Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-16 (section)

==== 16.6.2.1 Synergies and Trade-offs ====

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Policies that shift innovation in climate compatible directions can promote other development benefits, for instance, better health, increased energy access, poverty alleviation and economic competitiveness ( [[#Deng--2018|Deng et al. 2018]] ) (Cross-Chapter Box 12). Economic competitiveness co-benefits can emerge as climate mitigation policies trigger innovation that can be leveraged for promoting industrial development, job creation and economic growth, both in terms of localising low-emission energy technologies value chains as well as increased energy efficiency and avoided carbon lock-ins ( [[#16.4|Section 16.4]] ). However, without adequate capabilities, co-benefits at the local level would be minimal, and they would probably materialise far from where activities take place ( [[#Ockwell--2016|Ockwell and Byrne 2016]] ; [[#Vasconcellos--2021|Vasconcellos and Caiado Couto 2021]] ). Innovation and technological change can also empower citizens. Grass-roots innovation promotes the participation of grass-roots actors, such as social movements and networks of academics, activists and practitioners, and facilitate experimenting with alternative forms of knowledge creation ( [[#Seyfang--2007|Seyfang and Smith 2007]] ; [[#UNCTAD--2019|UNCTAD 2019]] ). Examples of ordinary people and entrepreneurs adopting and adapting technologies to local needs to address locally defined needs have been documented in the development literature ( [[#van%20Welie--2018|van Welie and Romijn 2018]] ) (Box 16.10). Digital technologies can empower citizens and communities in decentralised energy systems, contributing not only to a more sustainable but also to a more democratic and fairer energy system ( [[#Van%20Summeren--2021|Van Summeren et al. 2021]] ) ( [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-5#5.4|Section 5.4]] in Chapter 5, and Cross-Chapter Box 11 in this chapter).

Therefore, even though science, technology and innovation is an explicit focus of SDG 9, it is an enabler of most SDGs ( [[#UNCTAD--2019|UNCTAD 2019]] ). Striving for synergies between innovation and technological change for climate change mitigation with other SDGs can help to secure effective long-term climate mitigation, as development benefits can create feedback effects that sustain public and political support for subsequent climate mitigation policies ( [[#Geels--2014|Geels 2014]] ; [[#Meckling--2015|Meckling et al. 2015]] ; Cross-Chapter Box 12 in this chapter). However, innovation is not always geared to sustainable development – for instance, firms tend to know how to innovate when value chains are left intact ( [[#Hall--2005|Hall and Martin 2005]] ), which is usually not the case in systemic transitions.

A comprehensive study of these effects distinguishes among ‘… anticipated-intended, anticipated-unintended, and unanticipated-unintended consequences’ ( [[#Tonn--2019|Tonn and Stiefel 2019]] ). Theoretical and empirical studies have demonstrated that unintended consequences are typical of complex adaptive systems, and while a few are predictable, a much larger number are not ( [[#Sadras--2020|Sadras 2020]] ). Even when unintended consequences are unanticipated, they can be prevented through actor responses, for instance, rebound effects following the introduction of energy-efficient technologies. Other examples of unintended consequences include worse-than-expected physical damage to infrastructure and resistance from communities in the rapidly growing ocean renewable energy sector ( [[#Quirapas--2020|Quirapas and Taeihagh 2020]] ), and gaps between expected and actual performance of building-integrated photovoltaic (BIPV) technology ( [[#Boyd--2018|Boyd and Schweber 2018]] ; [[#Gram-Hanssen--2018|Gram-Hanssen and Georg 2018]] ). In the agricultural sector, new technologies and associated practices that target the fitness of crop pests have been found to favour resistant variants. Unintended consequences of digitalisation are reported as well ( [[#Lynch--2019|Lynch et al. 2019]] ) (Cross-Chapter Box 11 in this chapter).

Innovation and climate mitigation policies can also have negative socio-economic impacts, and not all countries, actors and regions around the world benefit equally from rapid technological change ( [[#Deng--2018|Deng et al. 2018]] ; [[#McCauley--2018|McCauley and Heffron 2018]] ; [[#Eisenberg--2019|Eisenberg 2019]] ; [[#UNCTAD--2019|UNCTAD 2019]] ; [[#Henry--2020|Henry et al. 2020]] ). In fact, socio-technical transitions often create winners and losers ( [[#Roberts--2018|Roberts et al. 2018]] ). Technological change can reinforce existing divides between women and men, rural and urban populations, and rich and poor communities: older workers displaced by technological change will not qualify for jobs if they were unable to acquire new skills; weak educational systems may not prepare young people for emerging employment opportunities; and disadvantaged social groups, including women in many countries, often have fewer opportunities for formal education ( [[#McCauley--2018|McCauley and Heffron 2018]] ; [[#UNCTAD--2019|UNCTAD 2019]] ). That is a risk regarding technological change for climate change mitigation, as emerging evidence suggests that the energy transition can create jobs and productivity opportunities in the renewable energy sector, but will also lead to job losses in fossil fuel and exposed sectors ( [[#Le%20Treut--2021|Le Treut et al. 2021]] ). At the same time, these new jobs may use more intensively high-level cognitive and interpersonal skills compared to regular, traditional jobs, requiring higher levels of human capital dimensions such as formal education, work experience and on-the-job training ( [[#Consoli--2016|Consoli et al. 2016]] ). Despite the empowerment potentials of decentralised energy systems, not all societal groups are equally positioned to benefit from energy community policies, with issues of energy justice taking place within initiatives, between initiatives and related actors, as well as beyond initiatives ( [[#Calzadilla--2018|Calzadilla and Mauger 2018]] ; [[#van%20Bommel--2021|van Bommel and Höffken 2021]] ).

The opportunities and challenges of technological change can also differ within country regions and between countries ( [[#Garcia-Casals--2019|Garcia-Casals et al. 2019]] ). Within countries, [[#Vasconcellos--2021|Vasconcellos and Caiado Couto (2021)]] show that, in the absence of policies and capacity-building activities which promote local recruiting, a significant part of total benefits of wind projects, especially high-income jobs and high value-added activities, is captured by already higher-income regions. Between countries, developing countries usually have lower innovation capabilities, which means they need to import low-emission technology from abroad and are also less able to adapt these technologies to local conditions and create new markets and business models. This can lead to external dependencies and limit opportunities to leverage economic benefits from technology transfer ( [[#16.5.1|Section 16.5.1]] ).

This means that, in countries below the technological frontier, the contribution of technological change to climate change mitigation can happen primarily through the adoption and less through the development of new technologies, which can reduce potential economic and welfare benefits from rapid technological change ( [[#UNCTAD--2019|UNCTAD 2019]] ). The adoption of consumer information and communication technology (ICT) ( [[#Baller--2016|Baller et al. 2016]] ) or renewable energy technology ( [[#Lema--2021|Lema et al. 2021]] ) cannot bring least-developed economies close to the technological frontier without appropriate technological capabilities in other sectors, and an enabling innovation system ( [[#Ockwell--2012|Ockwell and Mallett 2012]] ; [[#Sagar--2014|Sagar and Majumdar 2014]] ; [[#Ockwell--2018|Ockwell et al. 2018]] ; [[#UNCTAD--2019|UNCTAD 2019]] ; [[#Malhotra--2021|Malhotra et al. 2021]] ; [[#Vasconcellos--2021|Vasconcellos and Caiado Couto 2021]] ). It has been argued widely that both hard and soft infrastructure, as well as appropriate policy frameworks and capability building, would facilitate developing countries’ engagement in long-term technological innovation and sustainable industrial development, and eventually in achieving the SDGs ( [[#Ockwell--2016|Ockwell and Byrne 2016]] ; [[#Altenburg--2017|Altenburg and Rodrik 2017]] ; [[#UNCTAD--2019|UNCTAD 2019]] ).

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