Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-17 (section)

== 17.2 Accelerating Transitions in the Context of Sustainable Development: Definitions and Theories ==

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This section focuses on how different theoretical frameworks can help us understand and explain what is meant by accelerating transitions in the context of sustainable development. As suggested in [[#17.1|Section 17.1]] , the reference to ‘in the context of sustainable development’ suggests that sustainable transitions require more than speed, also necessitating removing the underlying drivers of vulnerability and high emissions (quality and depth of transitions), while also aligning the interests of different individuals, communities, sectors, stakeholders and cultures (scale and breadth of transitions).

The outcome of sustainable transitions is a sustainable transformation. While transitions involve ‘processes that shift development pathways and reorient energy, transport, urban and other subsystems’ ( [[#Loorbach--2017|Loorbach et al. 2017]] ) (Chapter 16), transformation is the resulting ‘fundamental reorganisation of large-scale socio-economic systems’ ( [[#Hölscher--2018|Hölscher et al. 2018]] ) ''.'' Such a fundamental reorganisation often requires dynamic multi-stage transition processes that change everything from public policies and prevailing technologies to individual lifestyles, and social norms to governance arrangements and institutions of political economy. This set of factors can lock-in development pathways and prevent transitions from gathering the momentum needed for transformations. [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-16|Chapter 16]] provides an overview of the multi-stage transition dynamics involved in moving from experimentation to commercialisation to integration to stabilisation. That overview describes how transitions can break through lock-ins and result in a transformation.

While there may be a relatively consistent set of transition dynamics for all countries, pathways are likely to vary across and even within countries. This variation is due to different development levels, starting points, capacities, agencies, geographies, power dynamics, political economies, ecosystems and other contextual factors. Given the diversity of contributing factors, a sustainable transition is likely to be a complex and multi-faceted process which cannot be reduced to a single dimension ( [[#Köhler--2019|Köhler et al. 2019]] ). Even with this multi-dimensionality, transition processes are likely to gain speed and become more sustainable as decision-makers adopt targeted policies and other interventions. Many disciplines have reflected on the roles of and relative influence on the policies and interventions that can drive transitions. The following discussion describes this diversity of views with a survey of how prominent lines of economic, psychological, institutional and systems thinking explain transitions. Though these disciplines differ greatly, they often stress that leveraging synergies and managing trade-offs between climate change and sustainable development can help advance a transition.

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=== 17.2.1 Economics ===

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This section concentrates on economic explanations for transitions. At the core of many of these explanations is the assumption that economic development can deliver multiple economic, social and environmental benefits. Many modern economic systems may nonetheless struggle to deliver these benefits due to major disruptions and shocks such as climate change ( [[#Heal--2020|Heal 2020]] ). One way to limit disruptions to free markets are targeted interventions in free markets such as taxes or regulation. These targeted interventions motivate firms and other entities to internalise GHGs and other pollutants, potentially paving the way for a sustainable transition ( [[#Arrow--2004|Arrow et al. 2004]] ; [[#Chichilnisky--1998|Chichilnisky and Heal 1998]] ).

A related line of thought common to economic explanations involves the principles of ‘weak sustainability’. These principles suggest that the substitution of exhaustible resources is, to some extent, feasible ( [[#Arrow--2004|Arrow et al. 2004]] ). One way to capitalise on this substitution is to target investments at technological change, green growth, and research and development. Targeted investments in the form of subsidies can encourage the substitution of exhaustible by non-exhaustible resources. To illustrate with a concrete example, investments in renewable energy can not only mitigate climate change but also offset the use of exhaustible fossil fuels and boost energy security ( [[#Heal--2020|Heal 2020]] ). It is nonetheless important to note that the principle of ‘weak sustainability’ contrasts with ‘strong sustainability’ or ‘integrated sustainability’ principles. These stronger principles suggest that constraints on resources restrict such substitutions ( [[#Rockström--2009|Rockström et al. 2009]] ). These constraints merit attention because some scarce non-substitutable forms of natural capital can be exhausted ( [[#Bateman--2020|Bateman and Mace 2020]] ). There is hence a need to capitalise on possible synergies such as those with other development priorities and trade-offs, for example, the exhaustion of non-substitutable resources. Capturing these synergies and managing these trade-offs is consistent with sustainable development, a state where the needs of the present generation do not compromise the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (Bruntland, [[#WCED--1987|WCED 1987]] ).

As suggested above, aligning climate investments with other sustainable development objectives is critical to a transition. In order to support better investments in sustainable development, financing schemes, including environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosure schemes and the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), can play important roles (Executive Summary in [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-15|Chapter 15]] of this report). After COVID-19, economic recovery packages have increased government-led investments ( [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-1#1.3.3|Section 1.3.3]] ), which could potentially be aligned with sustainable development. Technological change and innovation are considered key drivers of economic growth and of many aspects of social progress ( [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-16#16.1|Section 16.1]] ), but if technological innovation policies are coordinated with the shift to sustainable development pathways, then the economic benefits of technological change could come at the cost of increasing climate risks ( [[#Gossart--2015|Gossart 2015]] ) [[#Alarcón--2015|Alarcón and Vos 2015]] ). The environmental impacts of social and economic activities, including emissions of GHGs, are greatly influenced by the rate and direction of technological changes. Innovation and technological transformations present trade-offs that create externalities and rebound effects. This suggests that a sustainable future for people and nature requires rapid, radical and transformative societal change by integrating the technical, governance, financial and societal aspects ( [[#Pörtner--2021|Pörtner et al. 2021]] ) ( [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-16#16.1|Section 16.1]] ).

One area that is pertinent to transitions and has received considerable attention in economic modelling involving climate change is innovation. In particular, some studies have shown how low-cost innovations and improvements in end-use technologies have significant potential for emissions reductions as well as sustainable development ( [[#Wilson--2019|Wilson et al. 2019]] ). Currently information technologies are improving rapidly, and the internet of things (IoT), AI and Big Data can all contribute to other development needs. This is often the case in end-use sectors, as the benefits accrue directly to the individuals who use the new innovations. The achievement and widespread deployment of fully autonomous cars, for example, will bring about broader car- and ride-sharing with negative or low additional costs compared to more conventional approaches to car ownership, with their typically very low load factors. ( [[#Grubler--2018|Grubler et al. 2018]] ) estimate that the Low Energy Demand (LED) scenario which assumes information technology innovations and induced social changes, including a sharing economy, have considerable potential for harmonising the multiple achievements of SDGs with low marginal abatement costs compared with other scenarios ( [[#IPCC--2018|IPCC 2018]] ).

It is nonetheless important to highlight a caveat to the above logic on innovation. Whether a technological innovation is wholly sustainable or not becomes less clear when considering its effects on the wider economy. To illustrate, some models predict that CO 2 marginal abatement costs in the power sector will be USD240 and USD565 tCO 2 for the 2ºC and below 2ºC goals, respectively ( [[#IEA--2017|IEA 2017]] ).

In theory, if marginal abatement costs meet marginal climate damage, mitigation measures are economically optimal in the long run. Yet marginal damage from climate change is notoriously uncertain, and economic theories do not always reflect climate-related damage. On the other hand, marginal abatement mitigation costs impose additional costs in the short term. These added costs can cause productivity in capital to decline through increases in the prices of energy and products in which the energies are embodied. These increased costs can restrict the ability to invest in and achieve the sustainable development priorities. However, precisely the opposite can occur when innovation reduces additional costs or achieves negative costs. If technological innovation leads to the accumulation of capital and productivity increases due to the substitution of energy, material and labour, these are likely to deliver sustainable development and climate mitigation benefits.

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=== 17.2.2 Institutions, Governance and Political Economy ===

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This subsection focuses on institutions, governance and the political economy. Institutional and governance arrangements can influence which actors possess authority, as well as how motivated they are to cooperate in transition processes that are directed at finding solutions to climate change and other sustainability challenges. Often cooperation is enabled when policy frameworks or institutions align climate change with the political and economic interests of national governments, cities or businesses, and when institutional and governance arguments that support that alignment expand the scale of the transitions. However, there may also be political and economic interests and structures that can lock-in unsustainable development patterns, frustrate this alignment and slow down transitions ( [[#Haas--2021|Haas 2021]] ; [[#Mattioli--2020|Mattioli et al. 2020]] ; [[#Newell--2013|Newell and Mulvaney 2013]] ; [[#Power--2016|Power 2016]] ).

An extensive literature has examined how the international climate agreements and architecture influence collaboration across countries regarding climate and sustainable development to support a transition ( [[#Bradley--2005|Bradley 2005]] ). For example, international institutions offer opportunities for governments and other actors to share new perspectives on integrated solutions (Cole 2015). For some observers, however, decades of difficulties in crafting a comprehensive climate change agreement and the resulting fragmented climate policy landscape have been inimical to the collaboration needed for a transition ( [[#van%20Asselt--2014|van Asselt 2014]] ; [[#Nasiritousi--2019|Nasiritousi and Bäckstrand 2019]] ) (Chapters 1 and 13). Yet others see the potential for more incremental cooperation across countries, even without a single, integrated form of climate governance ( [[#Keohane--2016|Keohane and Victor 2016]] ).

A related argument suggests that fragmentation at the global level provides opportunities for cooperation at the national level ( [[#Kanie--2017|Kanie and Biermann 2017]] ). For example, in contrast to the relatively top-down Kyoto Protocol, the bottom-up pledge and review architecture of the Paris Agreement has prompted national governments to integrate climate change with other sustainable development priorities (Nachmany and SetzerJoana 2018; [[#Townshend--2013|Townshend et al. 2013]] ). Concrete examples included incorporating the SDGs into the NDCs as an international response to climate change ( [[#The%20Energy%20and%20Resources%20Institute--2017|The Energy and Resources Institute 2017]] ) or bringing climate into sustainable development strategies and so-called Voluntary National Reviews (VNRs) as part of the SDGs and the 2030 Agenda process ( [[#Elder--2018|Elder and King 2018]] ; [[#Elder--2019|Elder and Bartalini 2019]] ).

Another branch of institutional research is concerned with the interactions between multiple levels of governance. In this multi-level governance perspective, cities and other sub-national governments often lead transitions by devising innovative solutions to contribute to climate and local energy, transport, the environment, resilience and other forms of sustainability ( [[#Bellinson--2019|Bellinson and Chu 2019]] ; [[#Doll--2017|Doll and Puppim De Oliveira 2017]] ; [[#Geels--2011|Geels 2011]] ; [[#Koehn--2008|Koehn 2008]] ; [[#Rabe--2007|Rabe 2007]] ; [[#van%20der%20Heijden--2019|van der Heijden et al. 2019]] ). A complementary perspective suggests that national governments can help scale up transitions by allocating resources and can provide the technical support that can spread innovative solutions ( [[#Bowman--2017|Bowman et al. 2017]] ; [[#Corfee-Morlot--2009|Corfee-Morlot et al. 2009]] ; [[#Gordon--2015|Gordon 2015]] ). Such support has become increasingly important during the pandemic, as national governments transfer funds for investments in climate-friendly infrastructure, transport systems and energy systems. This line of thinking is supported by calls to strengthen vertical and horizontal integration within and across government agencies and stakeholders in ways that can enhance policy coherence ( [[#Amanuma--2018|Amanuma et al. 2018]] ; [[#OECD--2018|OECD 2018]] , 2019). The incoherence or misalignment between national and local fiscal institutions and policies can restrict the ability of local governments to secure resources for climate-friendly investments. Such investments are particularly likely to flow, as more local governments have adopted net-zero targets, climate emergency declarations and action plans that can stimulate innovations ( [[#Davidson--2020|Davidson et al. 2020]] ). Others have seen greater potential for collaboration and innovation, with more multi-centred or polycentric forms of governance that lead to the formulation and dissemination of transformative solutions to climate and other environmental challenges ( [[#Ostrom--2008|Ostrom 2008]] ). Though much of the above governance research has focused on western countries, there are some applications in other regions and countries such as China ( [[#Gu--2020|Gu et al. 2020]] ).

Yet another set of channels facilitating integration between climate and other concerns are networks of like-minded actors working across administrative borders and physical boundaries. For instance, city networks such as the Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate &amp; Energy ( [[#Covenant%20of%20Mayors--2019|Covenant of Mayors 2019]] ), the World Mayors Council on Climate Change ( [[#ICLEI--2019|ICLEI 2019]] ; [[#C40%20Cities--2019|C40 Cities 2019]] ) and the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction ( [[#UNDRR--2019|UNDRR 2019]] ) have agreed to share decision-making tools and good practices, and to sponsor ambition-raising campaigns that help align climate and sustainable development concerns within and across cities ( [[#Betsill--2006|Betsill and Bulkeley 2006]] ) ( [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-8|Chapter 8]] and [[#17.3.3.5|Section 17.3.3.5]] ). This can be particularly important for less capable ‘following’ and ‘laggard’ cities needing greater financing and other forms of support to move a transition forward ( [[#Fuhr--2018|Fuhr et al. 2018]] ).

Furthermore, sub-national governments may often work together with civil-society groups to create new networked forms of governance ( [[#Biermann--2012|Biermann et al. 2012]] ). Other forms of multi-stakeholder partnerships focusing on issues with strong climate synergies, such as forms of air pollution known as short-lived climate pollutants (Climate and Clean Air Coalition (CCAC)) or transport (Sustainable Low Carbon Transport Partnership (SLoCaT)), take their cue from global scientific communities or civic-minded advocacy groups that transmit knowledge across boundaries ( [[#Keck--1999|Keck and Sikkink 1999]] ). There is also scope for suggesting that the international climate regime serves a Global Framework for Climate Action (GFCA) in helping orchestrate the multilateral climate regime and non-state and sub-national initiatives ( [[#Chan--2014|Chan and Pauw 2014]] ), though questions remain about its actual impacts on mitigation ( [[#Michaelowa--2017|Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2017]] ).

Policymaking institutions and networks are themselves policies. A significant literature has looked at integrated policy frameworks and efforts across sectors, including climate adaptation and mitigation, as drivers of transitions ( [[#Landauer--2015|Landauer et al. 2015]] ; [[#Favretto--2018|Favretto et al. 2018]] ; [[#Obersteiner--2016|Obersteiner et al. 2016]] ; [[#Steen--2017|Steen and Weaver 2017]] ; [[#Thornton--2017|Thornton and Comberti 2017]] ). Policy coherence between climate and other development objectives is often considered essential to sustainable development ( [[#Sovacool--2018|Sovacool 2018]] ). A similar discussion about synergies and conflicts has been raised on the relationship between resilience and sustainability ( [[#Marchese--2018|Marchese et al. 2018]] ). To help achieve coherence, there have been some efforts to develop suitable tools and decision-making frameworks ( [[#Scobie--2016|Scobie 2016]] ).

A related line of reasoning has suggested that sustainable development often requires not one but a mix of policy instruments to bring about the multiple policy effects needed for social and technological change ( [[#Edmondson--2019|Edmondson et al. 2019]] ; [[#Rogge--2017|Rogge and Johnstone 2017]] ). Following these calls, some governments have aimed to address climate change and sustainability jointly with coherent and integrated approaches to achieving these agendas ( [[#Chimhowu--2019|Chimhowu et al. 2019]] ), although for some countries Small Island Developing States (SIDS) this has proven more challenging ( [[#Scobie--2016|Scobie 2016]] ).

Though the above work tends to downplay politics and business, others suggest that political economy should feature prominently in transitions. Some branches of political-economy research underline how resource-intensive and fossil-fuel industries leverage their resources and positions to undermine transitions (Jones, C.A. and Levy 2009; [[#Newell--2010|Newell and Paterson 2010]] ; [[#Zhao--2013|Zhao et al. 2013]] ; [[#Geels--2014|Geels 2014]] ; [[#Moe--2014|Moe 2014]] ) (Chapter 1). These vested interests can lock-in status quo policies in countries where political systems offer interest groups more opportunities to veto or overturn climate- or eco-friendly proposals ( [[#Madden--2014|Madden 2014]] ). Companies with a strong interest in earning profits and building competitiveness from conventional fossil fuel-based energy systems have particularly strong incentives to capture politicians and agencies ( [[#Meckling--2018|Meckling and Nahm 2018]] ). Such strategies can be particularly powerful when combined with concerns over job losses and dislocation, preventing transitions from gaining traction ( [[#Haas--2021|Haas 2021]] ; [[#Mattioli--2020|Mattioli et al. 2020]] ; [[#Newell--2013|Newell and Mulvaney 2013]] ; [[#Power--2016|Power 2016]] ).

This suggests that politics can be an impediment to change: other studies argue instead that politics can be harnessed to drive transitions forward. For example, some observers contend that building coalitions around green industrial policies and sequencing reforms to reward industries in such coalitions can align otherwise divergent interests and inject momentum into transitions ( [[#Meckling--2015|Meckling et al. 2015]] ). Others see the effects of political economy varying over time depending upon external market conditions. To illustrate, renewable feed-in tariffs in Europe persisted for over two decades and were crucial in wind and solar power technologies making the breakthrough. But once competition from China led to the demise of European technology providers, and once European populations started to oppose surcharges on their electricity bills, feed-in tariffs were abolished by politicians in the purely national interest ( [[#Michaelowa--2017|Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2017]] ).

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=== 17.2.3 Psychology, Individual Beliefs and Social Change ===

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This subsection draws on value- and action-oriented research that employs inter- or transdisciplinary methods such as transactional psychology, transformative science and similarly focused disciplines ( [[#Wamsler--2021|Wamsler et al. 2021]] ). These approaches frequently encourage researchers to participate in transitions that induce changes in the researcher’s own beliefs while triggering wider shifts in social norms (including human stewardship for the natural environment) ( [[#Adger--2013|Adger et al. 2013]] ; [[#Hulme--2009|Hulme 2009]] ; [[#Ives--2019|Ives et al. 2019]] ; [[#O’Brien--2018|O’Brien 2018]] ). This research also emphasises how changes in individual beliefs could lead to climate actions that contribute to more sustainable, equitable and just societies (e.g., ‘the mind- &amp; paradigm shifts’) ( [[#Göpel--2016|Göpel et al. 2016]] ). They further suggest the potential for virtuous cycles of individual-level and wider social changes that ultimately benefit the climate ( [[#Banks--2007|Banks 2007]] ; [[#Day--2014|Day et al. 2014]] ; [[#Lockhart--2011|Lockhart 2011]] ; [[#Montuori--2018|Montuori and Donnelly 2018]] ; [[#Power--2016|Power 2016]] ).

The starting point for this virtuous circle are inner transitions. Inner transitions occur within individuals, organisations and even larger jurisdictions that alter beliefs and actions involving climate change ( [[#Woiwode--2021|Woiwode et al. 2021]] ). An inner transition within an individual (see e.g., [[#Parodi--2018|Parodi and Tamm 2018]] ) typically involves a person gaining a deepening sense of peace and a willingness to help others, as well as protecting the climate and the planet (see e.g., [[#Banks--2007|Banks 2007]] ; [[#Power--2016|Power 2016]] ). Inner transition can imply that individuals become sympathetic to concerns that include climate issues and values connected to nature. For instance, they may include a desire to become a steward of nature ( [[#Buijs--2018|Buijs et al. 2018]] ); ‘live according to the principles of integrated sustainability’ ( [[#Schweizer-Ries--2018|Schweizer-Ries 2018]] ); ‘achieve the good life’ ( [[#Asara--2015|Asara et al. 2015]] ; [[#Escobar--2015|Escobar 2015]] ; [[#Kallis--2017|Kallis 2017]] ; [[#Latouche--2018|Latouche 2018]] ) ( [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-5|Chapter 5]] and [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-1#1.6.2|Section 1.6.2]] ); or protect the well-being of other living creatures ( [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-5|Chapter 5]] and [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-1#1.6.3|Section 1.6.3]] .1).

Examples have also been seen in relation to a similar set of inner transitions to individuals, organisations and societies, which involve embracing post-development, degrowth, or non-material values that challenge carbon-intensive lifestyles and development models (D’Alisa 2014; [[#Kothari--2019|Kothari 2019]] ; [[#Neuteleers--2015|Neuteleers and Engelen 2015]] ; [[#Paech--2017|Paech 2017]] ). These shifts in values can occur when humans reconnect with nature, deepen their consciousness and take responsibility for protecting the planet and its climate ( [[#Cross--2019|Cross et al. 2019]] ; [[#Martinez-Juarez--2015|Martinez-Juarez et al. 2015]] ; [[#Speldewinde--2015|Speldewinde et al. 2015]] ). Changes in both values and beliefs may also emerge through consciousness-raising processes where people cooperate in ways that would protect the climate (( [[#Banks--2007|Banks 2007]] ; [[#Hedlund-de%20Witt--2014|Hedlund-de Witt et al. 2014]] ; [[#Woiwode--2019|Woiwode and Woiwode 2019]] ) ( [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-1#1.6|Section 1.6]] .4).

Many of the above-mentioned beliefs and values that support climate actions have spread through expanding interests in conservationist world views, indigenous cultures (see, for example, [[#Lockhart--2011|Lockhart 2011]] ) and branches of neuroscience and psychology that suggest different notions of the self ( [[#Hüther--2018|Hüther 2018]] ; [[#Lewis--2016|Lewis 2016]] ; [[#Seligman--2014|Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi 2014]] ). These beliefs and values can also be spread through meditation, yoga or other social practices that encourage lower-carbon lifestyles ( [[#Woiwode--2019|Woiwode and Woiwode 2019]] ). Another channel for spreading climate concerns is sustainability culture, which is premised on connecting people and communities, and has also benefited from the internet and digital technologies that support these connections (see e.g., [[#Bradbury--2015|Bradbury 2015]] ; [[#Scharmer--2018|Scharmer 2018]] ). The spread of this culture, in turn, has led to the creation of social fields that allow changes to happen (see e.g., [[#Gillard--2016|Gillard et al. 2016]] ) or has promoted low-carbon thinking and related behavioural changes ( [[#O’Brien--2018|O’Brien 2018]] ; [[#Veciana--2018|Veciana and Ottmar 2018]] ). Studies of social contagions may also offer insights into the mechanisms that lead to the adoption of new values and related climate actions (see e.g., [[#Iacopini--2019|Iacopini et al. 2019]] ). It is nonetheless worth highlighting that communication networks and other mechanisms promoting the spread of interpersonal communication that can spread pro-climate views may also lead to the proliferation of climate scepticism and denial ( [[#Leombruni--2015|Leombruni 2015]] ). At the same time, some studies suggest that such scepticism can be countered by the generation of more credible information on climate change ( [[#Samantray--2019|Samantray and Pin 2019]] ).

One of the more direct channels through which transitions spread are climate change education and action-oriented research ( [[#Fazey--2018|Fazey et al. 2018]] ; [[#Ives--2019|Ives et al. 2019]] ; [[#Scharmer--2018|Scharmer 2018]] ; [[#Schäpke--2018|Schäpke et al. 2018]] ; [[#Schneidewind--2016|Schneidewind et al. 2016]] ). For instance, research using ‘social experiments’ or ‘real-world labs’ has helped give rise to shifts in mindsets on energy, food, transport and other systems that can benefit the climate ( [[#Bernstein--2018|Bernstein and Hoffmann 2018]] ; [[#Berkhout--2010|Berkhout et al. 2010]] ; [[#Bulkeley--2015|Bulkeley et al. 2015]] ; [[#Hoffmann--2010|Hoffmann 2010]] ). In much the same way, the acquisition of transformational knowledge and transformative learning ( [[#Lange--2018|Lange 2018]] ; [[#O’Neil--2018|O’Neil and Boyce 2018]] ; [[#Pomeroy--2018|Pomeroy and Oliver 2018]] ; [[#Walsh--2020|Walsh et al. 2020]] ; [[#Williams--2013|Williams 2013]] ) contributes to thinking and acting that open climate-friendly development pathways ( [[#Berkhout--2010|Berkhout et al. 2010]] ; [[#Lo--2019|Lo and Castán Broto 2019]] ; [[#Roberts--2018|Roberts et al. 2018]] ; [[#Turnheim--2019|Turnheim and Nykvist 2019]] )) ( [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-1#1.7.2|Section 1.7.2]] ). First-person and action research can also facilitate similar changes that bring about climate actions (see e.g., [[#Dick--2007|Dick 2007]] ; [[#Streck--2007|Streck 2007]] ; [[#Hutchison--2015|Hutchison and Walton 2015]] ; [[#Bradbury--2019|Bradbury et al. 2019]] ).

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=== 17.2.4 System-level Explanations ===

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Systems explanations help explain the dynamics of transitions toward sustainable development while explicitly uncovering links between the human and natural worlds, the socio-cultural embeddedness of technology, and the inertia behind high-carbon development pathways. This line of thinking often envisages transitions emerging from complex systems in which many different elements interact at small scales and spontaneously self-organise to produce behaviour that is unexpected, unmanaged and fundamentally different from the sum of the system’s constituent parts.

Social-ecological systems theory describes the processes of exchange and interaction between human and ecological systems, investigating in particular non-linear feedback occurring across different scales ( [[#Folke--2006|Folke 2006]] ; [[#Holling--2001|Holling 2001]] ). This approach has informed subsequent theoretical and empirical developments, including the ‘planetary boundaries’ approach ( [[#Rockström--2009|Rockström et al. 2009]] ), conceptualisations of vulnerability and adaptive capacity ( [[#Hinkel--2011|Hinkel 2011]] ; [[#Pelling--2010|Pelling 2010]] ) and more recent explorations of urban resilience ( [[#Romero-Lankao--2016|Romero-Lankao et al. 2016]] ) and regenerative sustainability ( [[#Clayton--2018|Clayton and Radcliffe 2018]] ; [[#Robinson--2015|Robinson and Cole 2015]] ). Employing a systems lens to address the ‘root causes’ of unsustainable development pathways (such as dysfunctional social or economic arrangements) rather than the ‘symptoms’ (dwelling quality, vehicle efficiency, etc.) can trigger the non-linear change needed for a transformation to take place ( [[#Pelling--2015|Pelling et al. 2015]] ). Exploring synergies between climate change adaptation, mitigation and other sustainability priorities (such as biodiversity and social equity, for instance) ( [[#Beg--2002|Beg 2002]] ; [[#Burch--2014|Burch et al. 2014]] ; [[#Shaw--2014|Shaw et al. 2014]] ) may help to yield these transformative outcomes, though data regarding the specific nature of these synergies is still emerging.

Socio-technical transition theory, on the other hand, explores the ways in which technologies such as low-carbon vehicles or regenerative buildings are bound up in a web of social practices, physical infrastructure, market rules, regulations, norms and habits (see, e.g, ( [[#Loorbach--2017|Loorbach et al. 2017]] ). Radical social and technical innovations can emerge that ultimately challenge destabilised or increasingly ineffective and undesirable incumbents, but path dependencies often stymie these transition processes, suggesting an important role for governance actors ( [[#Burch--2017|Burch 2017]] ; [[#Frantzeskaki--2012|Frantzeskaki et al. 2012]] ; [[#Holscher--2019|Holscher et al. 2019]] ).

This also reveals the large-scale macroeconomic, political and cultural trends (or contexts) that may reinforce or call into question the usefulness of current systems of production and consumption. One branch of this theory, transition management ( [[#Kern--2008|Kern and Smith 2008]] ; [[#Loorbach--2010|Loorbach 2010]] ), explores ways of guiding a socio-technical system from one path to another. In particular, it highlights interactions between actors, technologies and institutions, and the complex governance mechanisms that facilitate them ( [[#Smith--2005|Smith et al. 2005]] ). The challenge, in part, becomes linking radical short-term innovations with longer-term visions of sustainability ( [[#Loorbach--2010|Loorbach and Rotmans 2010]] ) and creating opportunities for collaborative course-correction in light of new information or unexpected outcomes ( [[#Burch--2017|Burch 2017]] ).

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=== 17.2.5 Conclusions ===

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This section has surveyed several explanations for interventions that can give rise to transitions. The review suggests that there are several differences between these various perspectives. Whether individuals, organisations, markets or socio-technical systems drive or undermine transitions is a key distinction. These differences have implications for the evidence these claims draw on in support of their arguments. For instance, some of the explanations tend to employ qualitative evidence to explain changes in attitudes at the individual or community levels as paving the way for broader changes to cultures and belief systems. Others assess how institutional arrangements can be reformed in order to align climate with the sustainable development agenda to enable a transition.

While there are indeed significant differences between explanations, there are also important parallels. Such parallels begin with a shared emphasis on synergies and trade-offs between climate and sustainable development. Most explanations tend to underline the importance of synergies in aligning the climate with broader sustainability agendas. Most importantly, many of the explanations are complementary with the systems-level discussion in that they offer a broad framework, while economic, psychological and governance theories offer more specific insights. Moving a transition forward will often require drawing upon insights from multiple schools of thought. Though it is unlikely that a one-size-fits-all set of factors will drive a transition, there is a growing body of empirical evidence shedding light on the factors that can strengthen synergies between climate and the broader sustainable development agenda.

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