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==== 16.6.2.2 Challenges to Governing Innovation for Sustainable Development ==== <div id="h3-28-siblings" class="h3-siblings"></div> Dominant economic systems and centralised governance structures continue to reproduce unsustainable patterns of production and consumption, reinforcing many economic and governance structures from local through national and global scales ( [[#Johnstone--2018|Johnstone and Newell 2018]] ). Technological change, as an inherently complex process ( [[#Funtowicz--2020|Funtowicz 2020]] ), poses governance challenges ( [[#Bukkens--2020|Bukkens et al. 2020]] ) requiring social innovation ( [[#Repo--2019|Repo and Matschoss 2019]] ) ( [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-5#5.6|Section 5.6]] and Chapter 13). Prospects for effectively governing SDG-oriented technological transformations require, at a minimum, balanced views and new tools for securing the scientific legitimacy and credibility to connect public policy and technological change in society ( [[#Jasanoff--2018|Jasanoff 2018]] ; [[#Sadras--2020|Sadras 2020]] ). Many frameworks of governance have been proposed, such as reflexive governance ( [[#Voss--2006|Voss et al. 2006]] ), polycentric governance ( [[#Ostrom--2010|Ostrom 2010]] ), collaborative governance ( [[#Bodin--2017|Bodin 2017]] ), adaptive governance ( [[#Munene--2018|Munene et al. 2018]] ) and transformative governance ( [[#Rijke--2013|Rijke et al. 2013]] ; [[#Westley--2013|Westley et al. 2013]] ) (Chapters 13 and 14). A particular class of barriers to the development and adoption of new technologies comprises entrenched power relations dominated by vested interests that control and benefit from existing technologies ( [[#Chaffin--2016|Chaffin et al. 2016]] ; [[#Dorband--2020|Dorband et al. 2020]] ). Such interests can generate balancing feedbacks within multilevel social-technological regimes that are related to technological lock-in, including allocations of investment between fossil and renewable energy technologies ( [[#Unruh--2002|Unruh 2002]] ; [[#Sagar--2009|Sagar et al. 2009]] ; [[#Seto--2016|Seto et al. 2016]] ). Weaker coordination and implementation capacity in some developing countries can undermine the ability to avoid trade-offs with other development objectives β such as reinforced inequalities or excessive indebtedness and increased external dependency β and can limit the potential of leveraging economic benefits from technologies transferred from abroad ( [[#16.5|Section 16.5]] and Cross-Chapter Box 12 in this chapter). Van Welie and Romijn (2018) show that, in a low-income setting, the exclusion of some local stakeholders from the decision-making process may undermine sustainability transitions efforts. Countries with high levels of inequality can be more prone to elite capture, non-transparent political decision-making processes, relations based on clientelism and patronage, and no independent judiciary ( [[#Jasanoff--2018|Jasanoff 2018]] ), although in particular contexts, non-elites manage to exert influence ( [[#Moldalieva--2020|Moldalieva and Heathershaw 2020]] ). The dominance of incumbents, however, implies that sustainable technological transitions could be achieved without yielding any social and democratic benefits ( [[#Hansen--2018|Hansen et al. 2018]] ). In the cultural domain, a recurrent policy challenge that has been observed in most countries is the limited public support for development and deployment of low-carbon technologies ( [[#Bernauer--2016|Bernauer and McGrath 2016]] ). The conventional approach to mobilising such support has been to portray technological change as a means of minimising climate change. Empirical studies show that simply reframing climate policy is highly unlikely to build and sustain public support ( [[#Bernauer--2016|Bernauer and McGrath 2016]] ). Finally, there is a link between social and technological innovation; any innovation is grounded in complex socio-economic arrangements, to which governance arrangements would need to respond (Sections 5.5 and 5.6, Chapter 13, and Cross-Chapter Box 12 in this chapter). Social innovation can contribute to maximising synergies and minimising trade-offs in relation to technological and other innovative practices, but for this to materialise, national, regional and local circumstances need to be taken into account and, if needed, changed. Even in circumstances of high capabilities, the extent that social innovation might help to promote synergies and avoid trade-offs is not easy to evaluate ( [[#Grimm--2013|Grimm et al. 2013]] ). <div id="16.6.3" class="h2-container"></div> <span id="actions-that-maximise-synergies-and-minimise-trade-offs-between-innovation-and-sustainable-development"></span>
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