Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-14 (section)

==== 14.5.8.2 Current and Potential Adaptation ====

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Adaptation options are highly diverse and sector specific ( [[#EPA--2017|EPA, 2017]] ). Regardless of economic sector, companies that implement effective and rapid response options that address climate change stressors will have a competitive advantage ( [[#Gasbarro--2016|Gasbarro et al., 2016]] , Lemmen, 2021). Most companies focus on short-term risk management and, consequently, short-term adaptation is often favoured over long-term approaches particularly in the private sector, which will be ineffective for climate-change risk reduction over the long term ( [[#Gasbarro--2016|Gasbarro et al., 2016]] ).

Investment and coordination of climate services (forecasting) can support many economic sectors across North America. In 2017, 15% of Standard and Poor’s (S&amp;P, US industry credit rating agency) 500 companies publicly disclosed an effect on earnings from weather events, reflecting a growing trend ( [[#Williams--2018|Williams et al., 2018]] ). Existing US federal-sponsored planning tools provide guidance to states and to plan for SLR and flooding with large threats to commercial sectors ( [[#US%20Department%20of%20Transportation--2015|US Department of Transportation, 2015]] ). The NOAA Coastal Services Center SLR and coastal inundation viewer 7 , [[#footnote-018|3]] the Army Corps of Engineers Sea Level Change Curve simulator, and Climate Central’s interactive portal (Ocean at the Door) all provide access to visualisations of future SLR that are available to US coastal cities and towns for commercial planning purposes. Similar resources are being developed and are available for Canada including Canada’s Climate Atlas 8 . [[#footnote-017|4]]

Adaptation options for transportation and related infrastructure include engineering and technological solutions, as well as innovative policy, planning, management and maintenance approaches ( [[#Natural%20Resources%20Conservation%20Service--2008|Natural Resources Conservation Service, 2008]] ; [[#Jacobs--2018|Jacobs et al., 2018]] ). For northern transportation, new technologies and infrastructure adaptations can be employed to facilitate heat extraction (e.g., air convection embankments, heat drains, thermosyphons, high albedo surfacing, gentle embankment slopes) ( [[#McGregor--2010b|McGregor et al., 2010b]] ; [[#United%20Nations--2020|United Nations, 2020]] ) Adaptation options for roads include changing pavement mixes to be more tolerant to heat or frost heaving, expanding drainage capacity, reducing flood risks, enhancing travel advisories and alerts, elevating or relocating new infrastructure where feasible and changing infrastructure design requirements to include climate-change considerations or to introduce new flood event thresholds ( [[#Natural%20Resources%20Conservation%20Service--2008|Natural Resources Conservation Service, 2008]] ; [[#EPA--2017|EPA, 2017]] ; [[#Pendakur--2017|Pendakur, 2017]] ). Railroads are testing temperature sensors on rail tracks to provide early warning of buckling. Sensors that signal when tracks are approaching dangerous temperatures may help to avoid accidents ( [[#Hodge--2014|Hodge et al., 2014]] ; [[#Chinowsky--2019|Chinowsky et al., 2019]] ).

Adapting building codes more uniformly to changing climate conditions, such as SLR, storms, winds and wildfires, reduces risk ( [[#Olsen--2015|Olsen, 2015]] ; [[#Maxwell--2018b|Maxwell et al., 2018b]] ). North America has not, on the whole, adapted its building code regulations to consider the dynamic challenges of climate change, although some specific efforts ''have'' been made, including the addition of requirements for wildfire within California’s building codes and Canada’s climate-resilient building and core public infrastructure initiative, which involves updating building codes and standards to improve climate resiliency (see Box 14.4; [[#Lacasse--2020|Lacasse et al., 2020]] ). To enhance safety, some outdoor workers have been fitted with heat sensors to analyse or assess how warming may affect productivity and well-being ( [[#Runkle--2019|Runkle et al., 2019]] ). Other options include raising public roads and seawalls, initiating buy-outs of property owners in flood risk areas and improving storm water drainage. Adopting approaches like the International Future Living Institute’s Living Building Challenge (LBC) may inform future regulatory processes ( [[#Eisenberg--2016|Eisenberg, 2016]] ). The LBC 9 [[#footnote-016|5]] has seven thematic areas that inform building design, although only a subset of those are relevant for climate change including water, energy and materials considerations.

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'''Box 14.5 | Climate-Change Impacts on Trade Affecting North America'''
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Trade, defined as the sum of exports and imports, accounts for 30% of North American GDP. Trade flows within North America are valued at $1.3 trillion USD annually (2019 dollars). Variations within the region are notable: Mexico relies on trade for 80% of its GDP and Canada for 66% ( [[#World%20Bank--2020|]] [[#World%20Bank--2020|World Bank, 2020]] a). Canada and the USA traded over 55.2 billion USD worth of products related to the agriculture industry between 2015 and 2018 ( [[#Government%20of%20Canada--2019|Government of Canada, 2019]] ). Canada, the USA and Mexico have the longest-running trade pacts globally and these agreements have played a major role in supporting economic and social development in the region (see ( [[#Frankel--2005|Frankel and Rose, 2005]] ; [[#Eaton--2016|Eaton et al., 2016]] ; [[#World%20Bank--2020|]] [[#World%20Bank--2020|World Bank, 2020]] b); however, recent changes to the North American Free Trade agreement do not clearly address climate change ( [[#Lucatello--2019|Lucatello, 2019]] ).

'''Climate risks may create shocks to the trade system by damaging infrastructure and disrupting supply chains in North America (''' '''''medium confidence''''' ''').''' Sea level rise, flooding, permafrost thaw, landslides and increased frequency and magnitude of extreme weather events are projected to impact transportation infrastructure which will pose challenges to the movement of goods, especially in coastal areas ( [[#Lantuit--2012|Lantuit et al., 2012]] ; [[#Doré--2016|Doré et al., 2016]] ; [[#Hjort--2018|Hjort et al., 2018]] ; [[#Koks--2019|Koks et al., 2019]] ; [[#Lemmen--2021|Lemmen et al., 2021]] ). Maritime ports are at the greatest risk from climate hazards ( [[#Messner--2013|Messner et al., 2013]] ; [[#Slack--2016|Slack and Comtois, 2016]] ), followed by roads, rail and airports ( [[#Anarde--2017|Anarde et al., 2017]] ). Due to the transnational nature of trade, extreme weather disruptions in one region are likely to lead to cascading effects in other regions ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Lemmen--2021|Lemmen et al., 2021]] ). For example, climate change will have negative impacts for global food and energy trade where reductions in crop production and fish stocks in some regions could cause food and fish price spikes elsewhere (Figure 14.10; Sections 14.5.4 and 5.11.8; [[#Beaugrand--2015|Beaugrand et al., 2015]] ; [[#Lam--2016|Lam et al., 2016]] ; [[#IPCC--2019a|IPCC, 2019a]] ).

'''Climate-change impacts may alter current trade practices and patterns with implications for regional economic development in North America, especially in the Arctic (''' '''''medium confidence''''' ''').''' Climate change is causing modal shifts in cargo shipping. For example, lower water levels in lakes and rivers (e.g., Mackenzie River, Mississippi River) impact freight transport and may cause a shift from marine transport to more GHG-intensive rail, road or air transport ( [[#Koetse--2009|Koetse and Rietveld, 2009]] ; [[#Du--2017|Du et al., 2017]] ; [[#Pendakur--2017|Pendakur, 2017]] ). Sea ice change is creating new Arctic marine trade corridors ( [[#Melia--2016|Melia et al., 2016]] ; [[#Pizzolato--2016|Pizzolato et al., 2016]] ; [[#Ng--2018|Ng et al., 2018]] ; [[#Bennett--2020|Bennett et al., 2020]] ; [[#Mudryk--2021|Mudryk et al., 2021]] ), including shorter and potentially more economical routes such as the Northwest Passages (see Box [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/14#CCP6.1 CCP6.1] ). Warming temperatures have also reduced the season length for ice roads, which are heavily relied upon to service remote communities and remote industries including forestry and mining ( [[#14.5.8.1.2|Section 14.5.8.1.2]] ; [[#Pendakur--2017|Pendakur, 2017]] ).

'''Effective and equitable trade policies can act as important adaptation strategies (''' '''''medium confidence''''' ''').''' Higher temperatures have had no direct effect on developed countries’ exports, but have significantly reduced growth in exports among developing countries, which in turn can increase the price of goods that developed countries then import ( [[#Costinot--2016|Costinot et al., 2016]] ; [[#Constant--2019|Constant and Davin, 2019]] ). [[#Schenker--2013|Schenker (2013)]] estimated that the climate impacts on trade from developing to developed countries could be responsible for 16.4% of the total expected cost of climate change in the USA in 2100 and, thus, North America would benefit from increased investment in effective and equitable trade policies and adaptation in developing regions. Under an RCP8.5 scenario (~2.6–4.8°C warming) and within current trade integration, climate change could lead to up to 55 million undernourished people by 2050. These projections decrease by 64% (20 million people) with the introduction of reduced trade tariffs and the lessening of institutional and infrastructure barriers ( [[#Janssens--2020|Janssens et al., 2020]] ). Although most studies focus on global food security (i.e., agriculture), it is likely that the same challenges exist for other commodities and manufactured goods.

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