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=== 7.3.3 Climate Change and Future Risks of Conflict === <div id="h2-18-siblings" class="h2-siblings"></div> Climate change may increase susceptibility to violent conflict, primarily intra-state conflicts, by strengthening climate-sensitive drivers of conflict ''(medium confidence).'' Section 7.2.7 described how climate variability and extremes affect violent conflict through food and water insecurity, loss of income and loss of livelihoods. Risks are amplified by insecure land tenure, competing land uses and weather-sensitive economic activities when they occur in the context of weak institutions and poor governance, poverty and inequality ( [[#7.2.7|Section 7.2.7]] ). These known, climate-sensitive risk factors allow projections of where conflict is more likely to arise or worsen under climate change impacts (see Chapters 1, 4, 5, 6 and 16) ( [[#Mach--2020|Mach et al., 2020]] ). However, there is also the potential for new causal pathways to emerge as climate changes beyond the variability observed in available datasets and adaptation limits are met ( [[#Theisen--2017|Theisen, 2017]] ; [[#Mach--2019|Mach et al., 2019]] ; [[#von%20Uexkull--2021|von Uexkull and Buhaug, 2021]] ). ''Future violent conflict risk is highly mediated by socioeconomic development trajectories'' ( ''high confidence'' ) ''. Development trajectories that prioritise economic growth, political rights and sustainability are associated with lower conflict risk'' ( ''medium confidence, low evidence'' ) ''.'' [[#Hegre--2016|Hegre et al. (2016)]] forecast future conflict under the SSPs and found that SSP1, which prioritises sustainable development, is associated with lower risks of conflict. Using data from sub-Saharan Africa, [[#Witmer--2017|Witmer et al. (2017)]] forecast conflict along the SSPs and find that any increases in conflict that may be associated with climate change could be offset by increases in political rights. Strong predictors of future conflict are a recent history of conflict, large populations and low levels of socioeconomic development ( [[#Hegre--2006|Hegre and Sambanis, 2006]] ; [[#Blattman--2010|Blattman and Miguel, 2010]] ). ''Increases in conflict-related deaths with climate change have been estimated but results are inconclusive'' ( ''high agreement, medium evidence'' ) ''.'' Some studies attempted to attribute observed conflict outbreaks to changes in the physical environment and quantify future conflict risk associated with climate change ( [[#von%20Uexkull--2021|von Uexkull and Buhaug, 2021]] ; [[#Theisen--2017|Theisen, 2017]] ). Burke et al. (2015b) concluded that with each one standard deviation increase in temperature, inter-personal conflict increased by 2.4% and inter-group conflict by 11.3%. However, the statistical methods have been criticised for under-representing the known role that socioeconomic conditions and conflict history play in determining the prevalence of violence ( [[#Buhaug--2014|Buhaug et al., 2014]] ; [[#van%20Weezel--2019|van Weezel, 2019]] ; [[#Abel--2019|Abel et al., 2019]] ). Forecasting armed conflict is used as a heuristic policy tool rather than a representation of the future ( [[#Cederman--2017|Cederman and Weidmann, 2017]] ) and forecasts have limitations. For example, what constitutes and is experienced as hazards and as drivers of conflict will shift over time as societies adapt to climate change ( [[#Roche--2020|Roche et al., 2020]] ). The SSPs assume economic convergence between countries and do not reflect growth disruptions (e.g., commodity price shocks) that are often a key conflict risk factor ( [[#Dellink--2017|Dellink et al., 2017]] ; [[#Buhaug--2019|Buhaug and]] [[#Vestby--2019|Vestby, 2019]] ; [[#Hegre--2021|Hegre et al., 2021]] ). Asia represents a key region where the peace, vulnerability and development nexus has been analysed. In central, south and Southeast Asia, there are large numbers of people exposed to changing climate ( [[#Busby--2018|Busby et al., 2018]] ; [[#Vinke--2017|Vinke et al., 2017]] ; [[#Reyer--2017|Reyer et al., 2017]] ). South Asia is one of the less peaceful regions in the world due to intra-state communal conflict, international military conflict and political tension ( [[#Wischnath--2014|Wischnath and Buhaug, 2014]] ; [[#Huda--2021|Huda, 2021]] ), and many of the factors that drive conflict risk (e.g. large populations with high levels of inequality) are present ( [[#Nordqvist--2018|Nordqvist and Krampe, 2018]] ). Despite these risks, studies in this region also support the case for environmental peacebuilding and resource sharing, as it relates to transboundary water sharing ( [[#Berndtsson--2020|Berndtsson and Tussupova, 2020]] ; [[#Huda--2018|Huda and Ali, 2018]] ; [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-4#4.3.6|Section 4.3.6]] ; [[#7.4.5.2|Section 7.4.5.2]] ). There is little evidence of weather-related impacts on conflict risk or prevalence, but the region is under-studied in general ( [[#Wischnath--2014|Wischnath and Buhaug, 2014]] ; [[#Nordqvist--2018|Nordqvist and Krampe, 2018]] ). Climate stressors may have contributed in part to local-level conflicts in Bangladesh and Nepal ( [[#Sultana--2019|Sultana et al., 2019]] ) and intensified water use conflict in peri-urban areas ( [[#Roth--2019|Roth et al., 2019]] ). In the future there is the potential for climate change to stretch the effectiveness of transboundary water agreements by raising regional geopolitical tensions ( [[#Atef--2019|Atef et al., 2019]] ; [[#Scott--2019|Scott et al., 2019]] ) or to generate water use conflicts between hydropower and irrigation within countries ( [[#Jalilov--2018|Jalilov et al., 2018]] ). Climate change may have an impact on conflict by affecting food security ( [[#Caruso--2016|Caruso et al., 2016]] ; [[#Raghavan--2019|Raghavan et al., 2019]] ). There may be greater military involvement in humanitarian response to cyclones, flooding and to other impacts of climate change that might contribute to increased instability ( [[#Pai--2008|Pai, 2008]] ; [[#Busby--2017|Busby and Krishnan, 2017]] ). <div id="7.4" class="h1-container"></div> <span id="adaptation-to-key-risks-and-climate-resilient-development-pathways"></span>
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