystems transitions, with forested areas and ecosystems being integral components of the water cycle, regulating streamflow, fostering groundwater recharge and contributing to atmospheric water recycling ( [[#Takata--2020|Takata and Hanasaki, 2020]] ) ( [[#4.2|Section 4.2]] ). However, mitigation action of large afforestation, can have negative water impacts (Cross-Chapter Box 1 in [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-5|Chapter 5]] of WGI report, 4.7.6), making it imperative to consider water footprint of land- and forest-based mitigation ( [[#Muricho--2019|Muricho et al., 2019]] ; [[#Seddon--2020|Seddon et al., 2020]] ) ( [[#4.7.6|Section 4.7.6]] ). Sustainable forest management and NBS are promising alternatives for good water management ( [[#Muricho--2019|Muricho et al., 2019]] ; [[#Seddon--2020|Seddon et al., 2020]] ). Water will also play a crucial role in sustainable urban transitions. Cities are already facing water-related impacts ( [[#4.3.4|Section 4.3.4]] ), which are projected to intensify with every degree of global warming ( [[#Flörke--2018|Flörke et al., 2018]] ; [[#Nazemi--2018|Nazemi and Madani, 2018]] ) ( [[#4.5.4|Section 4.5.4]] ). Mitigation and adaptation measures in urban spaces, such as green infrastructure ( [[#Liu--2018|Liu and Jensen, 2018]] ), sustainable water supply management through recycling of wastewater and storm water runoff (Box 4.5) and NbS like sponge cities, are fundamentally about water (Box 4.6).

Thus, water remains central to achieving SDGs and will play a fundamental role in systems transitions needed for climate resilient development. We outline a set of seven enabling principles that are needed to achieving water security and will also help in achieving SDGs and facilitate systems transitions.

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<span id="appropriate-technologies"></span>
=== 4.8.1 Appropriate Technologies ===

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AR5 concluded that successful adaptation across all sectors depends on access to technology, and technology transfer can play an essential role in building up adaptive capacity ( [[#Noble--2014|Noble et al., 2014]] ). SR1.5 discussed the role of efficient irrigation technologies in adaptation ( [[#de%20Coninck--2018|de Coninck et al., 2018]] ).

Technologies that reduce carbon emissions by promoting the efficient use of water can support successful adaptation ( [[#Biagini--2014|Biagini et al., 2014]] ), provided they do not have adverse distributional outcomes ( ''medium evidence, high agreement'' ). Water management in agriculture has long seen the use of technology. For example, the use of technology to improve access to water, for example, through the diffusion of groundwater pumps in the 1970s in South Asia, had several livelihood benefits, but made agriculture more carbon-intensive ( [[#Zaveri--2016|Zaveri et al., 2016]] ). More recently, technology has been used to improve water use efficiency in agriculture through the adoption of drip and sprinkler irrigation ( [[#Zhuo--2017|Zhuo and Hoekstra, 2017]] ; [[#Grafton--2018|Grafton et al., 2018]] ), and the use of the Internet of Things (IoT) ( [[#Keswani--2019|Keswani et al., 2019]] ). In addition, innovations to reuse water through various wastewater recovery technologies ( [[#Diaz-Elsayed--2019|Diaz-Elsayed et al., 2019]] ; [[#Capodaglio--2020|Capodaglio, 2020]] ), create potable water through desalinisation ( [[#Caldera--2018|Caldera et al., 2018]] ) and reuse of wastewater in agriculture ( [[#Salgot--2018|Salgot and Folch, 2018]] ) are also on the rise (Box 4.5). Solar technologies are increasingly used for irrigation, wastewater recovery, desalinisation and water harvesting ( [[#Algarni--2018|Algarni et al., 2018]] ; [[#Pouyfaucon--2018|Pouyfaucon and García-Rodríguez, 2018]] ; [[#Tu--2018|Tu et al., 2018]] ; Zhao F. et al., 2020). Machine learning and artificial intelligence technologies ( [[#Doorn--2021|Doorn, 2021]] ) have started being used in many water-use sectors, such as urban settings ( [[#Nie--2020|Nie et al., 2020]] ), wastewater management ( [[#Abdallah--2020|Abdallah et al., 2020]] ; [[#Ben%20Ammar--2020|Ben Ammar et al., 2020]] ) and agricultural water management, but mostly in high-income countries mostly on an experimental basis ( [[#Tsang--2016|Tsang and Jim, 2016]] ; [[#González%20Perea--2018|González Perea et al., 2018]] ). Technology is being increasingly used in hydrological sciences for measurements and monitoring (SM4.1), as well as for creating comprehensive hydrometeorological warning systems ( [[#Funk--2015|Funk et al., 2015]] ). Lack of technology and knowledge transfer, especially related to remote sensing, is an adaptation barrier in states with less resources ( [[#Funk--2015|Funk et al., 2015]] ).

Adoption of technologies depends on the availability of finance ( [[#4.8.2|Section 4.8.2]] ). The effectiveness of technology in reducing climate-related risks depends on its appropriateness to the local context ( [[#Biagini--2014|Biagini et al., 2014]] ; [[#Mfitumukiza--2020|Mfitumukiza et al., 2020]] ) and other factors, including institutional and governance frameworks ( ''high confidence'' ). Water technologies can also have unintended outcomes, leading to maladaptation in some cases. For example, efficient irrigation technologies like drip and sprinkler irrigation, while reducing water application rates per unit of land, can increase overall water extraction by increasing total land under irrigation ( [[#van%20der%20Kooij--2013|van der Kooij et al., 2013]] ; [[#Grafton--2018|Grafton et al., 2018]] ; [[#Mpanga--2021|Mpanga and Idowu, 2021]] ). Water-related technologies can also have adverse distributional outcomes when gains from technology adoption accrue disproportionately to a small section of the population; for example, only rich and male farmers can adopt high-cost technologies like solar irrigation pumps ( [[#Gupta--2019|Gupta, 2019]] ) ( ''medium confidence'' ).

In summary, technology is an important part of water adaptation response, and outcomes of technology adoption are mediated through other societal factors, including institutions, governance frameworks and equity and justice issues ( ''medium evidence, high agreement'' ).

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<span id="adequate-and-appropriate-financing"></span>
=== 4.8.2 Adequate and Appropriate Financing ===

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Although AR5 did not explicitly mention finance for water-related adaptation actions, it considered urban adaptation ( [[#Revi--2014|Revi et al., 2014]] ) and risk financing ( [[#Arent--2014|Arent et al., 2014]] ). SR1.5 ( [[#de%20Coninck--2018|de Coninck et al., 2018]] ) discussed governance and finance limitations, while SRCCL discussed finance in adapting to floods and droughts ( [[#Hurlbert--2019|Hurlbert et al., 2019]] ).

Mitigation garners the significant share of committed climate finance. For example, of the total USD 15.4 billion climate finance commitments through ‘green bonds’, 79% accrued to mitigation and the rest to adaptation ( [[#World%20Bank--2017|World Bank, 2017]] ). However, within adaptation finance, water garners a significant share of adaptation funds, with 13% of the Adaptation Fund’s investments were for water management, 12% for coastal management and 10% for disaster risk reduction ( [[#Adaptation%20Fund--2018|Adaptation Fund, 2018]] ). Similarly, within the urban adaptation landscape, which got ~3–5% of total adaptation finance flows of USD 30.8 billion tracked in 2017–2018 ( [[#Richmond--2021|Richmond et al., 2021]] ), water and wastewater management projects received the largest share of urban adaptation finance (USD 761 million annually) followed by disaster risk management (USD 323 million) ( [[#Richmond--2021|Richmond et al., 2021]] ). However, more frequent tracking of public financing is required, with a greater focus on transparency and accountability ( [[#Ciplet--2018|Ciplet et al., 2018]] ; [[#Khan--2020|Khan et al., 2020]] ) and justice and social equity ( [[#Emrich--2020|Emrich et al., 2020]] ) (also see Cross-Chapter Box FINANCE in Chapter 17).

Private financing remains a minor source of adaptation financing ( [[#World%20Bank--2019|World Bank, 2019]] ). Around 39% of green bonds issued in 2017 were for water, wastewater and solid waste management ( [[#World%20Bank--2017|World Bank, 2017]] ). In 2018, USD 100.5 billion of water-themed bonds were issued, mainly in Europe (63%), the Asia Pacific (19.6%) and North America (14.9%) ( [[#Filkova--2018|Filkova et al., 2018]] ; [[#World%20Bank--2019|World Bank, 2019]] ). Such financing focuses on returns and scale ( [[#Cholibois--2020|Cholibois, 2020]] ), and as such, local needs, especially those of the poor, may not be adequately represented ( [[#Manuamorn--2020|Manuamorn et al., 2020]] ; [[#Williams--2020|Williams, 2020]] ) ( ''medium confidence).''

COVID-19 will probably affect adaptation financing in water. Countries will be fiscally stretched to finance public investments domestically and through international development aid ( [[#Barbier--2020|Barbier and Burgess, 2020]] ). However, investments in flood and drought management ( [[#Phillips--2020|Phillips et al., 2020]] ) and water and sanitation ( [[#Armitage--2020b|Armitage and Nellums, 2020b]] ; [[#Bhowmick--2020|Bhowmick et al., 2020]] ) are critical for building resilience against pandemics, and are also crucial elements of adaptation in water. Therefore, integrated approaches that achieve both goals need to be deployed ( [[#Barbier--2020|Barbier and Burgess, 2020]] ; [[#Newell--2020|Newell and Dale, 2020]] ) (Box 4.4., Cross-Chapter Box COVID in Chapter 7).

In summary, water garners a significant share of public and private adaptation funds ( ''high confidence'' ). However, current COVID-19-related cuts in adaptation financing may further impede developing countries’ ability to invest in adequate water adaptation.

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=== 4.8.3 Gender, Equity and Social Justice ===

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SR1.5 acknowledged that the adaptive capacity of a population was going to reduce with each degree of warming and that vulnerability to climate change was due to gender, race and level of education, which can compound existing and future vulnerabilities ( [[#IPCC--2018a|IPCC, 2018a]] ).

Gender, class, race, age, physical ability and educational level determine access to water and financial and societal resources, potentially adverting climate-induced water hazards, reducing vulnerability and facilitating adaptation. However, insufficient attention has been given to the role of improving equity in access to water ( [[#Abedin--2019|Abedin et al., 2019]] ; [[#Eakin--2020|Eakin et al., 2020]] ). Not all water adaptation strategies are accessible to the poorest, who may turn to maladaptive strategies if their access to water is negatively affected ( [[#Eakin--2016|Eakin et al., 2016]] ). Consequently, there have been calls for mainstreaming equity considerations into adaptation ( [[#Blackburn--2018|Blackburn and Pelling, 2018]] ) ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ''.'' It has been shown that people living in poverty, racial minorities and those ageing are more vulnerable to climate-induced water hazards and that their adaptive capacity is limited ( [[#Szewrański--2018|Szewrański et al., 2018]] ; [[#Winsemius--2018|Winsemius et al., 2018]] ; [[#Nyantakyi-Frimpong--2020|Nyantakyi-Frimpong, 2020]] ; [[#Erwin--2021|Erwin et al., 2021]] ). Among these categories, gender is the one that has been most analysed in the context of water and climate change.

Women’s water rights are hampered by societal patriarchal norms that prevent women from accessing water and participating in water management. Gender power relations effectively limit women’s decision-making power, mobility and access to resources, including water, which makes them more vulnerable to climate-related hazards ( [[#Caretta--2015|Caretta and Börjeson, 2015]] ; [[#Djoudi--2016|Djoudi et al., 2016]] ; [[#Sultana--2018|Sultana, 2018]] ; [[#Yadav--2018|Yadav and Lal, 2018]] ). In most societies in developing countries, women and girls are in charge of fetching water. The necessity of water collection takes away time from income-generating activities and education ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Fontana--2014|Fontana and Elson, 2014]] ; [[#Kookana--2016|Kookana et al., 2016]] ; [[#Yadav--2018|Yadav and Lal, 2018]] ). In addition, the distances women and girls would have to walk as a result of growing water scarcity due to climate change may increase ( ''limited evidence, high confidence'' ) ( [[#Becerra--2016|Becerra et al., 2016]] ) (Sections 4.3.3, 4.5.3). Numerous studies substantiate a male bias in information access, employment opportunities, resource availability and decision-making in water-related adaptation measures ( [[#Huynh--2014|Huynh and Resurreccion, 2014]] ; [[#Sinharoy--2019|Sinharoy and Caruso, 2019]] ).

Although women are often depicted as victims of climate change-induced water scarcity ( [[#Huynh--2014|Huynh and Resurreccion, 2014]] ; [[#Djoudi--2016|Djoudi et al., 2016]] ; [[#Gonda--2016|Gonda, 2016]] ; [[#Yadav--2018|Yadav and Lal, 2018]] ), they are also proactive adaptation actors ( [[#Singh--2015|Singh and Singh, 2015]] ) (Cross-Chapter Box GENDER in Chapter 18). Notably, women are not a homogenous group, and local gender roles are not immutable or generalisable ( [[#Carr--2014|Carr and Thompson, 2014]] ; [[#Djoudi--2016|Djoudi et al., 2016]] ; [[#Gonda--2016|Gonda, 2016]] ; [[#Sultana--2018|Sultana, 2018]] ). Coping responses and adaptation mechanisms to climate change are profoundly gendered. Women and men approach the diversification of agricultural and pastoral livelihoods differently in response to climate change ( [[#Caretta--2015|Caretta and Börjeson, 2015]] ; [[#Kankwamba--2018|Kankwamba et al., 2018]] ; [[#Singh--2018|Singh et al., 2018]] ; [[#Basupi--2019|Basupi et al., 2019]] ). For example, reliance on women’s self-help groups and associations has proven successful in ensuring women’s participation in decision-making in adaptation interventions as a response to climate change-induced shifting precipitation patterns and increasing droughts ( [[#Chu--2017|Chu, 2017]] ; [[#Mersha--2018|Mersha and van Laerhoven, 2018]] ; [[#Phuong--2018|Phuong et al., 2018]] ; [[#Walch--2019|Walch, 2019]] ). Studies feature water harvesting, crop diversification, cash transfer programmes and food subsidies as adaptation measures that enhance gender equality. Adaptation to climate change in these instances promoted gender equality because it allowed women to reap the benefits of these new measures in terms of economic and health well-being ( [[#Tesfamariam--2017|Tesfamariam and Hurlbert, 2017]] ; [[#Lindoso--2018|Lindoso et al., 2018]] ; [[#Walch--2019|Walch, 2019]] ).

Meanwhile, adaptation interventions such as drip irrigation, the adoption of more labour-intensive crops and livelihood diversification through male out-migration have proven to increase women’s burden ( [[#Caretta--2015|Caretta and Börjeson, 2015]] ; [[#Kattumuri--2017|Kattumuri et al., 2017]] ). Hence, a lack of gender-sensitive analysis before implementing water management projects can lead to maladaptation and increase gender vulnerability ( [[#Phan--2019|Phan et al., 2019]] ; [[#Eriksen--2021|Eriksen et al., 2021]] ) ( ''high confidence)'' .

Acknowledging and understanding the implications of climate-related water adaptation policies in terms of equity and justice is a prerequisite for ensuring their legitimacy and inclusiveness and promotes social justice ( [[#Carr--2014|Carr and Thompson, 2014]] ; [[#Djoudi--2016|Djoudi et al., 2016]] ; [[#Jost--2016|Jost et al., 2016]] ; [[#Sultana--2018|Sultana, 2018]] ). Furthermore, integrating the principle of gender inclusivity in adaptation is morally and ethically appropriate and effective because women hold much of the local and TK in many agricultural communities and can fruitfully provide insights on how to design and implement adaptation responses ( [[#Fauconnier--2018|Fauconnier et al., 2018]] ; [[#James--2019|James, 2019]] ).

In summary, there is ''high confidence'' that the effects of climate change-induced water insecurity are not evenly felt across populations. Particularly vulnerable groups are women, children, disabled and Indigenous Peoples whose ability to access adequate water is limited and varies across race, ethnicity and caste. Equity and justice are central to climate change adaptation and sustainable development, as the world’s poorest people and countries feel the adverse impacts of a changing climate most acutely. These groups can become even more vulnerable due to adaptation actions that are not equitable.

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<span id="inclusion-of-indigenous-knowledge-and-local-knowledge"></span>
=== 4.8.4 Inclusion of Indigenous Knowledge and Local Knowledge ===

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AR5 concluded that there is ''robust evidence'' that mutual integration and co-production of local, traditional and scientific knowledge increase adaptive capacity and reduce vulnerability ( [[#Adger--2014|Adger and Pulhin, 2014]] ). SROCC stated with ''medium confidence'' that IKLK provide context-specific and socioculturally relevant understandings for effective climate change responses and policies ( [[#Abram--2019|Abram et al., 2019]] ). SRCCL found that IKLK contribute to enhancing resilience against climate change and combating desertification ( ''medium confidence'' ). The combination of IKLK with new sustainable land management techniques, SRCCL stated with ''high confidence'' , can contribute to raising resilience to the challenges of climate change and desertification ( [[#Mirzabaev--2019|Mirzabaev et al., 2019]] ).

There is ''high confidence'' that adaptation efforts benefit from the inclusion of IKLK ( [[#Mustonen--2021|Mustonen et al., 2021]] ). IKLK can inform how climate change impacts and risks are understood and experienced. Holders of IKLK can also help to develop place-based and culturally appropriate adaptation strategies that meet their community’s expectations ( [[#Comberti--2019|Comberti et al., 2019]] ; [[#Martinez%20Moscoso--2019|Martinez Moscoso, 2019]] ) (Cross-Chapter Box INDIG in Chapter 18).

There is ''high confidence'' that genuine partnerships with Indigenous Peoples and local communities can assist in decolonising approaches to freshwater management ( [[#Arsenault--2019|Arsenault et al., 2019]] ; [[#Wilson--2019|Wilson et al., 2019]] ), which recognise the importance of knowledge that is not grounded on the technocratic division between nature and society ( [[#Goldman--2018|Goldman et al., 2018]] ). There is also ''high confidence'' that Indigenous Peoples-led freshwater management can facilitate culturally inclusive decision-making and collaborative planning processes at the local and national levels ( [[#Somerville--2014|Somerville, 2014]] ; [[#Harmsworth--2016|Harmsworth et al., 2016]] ; [[#Parsons--2017|Parsons et al., 2017]] ). However, market-based models of water rights regimes can impede the ability of Indigenous Peoples to exercise their rights and deploy traditional ecological knowledge regarding freshwater protection ( [[#Nursey-Bray--2018|Nursey-Bray and Palmer, 2018]] ) ( ''medium evidence, high agreement'' ).

Community-led actions and restoration measures are helping to ameliorate climate impacts and provide ‘safe havens’ to affected freshwater species ( ''high confidence'' ). For example, the Skolt Sámi of Finland have introduced adaptation measures to aid survival of culturally significant Atlantic salmon stocks in the Näätämö watershed. Atlantic salmon had declined as northern pike, which preys on juvenile salmon, expanded its range in response to warmer water temperatures. Indigenous co-management measures included increasing the catch of pike and documenting important sites (such as lost spawning beds) to ensure that ecological restoration encourages further habitat and increased salmon reproduction ( [[#Pecl--2017|Pecl et al., 2017]] ; [[#Mustonen--2018|Mustonen and Feodoroff, 2018]] ).

Community-led applications of IKLK in conjunction with external knowledge and funding can improve water security ( ''high confidence'' ). For example, Borana pastoralists in Ethiopia ( [[#Iticha--2019|Iticha and Husen, 2019]] ) and Ati and Suludnon people (Philippines) ( [[#Nelson--2019|Nelson et al., 2019]] ) utilise both IK and technical information for weather forecasting, while Calanguya people (Philippines) collaborated with local government and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) to diversify crops and protect the watershed ( [[#Gabriel--2017|Gabriel and Mangahas, 2017]] ). With assistance from municipalities, Indigenous Peoples are rehabilitating springs and traditional water wells in Bangladesh hill tracts ( [[#Sultana--2019|Sultana et al., 2019]] ) and Micronesia ( [[#McLeod--2019|McLeod et al., 2019]] ). In response to changing cryospheric conditions in the Peruvian Andes, indigenous Quechua farmers use IK and technical information in community-led research to preserve biocultural knowledge and emblematic crops ( [[#Sayre--2017|Sayre et al., 2017]] ). In Galena, Alaska (USA), a flood-preparedness and response programme has benefitted from the long-term cooperation between emergency management and tribal officials ( [[#Kontar--2015|Kontar et al., 2015]] ) (12.5.3.2 Main concepts and approaches). IKLK can enhance the visibility of Indigenous Peoples and local communities that are excluded from official decision-making processes. In southwest Burkina Faso, for example, Indigenous Peoples are using IKLK to balance (and sometimes resist) official technical estimates of water availability, which enhances their political visibility and enables them to address water scarcity ( [[#Roncoli--2019|Roncoli et al., 2019]] ).

There are structural and institutional challenges in knowledge co-production between holders of IKLK and ‘technical’ knowledge. These challenges include issues of water rights, language, extractive research practices ( [[#Ford--2016|Ford et al., 2016]] ; [[#Simms--2016|Simms et al., 2016]] ; [[#Stefanelli--2017|Stefanelli et al., 2017]] ; [[#Arsenault--2019|Arsenault et al., 2019]] ) and colonial uses of IKLK ( [[#Castleden--2017|Castleden et al., 2017]] ), which can produce distrust among holders of IKLK ( [[#David-Chavez--2018|David-Chavez and Gavin, 2018]] ). In addition, some IK is sacred and cannot be shared with outsiders ( [[#Sanderson--2015|Sanderson et al., 2015]] ).

In summary, IKLK are dynamic and have developed over time to adapt to climate and environmental change in culturally specific and place-based ways ( ''high confidence'' ). Ethical co-production between holders of IKLK and technical knowledge is a key enabling condition for successful adaptation measures and strategies pertaining to water security, as well as other areas ( ''medium evidence, high agreement'' ). Knowledge co-production is a vital and developing approach to the water-related impacts of climate change that recognises the culture, agency and concerns of Indigenous Peoples and local communities. It is critical to developing effective, equitable and meaningful strategies for addressing the water-related impacts of global warming (Cross-Chapter Box INDIG in Chapter 18).

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<span id="participative-cooperative-and-bottom-up-engagement"></span>
=== 4.8.5 Participative, Cooperative and Bottom-Up Engagement ===

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Participation, cooperation and bottom-up engagement are critical to optimal adaptation ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ). There is ''high confidence'' that many of the countries and social groups most threatened by climate change have contributed the least to global emissions and do not have not the resources to adapt. Effective participation of these actors in climate change adaptation planning in the water sector can contribute to more just adaptation actions ( ''high confidence'' ).

There is ''medium evidence'' and ''high agreement'' that optimal adaptation depends critically on inter-state cooperation ( [[#Banda--2018|Banda, 2018]] ), which in turn requires trust and norms of reciprocity among all those involved ( [[#Ostrom--2014|Ostrom, 2014]] ). Reciprocity is central to international cooperation on climate change, where actors are more inclined to cooperate when they perceive that the expected outcome will be fair in terms of costs and benefits of implementation ( [[#Keohane--2016|Keohane and Oppenheimer, 2016]] ). Indeed, cooperation at the international level is less probable to occur if participants do not trust each other ( [[#Hamilton--2018|Hamilton and Lubell, 2018]] ). In climate-related water adaptation, transboundary cooperation is essential, as 60% of global freshwater resources contained in 276 river and lake basins are shared between countries ( [[#Timmerman--2017|Timmerman et al., 2017]] ). Yet, more than 50% of the world’s 310 international river basins lack any type of cooperative framework ( [[#McCracken--2018|McCracken and Meyer, 2018]] ).

SDG6 on water and sanitation includes a specific indicator (6.5.2) to assess cooperation over transboundary waters. While the methodology for measuring this indicator is debated, it is clear that its composition will influence international and national water policy and law ( [[#McCracken--2018|McCracken and Meyer, 2018]] ) and possibly help build an environment of trust among riparian states. Moreover, although the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (A/RES/70/1) makes it clear that without the participation of local communities (e.g., SDG6, Target 6b) and women (e.g., SDG5, Target 5.5), the SDGs will not be met; the involvement of these actors in formal water governance processes and water management is still limited ( [[#Fauconnier--2018|Fauconnier et al., 2018]] ). This is due partly to the absence, in many regions of the world, of adequate legal, regulatory and institutional frameworks for effective stakeholder participation, partly to the influence of local social and cultural contexts, which can discourage inclusive water governance ( [[#Andajani-Sutjahjo--2015|Andajani-Sutjahjo et al., 2015]] ; [[#Dang--2017|Dang, 2017]] ). Yet, inclusion and effective participation in bottom-up decision-making processes of those disproportionately affected by climate change—including women and Indigenous Peoples—is particularly important to ensure the legitimacy and inclusiveness of the decision-making process and the design of socially just adaptation actions ( [[#Shi--2016|Shi et al., 2016]] ). Moreover, incentives for bottom-up and participative decision-making in the water sector can facilitate effective stakeholder engagement ( [[#OECD--2015|OECD, 2015]] ), which helps build public confidence and trust in water governance.

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<span id="polycentric-water-governance"></span>
=== 4.8.6 Polycentric Water Governance ===

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SR1.5 concluded with ''high confidence'' that cooperation and coordinated actions at various governance levels are vital to ensuring participation, transparency, capacity building and learning among different actors ( [[#IPCC--2018a|IPCC, 2018a]] ). According to SRCCL, adaptive governance builds on multi-level and polycentric governance ( [[#Hurlbert--2019|Hurlbert et al., 2019]] ), where efforts taken by multiple actors across different scales provide learning opportunities for all ( [[#Hurlbert--2018|Hurlbert, 2018]] ).

Polycentrism is characterised by the absence of a unique centre of authority. Therefore, the legitimacy of the decisions taken by multiple decision-makers at different levels of water governance derives from the perceived fairness of the decision-making process ( [[#Baldwin--2018|Baldwin et al., 2018]] ) and the inclusion of women, Indigenous Peoples and young people ( [[#Iza--2019|Iza, 2019]] ) ( ''medium confidence'' ). Evidence-based approaches can also enhance the legitimacy of polycentric governance ( [[#Boelens--2015|Boelens et al., 2015]] ; [[#Arriagada--2018|Arriagada et al., 2018]] ) by generating knowledge to support localised and multi-leveled decision-making, as in the case of water user communities in Peru ( [[#Buytaert--2014|Buytaert et al., 2014]] ; [[#Buytaert--2016|Buytaert et al., 2016]] ).

The advantages of polycentric approaches to climate governance include improved communication, inclusiveness, consensus and better outcomes ( [[#Ostrom--2014|Ostrom, 2014]] ; [[#Cole--2015|Cole, 2015]] ; [[#Keohane--2016|Keohane and Victor, 2016]] ; [[#Morrison--2017|Morrison et al., 2017]] ; [[#Tormos-Aponte--2018|Tormos-Aponte and García-López, 2018]] ) ( ''high agreement'' ). However, polycentric governance systems require cross-scale information sharing, coordination and democratic participation to work appropriately ( [[#Pahl-Wostl--2014|Pahl-Wostl and Knieper, 2014]] ; [[#Carlisle--2017|Carlisle and Gruby, 2017]] ; [[#Morrison--2017|Morrison et al., 2017]] ; [[#Biesbroek--2018|Biesbroek and Lesnikowski, 2018]] ; [[#Frey--2021|Frey et al., 2021]] ) ( ''high confidence'' ). For example, efficient information sharing has been necessary to implement groundwater governance in transboundary contexts ( [[#Albrecht--2017|Albrecht et al., 2017]] ).

Empirical studies that examined the potential of polycentric governance to address water challenges in the face of climate change showed that polycentrism could encourage and support participatory, decentralised and deliberative adaptation. These, in turn, can produce better environmental outcomes and improve water governance outcomes ( ''high confidence'' ). Polycentric water governance can be an effective enabler for adaptation when it ensures interconnectedness with multiple public and private actors across the different sectors (e.g., irrigation users, domestic users, industrial users, watershed institutions, etc.) and across different levels (e.g., local, regional and national governments) to help come up with well-coordinated water adaptation responses ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Pahl-Wostl--2014|Pahl-Wostl and Knieper, 2014]] ; [[#McCord--2017|McCord et al., 2017]] ; [[#Baldwin--2018|Baldwin et al., 2018]] ; [[#Hamilton--2018|Hamilton and Lubell, 2018]] ; [[#Kellner--2019|Kellner et al., 2019]] ).

Questions remain about the extent to which polycentrism can result in either greater climate justice or exacerbate existing inequalities due, for example, to existing power inequalities which may affect the performance and effectiveness of a polycentric system ( [[#Pahl-Wostl--2014|Pahl-Wostl and Knieper, 2014]] ; [[#Morrison--2017|Morrison et al., 2017]] ; [[#Hamilton--2018|Hamilton and Lubell, 2018]] ; [[#Okereke--2018|Okereke, 2018]] ). For instance, historical inequities and injustices due to settler colonialism and top-down water policies, governance and laws ( [[#Collins--2017|Collins et al., 2017]] ; [[#Arsenault--2018|Arsenault et al., 2018]] ; Johnson et al., 2018; [[#Robison--2018|Robison et al., 2018]] ) have resulted in long-term water insecurity in many indigenous communities in North America ( [[#Simms--2016|Simms et al., 2016]] ; [[#Medeiros--2017|Medeiros et al., 2017]] ; [[#Conroy-Ben--2018|Conroy-Ben and Richard, 2018]] ; [[#Diver--2018|Diver, 2018]] ; [[#Emanuel--2018|Emanuel, 2018]] ) ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#4.6.9|Section 4.6.9]] ). Additionally, studies highlight that power dynamics can undermine the success of those initiatives. For example, in the Sao Paulo water crisis, polycentric governance did not fully realise its potential when it was guided by authoritarian governance favouring political interests over social, territorial and environmental justice ( [[#Frey--2021|Frey et al., 2021]] ). Likewise, in the Thau basin (France), the most important and influential actors shaped policy measures in response to climate change, thus limiting the potential for radical changes in water use ( [[#Aubin--2019|Aubin et al., 2019]] ).

In summary, polycentric governance can enable improved water governance and effective climate change adaptation ( ''medium confidence'' ). However, it can also exacerbate existing inequalities as long as less powerful actors, such as women, Indigenous Peoples and young people, are not adequately involved in the decision-making process ( ''high confidence'' ).

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=== 4.8.7 Strong Political Support ===

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According to AR5 ( [[#Jiménez%20Cisneros--2014|Jiménez Cisneros et al., 2014]] ), barriers to adaptation in the water sector include lack of institutional capacity, which, together with political support, constitutes one of the feasibility dimensions towards limiting global warming to 1.5°C ( [[#de%20Coninck--2018|de Coninck et al., 2018]] ) ''.'' As the IPCC SROCC ( [[#IPCC--2019a|IPCC, 2019a]] ) and SRCCL (Shukla et al., 2019) suggest, limited institutional support can challenge adaptation efforts in water management.

Climate adaptation planning approaches can be constrained by several economic, institutional, developmental and political barriers ( [[#Anguelovski--2014|Anguelovski et al., 2014]] ; [[#Eisenack--2014|Eisenack et al., 2014]] ), including strong political support, that is, the lack of collective willingness to take action. Despite the ongoing accumulation of scientific evidence as to the seriousness of the impact of climate change on water resources, state action has not always been effective. There are now a rising number of case laws addressing the state’s failure to implement adaptation policies and resultant climate change litigation ( [[#Setzer--2019|Setzer and Vanhala, 2019]] ; [[#Peel--2020|Peel and Osofsky, 2020]] ), including in the water sector, as in the leading case Leghari v Federation of Pakistan (2015 WP. No. 25501/201), in which a farmer sued the national government for failure to carry out national climate change policies impacting on the constitutional right to life ( [[#Preston--2016|Preston, 2016]] ).

The 2015 Paris Agreement made a significant impact on the status quo, with almost all the countries agreeing to limit global warming to 2°C or less. The preparation of NDCs under the Paris Agreement contributed positively to national climate policies and helped focus on the centrality of water in adaptation planning ( [[#Röser--2020|Röser et al., 2020]] ). In total, 92% of countries that mention adaptation in NDCs also include water ( [[#GWP--2018|GWP, 2018]] ). Low-income countries make specific reference to rain-fed or irrigated agriculture and livestock. In contrast, middle- and high-income countries include developing management, governance mechanisms and increased disaster risk reduction in their NDC pledges ( [[#GWP--2018|GWP, 2018]] ). Floods were the critical climate hazards identified in the adaptation components of NDCs, followed by droughts (85 out of 137 countries for floods and 80 out of 137 for drought). Also, the water sector was identified as the top priority sector for adaptation actions in the NDCs for 118 out of 137 countries, followed closely by the agricultural sector with 100 out 137 ( [[#GWP--2018|GWP, 2018]] ) based on data from [[#UNFCCC--2017|UNFCCC (2017)]] . Many developing countries have included quantitative targets for adaptation in the water sector ( [[#Pauw--2018|Pauw et al., 2018]] ). Similarly, water-related impacts and adaptation often feature prominently in NAPs ( [[#DEFRA--2018|DEFRA, 2018]] ).

Evidence suggests that adaptation failure in the water sector is due to policy and regulatory failures ( [[#Keohane--2016|Keohane and Victor, 2016]] ; [[#Oberlack--2018|Oberlack and Eisenack, 2018]] ; [[#Javeline--2019|Javeline et al., 2019]] ), reflecting political myopia ( [[#Muller--2018|Muller, 2018]] ; [[#Empinotti--2019|Empinotti et al., 2019]] ; [[#Pralle--2019|Pralle, 2019]] ) ( ''high confidence'' ).

International donors and supranational/transnational legislation (e.g., EU law) can support the capacity of national and sub-national governments to act and remove possible barriers to the effective implementation of climate change adaptation policies in the water sector, including obstacles posed due to lack of financial support for the developing countries ( [[#Massey--2014|Massey et al., 2014]] ; [[#Tilleard--2016|Tilleard and Ford, 2016]] ; [[#Biesbroek--2018|Biesbroek et al., 2018]] ; [[#Rahman--2018|Rahman and Tosun, 2018]] ) ( ''medium confidence'' ).

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