Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-14 (section)

==== 14.5.10.2 Projected Risks ====

<div id="h3-33-siblings" class="h3-siblings"></div>

<div id="14.5.10.2.1" class="h4-container"></div>

<span id="violence-and-crime"></span>
===== 14.5.10.2.1 Violence and crime =====

<div id="h4-21-siblings" class="h4-siblings"></div>

'''Projections of future crime derived from the empirical relationships between temperature and crime in the USA show the potential for increased criminality under RCP8.5 compared with RCP4.5 (''' '''''low confidence''''' ''').''' For RCP8.5, holding all socioeconomic conditions at 2015 levels, violent crime could increase 0.6–2.1% by mid-century and 1.9–4.5% by late century ( [[#Houser--2015|Houser et al., 2015]] ). The rise in property crime is projected to be smaller as property crime flattens at higher temperatures ( [[#Hsiang--2013|Hsiang et al., 2013]] ). Using relationships between crime and monthly temperatures established for five US regions by [[#Harp--2018|Harp and Karnauskas (2018)]] , [[#Harp--2020|Harp and Karnauskas (2020)]] project 18,800 additional violent crimes annually beyond 2014 levels by the end of the 21st century under 1.5°C warming, rising to 48,200 under 4°C warming. Aggregating data by states weighted by population density, [[#Mares--2019|Mares and Moffett (2019)]] project an average annual increase of 0.94% across seven categories of violent and property crime for each anomalous degree Celsius of warming (an average annual increase of about 100,000 crimes). Changing socioeconomic conditions in the future may either reduce or exacerbate the projected contemporaneous relationship between temperature anomalies and crime ( [[#Agnew--2011|Agnew, 2011]] ; [[#Lynch--2020b|Lynch et al., 2020b]] ), whereas adaptation could weaken these relationships.

<div id="14.5.10.2.2" class="h4-container"></div>

<span id="defence-and-security"></span>
===== 14.5.10.2.2 Defence and security =====

<div id="h4-22-siblings" class="h4-siblings"></div>

'''Climate change will affect ecosystems ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-16#16.5.2.3|Section 16.5.2.3]] ), living standards ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-16#16.5.2.3|Section 16.5.2.3.4]] ), health ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-16#16.5.2.3.5|Section 16.5.2.3.5]] ) and food security ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-16#16.5.2.3.6|Section 16.5.2.3.6]] ) globally, and these changes may exacerbate violence and political instability (''' '''''medium confidence''''' ) '''with implications for national security in North America (''' '''''medium confidence''''' ) '''.''' Climate variability, hazards and trends, to date, have played a role in exacerbating conflict, but the influence of climate appears to be minor and more uncertain than the roles of low socioeconomic development, low state capability and high intergroup inequality ( [[#Mach--2019|Mach et al., 2019]] ). More profound impacts from climate change on weather and seasons, as well as changing socioeconomic conditions, could lead to patterns of violence that cannot be predicted by projecting relationships between current climate and violence into the future ( [[#14.6.3|Section 14.6.3]] ; [[#Mach--2019|Mach et al., 2019]] ). If global levels of violence increase, there will be increased demand for international efforts, including disaster aid and humanitarian efforts ( [[#Eyzaguirre--2021|Eyzaguirre et al., 2021]] ). Climate change and geopolitical goals interact in the Arctic ( [[#Smith--2018|Smith et al., 2018]] ). New transportation corridors and the potential access to natural resources could lead to competition for access to and control over the region (Section [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/14#CCP6.2.6 CCP6.2.6] ; see Box [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/14#CCP6.1 CCP6.1] ; FAQ [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/14#CCP6.2 CCP6.2] ; [[#Estrada--2021|Estrada, 2021]] ). Governance structures exist to manage geopolitical manoeuvring and to protect the human security of Arctic populations (Sections 14.5.10.3, 7.2.7.1).

<div id="14.5.10.3" class="h3-container"></div>

<span id="adaptation-options"></span>