Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-8 (section)

== 8.7 Conclusion ==

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The chapter has moved beyond the IPCC WGII AR5 in that it lays out structural elements of vulnerability and provides quantitative information about climate-related vulnerability hotspots globally complemented by the assessment of poverty, local livelihood vulnerability and sustainable development. The assessment of non-economic losses, and enabling and supportive environments for adaptation are also new aspects.

The chapter provides additional evidence on livelihood resources at local levels that have been impacted by different climate hazards and, globally, that specific hazards (namely, drought and rising temperatures) are more threatening and destabilising to livelihoods than others. There is ''robust evidence'' that coping and adaptive capacities erode with increasing GMT—substantial differences are expected between a GMT increase of less than 1.5°C compared to an increase of more than 3°C—and the frequencies of climate hazards, such as heat waves, droughts or floods is likely to increase substantially. Nevertheless, this assessment also revealed that the adverse impacts of climate change for livelihoods and multidimensional poverty differ substantially between different population groups exposed to climate hazards, based on the socioeconomic and governance context. Consequently, societal impacts of climate change need to be understood in the broader context of development and the development challenges that influence exposure, vulnerability and adaptation.

There is ''robust evidence'' of the impacts of all climate hazards on the key livelihood resources that the poor depend on. There is ''high confidence'' that two climate hazards pose high risk to a broad range of livelihood resources: warming trends and droughts. Meanwhile, the livelihood resources that are globally at greatest risk include people’s bodily health, food security and agricultural productivity ( ''high confidence'' ). Evidence suggests that the fundamental challenge of climate change to livelihoods is that rising temperatures, drought and other hazards endanger human life, and the lives of plants and animals that humans rely on to survive ( ''high confidence'' ). There is now ''robust evidence'' that the impacts of climate change on livelihoods are driving people to migrate in search of alternative incomes, and this tendency will increase with rising temperatures. Of greatest concern are people whose development context is compromised by war, conflict and extreme poverty and inequality, such as refugee populations and displaced people.

This chapter reports quantitative evidence of human vulnerability and therefore identifies various spatial hotspots of vulnerability emerging in regional clusters. It reports that significantly more people are living in highly vulnerable context conditions compared to those living in low vulnerability contexts. The assessment revealed that more than 3 million people are living in countries classified as very highly or highly vulnerable (depending on the assessment method and the number of classes used, and countries included). In contrast, approximately 1.8 billion people reside in low or very low vulnerable country contexts. Studies estimate the population in the most vulnerable regions to almost double by the year 2100 ( [[#8.4.5.2|Section 8.4.5.2]] ). When near-term estimates are used, the population growth in highly vulnerable countries is still significantly higher compared to less vulnerable countries. Consequently, this assessment points towards the fact that even if we do not know how societal or community vulnerability will develop in specific areas, it is ''very likely'' that in the future, more people will live in destabilised and highly vulnerable country contexts compared to the population today. However, it is important to note that the scientific literature also underscores that trends in vulnerability differ significantly between different world regions and within countries.

The chapter also advances knowledge in terms of the interconnections between human vulnerability, observed losses and adverse consequences. The assessment shows that statistically relevant differences in observed fatalities per hazard event can be explained by hazard intensity and frequency, and are also linked to different levels of vulnerability of a region exposed. Despite all uncertainties about future change, the assessed literature clearly provides an accurate picture of the expected societal impacts of climate change, the requirements for successful adaptation and the need to address the adaptation gap from the perspective of vulnerability.

The chapter shows that intersectionality approaches are becoming increasingly central to grasping how differential vulnerability to climate hazards is experienced by different social groups. Intersectionality recognises that age, gender, class, race and ethnicity are reinforcing social phenomena, shaping social inequalities and experiences of the world, and also intersect with climate hazards and vulnerability. Our assessment reveals the central role of maladaptation with ''robust new evidence'' on negative consequences of interventions on different social groups. Well-intentioned adaptation can exacerbate past and existing vulnerabilities and undermine livelihoods. There is also evidence that, despite maladaptation, inclusive and sustainable development at the local level can reduce vulnerability.

Since AR5 L&amp;D has taken much more central stage in sustainable development, policy, and poverty and livelihoods discourse. While there is ambiguity about what constitutes L&amp;D, the chapter highlights new evidence of observed L&amp;Ds, including slow-onset impacts (e.g., sea level rise and drought). Our assessment reveals that there is a body of literature that explicitly addresses non-economic losses and that these are experienced everywhere now due to human-induced climate change. These are coupled with advancements in the science of extreme event attribution with new focus on adaptation metrics and vulnerability assessments.

This assessment also identifies emerging evidence of linkages between extreme and slow-onset events, NELD and livelihood shifts. This suggests that losses are leading to a range of shifts in livelihoods, which may be easier for some social groups than others, and which have implications for livelihoods security across transboundary scales. Yet, climate change is only one driver. Untangling the drivers of vulnerability using intersectionality approaches is also critical. Our quantification of vulnerability hotspots supports this concern. It is critical to seek further knowledge on the extent of livelihood shifts among the most vulnerable resulting from specific NELD, for whom, where and at what scale. Gaps in knowledge highlight this as an area that needs further work in order to develop and understand further the full extent and reach of the relationships between extreme and slow-onset climate events, non-economic losses and shifting livelihoods.

This chapter builds on AR5 and the IPCC SR 1.5°C on key limits to the adaptation of natural and social systems that are compounded by the effects of poverty and inequality, such as on water scarcity, ecosystems alteration and degradation, coastal cities in relation to sea level rise, cyclones and coastal erosion, food systems and human health ( ''high confidence'' ). Climate change risks could have substantial negative impacts on climate-sensitive livelihoods of smallholder farmers, fisheries communities, Indigenous People, urban poor and informal settlements, with limits to adaptation evidenced in the loss income, ecosystems, health and increasing migration ( ''high confidence'' ). The chapter also addresses how ecological thresholds and socioeconomic determinants of vulnerabilities are linked to soft and hard adaptation limits, including the potential and magnitude of livelihood risks in the future. For instance, a hard limit associated with losses of coral reefs in a 1.5°C warmer world will lead to substantial loss of income and livelihoods for coastal communities ( ''high confidence'' ), including loss of culture- and place-based attachment ( ''medium confidence'' ). Hard adaptation limits are expected for the Arctic ecosystem. Their threshold will affect residents of Arctic regions dependent on hunting and fishing livelihoods ( ''high confidence'' ). New emerging considerations to ecological limits to adaptation, such as severe glacier retreat and Amazon forest dieback, is expected to affect the livelihoods of smallholder farmers and Indigenous People through crop yield failures, biodiversity loss, reduced hydropower capacity and health ( ''medium evidence'' ). While a knowledge gap remains on the projected risks of increasing global temperature to climate-sensitive livelihoods among Global South countries and specific groups of people, current observations show negative impacts to livelihoods for tens to hundreds of millions of people. Thus, without sustainable, equitable and urgent adaptation measures, maladaptation risks are ''likely'' to further increase vulnerability, marginalisation and ecological tipping points among the poor within countries ( ''medium confidence'' ).

Evidence on the kinds of enabling environment required paints a complex picture. The assessment highlights the interaction of different capital assets within the broader context of key enablers in shaping the overall enabling environment for adaptation, which itself is highly context dependent. In this regard, countries present different starting points for adaptation, with some requiring, for example, more of an emphasis on institutional capacity building; others requiring transformation to the broader legal and political conditions. Capitals are not necessarily substitutable but rather act as an assemblage in shaping both perceptions of climate risk and the necessity and appropriateness of actions. At the same time there is ''robust evidence'' that livelihoods that depend strongly on natural capital for both subsistence and as a source of income are particularly sensitive to climate risks; and are where perhaps adaptive actions are most urgently needed, even with smaller rises in temperature under the most optimistic scenarios. This applies to both the Global South and the Global North. Investments in any form of capital asset to support adaptation need to be mindful of reinforcing existing inequalities and introducing new ones, particularly if transformation takes place. This also underscores the importance of inclusive, polycentric governance in ensuring the voices of all groups are heard and that wide-ranging knowledge types are incorporated in decision making, nevertheless recognising that trade-offs are inevitable.

The chapter also highlights and provides quantitative evidence that adaptation strategies need to go beyond the idea of adapting to warming levels only. Adaptation strategies have to reduce the adaptation gap and therewith reduce human vulnerability independent of a specific climatic hazard. It has been shown that adaptation strategies that explicitly address poverty and inequities, and also consider rights-based approaches can generate co-benefits for resilience building of most vulnerable groups and for sustainable development.

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