Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-4 (section)

=== 4.8.6 Polycentric Water Governance ===

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SR1.5 concluded with ''high confidence'' that cooperation and coordinated actions at various governance levels are vital to ensuring participation, transparency, capacity building and learning among different actors ( [[#IPCC--2018a|IPCC, 2018a]] ). According to SRCCL, adaptive governance builds on multi-level and polycentric governance ( [[#Hurlbert--2019|Hurlbert et al., 2019]] ), where efforts taken by multiple actors across different scales provide learning opportunities for all ( [[#Hurlbert--2018|Hurlbert, 2018]] ).

Polycentrism is characterised by the absence of a unique centre of authority. Therefore, the legitimacy of the decisions taken by multiple decision-makers at different levels of water governance derives from the perceived fairness of the decision-making process ( [[#Baldwin--2018|Baldwin et al., 2018]] ) and the inclusion of women, Indigenous Peoples and young people ( [[#Iza--2019|Iza, 2019]] ) ( ''medium confidence'' ). Evidence-based approaches can also enhance the legitimacy of polycentric governance ( [[#Boelens--2015|Boelens et al., 2015]] ; [[#Arriagada--2018|Arriagada et al., 2018]] ) by generating knowledge to support localised and multi-leveled decision-making, as in the case of water user communities in Peru ( [[#Buytaert--2014|Buytaert et al., 2014]] ; [[#Buytaert--2016|Buytaert et al., 2016]] ).

The advantages of polycentric approaches to climate governance include improved communication, inclusiveness, consensus and better outcomes ( [[#Ostrom--2014|Ostrom, 2014]] ; [[#Cole--2015|Cole, 2015]] ; [[#Keohane--2016|Keohane and Victor, 2016]] ; [[#Morrison--2017|Morrison et al., 2017]] ; [[#Tormos-Aponte--2018|Tormos-Aponte and García-López, 2018]] ) ( ''high agreement'' ). However, polycentric governance systems require cross-scale information sharing, coordination and democratic participation to work appropriately ( [[#Pahl-Wostl--2014|Pahl-Wostl and Knieper, 2014]] ; [[#Carlisle--2017|Carlisle and Gruby, 2017]] ; [[#Morrison--2017|Morrison et al., 2017]] ; [[#Biesbroek--2018|Biesbroek and Lesnikowski, 2018]] ; [[#Frey--2021|Frey et al., 2021]] ) ( ''high confidence'' ). For example, efficient information sharing has been necessary to implement groundwater governance in transboundary contexts ( [[#Albrecht--2017|Albrecht et al., 2017]] ).

Empirical studies that examined the potential of polycentric governance to address water challenges in the face of climate change showed that polycentrism could encourage and support participatory, decentralised and deliberative adaptation. These, in turn, can produce better environmental outcomes and improve water governance outcomes ( ''high confidence'' ). Polycentric water governance can be an effective enabler for adaptation when it ensures interconnectedness with multiple public and private actors across the different sectors (e.g., irrigation users, domestic users, industrial users, watershed institutions, etc.) and across different levels (e.g., local, regional and national governments) to help come up with well-coordinated water adaptation responses ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Pahl-Wostl--2014|Pahl-Wostl and Knieper, 2014]] ; [[#McCord--2017|McCord et al., 2017]] ; [[#Baldwin--2018|Baldwin et al., 2018]] ; [[#Hamilton--2018|Hamilton and Lubell, 2018]] ; [[#Kellner--2019|Kellner et al., 2019]] ).

Questions remain about the extent to which polycentrism can result in either greater climate justice or exacerbate existing inequalities due, for example, to existing power inequalities which may affect the performance and effectiveness of a polycentric system ( [[#Pahl-Wostl--2014|Pahl-Wostl and Knieper, 2014]] ; [[#Morrison--2017|Morrison et al., 2017]] ; [[#Hamilton--2018|Hamilton and Lubell, 2018]] ; [[#Okereke--2018|Okereke, 2018]] ). For instance, historical inequities and injustices due to settler colonialism and top-down water policies, governance and laws ( [[#Collins--2017|Collins et al., 2017]] ; [[#Arsenault--2018|Arsenault et al., 2018]] ; Johnson et al., 2018; [[#Robison--2018|Robison et al., 2018]] ) have resulted in long-term water insecurity in many indigenous communities in North America ( [[#Simms--2016|Simms et al., 2016]] ; [[#Medeiros--2017|Medeiros et al., 2017]] ; [[#Conroy-Ben--2018|Conroy-Ben and Richard, 2018]] ; [[#Diver--2018|Diver, 2018]] ; [[#Emanuel--2018|Emanuel, 2018]] ) ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#4.6.9|Section 4.6.9]] ). Additionally, studies highlight that power dynamics can undermine the success of those initiatives. For example, in the Sao Paulo water crisis, polycentric governance did not fully realise its potential when it was guided by authoritarian governance favouring political interests over social, territorial and environmental justice ( [[#Frey--2021|Frey et al., 2021]] ). Likewise, in the Thau basin (France), the most important and influential actors shaped policy measures in response to climate change, thus limiting the potential for radical changes in water use ( [[#Aubin--2019|Aubin et al., 2019]] ).

In summary, polycentric governance can enable improved water governance and effective climate change adaptation ( ''medium confidence'' ). However, it can also exacerbate existing inequalities as long as less powerful actors, such as women, Indigenous Peoples and young people, are not adequately involved in the decision-making process ( ''high confidence'' ).

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