Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-6 (section)

=== 6.7.6 Behaviour and Societal Integration ===

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Members of societies, including individuals, civil society, and businesses, will all need to engage with, and be affected by, low-carbon energy system transitions ( ''high confidence'' ). This raises questions about the extent to which different strategies and policy would effectively promote mitigation behaviours and the factors that increase the social acceptability of mitigation options, policies, and system changes.

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==== 6.7.6.1 Strategies to Encourage Climate Mitigation Actions ====

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Climate policy will be particularly effective if it targets key factors inhibiting, enabling, and motivating mitigation behaviours. As barriers differ across mitigation options, regions, and groups, tailored approaches are more effective ( [[#Grubb--2017|Grubb et al. 2017]] ). When people face important barriers to change (e.g., high costs, legal barriers), policy would be needed make low-carbon actions more attractive, or to make high-carbon actions less attractive. As people generally face multiple barriers for change, combinations of policies would be more effective ( [[#Rosenow--2017|Rosenow et al. 2017]] ).

Financial incentives can motivate mitigation actions ( [[#Santos--2008|Santos 2008]] ; [[#Thøgersen--2009|Thøgersen 2009]] ; [[#Bolderdijk--2011|Bolderdijk et al. 2011]] ; [[#Eliasson--2014|Eliasson 2014]] ; [[#Maki--2016|Maki et al. 2016]] ), particularly when actions are costly ( [[#Mundaca--2007|Mundaca 2007]] ). In many countries, more residential solar PV were installed after the introduction of favourable financial schemes such as feed-in-tariffs, federal income tax credits, and net metering ( [[#Wolske--2018|Wolske and Stern 2018]] ). Similarly, many programs have promoted the installation of lower-carbon household options such as heat pumps, district heating, or solar water heaters across Europe, the Asia-Pacific and Africa (Hu et al. 2012; Sovacool and Martiskainen 2020; [[#Ahmed--2021|Ahmed et al. 2021]] ). Yet, financial incentives may underperform expectations when other factors are overlooked. For example, people may not respond to financial incentives when they do not trust the organisation sponsoring the programme, or when it takes too much effort to receive the incentive ( [[#Mundaca--2007|Mundaca 2007]] ; [[#Stern--2016a|Stern et al. 2016a]] ). Financial incentives are more effective if combined with strategies addressing non-financial barriers.

Communicating financial consequences of behaviour seems less effective than emphasising social rewards ( [[#Handgraaf--2013|Handgraaf et al. 2013]] ) or benefits of actions for people (e.g., public health, comfort) and the environment ( [[#Bolderdijk--2013|Bolderdijk et al. 2013]] ; [[#Asensio--2015|Asensio and Delmas 2015]] , 2016; [[#Schwartz--2015|Schwartz et al. 2015]] ; Ossokina 2020) ''.'' Financial appeals may have limited effects because they reduce people’s focus on environmental consequences, weaken intrinsic motivation to engage in mitigation actions, provide a licence to pollute ( [[#Agrawal--2015|Agrawal et al. 2015]] ; [[#Bolderdijk--2015|Bolderdijk and Steg 2015]] ; [[#Schwartz--2015|Schwartz et al. 2015]] ), and because pursuing small financial gains is perceived not worth the effort ( [[#Bolderdijk--2013|Bolderdijk et al. 2013]] ; [[#Dogan--2014|Dogan et al. 2014]] ).

Providing information on the causes and consequences of climate change or on effective mitigation actions increases people’s knowledge and awareness, but generally does not promote mitigation actions by individuals ( [[#Abrahamse--2005|Abrahamse et al. 2005]] ) or organisations ( [[#Anderson--2004|Anderson and Newell 2004]] ). Fear-inducing representations of climate change may inhibit action when they make people feel helpless (O’Neill and Nicholson-Cole 2009). Energy-related advice and feedback can promote energy savings, load shifting in electricity use and sustainable travel, particularly when framed in terms of losses rather than gains ( [[#Gonzales--1988|Gonzales et al. 1988]] ; [[#Wolak--2011|Wolak 2011]] ; [[#Bradley--2016|Bradley et al. 2016]] ; [[#Bager--2017|Bager and]] [[#Mundaca--2017|Mundaca 2017]] ). Also, credible and targeted information at the point of decision can promote action ( [[#Stern--2016a|Stern et al. 2016a]] ). Information is more effective when delivered by a trusted source, such as peers ( [[#Palm--2017|Palm 2017]] ), advocacy groups ( [[#Schelly--2014|Schelly 2014]] ), and community organisations ( [[#Noll--2014|Noll et al. 2014]] ), and when tailored to actors’ personal situations and core values ( [[#Daamen--2001|Daamen et al. 2001]] ; [[#Abrahamse--2007|Abrahamse et al. 2007]] ; [[#Bolderdijk--2013|Bolderdijk et al. 2013]] ; [[#Boomsma--2014|Boomsma and Steg 2014]] ; [[#Wolsko--2016|Wolsko et al. 2016]] ; van den Broek et al. 2017). This explains why home energy audits promoted energy savings ( [[#Delmas--2013|Delmas et al. 2013]] ; [[#Alberini--2015|Alberini and Towe 2015]] ), and investments in resource efficiency and renewable energy generation ( [[#Kastner--2015|Kastner and Stern 2015]] ).

Energy use feedback can promote energy saving behaviour within households ( [[#Fischer--2008|Fischer 2008]] ; [[#Grønhøj--2011|Grønhøj and Thøgersen 2011]] ; [[#Delmas--2013|Delmas et al. 2013]] ; [[#Karlin--2015|Karlin et al. 2015]] ; [[#Zangheri--2019|Zangheri et al. 2019]] ) and at work ( [[#Young--2015|Young et al. 2015]] ), particularly when provided in real time or immediately after the action so that people learn the impact of different actions ( [[#Abrahamse--2005|Abrahamse et al. 2005]] ; [[#Faruqui--2009|Faruqui et al. 2009]] ; [[#Delmas--2013|Delmas et al. 2013]] ; [[#Yu--2015|Yu et al. 2015]] ; [[#Stern--2016a|Stern et al. 2016a]] ; [[#Tiefenbeck--2016|Tiefenbeck et al. 2016]] ). Energy labels ( [[#Banerjee--2003|Banerjee and Solomon 2003]] ; [[#Stadelmann--2017|Stadelmann 2017]] ), visualisation techniques ( [[#Pahl--2016|Pahl et al. 2016]] ), and ambient persuasive technology ( [[#Midden--2012|Midden and Ham 2012]] ) can encourage energy savings as they immediately make sense and hardly require users’ conscious attention. Feedback can make people aware of their previous mitigation behaviours, which can strengthen their environmental self-identity, and motivate them to engage in other mitigation actions, to act in line with their self-image ( [[#Van%20der%20Werff--2014|Van der Werff et al. 2014]] ).

Social influence approaches that communicate what other people do or think can encourage mitigation actions ( [[#Clayton--2015|Clayton et al. 2015]] ), as can social models of desired actions ( [[#Osbaldiston--2012|Osbaldiston and Schott 2012]] ; [[#Abrahamse--2013|Abrahamse and Steg 2013]] ; [[#Sussman--2013|Sussman and Gifford 2013]] ; [[#Wolske--2020|Wolske et al. 2020]] ). Feedback on one’s own energy use relative to others can be effective ( [[#Nolan--2008|Nolan et al. 2008]] ; [[#Allcott--2011|Allcott 2011]] ; [[#Schultz--2015|Schultz et al. 2015]] ), although not always, and effect sizes are small ( [[#Abrahamse--2013|Abrahamse and Steg 2013]] ) compared to other types of feedback ( [[#Karlin--2015|Karlin et al. 2015]] ).

Interventions that capitalise on people’s motivation to be consistent can promote mitigation actions ( [[#Steg--2016|Steg 2016]] ). Examples are commitment strategies where people pledge to act ( [[#Abrahamse--2013|Abrahamse and Steg 2013]] ; [[#Lokhorst--2013|Lokhorst et al. 2013]] ), implementation intentions where they additionally explicate how and when they will perform the relevant action and how they would cope with possible barriers ( [[#Bamberg--2000|Bamberg 2000]] , 2002; [[#Rees--2018|Rees et al. 2018]] ), and hypocrisy-related strategies that make people aware of inconsistencies between their attitudes and behaviour ( [[#Osbaldiston--2012|Osbaldiston and Schott 2012]] ).

Bottom-up approaches can promote mitigation action ( [[#Abrahamse--2013|Abrahamse and Steg 2013]] ). Indeed, community energy initiatives can encourage members’ low-carbon behaviour ( [[#Middlemiss--2011|Middlemiss 2011]] ; [[#Seyfang--2012|Seyfang and Haxeltine 2012]] ; [[#Abrahamse--2013|Abrahamse and Steg 2013]] ; [[#Sloot--2018|Sloot et al. 2018]] ). Organisations can promote mitigation behaviour among their employees and customers by communicating their mission and strategies to mitigate climate change ( [[#Ruepert--2017|Ruepert et al. 2017]] ; van der Werff et al. 2021).

Default options, where a preset choice is implemented if users do not select another option, can promote mitigation actions such as energy savings, green electricity uptake, and meat-free options ( [[#Pichert--2008|Pichert and Katsikopoulos 2008]] ; [[#Bessette--2014|Bessette et al. 2014]] ; [[#Campbell-Arvai--2014|Campbell-Arvai et al. 2014]] ; Kunreuther and Weber 2014; [[#Ölander--2014|Ölander and Thøgersen 2014]] ; [[#Ebeling--2015|Ebeling and Lotz 2015]] ; [[#Liebe--2018|Liebe et al. 2018]] ; [[#Liebe--2021|Liebe et al. 2021]] ).

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==== 6.7.6.2 Acceptability of Policy, Mitigation Options and System Changes ====

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Public acceptability reflects the extent to which the public evaluates climate policy, mitigation options, and system changes (un)favourably, which can shape, enable, or prevent low-carbon energy system transitions. Public acceptability of policy and mitigation options is higher when people expect these have more positive and less negative consequences for self, others, and the environment ( [[#Perlaviciute--2014|Perlaviciute and Steg 2014]] ; [[#Demski--2015|Demski et al. 2015]] ; [[#Drews--2016|Drews and Van den Bergh 2016]] ). Public opposition may result when a culturally valued landscape is affected by renewable energy development ( [[#Warren--2005|Warren et al. 2005]] ; [[#Devine-Wright--2010|Devine-Wright and Howes 2010]] ), particularly when place-based identities are threatened ( [[#Devine-Wright--2009|Devine-Wright 2009]] , 2013; [[#Boudet--2019|Boudet 2019]] ). Acceptability can increase after a policy or change has been implemented and the consequences appear to be more positive than expected ( [[#Schuitema--2010|Schuitema et al. 2010]] ; [[#Eliasson--2014|Eliasson 2014]] ; [[#Weber--2015|Weber 2015]] ; [[#Carattini--2018|Carattini et al. 2018]] ); effective policy trials can thus build public support.

Next, climate policy and low-carbon options are evaluated as more fair and acceptable when costs and benefits are distributed equally, and when nature, the environment and future generations are protected ( [[#Schuitema--2011|Schuitema et al. 2011]] ; [[#Drews--2016|Drews and Van den Bergh 2016]] ). Compensating affected groups for losses due to policy or systems changes enhanced public acceptability in some cases ( [[#Perlaviciute--2014|Perlaviciute and Steg 2014]] ), but people may disagree on which compensation would be worthwhile ( [[#Aitken--2010b|Aitken 2010b]] ; [[#Cass--2010|Cass et al. 2010]] ), on the distribution of compensation ( [[#Devine-Wright--2019|Devine-Wright and Sherry-Brennan 2019]] ; [[#Leer%20Jørgensen--2020|Leer Jørgensen et al. 2020]] ), or feel they are being bribed ( [[#Cass--2010|Cass et al. 2010]] ; [[#Perlaviciute--2014|Perlaviciute and Steg 2014]] ). Pricing policies are more acceptable when revenues are earmarked for environmental purposes ( [[#Steg--2006|Steg et al. 2006]] ; [[#Sælen--2011|Sælen and Kallbekken 2011]] ) or redistributed towards those affected ( [[#Schuitema--2008|Schuitema and Steg 2008]] ).

Climate policy and mitigation options, such as renewable energy projects, are also perceived as more fair and acceptable when the public ( [[#Dietz--2013|Dietz 2013]] ; [[#Bidwell--2014|Bidwell 2014]] ; [[#Bernauer--2016b|Bernauer et al. 2016b]] ) or public society organisations ( [[#Terwel--2010|Terwel et al. 2010]] ; [[#Bernauer--2016b|Bernauer et al. 2016b]] ) could participate in the decision-making ( [[#Arvai--2003|Arvai 2003]] ; [[#Devine-Wright--2005|Devine-Wright 2005]] ; [[#Terwel--2012|Terwel et al. 2012]] ; [[#Walker--2017|Walker and Baxter 2017]] ; [[#Perlaviciute--2020|Perlaviciute and Squintani 2020]] ). People are more motivated to participate in decision-making on local projects than on national or general policy goals ( [[#Perlaviciute--2020|Perlaviciute and Squintani 2020]] ). Public acceptability is also higher when people can influence major rather than only minor decisions, particularly when trust in responsible parties is low ( [[#Liu--2019a|Liu et al. 2019a]] ). Public participation can enhance the quality and legitimacy of decisions by including local knowledge and views that may otherwise be missed ( [[#Dietz--2013|Dietz 2013]] ; [[#Bidwell--2016|Bidwell 2016]] ).

Public support is higher when people trust responsible parties ( [[#Perlaviciute--2014|Perlaviciute and Steg 2014]] ; [[#Drews--2016|Drews and Van den Bergh 2016]] ; [[#Michaels--2016|Michaels and Parag 2016]] ; [[#Jiang--2018|Jiang et al. 2018]] ; [[#Liu--2019a|Liu et al. 2019a]] ). Public support for unilateral climate policy is rather strong and robust ( [[#Bernauer--2016a|Bernauer et al. 2016a]] ), even in the absence of reciprocal commitments by other states ( [[#Bernauer--2015|Bernauer and Gampfer 2015]] ).

Public acceptability of climate policy and low-carbon options differs across individuals. Climate policy and low-carbon options are more acceptable when people strongly value protecting other people and the environment, and support egalitarian worldviews, left-wing or green political ideologies, while acceptability is lower when people strongly endorse self-centred values, and support individualistic worldviews ( [[#Dietz--2007|Dietz et al. 2007]] ; [[#Perlaviciute--2014|Perlaviciute and Steg 2014]] ; [[#Drews--2016|Drews and Van den Bergh 2016]] ). Similarly, public decision-makers support climate policy more when they endorse environmental values ( [[#Nilsson--2016|Nilsson et al. 2016]] ). Climate and energy policy is more acceptable when people are more concerned about climate change ( [[#Hornsey--2016|Hornsey et al. 2016]] ), when they believe their actions would help mitigate climate change, and feel responsible to mitigate climate change ( [[#Steg--2005|Steg 2005]] ; [[#Eriksson--2006|Eriksson et al. 2006]] ; [[#Jakovcevic--2013|Jakovcevic and Steg 2013]] ; [[#Drews--2016|Drews and Van den Bergh 2016]] ; [[#Kim--2017|Kim and Shin 2017]] ; [[#Ünal--2019|Ünal et al. 2019]] ).

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