Editing IPCC:AR6/SR15/Chapter-4 (section)

== Box 4.4: Manizales, Colombia: Supportive National Government and Localized Planning and Integration as an Enabling Condition for Managing Climate and Development Risks ==

<div id="section-4-4-2-1-block-1"></div>

Institutional reform in the city of Manizales, Colombia, helps identify three important features of an enabling environment: integrating climate change adaptation, mitigation and disaster risk management at the city-scale; the importance of decentralized planning and policy formulation within a supportive national policy environment; and the role of a multi-sectoral framework in mainstreaming climate action in development activities.

Manizales is exposed to risks caused by rapid development and expansion in a mountainous terrain exposed to seismic activity and periodic wet and dry spells. Local assessments expect climate change to amplify the risk of disasters (Carreño et al., 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r996|996]]</sup> . The city is widely recognized for its longstanding urban environmental policy (Biomanizales) and local environmental action plan (Bioplan), and has been integrating environmental planning in its development agenda for nearly two decades (Velásquez Barrero, 1998; Hardoy and Velásquez Barrero, 2014) <sup>[[#fn:r997|997]]</sup> . When the city’s environmental agenda was updated in 2014 to reflect climate change risks, assessments were conducted in a participatory manner at the street and neighbourhood level (Hardoy and Velásquez Barrero, 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r998|998]]</sup> .

The creation of a new Environmental Secretariat assisted in coordination and integration of environmental policies, disaster risk management, development and climate change (Leck and Roberts, 2015) <sup>[[#fn:r999|999]]</sup> .

Planning in Manizales remains mindful of steep gradients through its longstanding Slope Guardian programme that trains women and keeps records of vulnerable households. Planning also looks to include mitigation opportunities and enhance local capacity through participatory engagement (Hardoy and Velásquez Barrero, 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r1000|1000]]</sup> .

Manizales’ mayors were identified as important champions for much of these early integration and innovation efforts. Their role may have been enabled by Colombia’s history of decentralized approaches to planning and policy formulation, including establishing environmental observatories (for continuous environmental assessment) and participatory tracking of environmental indicators. Multi-stakeholder involvement has both enabled and driven progress, and has enabled the integration of climate risks in development planning (Hardoy and Velásquez Barrero, 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r1001|1001]]</sup> .

<div id="section-4-4-2-2"></div>

<span id="monitoring-reporting-and-review-institutions"></span>
==== 4.4.2.2 Monitoring, reporting, and review institutions ====

<div id="section-4-4-2-2-block-1"></div>

One of the novel features of the new climate governance architecture emerging from the 2015 Paris Agreement is the transparency framework in Article 13 committing countries, based on capacity, to provide regular progress reports on national pledges to address climate change (UNFCCC, 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r1002|1002]]</sup> . Many countries will rely on public policies and existing national reporting channels to deliver on their NDCs under the Paris Agreement. Scaling up the mitigation and adaptation efforts in these countries to be consistent with 1.5°C would put significant pressure on the need to develop, enhance and streamline local, national and international climate change reporting and monitoring methodologies and institutional capacity in relation to mitigation, adaptation, finance, and GHG inventories (Ford et al., 2015b; Lesnikowski et al., 2015; Schoenefeld et al., 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r1003|1003]]</sup> . Consistent with this direction, the provision of the information to the stocktake under Article 14 of the Paris Agreement would contribute to enhancing reporting and transparency (UNFCCC, 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r1004|1004]]</sup> . Nonetheless, approaches, reporting procedures, reference points, and data sources to assess progress on implementation across and within nations are still largely underdeveloped (Ford et al., 2015b; Araos et al., 2016b; Magnan and Ribera, 2016; Lesnikowski et al., 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r1005|1005]]</sup> . The availability of independent private and public reporting and statistical institutions are integral to oversight, effective monitoring, reporting and review. The creation and enhancement of these institutions would be an important contribution to an effective transition to a low-emission world.

<div id="section-4-4-2-x"></div>

<span id="financial-institutions"></span>
==== 4.4.2.3 Financial institutions ====

<div id="section-4-4-2-x-block-1"></div>

IPCC AR5 assessed that in order to enable a transition to a 2°C pathway, the volume of climate investments would need to be transformed along with changes in the pattern of general investment behaviour towards low emissions. The report argued that, compared to 2012, annually up to a trillion dollars in additional investment in low-emission energy and energy efficiency measures may be required until 2050 (Blanco et al., 2014; IEA, 2014a) <sup>[[#fn:r1006|1006]]</sup> . Financing of 1.5°C would present an even greater challenge, addressing financing of both existing and new assets, which would require significant transitions to the type and structure of financial institutions as well as to the method of financing (Cochrani et al., 2014; Ma, 2014) <sup>[[#fn:r1007|1007]]</sup> . Both public and private financial institutions would be needed to contribute to the large resource mobilization needed for 1.5°C, yet, in the ordinary course of business, these transitions may not be expected. On the one hand, private financial institutions could face scale-up risk, for example, the risks associated with commercialization and scaling up of renewable technologies to accelerate mitigation (Wilson, 2012; Hartley and Medlock, 2013) <sup>[[#fn:r1008|1008]]</sup> and/or price risk, such as carbon price volatility that carbon markets could face. In contrast, traditional public financial institutions are limited by both structure and instruments, while concessional financing would require taxpayer support for subsidization. Special efforts and innovative approaches would be needed to address these challenges, for example the creation of special institutions that underwrite the value of emission reductions using auctioned price floors (Bodnar et al., 2018) <sup>[[#fn:r1009|1009]]</sup> to deal with price volatility.

Financial institutions are equally important for adaptation. Linnerooth-Bayer and Hochrainer-Stigler (2015) <sup>[[#fn:r1010|1010]]</sup> discussed the benefits of financial instruments in adaptation, including the provision of post-disaster finances for recovery and pre-disaster security necessary for climate adaptation and poverty reduction. Pre-disaster financial instruments and options include insurance, such as index-based weather insurance schemes, catastrophe bonds, and laws to encourage insurance purchasing. The development and enhancement of microfinance institutions to ensure social resilience and smooth transitions in the adaptation to climate change impacts could be an important local institutional innovation (Hammill et al., 2008) <sup>[[#fn:r1011|1011]]</sup> .

<div id="section-4-4-2-4"></div>

<span id="co-operative-institutions-and-social-safety-nets"></span>
==== 4.4.2.4 Co-operative institutions and social safety nets ====

<div id="section-4-4-2-4-block-1"></div>

Effective cooperative institutions and social safety nets may help address energy access and adaptation, as well as distributional impacts during the transition to 1.5°C-consistent pathways and enabling sustainable development. Not all countries have the institutional capabilities to design and manage these. Social capital for adaptation in the form of bonding, bridging, and linking social institutions has proved to be effective in dealing with climate crises at the local, regional and national levels (Aldrich et al., 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r1012|1012]]</sup> .

The shift towards sustainable energy systems in transitioning economies could impact the livelihoods of large populations in traditional and legacy employment sectors. The transition of selected EU Member States to biofuels, for example, caused anxiety among farmers, who lacked confidence in the biofuel crop market. Enabling contracts between farmers and energy companies, involving local governments, helped create an atmosphere of confidence during the transition (McCormick and Kåberger, 2007) <sup>[[#fn:r1013|1013]]</sup> .

How do broader socio-economic processes influence urban vulnerabilities and thereby underpin climate change adaptation? This is a systemic challenge originating from a lack of collective societal ownership of the responsibility for climate risk management. Explanations for this situation include competing time-horizons due to self-interest of stakeholders to a more ‘rational’ conception of risk assessment, measured across a risk-tolerance spectrum (Moffatt, 2014) <sup>[[#fn:r1014|1014]]</sup> .

Self-governing and self-organised institutional settings, where equipment and resource systems are commonly owned and managed, can potentially generate a much higher diversity of administration solutions, than other institutional arrangements, where energy technology and resource systems are either owned and administered individually in market settings or via a central authority (e.g., the state). They can also increase the adaptability of technological systems while reducing their burden on the environment (Labanca, 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r1015|1015]]</sup> . Educational, learning and awareness-building institutions can help strengthen the societal response to climate change (Butler et al., 2016; Thi Hong Phuong et al., 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r1016|1016]]</sup> .

<span id="enabling-lifestyle-and-behavioural-change"></span>
=== 4.4.3 Enabling Lifestyle and Behavioural Change ===

<div id="section-4-4-3-block-1"></div>

Humans are at the centre of global climate change: their actions cause anthropogenic climate change, and social change is key to effectively responding to climate change (Vlek and Steg, 2007; Dietz et al., 2013; ISSC and UNESCO, 2013; Hackmann et al., 2014) <sup>[[#fn:r1017|1017]]</sup> . Chapter 2 shows that 1.5°C-consistent pathways assume substantial changes in behaviour. This section assesses the potential of behaviour change, as the integrated assessment models (IAMs) applied in Chapter 2 do not comprehensively asses this potential.

Table 4.8 shows examples of mitigation and adaption actions relevant for 1.5ºC-consistent pathways. Reductions in population growth can reduce overall carbon demand and mitigate climate change (Bridgeman, 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r1018|1018]]</sup> , particularly when population growth is accompanied by increases in affluence and carbon-intensive consumption (Rosa and Dietz, 2012; Clayton et al., 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r1019|1019]]</sup> . Mitigation actions with a substantial carbon emission reduction potential (see Figure 4.3) that individuals may readily adopt would have the most climate impact (Dietz et al., 2009) <sup>[[#fn:r1020|1020]]</sup> .

<div id="section-4-4-3-block-2"></div>

<span id="table-4.8"></span>
<!-- START TABLE -->
'''Table 4.8'''

Examples of mitigation and adaptation behaviours relevant for 1.5ºC (Dietz et al., 2009; Jabeen, 2014; Taylor et al., 2014; Araos et al., 2016b; Steg, 2016; Stern et al., 2016b; Creutzig et al., 2018) <sup>[[#fn:r1021|1021]]</sup> .

<!-- TABLE -->
{| class="wikitable"
|-
| Climate action
| Type of action
| Examples
|-
| rowspan="6"| Mitigation
| Implementing resource efficiency in buildings
| Insulation<br />
Low-carbon building materials
|-
| Adopting low-emission innovations
| Electric vehicles<br />
Heat pumps, district heating and cooling
|-
| Adopting energy efficient appliances
| Energy-efficient heating or cooling<br />
Energy-efficient appliances
|-
| Energy-saving behaviour
| Walking or cycling rather than drive short distances
Using mass transit rather than flying

Lower temperature for space heating

Line drying of laundry

Reducing food waste

|-
| Buying products and materials with low GHG emissions during production and transport
| Reducing meat and dairy consumption
Buying local, seasonal food

Replacing aluminium products by low-GHG alternatives

|-
| Organisational behaviour
| Designing low-emission products and procedures
Replacing business travel by videoconferencing

|-
| rowspan="4"| Adaptation
| Growing different crops and raising different animal varieties
| Using crops with higher tolerance for higher temperatures or CO <sub>2</sub> elevation
|-
| Flood protective behaviour
| Elevating barriers between rooms
Building elevated storage spaces

Building drainage channels outside the home

|-
| Heat protective behaviour
| Staying hydrated
Moving to cooler places

Installing green roofs

|-
| Efficient water use during water shortage crisis
| Rationing water
Constructing wells or rainwater tanks

|-
| rowspan="2"| Mitigation &amp; adaptation
| Adoption of renewable energy sources
| Solar PV
Solar water heaters

|-
| Citizenship behaviour
| Engage through civic channels to encourage or support planning for low-carbon climate-resilient development
|}
<!-- END TABLE -->

<div id="section-4-4-3-block-3"></div>

<span id="figure-4.3"></span>
<!-- START IMG -->
<!-- IMG TITLE -->
'''Figure 4.3'''

<span id="examples-of-mitigation-behaviour-and-their-ghg-emission-reduction-potential."></span>
<!-- IMG CAPTION -->
'''Examples of mitigation behaviour and their GHG emission reduction potential.'''
<!-- IMG FILE -->
[[File:ded20a6e9384be5b0d6232160f47b892 Figure-4.3-1-1024x724.jpg]]

Mitigation potential assessments are printed in different units. Based on [1] Carlsson-Kanyama and González (2009) <sup>[[#fn:r1022|1022]]</sup> ; [2] Tuomisto and Teixeira de Mattos (2011) <sup>[[#fn:r1023|1023]]</sup> ; [3] Springmann et al. (2016) <sup>[[#fn:r1024|1024]]</sup> ; [4] Nijland and Meerkerk (2017) <sup>[[#fn:r1025|1025]]</sup> ; [5] Woodcock et al. (2009) <sup>[[#fn:r1026|1026]]</sup> ; [6] Salon et al. (2012) <sup>[[#fn:r1027|1027]]</sup> ; [7] Dietz et al. (2009) <sup>[[#fn:r1028|1028]]</sup> ; [8] Mulville et al. (2017) <sup>[[#fn:r1029|1029]]</sup> ; [9] Huebner and Shipworth (2017) <sup>[[#fn:r1030|1030]]</sup> ; [10] Jaboyedoff et al. (2004) <sup>[[#fn:r1031|1031]]</sup> ; [11] Pellegrino et al. (2016) <sup>[[#fn:r1032|1032]]</sup> ; [12] Nägele et al. (2017) <sup>[[#fn:r1033|1033]]</sup> .

Original Creation for this Report. Based on [1] Carlsson-Kanyama and González (2009); [2] Tuomisto and Teixeira de Mattos (2011); [3] Springmann et al. (2016); [4] Nijland and Meerkerk (2017); [5] Woodcock et al. (2009); [6] Salon et al. (2012); [7] Dietz et al. (2009); [8] Mulville et al. (2017); [9] Huebner and Shipworth (2017); [10] Jaboyedoff et al. (2004); [11] Pellegrino et al. (2016); [12] Nägele et al. (2017)

<!-- END IMG -->
<div id="section-4-4-3-block-4"></div>

Various policy approaches and strategies can encourage and enable climate actions by individuals and organizations. Policy approaches would be more effective when they address key contextual and psycho-social factors influencing climate actions, which differ across contexts and individuals (Steg and Vlek, 2009; Stern, 2011) <sup>[[#fn:r1034|1034]]</sup> . This suggests that diverse policy approaches would be needed in 1.5ºC-consistent pathways in different contexts and regions. Combinations of policies that target multiple barriers and enabling factors simultaneously can be more effective (Nissinen et al., 2015) <sup>[[#fn:r1035|1035]]</sup> .

In the United States and Europe, GHG emissions are lower when legislators have strong environmental records (Jensen and Spoon, 2011; Dietz et al., 2015) <sup>[[#fn:r1036|1036]]</sup> . Political elites affect public concern about climate change: pro-climate action statements increased concern, while anti-climate action statements and anti-environment voting reduced public concern about climate change (Brulle et al., 2012) <sup>[[#fn:r1037|1037]]</sup> . In the European Union (EU), individuals worry more about climate change and engage more in climate actions in countries where political party elites are united rather than divided in their support for environmental issues (Sohlberg, 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r1038|1038]]</sup> .

This section discusses how to enable and encourage behaviour and lifestyle changes that strengthen implementation of 1.5ºC-consistent pathways by assessing psycho-social factors related to climate action, as well as the effects and acceptability of policy approaches targeting climate actions that are consistent with 1.5ºC. Box 4.5 and Box 4.6 illustrate how these have worked in practice.

<div id="section-4-4-3-1"></div>

<span id="factors-related-to-climate-actions"></span>
==== 4.4.3.1 Factors related to climate actions ====

<div id="section-4-4-3-1-block-1"></div>

Mitigation and adaptation behaviour is affected by many factors that shape which options are feasible and considered by individuals. Besides contextual factors (see other sub-sections in Section 4.4), these include abilities and different types of motivation to engage in behaviour.

'''Ability to engage in climate action''' '''''. ''''' Individuals more often engage in adaptation (Gebrehiwot and van der Veen, 2015; Koerth et al., 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r1039|1039]]</sup> and mitigation behaviour (Pisano and Lubell, 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r1040|1040]]</sup> when they are or feel more capable to do so. Hence, it is important to enhance ability to act on climate change, which depends on income and knowledge, among other things. A higher income is related to higher CO <sub>2</sub> emissions; higher income groups can afford more carbon-intensive lifestyles (Lamb et al., 2014; Dietz et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2015) <sup>[[#fn:r1041|1041]]</sup> . Yet low-income groups may lack resources to invest in energy-efficient technology and refurbishments (Andrews-Speed and Ma, 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r1042|1042]]</sup> and adaptation options (Wamsler, 2007; Fleming et al., 2015b; Takahashi et al., 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r1043|1043]]</sup> . Adaptive capacity further depends on gender roles (Jabeen, 2014; Bunce and Ford, 2015) <sup>[[#fn:r1044|1044]]</sup> , technical capacities and knowledge (Feola et al., 2015; Eakin et al., 2016; Singh et al., 2016b) <sup>[[#fn:r1045|1045]]</sup> .

Knowledge of the causes and consequences of climate change and of ways to reduce GHG emissions is not always accurate (Bord et al., 2000; Whitmarsh et al., 2011; Tobler et al., 2012) <sup>[[#fn:r1046|1046]]</sup> , which can inhibit climate actions, even when people would be motivated to act. For example, people overestimate savings from low-energy activities, and underestimate savings from high-energy activities (Attari et al., 2010) <sup>[[#fn:r1047|1047]]</sup> . They know little about ‘embodied’ energy (i.e., energy needed to produce products; Tobler et al., 2011) <sup>[[#fn:r1048|1048]]</sup> , including meat (de Boer et al., 2016b) <sup>[[#fn:r1049|1049]]</sup> . Some people mistake weather for climate (Reynolds et al., 2010) <sup>[[#fn:r1050|1050]]</sup> , or conflate climate risks with other hazards, which can inhibit adequate adaptation (Taylor et al., 2014) <sup>[[#fn:r1051|1051]]</sup> .

More knowledge on adaptation is related to higher engagement in adaptation actions in some circumstances (Bates et al., 2009; van Kasteren, 2014; Hagen et al., 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r1052|1052]]</sup> . How adaptation is framed in the media can influence the types of options viewed as important in different contexts (Boykoff et al., 2013; Moser, 2014; Ford and King, 2015) <sup>[[#fn:r1053|1053]]</sup> .

Knowledge is important, but is often not sufficient to motivate action (Trenberth et al., 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r1054|1054]]</sup> . Climate change knowledge and perceptions are not strongly related to mitigation actions (Hornsey et al., 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r1055|1055]]</sup> . Direct experience of events related to climate change influences climate concerns and actions (Blennow et al., 2012; Taylor et al., 2014) <sup>[[#fn:r1056|1056]]</sup> , more so than second-hand information (Spence et al., 2011; Myers et al., 2012; Demski et al., 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r1057|1057]]</sup> ; high impact events with low frequency are remembered more than low impact regular events (Meze-Hausken, 2004; Singh et al., 2016b; Sullivan-Wiley and Short Gianotti, 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r1058|1058]]</sup> . Personal experience with climate hazards strengthens motivation to protect oneself (Jabeen, 2014) <sup>[[#fn:r1059|1059]]</sup> and enhances adaptation actions (Bryan et al., 2009; Berrang-Ford et al., 2011; Demski et al., 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r1060|1060]]</sup> , although this does not always translate into proactive adaptation (Taylor et al., 2014) <sup>[[#fn:r1061|1061]]</sup> . Collectively constructed notions of risk and expectations of future climate variability shape risk perception and adaptation behaviour (Singh et al., 2016b) <sup>[[#fn:r1062|1062]]</sup> . People with particular political views and those who emphasize individual autonomy may reject climate science knowledge and believe that there is widespread scientific disagreement about climate change (Kahan, 2010; O’Neill et al., 2013) <sup>[[#fn:r1063|1063]]</sup> , inhibiting support for climate policy (Ding et al., 2011; McCright et al., 2013) <sup>[[#fn:r1064|1064]]</sup> . This may explain why extreme weather experiences enhances preparedness to reduce energy use among left- but not right-leaning voters (Ogunbode et al., 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r1065|1065]]</sup> .

'''Motivation to engage in climate action''' '''. ''' Climate actions are more strongly related to motivational factors than to knowledge, reflecting individuals’ reasons for actions, such as values, ideology and worldviews (Hornsey et al., 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r1066|1066]]</sup> . People consider various types of costs and benefits of actions (Gölz and Hahnel, 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r1067|1067]]</sup> and focus on consequences that have implications for the values they find most important (Dietz et al., 2013; Hahnel et al., 2015; Steg, 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r1068|1068]]</sup> . This implies that different individuals consider different consequences when making choices. People who strongly value protecting the environment and other people generally more strongly consider climate impacts and act more on climate change than those who strongly endorse hedonic and egoistic values (Taylor et al., 2014; Steg, 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r1069|1069]]</sup> . People are more prone to adopt sustainable innovations when they are more open to new ideas (Jansson, 2011; Wolske et al., 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r1070|1070]]</sup> . Further, a free-market ideology is associated with weaker climate change beliefs (McCright and Dunlap, 2011; Hornsey et al., 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r1071|1071]]</sup> , and a capital-oriented culture tends to promote activity associated with GHG emissions (Kasser et al., 2007) <sup>[[#fn:r1072|1072]]</sup> .

Some indigenous populations believe it is arrogant to predict the future, and some cultures have belief systems that interpret natural phenomena as sentient, where thoughts and words are believed to influence the future, with people reluctant to talk about negative future possibilities (Natcher et al., 2007; Flynn et al., 2018) <sup>[[#fn:r1073|1073]]</sup> . Integrating these considerations into the design of adaptation and mitigation policy is important (Cochran et al., 2013; Chapin et al., 2016; Brugnach et al., 2017; Flynn et al., 2018) <sup>[[#fn:r1074|1074]]</sup> .

People are more prone to act on climate change when individual benefits of actions exceed costs (Steg and Vlek, 2009; Kardooni et al., 2016; Wolske et al., 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r1075|1075]]</sup> . For this reason, people generally prefer adoption of energy-efficient appliances above energy-consumption reductions; the latter is perceived as more costly (Poortinga et al., 2003; Steg et al., 2006) <sup>[[#fn:r1076|1076]]</sup> , although transaction costs can inhibit the uptake of mitigation technology (Mundaca, 2007) <sup>[[#fn:r1077|1077]]</sup> . Decentralized renewable energy systems are evaluated most favourably when they guarantee independence, autonomy, control and supply security (Ecker et al., 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r1078|1078]]</sup> .

Besides, social costs and benefits affect climate action (Farrow et al., 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r1079|1079]]</sup> . People engage more in climate actions when they think others expect them to do so and when others act as well (Nolan et al., 2008; Le Dang et al., 2014; Truelove et al., 2015; Rai et al., 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r1080|1080]]</sup> , and when they experience social support (Singh et al., 2016a; Burnham and Ma, 2017; Wolske et al., 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r1081|1081]]</sup> . Discussing effective actions with peers also encourages climate action (Esham and Garforth, 2013) <sup>[[#fn:r1082|1082]]</sup> , particularly when individuals strongly identify with their peers (Biddau et al., 2012; Fielding and Hornsey, 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r1083|1083]]</sup> . Further, individuals may engage in mitigation actions when they think doing so would enhance their reputation (Milinski et al., 2006; Noppers et al., 2014; Kastner and Stern, 2015) <sup>[[#fn:r1084|1084]]</sup> . Such social costs and benefits can be addressed in climate policy (see Section 4.4.3.2).

Feelings affect climate action (Brosch et al., 2014) <sup>[[#fn:r1085|1085]]</sup> . Negative feelings related to climate change can encourage adaptation action (Kerstholt et al., 2017; Zhang et al., 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r1086|1086]]</sup> , while positive feelings associated with climate risks may inhibit protective behaviour (Lefevre et al., 2015) <sup>[[#fn:r1087|1087]]</sup> . Individuals are more prone to engage in mitigation actions when they worry about climate change (Verplanken and Roy, 2013) <sup>[[#fn:r1088|1088]]</sup> and when they expect to derive positive feelings from such actions (Pelletier et al., 1998; Taufik et al., 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r1089|1089]]</sup> .

Furthermore, collective consequences affect climate actions (Balcombe et al., 2013; Dóci and Vasileiadou, 2015; Kastner and Stern, 2015) <sup>[[#fn:r1090|1090]]</sup> . People are motivated to see themselves as morally right, which encourages mitigation actions (Steg et al., 2015) <sup>[[#fn:r1091|1091]]</sup> , particularly when long-term goals are salient (Zaval et al., 2015) <sup>[[#fn:r1092|1092]]</sup> and behavioural costs are not too high (Diekmann and Preisendörfer, 2003) <sup>[[#fn:r1093|1093]]</sup> . Individuals are more prone to engage in climate actions when they believe climate change is occurring, when they are aware of threats caused by climate change and by their inaction, and when they think they can engage in actions that will reduce these threats (Esham and Garforth, 2013; Arunrat et al., 2017; Chatrchyan et al., 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r1094|1094]]</sup> . The more individuals are concerned about climate change and aware of the negative climate impact of their behaviour, the more they feel responsible for their actions and think that their actions can help reduce such negative impacts, which can strengthen their moral norms to act accordingly (Steg and de Groot, 2010; Jakovcevic and Steg, 2013; Chen, 2015; Ray et al., 2017; Wolske et al., 2017; Woods et al., 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r1095|1095]]</sup> . Individuals may engage in mitigation actions when they see themselves as supportive of the environment (i.e., strong environmental self-identity) (Fielding et al., 2008; van der Werff et al., 2013b; Kashima et al., 2014; Barbarossa et al., 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r1096|1096]]</sup> ; a strong environmental identity strengthens intrinsic motivation to engage in mitigation actions both at home (van der Werff et al., 2013a) <sup>[[#fn:r1097|1097]]</sup> and at work (Ruepert et al., 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r1098|1098]]</sup> . Environmental self-identity is strengthened when people realize they have engaged in mitigation actions, which can in turn promote further mitigation actions (van der Werff et al., 2014b) <sup>[[#fn:r1099|1099]]</sup> .

Individuals are less prone to engage in adaptation behaviour themselves when they rely on external measures such as government interventions (Grothmann and Reusswig, 2006; Wamsler and Brink, 2014a; Armah et al., 2015; Burnham and Ma, 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r1100|1100]]</sup> or perceive themselves as protected by god (Gandure et al., 2013; Dang et al., 2014; Cannon, 2015) <sup>[[#fn:r1101|1101]]</sup> .

'''Habits, heuristics and biases''' '''. ''' Decisions are often not based on weighing costs and benefits, but on habit or automaticity, both of individuals (Aarts and Dijksterhuis, 2000; Kloeckner et al., 2003) <sup>[[#fn:r1102|1102]]</sup> and within organizations (Dooley, 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r1103|1103]]</sup> and institutions (Munck et al., 2014) <sup>[[#fn:r1104|1104]]</sup> . When habits are strong, individuals are less perceptive of information (Verplanken et al., 1997; Aarts et al., 1998) <sup>[[#fn:r1105|1105]]</sup> and may not consider alternatives as long as outcomes are good enough (Maréchal, 2010) <sup>[[#fn:r1106|1106]]</sup> . Habits are mostly only reconsidered when the situation changed significantly (Fujii and Kitamura, 2003; Maréchal, 2010; Verplanken and Roy, 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r1107|1107]]</sup> . Hence, strategies that create the opportunity for reflection and encourage active decisions can break habits (Steg et al., 2018) <sup>[[#fn:r1108|1108]]</sup> .

Individuals can follow heuristics, or ‘rules of thumb’, in making inferences, which demand less cognitive resources, knowledge and time than thinking through all implications of actions (Preston et al., 2013; Frederiks et al., 2015; Gillingham and Palmer, 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r1109|1109]]</sup> . For example, people tend to think that larger and more visible appliances use more energy, which is not always accurate (Cowen and Gatersleben, 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r1110|1110]]</sup> . They underestimate energy used for water heating and overestimate energy used for lighting (Stern, 2014) <sup>[[#fn:r1111|1111]]</sup> . When facing choice overload, people may choose the easiest or first available option, which can inhibit energy-saving behaviour (Stern and Gardner, 1981; Frederiks et al., 2015) <sup>[[#fn:r1112|1112]]</sup> . As a result, individuals and firms often strive for satisficing (‘good enough’) outcomes with regard to energy decisions (Wilson and Dowlatabadi, 2007; Klotz, 2011) <sup>[[#fn:r1113|1113]]</sup> , which can inhibit investments in energy efficiency (Decanio, 1993; Frederiks et al., 2015) <sup>[[#fn:r1114|1114]]</sup> .

Biases also play a role. In Mozambique, farmers displayed omission biases (unwillingness to take adaptation actions with potentially negative consequences to avoid personal responsibility for losses), while policymakers displayed action biases (wanting to demonstrate positive action despite potential negative consequences; Patt and Schröter, 2008) <sup>[[#fn:r1115|1115]]</sup> . People tend to place greater value on relative losses than gains (Kahneman, 2003) <sup>[[#fn:r1116|1116]]</sup> . Perceived gains and losses depend on the reference point or status-quo (Kahneman, 2003) <sup>[[#fn:r1117|1117]]</sup> . Loss aversion and the status-quo bias prevent consumers from switching electricity suppliers (Ek and Söderholm, 2008) <sup>[[#fn:r1118|1118]]</sup> , to time-of-use electricity tariffs (Nicolson et al., 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r1119|1119]]</sup> , and to accept new energy systems (Leijten et al., 2014) <sup>[[#fn:r1120|1120]]</sup> .

Owned inefficient appliances and fossil fuel-based electricity can act as endowments, increasing their value compared to alternatives (Pichert and Katsikopoulos, 2008; Dinner et al., 2011) <sup>[[#fn:r1121|1121]]</sup> . Uncertainty and loss aversion lead consumers to undervalue future energy savings (Greene, 2011) <sup>[[#fn:r1122|1122]]</sup> and savings from energy efficient technologies (Kolstad et al., 2014) <sup>[[#fn:r1123|1123]]</sup> . Uncertainties about the performance of products and illiquidity of investments can drive consumers to postpone (profitable) energy-efficient investments (Sutherland, 1991; van Soest and Bulte, 2001) <sup>[[#fn:r1124|1124]]</sup> . People with a higher tendency to delay decisions may engage less in energy saving actions (Lillemo, 2014) <sup>[[#fn:r1125|1125]]</sup> . Training energy auditors in loss-aversion increased their clients’ investments in energy efficiency improvements (Gonzales et al., 1988) <sup>[[#fn:r1126|1126]]</sup> . Engagement in energy saving and renewable energy programmes can be enhanced if participation is set as a default option (Pichert and Katsikopoulos, 2008; Ölander and Thøgersen, 2014; Ebeling and Lotz, 2015) <sup>[[#fn:r1127|1127]]</sup> .

<div id="section-4-4-3-2"></div>

<span id="strategies-and-policies-to-promote-actions-on-climate-change"></span>
==== 4.4.3.2 Strategies and policies to promote actions on climate change ====

<div id="section-4-4-3-2-block-1"></div>

Policy can enable and strengthen motivation to act on climate change via top-down or bottom-up approaches, through informational campaigns, regulatory measures, financial (dis)incentives, and infrastructural and technological changes (Adger et al., 2003; Steg and Vlek, 2009; Henstra, 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r1128|1128]]</sup> .

Adaptation efforts tend to focus on infrastructural and technological solutions (Ford and King, 2015) <sup>[[#fn:r1129|1129]]</sup> with lower emphasis on socio-cognitive and finance aspects of adaptation. For example, flooding policies in cities focus on infrastructure projects and regulation such as building codes, and hardly target individual or household behaviour (Araos et al., 2016b; Georgeson et al., 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r1130|1130]]</sup> .

Current mitigation policies emphasize infrastructural and technology development, regulation, financial incentives and information provision (Mundaca and Markandya, 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r1131|1131]]</sup> that can create conditions enabling climate action, but target only some of the many factors influencing climate actions (see Section 4.4.5.1). They fall short of their true potential if their social and psychological implications are overlooked (Stern et al., 2016a) <sup>[[#fn:r1132|1132]]</sup> . For example, promising energy-saving or low-carbon technology may not be adopted or not be used as intended (Pritoni et al., 2015) <sup>[[#fn:r1133|1133]]</sup> when people lack resources and trustworthy information (Stern, 2011; Balcombe et al., 2013) <sup>[[#fn:r1134|1134]]</sup> .

Financial incentives or feedback on financial savings can encourage climate action (Santos, 2008; Bolderdijk et al., 2011; Maki et al., 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r1135|1135]]</sup> (see Box 4.5), but are not always effective (Delmas et al., 2013) <sup>[[#fn:r1136|1136]]</sup> and can be less effective than social rewards (Handgraaf et al., 2013) <sup>[[#fn:r1137|1137]]</sup> or emphasising benefits for people and the environment (Bolderdijk et al., 2013b; Asensio and Delmas, 2015; Schwartz et al., 2015) <sup>[[#fn:r1138|1138]]</sup> . The latter can happen when financial incentives reduce a focus on environmental considerations and weaken intrinsic motivation to engage in climate action (Evans et al., 2012; Agrawal et al., 2015; Schwartz et al., 2015) <sup>[[#fn:r1139|1139]]</sup> . In addition, pursuing small financial gains is perceived to be less worth the effort than pursuing equivalent CO <sub>2</sub> emission reductions (Bolderdijk et al., 2013b; Dogan et al., 2014) <sup>[[#fn:r1140|1140]]</sup> . Also, people may not respond to financial incentives (e.g., to improve energy efficiency) because they do not trust the organization sponsoring incentive programmes (Mundaca, 2007) <sup>[[#fn:r1141|1141]]</sup> or when it takes too much effort to receive the incentive (Stern et al., 2016a) <sup>[[#fn:r1142|1142]]</sup> .

<div id="section-4-4-3-2-block-2" class="box"></div>

<span id="box-4.5-how-pricing-policy-has-reduced-car-use-in-singapore-stockholm-and-london"></span>