Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-14 (section)

==== 14.5.9.1 Observed Impacts ====

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Livelihoods are ‘the resources used and the activities undertaken in order to live. Livelihoods are usually determined by the entitlements and assets to which people have access’ ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-8#8.1|Section 8.1.1]] ; [[#IPCC--2018|IPCC, 2018]] ). While often understood as subsistence or traditional ways of life ( [[#Oswal--1991|Oswal, 1991]] ), livelihoods are often conceptualised more broadly as encompassing the economic, cultural, and social capitals or assets, capabilities, and activities that individuals, households and social groups use as the means to make a living (DFID, 1999; [[#Obrist--2010|Obrist et al., 2010]] ).

Past and current patterns of development in North America have propagated and perpetuated vulnerabilities that have created differential impacts on livelihoods from climate hazards ( ''high confidence'' ). Predatory and extractive economies have underpinned economic activity in North America historically and currently. While generating substantial wealth, these patterns have also driven social and economic inequality ( ''medium evidence, high agreement'' ) ( [[#Jasanof--2010|Jasanof, 2010]] ; [[#Shove--2010|Shove, 2010]] ; [[#Klinsky--2016|Klinsky et al., 2016]] ; [[#Robinson--2018|Robinson and Shine, 2018]] ). Patterns of development that reinforce these structures remain a large contributor to current social–environmental risks and have affected all kinds of contemporary livelihoods (Chapter 18; [[#Cannon--2010|Cannon and Müller-Mahn, 2010]] ; [[#Koch--2019|Koch et al., 2019]] ).

Climate impacts have damaged livelihoods across North America, especially those of marginalised people ( ''high confidence'' ) and deepened inequalities for these groups ( ''medium confidence'' ). Across North America, climate change has affected livelihoods with larger effects on individuals, households and communities that are already more vulnerable due to a range of pre-existing social and environmental stressors ( [[#Olsson--2014|Olsson et al., 2014]] ; [[#Hickel--2017|Hickel, 2017]] ; [[#Koch--2019|Koch et al., 2019]] ) such as Indigenous Peoples, urban ethnic minorities and immigrants ( [[#Guyot--2006|Guyot et al., 2006]] ; [[#Gronlund--2014|Gronlund, 2014]] ; [[#Klinenberg--2015|Klinenberg, 2015]] ). These impacts have also contributed to a deepening of inequalities for marginalised groups ( ''medium evidence, high agreement'' ) ( [[#Audefroy--2017|Audefroy and Cabrera Sánchez, 2017]] ; [[#García--2018|García et al., 2018]] ). As climate hazards further degrade their livelihoods, these groups have faced additional challenges to avoiding or escaping poverty ( [[#Ruiz%20Meza--2014|Ruiz Meza, 2014]] ). Furthermore, these groups have needed to use their more limited resources to manage present challenges, restricting their future capacities to adapt ( [[#Tolentino-Arévalo--2019|Tolentino-Arévalo et al., 2019]] ). Climate impacts have also affected the livelihoods of the middle classes ( [[#Domínguez--2020|Domínguez et al., 2020]] ) who have become more vulnerable due to changes in their social and economic security ( [[#Garza-Lopez--2018|Garza-Lopez et al., 2018]] ). Gender has also been recognised as a determinant of differential vulnerability with implications for women’s livelihoods (Cross-Chapter Box GENDER in Chapter 18).

Migration and mobility have been an important part of livelihoods in North America ( ''high confidence'' ). Movement across North America has been reinforced by social, cultural and economic ties (see Box 14.5). For example, middle class retirees from Canada and the USA engage from temporary, seasonal to permanent migration to the warmer climates of the southern USA and Mexico, often benefiting from the lower cost of living ( [[#Domínguez--2018|Domínguez et al., 2018]] ). Temporary or semi-permanent labour migration, generally followed by remittances, has been an important part of livelihoods for rural areas in Mexico ( ''high confidence'' ) and has been employed as a response to climate hazards ( ''low evidence'' ). Drought in rural areas which are highly dependent on subsistence agriculture have observed migration to urban areas in Mexico ( [[#Nawrotzki--2017|Nawrotzki et al., 2017]] ). Evidence of international migration in response to climate hazards is sparse with difficulties in identifying a climate signal due to the multi-causal nature of migration decision making (Cross-Chapter Box MIGRATE in Chapter 7). There is limited evidence of extreme weather events or climate hazards on migration from Mexico to the USA ( [[#Nawrotzki--2015b|Nawrotzki et al., 2015b]] ; [[#Nawrotzki--2015c|Nawrotzki et al., 2015c]] ; [[#Nawrotzki--2016|Nawrotzki et al., 2016]] ; [[#Murray-Tortarolo--2021|Murray-Tortarolo and Salgado, 2021]] ).

Pre-existing social vulnerabilities have also led to forced displacement from extreme weather events ( ''low confidence'' ). In the USA, compounding effects of SLR and storm surge interacted with pre-existing social vulnerabilities of local communities to generate large-scale displacement after the effects of Hurricane Katrina on New Orleans in 2005 ( [[#Jessoe--2018|Jessoe et al., 2018]] ). The processes of relocation and recovery in New Orleans was further shaped by vulnerability where out-migration was more likely to be minorities and economically disadvantaged, while the recovery was predominantly in neighbourhoods that were wealthier prior to the disaster ( [[#Fussell--2014|Fussell et al., 2014]] ; [[#Fussell--2015|Fussell, 2015]] ). Newer evidence from Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico in 2017 has shown an initial spike in displacement with slower recovery with more vulnerable communities returning at higher rates ( [[#DeWaard--2020|DeWaard et al., 2020]] ); however, overall out-migration trends have been consistent with long-term economic migration ( [[#Santos-Lozada--2020|Santos-Lozada et al., 2020]] ). Interactions of slower onset climate hazards with displacement, such as observed in Shishmaref, Alaska, have revealed the challenges in attribution of migration to climate as it intersects with socioeconomic conditions and lived experiences ( [[#Marino--2015|Marino and Lazrus, 2015]] ).

Maladaptation has also been occurring in livelihoods, especially as it relates to agricultural practices that are less resilient to climate hazards and competition for land use ( ''limited evidence, high agreement'' ). Focusing on examples in Mexico (see [[#14.5.4.3|Section 14.5.4.3]] for US and Canada examples), for some Mexican Indigenous Peoples, the replacement of ancestral farming practices with technological adaptations like transgenic crops has reduced their resilience by making them more dependent on external inputs and more expensive supplies while increasing putting their health at risk with herbicide and insecticide use ( [[#Mercer--2012|Mercer et al., 2012]] ). Existing power structures have also interacted with climate hazards to generate maladaptive outcomes ( [[#Quintana--2013|Quintana, 2013]] ). Mennonite communities in the northern state of Chihuahua, Mexico, have pursued commercial agricultural markets that lead them to shift to transgenic crops and to overexploit local groundwater resources in a region experiencing multi-year droughts. These actions have led to conflict with other local farming groups with less economic capital to access groundwater ( [[#Quintana--2013|Quintana, 2013]] ). Climate mitigation measures may also have adverse effects on local livelihoods with implications for adaptive capacity. The Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (REDD+) mitigation programme has been highlighted as a trade-off between an international/national carbon mitigation strategy and the ability of some Mexican rural communities to improve their food security ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-5#5.6.3|Section 5.6.3.3]] ; [[#Barbier--2014|Barbier, 2014]] ).

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