Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-6 (section)

=== 6.4.3 Solution Spaces to Address the ‘Policy Action Gap’ ===

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A policy action gap arises when administrative, communication, financial and other organisational blockages and inertia interrupt implementation of policy, the intent of political leadership and delivery of adaptation interventions on the ground (Ampaire et al., 2017; [[#Bell--2018|Bell, 2018]] ; [[#Shi--2019|Shi, 2019]] ). Political and policy confidence are key enabling conditions for adaptation decision making. As the AR5 already acknowledged, political inaction can arise where there is ''low confidence'' that adaptation actions can deliver a safer future for all (Chan et al., 2015a). For example, in some administrative jurisdictions (most of them local governments), calls by social movements for the adoption of Climate Emergency Declarations were addressed, however, practical outcomes in terms of adaptation have been limited, and may have foreclosed other future local actions (Nissen et al., 2020; Ruiz Campillo, Castán Broto and Westman, 2020) and raised concerns about maladaptation ( [[#Long--2019|Long and Rice, 2019]] ). Political inaction for climate justice is particularly visible in contexts of informality ( [[#Ziervogel--2020|Ziervogel, 2020]] ). Studies of city and local authority decision-making in South America (Di Giulio et al., 2019), Asia (Araos et al., 2017) and Europe (Lesnikowski et al., 2021) indicate that where there is insufficient political will (that is lack of prioritisation of the issue and inadequate allocation of resources including staffing and finance) and lack of inclusive, coordinated leadership, it can be difficult to overcome inaction, generating a policy action gap.

Multiple actors contribute to deliver climate change adaptation (Chan et al., 2015a; Bäckstrand et al., 2017). There are also multiple scales of action, from the provision of local services to large infrastructures of national or even international significance. Figure 6.5 provides an insight into the challenges that shape the policy action gap and a range of strategies that can help bridge policy action gaps. Effective adaptation governance will depend on the compound impact of the actions of multiple agents operating at different scales ( ''medium confidence'' , ''medium agreement'' ) (Di Giulio et al., 2019; Hale et al., 2021; Zwierzchowska et al., 2019).

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'''Figure 6.5 |''' '''Solution spaces for the policy action gap.''' The categories in the outer circle represent the tension that shape the policy action gap. On the one hand, there is a tension between the need to deliver action at scale (multi-level) and the need to mobilise the capacities in a given place (place-bound). On the other hand, there is a tension between the need to facilitate collaborations among multiple actors (multi-actor) and the fundamental impact that leadership can have in actor-led initiatives (actor-led). These two tensions interact creating different possibilities for transformative adaptation. The inner ring represents different areas of intervention that configure the solution space to tackle the policy action gap and that bridge these two tensions.

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==== 6.4.3.1 Delivers on the Needs of the Most Vulnerable ====

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Success in urban adaptation is most often understood as requiring measurable outcomes and evaluation (see also [[#6.4.6|Section 6.4.6]] ). However, many adaptation outcomes are not measurable ( ''medium evidence'' , ''medium agreement'' ) (Béné et al., 2018). Adaptation action solely focused on action tends to ignore areas in the city for which there is no existing data even though actions in these areas may play an essential role in shaping resilience and its limits. Informal settlements and informal economies, which are integral in managing urban resources for effective climate adaptation, are not routinely included in formal urban and national monitoring( [[#Guibrunet--2016|Guibrunet and Castán Broto, 2016]] ). The resulting understanding and monitoring of city needs, capacities and actions that feed into policy is incomplete. The innovation, as well as particular concerns and capacities of the informal sector, which is often highly gendered, are not always measured ( [[#Brown--2016|Brown and McGranahan, 2016]] ). An emphasis on measurable adaptation outcomes may lead to prioritising techno-economic measures to adaptation at the local level. Technocratic approaches to environmental policy continue to shape local sustainability politics ( [[#Bulkeley--2015|Bulkeley, 2015]] ). The deployment of such technocratic approaches at the local scale is detrimental for democratic and collaborative practices ( [[#Metzger--2020|Metzger and Lindblad, 2020]] ). For example, while China has received praise in terms of delivering urban policies that put climate change at its core, thus suggesting its role providing leadership in climate change debates (Liu et al., 2014; [[#Wang--2015|Wang and He, 2015]] ; [[#Fu--2017|Fu and Zhang, 2017]] ), other analyses suggest that processes of planning should take greater account of certain groups and interests ( [[#Westman--2018|Westman and Broto, 2018]] ). Urban sustainability policy may, as a result, fail to deliver collaborative social and environmental objectives, and this is maladaptive in terms of CRD.

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==== 6.4.3.2 Moves from Mainstreaming to Transformative Adaptation ====

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Two forms of mainstreaming are usually found in urban policy: incorporating climate adaptation into different sectors or incorporating climate adaptation in holistic sustainability or resilience plans, linking climate adaptation objectives with other social and development objectives (Reckien et al., 2019; Fainstein, 2018). The integration of climate adaptation in local policies in cities and settlements has often been seen as maintaining business-as-usual and not always aligned with transformative efforts to address structural drivers of vulnerability ( ''high confidence'' ). For example, mainstream actions that seek to advance other development objectives, as explained above, may reduce adaptation to ‘low-hanging fruits’, which may maintain business-as-usual practices without any fundamental transformation of the social, institutional and economic systems that drive vulnerabilities (Aylett, 2014). However, as explained above, mainstreaming can also generate wider processes of institutional change ( [[#6.4.2|Section 6.4.2]] ). Mainstream strategies may help to demonstrate how policy and frameworks can produce practical outcomes on the ground ( [[#Biesbroek--2020|Biesbroek and Delaney, 2020]] ). However, previous experiences in other sectors, such as gender mainstreaming, have shown the limitations of the mainstreaming approach, particularly in terms of addressing the structural drivers of inequality and vulnerability, and in achieving justice for those who suffer most ( [[#Moser--2017|Moser, 2017]] ). Local governments in particular, can link mainstreaming efforts with specific strategies that support justice in adaptation, including redistribution efforts to address vulnerabilities (see [[#6.3.2|Section 6.3.2]] ), representation in local institution and deliberative processes, and recognition of the conditions for self-realisation, including personal and collective safety (Agyeman et al., 2016; [[#Castán%20Broto--2017|Castán Broto and Westman, 2017]] ; [[#Castán%20Broto--2019|Castán Broto and Westman, 2019]] ; [[#Hess--2021|Hess and McKane, 2021]] ).

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==== 6.4.3.3 Facilitates Coordination Across Separate Actors and Interests ====

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Coordination of adaptation policy goals cuts across cities to integrate them into international processes of climate policy formulation; coordination in cities produces effective collective outcomes, cementation of common standards and methodologies for climate action (e.g., emission inventories) ( ''high agreement'' , ''medium evidence'' ) ( [[#Gordon--2017|Gordon and Johnson, 2017]] ; [[#Hsu--2021|Hsu and Rauber, 2021]] ). A collective global response has become a significant concern in international climate policy (Chan et al., 2015a). The UNFCCC has adopted a role as an orchestrator, including providing framework for city governments ( [[#Bäckstrand--2017|Bäckstrand and Kuyper, 2017]] ). Within cities, coordination can arise from active programming; for example, in Rotterdam and New York City, local authorities adopted long-term objectives and conditions for action, bringing together a multiplicity of actors across sectors to orient contributions, share knowledge and coordinate actions (Hölscher et al., 2019). Where national politics is supportive, coordination between city and national government is an asset ( [[#Chan--2019|Chan and Amling, 2019]] ; [[#Inch--2019|Inch, 2019]] ). The use of social media and digital mechanisms for coordination with public interest is ambiguous: in China, Weibo has facilitated an expansion of public engagement, although it remains top down and dominated by a few influencial actors (Liu and Zhao, 2017; [[#Yang--2021|Yang and Stoddart, 2021]] ). The pilot project #OurChangingClimate is one example of engaging youth with an understanding of their communities and their resilience or vulnerability to climate change (Napawan, Simpson and Snyder, 2017).

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==== 6.4.3.4 Enables the Co-production of Adaptation Strategies with Citizens ====

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Co-production can advance urban sustainability and social justice in cities and settlements to provide infrastructure adapted to the human scale and advancing SDGs ( ''medium confidence'' ) ( [[#McGranahan--2015|McGranahan, 2015]] ; [[#McGranahan--2016|McGranahan and Mitlin, 2016]] ; Chowdhury, Jahan and Rahman, 2017; [[#Moretto--2017|Moretto and Ranzato, 2017]] ; Nastiti et al., 2017). Co-production involves the active involvement of citizens and citizens’ organisation in iterative public service planning and delivery, and has become increasingly central in climate change responses alongside other bottom-up, community-led strategies (Bremer et al., 2019; Vasconcelos, Santos and Pacheco, 2013).

Co-production builds on public participation that brings together diverse sets of citizen interests, values and ideas to inform change and solve problems relating to a collective adaptation challenge (Archer et al., 2014; Bisaro, Roggero and Villamayor-Tomas, 2018; [[#Sarzynski--2015|Sarzynski, 2015]] ), and is increasingly important in environmental policy more widely ( [[#McGranahan--2015|McGranahan, 2015]] ; [[#Moretto--2017|Moretto and Ranzato, 2017]] ). For example, in three cities across the Czech Republic, stakeholder participation exercises were used to prioritise climate change risks, provide impetus and opportunity for knowledge co-production, and support adaptation planning (Krkoška Lorencová et al., 2018). In municipalities in Malaysia, stakeholders and citizens are active in the adaptation policy cycle ( [[#Palermo--2020|Palermo and Hernandez, 2020]] ). In Quebec, Canada, citizens collaborated with the municipal authority to bring together climate science and ‘ordinary’ urban management and design solutions (Cloutier et al., 2015). Service co-production enables integrating multiple actors in the management and delivery of public services ( [[#Pestoff--2013|Pestoff and Brandsen, 2013]] ; Pestoff, Brandsen and Verschuere, 2013). Civil society-driven, co-productive approaches can pioneer new forms of institutional relations and practices filling gaps where the public sector is absent or retreating (Frantzeskaki et al., 2016).

A co-production approach to climate change governance addresses the increasing public interest on climate change (Davies, Broto and Hügel, 2021). Youth movements such as Forum for Future have joined forces with other environmental and Indigenous organisations to lobby governments and institutions to action ( [[#Kenis--2021|Kenis, 2021]] ; [[#Fisher--2021|Fisher and Nasrin, 2021]] ; [[#Davies--2021|]] [[#Davies--2021|Davies and Hügel, 2021]] ; [[#Hayward--2021|Hayward, 2021]] ). These movements have built momentum moving local governments and other institutions to declare a climate emergency and have supported the creation of new forums where climate change can be addressed collectively, such as citizens’ assemblies. In the UK, for example, initial scepticism has led to the proliferation of citizen-centric Climate Assemblies at the local level (Sandover, Moseley and Devine-Wright, 2021).

Cooperative governance models provide insights for designing forms of participatory and collaborative planning through which communities and state actors can identify concrete actions and resources to improve services and mitigate structural vulnerabilities to disasters (Castán Broto et al., 2015). Experiences of co-production of sanitation services show how co-production may improve outcomes, while at the same time opening up avenues for grassroots organisations to claim political influence ( [[#McGranahan--2016|McGranahan and Mitlin, 2016]] ). Co-production may change institutions in response to external interventions ( [[#Das--2016|Das, 2016]] ). Although there are drawbacks in terms of the extent to which co-production can be used to legitimise unfair interventions within a given context, co-production may also be a tool for improving the accountability of dominant groups to vulnerable sectors of the population (Nastiti et al., 2017). There are limitations to co-production. The city of Barcelona, Spain, used co-production methodologies to develop the Barcelona Climate Plan. However, policymakers and civil servants were reluctant to use lay knowledge from participants and political deadlines constrained the time dedicated to deliberation (Satorras et al., 2020).

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==== 6.4.3.5 Addresses Inequalities through Intersectional Perspectives ====

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Inclusive and sustainable adaptation can address the causes of systemic vulnerability ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ). This points to the fundamental requirements of adaptation action in line with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Climate justice theories draw on the environmental justice movement experiences at the local level ( [[#Bickerstaff--2012|Bickerstaff, 2012]] ; Bickerstaff, Walker and Bulkeley, 2013; Perez et al., 2015; Hall, Hards and Bulkeley, 2013). Slogans such as ‘leave no one behind’ embedded in international policy for cities and settlements recognise the connection between systems of oppression and exclusion that reproduce and perpetuate urban inequality and the delivery of urban services and security ( [[#Kabeer--2016|Kabeer, 2016]] ; [[#Stuart--2016|Stuart and Woodroffe, 2016]] ).

Intersectional strategies of action seek to consider the multiple forms of structural oppression experienced at the local level ( [[#Grunenfelder--2015|Grunenfelder and Schurr, 2015]] ) and, in the context of adaptation, explain how they produce or exacerbate vulnerabilities. For example, intersectionality ties with the idea of how multiple deprivations shape access to services (from sanitation to health and education) and the exposition to environmental risks ( [[#Sicotte--2014|Sicotte, 2014]] ; [[#Lau--2016|Lau and Scales, 2016]] ; [[#Van%20Aelst--2016|Van Aelst and Holvoet, 2016]] ; Lievanos and Horne, 2017; [[#Raza--2017|Raza, 2017]] ; [[#Yon--2017|Yon and Nadimpalli, 2017]] ; [[#European%20Environment%20Agency--2020|European Environment Agency, 2020]] ) (see Box 6.6 on the participation of women in local decision making bodies). For example, fisherwomen in the western coast of India rely on a complex arrangement of relationships around categories of class, caste and gender that shapes their possibilities to draw political resources to maintain their livelihoods and, hence, influence the dynamics of transformation ( [[#Thara--2016|Thara, 2016]] ). Intersectionality is central to build resilience across communities, rather than in particular areas ( [[#Khosla--2010|Khosla and Masaud, 2010]] ; Reckien et al., 2017). Including intersectionality deliberately in partnerships with communities can empower socially excluded groups and highlight justice issues while aligning agendas with local development priorities (Castán Broto et al., 2015a). Despite the ''high confidence'' on the growing importance of intersectionality concerns in the delivery of just environmental policies, there is ''limited evidence'' of its explicit inclusion in adaptation policies.

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'''Box 6.6 | Invisible Women: Lack of Women’s Participation in Urban Authorities'''
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Women are under-represented internationally in governance structures ( [[#Prihatini--2019|Prihatini, 2019]] ; [[#Gonzalez-Eiras--2018|Gonzalez-Eiras and Sanz, 2018]] ; [[#Rashkova--2017|Rashkova and Zankina, 2017]] ; Koyuncu and Sumbas). This situation is reflected in urban authorities where participation by those who identify as women is low (Williams, Devika and Aandahl, 2015; [[#Kivoi--2014|Kivoi, 2014]] ). [[#Das--2014|Das (2014)]] reports deep-rooted economic inequalities are barriers for women’s participation in Indore, India, and that women’s collective empowerment could increase their bargaining power within households as well as in the community and state. [[#Kivoi--2014|Kivoi (2014)]] draws a similar conclusion presenting experiences from Kenya. The big question is how to make women more visible in the urban governance process?

What are the barriers women face and how do we increase their participation so that urban governance become more inclusive? Escalante and Valdivia (2015) show the participatory tools that can be used at different stages of planning for women’s empowerment using bottom-up planning models. Using these tools makes planning processes more inclusive. Araujo and Tejedo-Romero (2016) show from Spanish local councils that women’s political representation in municipalities has a positive influence on the level of transparency, increasing information transparency and reducing information asymmetry. In Myanmar, [[#Minoletti--2014|Minoletti (2014)]] increased levels of women’s participation in urban authorities helped to improve the quality of governance such as reducing corruption and conflicts, and improving service delivery.

People traditionally excluded from climate change governance, such as children, are also more likely to have their needs and priorities considered in urban planning for adaptation where there are national advocacy bodies, for example, Commissions for Future, or Children’s commissions ( [[#Nordström--2019|Nordström and Wales, 2019]] ; Watts et al., 2019; [[#Hayward--2021|Hayward, 2021]] ). An emphasis on procedural justice in decision-making has potential to produce transformational outcomes where these are defined as significantly reducing inequality ( [[#Holland--2017|Holland, 2017]] ). In this light, emerging evidence suggests transformative adaptation is more likely to occur if people have the agency to influence decisions and enact change ( [[#Archer--2015|Archer and Dodman, 2015]] ). Cities are also more likely to build and develop infrastructure that serves the needs of disadvantaged groups when urban climate governance encourages wider community participation and inclusion ( [[#Ziervogel--2019a|Ziervogel, 2019a]] ; Hölscher et al., 2019; Anguelovski et al., 2016). This can help to stimulate innovation, shift power relations and address diverse needs (Martel and Sutherland, 2019; Chu, Schenk and Patterson, 2018). Experiments in including marginalised groups in adaptation planning are starting to emerge in places such as Quito (Ecuador), Lima (Peru), Manizales (Colombia) and Surat (India), where disadvantaged youth, informal settlers and other vulnerable communities are included in discussions of short-/long-term adaptation needs and fair distribution of adaptation resources (Chu, Anguelovski and Carmin, 2016; Sara, Pfeffer and Baud, 2017; Hardoy and Velásquez Barrero, 2014). These processes can also support citizens to manage risks as they encounter them in their everyday life (Ziervogel et al., 2017).

To respond to urban injustices, attention needs to be paid to both the local level and to broader system-wide governance issues (that are unpacked further in [[#6.4|Section 6.4]] ). At the local level, it is important to understand who is most vulnerable to climate risk, which is likely to be related to class, race, gender, ability and age ( [[#Wilby--2012|Wilby and Keenan, 2012]] ; [[#Ranganathan--2019|Ranganathan and Bratman, 2019]] ; Thomas, Cretney and Hayward, 2019). Factors such as age and levels of ability, as well as those pursuing outdoor livelihoods, have a direct link to higher vulnerability to heat stress (Conry et al., 2015). In least-developed countries, less than 60% of the urban population have access to piped water which impacts on health and well-being, and emphasises the importance of alternative resources for these households (World Health Organization, Nations and Fund, 2017).

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==== 6.4.3.6 Supports Visionary and Imaginative Design ====

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The failure to deliver inclusive and sustainable adaptation contributes to a collective inability to mobilise the power of creative community vision ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ). Urban design plays a central role to support creative adaptation strategies (Box 6.7). Much adaptation action repeats previous experiences. However, the potential for building resilience to deliver adaptation, especially transformative adaptation, requires an articulation of collective visions of the future and the imagination of new or alternative urban futures (Glaas et al., 2018), including through design and deliberate engagement with cultural artefacts, technologies and performances ( [[#Jordan--2020|Jordan, 2020]] ). Social movements can be powerful sources of such alternative visions of the future, as exemplified by recent Youth Climate Strikes and Extinction Rebellion ( ''limited evidence'' , ''medium agreement'' ). Community protest such as Youth Climate Strikes have influenced urban climate policy agendas including the declaration of climate emergency in municipalities worldwide, fostering a new debate on climate change, although their impact on local policy is ambiguous (Davidson et al., 2020; Thomas, Cretney and Hayward, 2019; Prendergast et al., 2021; Ruiz Campillo, Castán Broto and Westman, 2020). Social movements on climate mitigation, such as the Transition Movement and Transition Towns ( [[#Feola--2014|Feola and Nunes, 2014]] ), and school strikes may serve as an example for mobilisations more specifically about climate adaptation and the way new, networked, grassroots citizen activism and community organisations can encourage urban institutional change ( [[#Gunningham--2019|Gunningham, 2019]] ; Jordan et al., 2018; Wahlström et al., 2019). Other strategies such as cultural production and exhibitions may also have an impact (Stripple, Nikoleris and Hildingsson, 2021).

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'''Box 6.7 | The Role of Urban Design in Local Adaptation'''
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Since AR5, there has been a growing literature about the role of urban design, creating new opportunities for both incremental and transformative adaptive responses to climate change ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ). For example, some of these creative design approaches compliment and extend regulatory and land use planning approaches such as form-based codes and established certifications such as Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design–Neighbourhood Design (LEED-ND) ( [[#Garde--2018|Garde, 2018]] ; [[#Garde--2017|Garde and Hoff, 2017]] ) and the USA’s Sustainable Sites Initiative (SITES) ( [[#Valente--2014|Valente, 2014]] ). Emphasis on sufficiency has also influenced urban design, for example, with the mobilisation of ‘doughnut’ economics that emphasise both a social foundation and an environmental ceiling, for example Amsterdam ( [[#Raworth--2017|Raworth, 2017]] ). However, such cases are rare, substantial public investment is often required ( ''high confidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) (see also [[#6.4.7|Section 6.4.7]] on finance and insurance). Other approaches underscore innovation and creativity, at the essence of which are context-specific interventions that draw on a compendium of urban design principles such as indeterminacy (to accommodate climate uncertainty), polyvalency and diversity, and harmony with nature ( [[#Dhar--2017|Dhar and Khirfan, 2017]] ). Creative interventions include the daylighting of buried streams to create climate adaptive public realms (Khirfan et al., 2020; Khirfan, Mohtat and Peck, 2020). For example, the demolition of a major expressway and the restoration of the Cheonggyecheon Stream reorganised downtown Seoul, South Korea, and significantly contributed to climate change adaptation through stormwater management and reducing the urban heat island effect ( [[#Kim--2019|Kim and Jung, 2019]] ). Biomimicry and ecological infrastructure are design features that governance bodies can use to reshape space and contribute to place making ( [[#Santos%20Nouri--2017|Santos Nouri and Costa, 2017]] ; Prior et al., 2018). For example, urban metabolism and local ecological knowledge has constituted the essence of urban design interventions on the Island of Tobago in ways that capitalise on the contiguous relationship between ecosystems (e.g., the mangrove forest) and human actions (rainwater harvesting and grey water management) ( [[#Khirfan--2016|Khirfan and Zhang, 2016]] ). While lack of funding or design capacity, restrictive planning regulations, inequality and competing urban agendas can create barriers for the implementation of creative design solutions. Transition architecture movements are also driving local urban adaptation experiments and exploring ways local learning can be scaled up ( [[#Tubridy--2020|Tubridy, 2020]] ; [[#Irwin--2019|Irwin, 2019]] ).

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