Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-13 (section)

== 13.9 Accelerating Mitigation Through Cross-sectoral and Economy-wide System Change ==

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=== 13.9.1 Introduction ===

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[[#13.9|Section 13.9]] assesses literature related to economy wide and cross – sector systemic change as an approach to accelerate climate mitigation.

It focuses specifically on policy and institutions, as two of the six enabling conditions for economy-wide system change and thus provides a third dimension of the role of policy and institutions to climate mitigation. Enabling conditions in general are discussed in [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-4|Chapter 4]] of the SR1.5 ( [[#IPCC--2018|IPCC 2018]] ), as well as [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-4|Chapter 4]] of this report. This section follows on from [[#13.6|Section 13.6]] (single policy instruments) and 13.7 (policy packages). [[#13.9|Section 13.9]] literature follows closely on from [[#13.7|Section 13.7]] literature on policy packages, which discusses change within one system, although there remains an overlap.

[[#13.9.2|Section 13.9.2]] provides a brief introduction to policy and institutions as two of the six dimensions of enabling conditions, and the importance of enabling conditions to systemic change and climate mitigation. [[#13.9.3|Section 13.9.3]] briefly introduces actions for transformative justice, which seek to restructure the underlying system framework that produces mitigation inequalities. [[#13.9.4|Section 13.9.4]] provides a brief overview of net zero policies and targets (often no more than aspirational), which imply economy-wide measures and system change. [[#13.9.5|Section 13.9.5]] assesses the literature arguing for a system restructuring approach to climate mitigation, based on systemic restructuring. [[#13.9.6|Section 13.9.6]] assesses the literature on stimulus packages and green new deals which aim for systemic change, sometimes with value for climate mitigation. And finally, [[#13.9.7|Section 13.9.7]] assesses emerging literatures which argues that there are existing challenges to accelerating climate mitigation that may be overcome by systemic change and targeted actions.

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=== 13.9.2 Enabling Acceleration ===

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IPCC AR6 WG3, particularly Chapter 4, following on from the IPCC WG3 SR1.5 ( [[#IPCC--2018|IPCC 2018]] ), has highlighted the importance of enabling conditions for delivering successful climate mitigation actions. The AR6 Glossary term for enabling conditions is: ‘enabling conditions include ''finance, technological innovation'' , strengthening policy instruments, ''institutional capacity'' , ''multi-level governance'' , and changes in ''human behaviour'' and lifestyles ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) (see Glossary). The IPCC SR1.5 report adds to these six dimensions saying enabling conditions also includes ‘inclusive processes, attention to power asymmetries and unequal opportunities for development and reconsideration of values’ ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#IPCC--2018|IPCC 2018]] ). Not only is the presence of enabling conditions necessary for delivering the successful implementation of single policy instruments and policy packages, but also for delivering systemic change ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#de%20Coninck--2018|de Coninck et al. 2018]] ; [[#IPCC--2018|IPCC 2018]] ; [[#Waisman--2019|Waisman et al. 2019]] ). The feasibility of 1.5°C compatible pathways is contingent upon enabling conditions for systemic change ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#de%20Coninck--2018|de Coninck et al. 2018]] ; [[#Waisman--2019|Waisman et al. 2019]] ).

At the same time, again following on from SR1.5 report, [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-1#1.8.1|Section 1.8.1]] explains that there are six feasibility dimensions of successful delivery of climate goals. These feasibility dimensions include geophysical; environmental and ecological; technological; economic; behaviour and lifestyles and institutional dimensions. The presence or absence of enabling conditions would affect the feasibility of mitigation as well as adaptation pathways and can reduce trade-offs while amplifying synergies between options ( [[#Waisman--2019|Waisman et al. 2019]] ). Policies and institutions, which are two of the six enabling conditions, are therefore central to accelerated mitigation and systemic change. Identifying, and ensuring, the presence of all the enabling conditions for any given goal, including systemic transformation and acceleration of climate mitigation, is an important first step ( ''medium evidence'' , ''medium agreement'' ) ( [[#Roberts--2018|Roberts et al. 2018]] ; [[#Le%20Treut--2021|Le Treut et al. 2021]] ; [[#Singh--2021|Singh and Chudasama 2021]] ).

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=== 13.9.3 Transformative Justice Action and Climate Mitigation ===

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[[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-4|Chapter 4]] is the lead chapter of this report for justice and climate mitigation issues, and includes an overview of institutions which have been set up to ensure a Just climate transition ( [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-4#4.5|Section 4.5]] ). [https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/chapter/chapter-13 Chapter 13] has sought to integrate justice issues in [[#13.2|Section 13.2]] in reference to procedural justice and the impact of inequalities on sub-national institutions, [[#13.6|Section 13.6]] in regard to distribution, and [[#13.8|Section 13.8]] in relation to integrating mitigation and adaptation policies.

This sub-section introduces the concept of transformative justice as part of measures intending to accelerate mitigation. Fair and effective climate policymaking requires institutional practices to: consider the distributional impacts of climate policy in the design and implementation of every policy ( [[#Agyeman--2013|Agyeman 2013]] ; [[#Castán%20Broto--2017|Castán Broto and Westman 2017]] ); align mitigation with other objectives such as inclusion and poverty reduction ( [[#Hughes--2020|Hughes and Hoffmann 2020]] ; [[#Rice--2020|Rice et al. 2020]] ; [[#Hess--2021|Hess and McKane 2021]] ); represent a variety of voices, especially those of the most vulnerable ( [[#Bullard--2008|Bullard et al. 2008]] ; [[#Temper--2018|Temper et al. 2018]] ); and rely on open processes of participation ( ''robust evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Anguelovski--2016|Anguelovski et al. 2016]] ; [[#Bouzarovski--2018|Bouzarovski et al. 2018]] ; [[#Rice--2020|Rice et al. 2020]] ).

Distributive approaches to climate justice address injustices related to access to resources and protection from impacts. There is an important difference between affirmative and transformative justice action ( [[#Fraser--1995|Fraser 1995]] ; [[#Agyeman--2016|Agyeman et al. 2016]] ; [[#Castán%20Broto--2019|Castán Broto and Westman 2019]] ): Affirmative action includes policies and strategies that seek to correct inequitable outcomes without disturbing the underlying political framework while transformative action seeks to correct inequitable outcomes by restructuring the underlying framework that produces inequalities.

Transformative action that responds to distributive justice concerns include economy-wide actions via stimulus packages (such as the European Green Deal and the New Green Deal in the USA) ( [[#13.9.5|Section 13.9.5]] ). Other examples are the increasing number of climate litigation suits that are transforming the way distributive dimensions of climate justice are understood ( [[#13.4.2|Section 13.4.2]] ).

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=== 13.9.4 Net Zero Emissions Targets ===

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The last few years have seen a proliferation of net zero emission targets set by national and regional governments, cities as well as companies and institutions (NewClimate Institute and Data Driven EnviroLab 2020; [[#Black--2021|Black et al. 2021]] ; [[#Rogelj--2021|Rogelj et al. 2021]] ) (see also Cross-Chapter Box 3 in Chapter 3). Meeting these targets implies economy-wide systemic change ( ''medium evidence'' , ''h'' ''igh agreement'' ).

The Energy &amp; Climate Intelligence Unit (ECIU) Net Zero Tracker divides countries into those which have net zero emissions achieved, have it in law, have proposed legislation, have it in policy documents or have emission reduction targets under discussion in some form. a recent study estimated that 131 countries have either adopted, announced or are discussing net zero GHG emissions targets, covering 72% of global emissions ( [[#Höhne--2021|Höhne et al. 2021]] ). Out of those, as of 1 October 2021, the ECIU Net Zero Tracker states that Germany, Sweden, the European Union, Japan, United Kingdom, France, Canada, South Korea, Spain, Denmark, New Zealand, Hungary and Luxembourg have net zero targets set in law ( [[#ECIU--2021|ECIU 2021]] ).

Some have argued that the expansion of these emission reduction targets marks an important increase in climate mitigation momentum since the Paris Agreement of 2015 and the 2018 IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C ( [[#Black--2021|Black et al. 2021]] ; [[#Höhne--2021|Höhne et al. 2021]] ). On the other hand net zero emission targets in their current state vary enormously in scope, quality and transparency – with many countries at the discussion stage – and this makes scrutiny and comparison difficult (NewClimate Institute and Data Driven EnviroLab 2020; [[#Black--2021|Black et al. 2021]] ; [[#Rogelj--2021|Rogelj et al. 2021]] ).

In order to realise the mitigation potential of net zero emission targets some areas within the targets might need to be changed. For example, this includes clearer definitions; well defined time frames and scopes; focusing on direct emission reductions within their own territory; minimal reliance on offsets; scrutiny of use and risks of CO 2 removal; attention to equity, near-term action coupled with long-term intent setting; and ongoing monitoring and review ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Levin--2020|Levin et al. 2020]] ; NewClimate Institute and Data Driven EnviroLab 2020; [[#Black--2021|Black et al. 2021]] ; [[#Höhne--2021|Höhne et al. 2021]] ; [[#Rogelj--2021|Rogelj et al. 2021]] ; [[#World%20Bank--2021b|World Bank 2021b]] ).

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=== 13.9.5 Systemic Responses for Climate Mitigation ===

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There is now a significant body of work which explicitly states, or implicitly accepts, that systemic change may be necessary to deliver successful climate mitigation, including net zero targets. Newell phrases this as the difference between ‘plug and play’ mitigation applications where one aspect of a system is changed while everything in the system remains the same compared to systemic change, with change affecting all the system ( [[#Newell--2021a|Newell 2021a]] ,b). This section highlights an emergent, multidisciplinary literature since IPCC AR5, which suggests that acceleration to decarbonised systems via a sustainable development pathway may be better achieved by moving from a single policy instrument or mix of policies approach to a systemic economy-wide approach (Figure 13.6).

The complexity and multi-facetted challenges of rapidly decarbonising our current interconnected systems (such as energy, food, health) in a just way has led [[#Michaelowa--2018|Michaelowa et al. (2018)]] to conclude that implementation of strong mitigation policy packages that are needed requires a systemic change in policymaking.

Multiple modelling assessments of different development and mitigation pathways are available. Most of these analyses which lead to significant climate mitigation assume significant systemic change across social, technological, and economic aspects of a country for example, India ( [[#Gupta--2020|Gupta et al. 2020]] ); Japan ( [[#Sugiyama--2021|Sugiyama et al. 2021]] ) and the globe ( [[#Rogelj--2015|Rogelj et al. 2015]] ; [[#Dejuán--2020|Dejuán et al. 2020]] ).

UNEP (2020) argued that major, long-term sectoral transformation across multiple systems is needed to reach net zero GHG emissions. [[#Bernstein--2019|Bernstein and Hoffmann (2019)]] and [[#Rockström--2017|Rockström et al. (2017)]] argue that the presence of multi-level, multi-sectoral lock-ins of overlapping and interdependent political, economic, technological and cultural forces mean that a new approach of coordinated, cross-economy, systemic climate mitigation is necessary. [[#Creutzig--2018|Creutzig et al. (2018)]] propose a resetting of the approach to consumption and use of resources to that of demand side solutions, which would have ongoing economy-wide systemic implications.

Others focus more on single system reconfigurations, such as the energy system ( [[#Matthes--2017|Matthes 2017]] ; [[#Tozer--2020|Tozer 2020]] ); urban systems ( [[#Holtz--2018|Holtz et al. 2018]] ); or the political system ( [[#Somerville--2020|Somerville 2020]] ; [[#Newell--2020|Newell and Simms 2020]] ). [[#Becken--2019|Becken (2019)]] argues that only systemic changes at a large scale will be sufficient to break or disrupt existing arrangements and routines in the tourism industry.

Others argue for thinking about mitigation in even wider ways. [[#O’Brien--2018|O’Brien (2018)]] posits that sector-focused, or a silo approach, to mitigation may need to give way to decisions and policies which reach across sectoral, geographic and political boundaries and involve a broad set of interrelated processes – practical, political and personal. Gillard et al. ( [[#Gillard--2016|Gillard et al. 2016]] ) argue that a response to climate change has to move beyond incremental responses, aiming instead for a society-wide transformation which goes beyond a system perspective to include learning from social theory; while [[#Eyre--2018|Eyre et al. (2018)]] argue that moving beyond incremental emissions reductions will require expanding the focus of efforts beyond the technical to include people, and their behaviour and attitudes. [[#Stoddard--2021|Stoddard et al. (2021)]] argue that ‘more sustainable and just futures require a radical reconfiguration of long-run socio-cultural and political economic norms and institutions’. They focus on nine themes: international climate governance, the vested interests of the fossil fuel industry, geopolitics and militarism, economics and financialisation, mitigation modelling, energy supply systems, inequity, high carbon lifestyles and social imaginaries.

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=== 13.9.6 Economy-wide Measures ===

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Economy-wide stimulus packages which have occurred post COVID-19, and in some cases in response to environmental concerns, have the ability to undermine or aid climate mitigation ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ). Attention in the early efforts of their development and design can contribute to shifting sustainable development pathways and net zero outcomes, while meeting short-term economic goals ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Hepburn--2020|Hepburn et al. 2020]] ; [[#Hanna--2020|Hanna et al. 2020]] ).

Economy-wide packages, as a way to stimulate and/or restructure domestic economies to deliver particular, desired outcomes is a widely accepted tool of government (for example the Roosevelt’s New Deal packages in the USA between 1933 and 1939). a number of country-level stimulus package were put in place after the 2008 Global Recession, and there was support for a Global Green New Deal from UNEP ( [[#Steiner--2009|Steiner 2009]] ; [[#Barbier--2010|Barbier 2010]] ). Cross-economy structural change packages may provide opportunities for another approach to accelerate climate mitigation.

This approach has already been taken up to some degree by a number of countries/blocs. For example, California as well as Germany, through the German ''Energiewende'' , are early examples of a USA state and a country which have tried to link their economies to a sustainable future through energy-wide efforts of structural change ( [[#Morris--2016|Morris and Jungjohann 2016]] ; [[#Burger--2020a|Burger et al. 2020a]] ).

In addition to these economy-wide measures, there have since been cross-economy Green New Deals implemented such as the European Green Deal ( [[#Elkerbout--2020|Elkerbout et al. 2020]] ; [[#Hainsch--2020|Hainsch et al. 2020]] ; [[#UNEP--2020a|UNEP 2020a]] ) (Box 13.1) with calls for other New Deals, for example a Blue New Deal ( [[#Dundas--2020|Dundas et al. 2020]] ), or deals to bring together climate and justice goals ( [[#Hathaway--2020|Hathaway 2020]] ; [[#MacArthur--2020|MacArthur et al. 2020]] ).

The COVID-19 Pandemic has resulted in global economic recession, which many Governments have responded to with economic stimulus programmes. See also Cross-Chapter Box 1 in [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-1|Chapter 1]] on COVID-19. It has also led to more analysis of the potential of cross-economy stimulus packages to benefit climate goals, including what lessons can be learned from the stimulus packages put in place as a result of the 2008–2009 Global Recession.

The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) reviewed the green stimulus plans of the G20 following the 2008–2009 recession to examine what worked; what did not; and the lessons which could be learnt ( [[#Barbier--2010|Barbier 2010]] ). This work was updated ( [[#Barbier--2020|Barbier 2020]] ) and concluded that the constituents of successful green stimulus frameworks were long-term commitments in public spending; pricing reform; ensuring concerns about affordability were overcome; and minimising unwanted distributional impacts. Others argue that post-2008 recession stimulus package outcomes benefited both environmental and industrial objectives and that a long-term policy commitment to the transition to a sustainable, low-carbon economy makes sense from both an environmental and industrial strategy point of view ( [[#Fankhauser--2013|Fankhauser et al. 2013]] ).

With the outbreak of the COVID-19 Pandemic in 2020, past stimulus packages have been further investigated. One study interviewed 231 central bank officials and identified five key policies for both economic multipliers and climate impacts metrics ( [[#Hepburn--2020|Hepburn et al. 2020]] ). These were expenditure on clean physical infrastructure; building energy efficiency retrofits; investment in education and training; natural capital investment; and clean R&amp;D. However, the mix of effective policies may differ in lower and middle income countries: rural support spending was more relevant, while clean R&amp;D was less so. The study illuminated that there were different phases to recovery packages: the initial ‘rescue’ spending but then a second ‘recovery’ phase that can be more fairly rated green or not green. Recovery phase policies can deliver both economic and climate goals – co-benefits can be captured (i.e. support for EV infrastructure can also reduce local air pollution etc.) – but package design is important ( [[#Hepburn--2020|Hepburn et al. 2020]] ).

Others provide a framework which allows a systematic evaluation of options, given objectives and indicators, for COVID-19 stimulus packages (e.g. [[#Dupont--2020|Dupont et al. 2020]] ; [[#Jotzo--2020|Jotzo et al. 2020]] ; [[#OECD--2021c|OECD 2021c]] ). [[#Jotzo--2020|Jotzo et al. (2020)]] conclude that the programmes that most closely match green stimulus are afforestation and ecosystem restoration programmes, energy efficiency upgrades and RE projects. These type of policies provide short-term goals of COVID-19 while also making progress on longer terms objectives ( [[#Jotzo--2020|Jotzo et al. 2020]] ). The IMF concluded that a comprehensive mitigation policy package combining carbon pricing and government green infrastructure spending (that is partly debt financed) can reduce emissions substantially while boosting economic activity, supporting the recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic ( [[#Jaumotte--2020|Jaumotte et al. 2020]] ).

Conversely, other short-term fiscal or recovery measures in stimulus packages may perpetuate high carbon and environmental damaging systems. These include fossil fuel based infrastructure investment; fiscal incentives for high carbon technologies or projects; waivers or roll-backs of environmental regulation; bailouts of fossil fuel intensive companies without conditions for low-carbon transitions or environmental sustainability ( [[#UNEP--2020a|UNEP 2020a]] ; [[#O’Callaghan--2021|O’Callaghan and Murdock 2021]] ; [[#Vivid%20Economics--2021|Vivid Economics 2021]] ).

Of the USD17.2 trillion so far spent on stimulus packages, USD4.8 trillion (28% of the total as of July 2021) is linked to environmental outcomes ( [[#Vivid%20Economics--2021|Vivid Economics 2021]] ). This study relates to 30 countries: the G20 and 10 others. The packages in EU, Denmark, Canada, France, Spain, the UK, Sweden, Finland and Germany ( [[#German%20Federal%20Ministry%20of%20Finance--2020|German Federal Ministry of Finance 2020]] ; [[#Vivid%20Economics--2021|Vivid Economics 2021]] ) result in net benefits for the environment. a number of studies provide differing conclusions with respect to net benefits or otherwise for the environment for a number of countries ( [[#Climate%20Action%20Tracker--2020|Climate Action Tracker 2020]] ; [[#UNEP--2020a|UNEP 2020a]] ; [[#Vivid%20Economics--2021|Vivid Economics 2021]] ). An OECD database found that, as of mid-July 2021, 21% of economic recovery spending in OECD, EU and Key Partners is allocated to environmentally positive measures ( [[#OECD--2021c|OECD 2021c]] ). [[#O’Callaghan--2021|O’Callaghan and Murdock (2021)]] reviewed the 50 countries with the greatest stimulus spend in 2020 and find that 13% of the spend is directed to long-term recovery type measures, of which 18% is spent on green recovery. This is a total of 2.5% of total spend or 368 billion USD on green initiatives.

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=== 13.9.7 Steps for Acceleration ===

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The multidisciplinary literature exploring how to accelerate climate mitigation and transition to low GHG economies and systems has grown rapidly over the last few years. Acceleration is also confirmed as an important sub-theme of the more specific transition literature ( [[#Köhler--2019|Köhler et al. 2019]] ). While literature focusing on how to accelerate the impact of climate mitigation is derived from empirical evidence, there is very little ''ex post'' evidence of directed acceleration approaches.

The overlapping discussions of how to accelerate climate mitigation; transition to low-carbon economies; and shift development pathways depends heavily on country-specific dynamics in political coalitions, material endowments, industry strategy, cultural discourses, and civil society pressures (Sections 13.2, 13.3, 13.4, 13.7, and 13.8). Ambition for acceleration at different scales and stringency (whether for cities, country climate policies, country industrial strategies, or national economic restructuring) increase governance challenges, including coordination across stakeholders, institutions, and scales. ‘There is therefore no “one-size-fits-all” blueprint for accelerating low-carbon transitions’ ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Geels--2017a|Geels et al. 2017a]] ; [[#Roberts--2018|Roberts et al. 2018]] ).

[[#Markard--2020|Markard et al. (2020)]] describe the key challenges to accelerating climate mitigation and sustainability transitions as:

1. The ability for low-carbon innovations to emerge in whole systems. Two critical issues need to occur to overcome this challenge (i) complementary interactions between different elements. For example, in an electricity system, the integration of renewable energy requires complementary storage technologies etc. and (ii) changes in system architecture. Thus, in the accelerating phase, policy has to shift from stimulating singular innovations towards managing wider system transformation.

2. The need for greater interactions between adjacent systems: interactions between multiple systems increases the complexity of the transition. Policies are linked to institutions or government departments, and they are often compartmentalised into different policy areas (e.g. energy policy and transport policy). Increasing and coordinating that interaction adds complexity.

3. The resistance from declining industries; acceleration of sustainability transitions will involve the phase out of unsustainable technologies. As a result, acceleration towards a sustainability transition may be resisted – whether business models, or where jobs are involved. Political struggles and conflicts are an inherent part of accelerating transitions, one strategy to deal with this resistance is to accomplish wide societal support for long-term transition targets and to form broad constituencies of actors in favour of those transitions.

4. The need for changes in consumer practices and routines; this challenge relates to changes in social practices that may be required for mainstreaming of sustainable technologies. For example, electric vehicles require changes in trip planning and refuelling practices. Reducing levels or types of consumption is also desirable.

5. Coordination challenges in policy and governance. There is an increasing complexity of governance which can be overcome by stronger vertical and horizontal policy coordination across systems.

The acceleration literature links two over-arching actions: first, a strategic targeting approach to overcoming the challenges to acceleration by a parallel focus on undermining high carbon systems while simultaneously encouraging low-carbon systems; and second, focusing on a coordinated, cross-economy systemic response, including harnessing enabling conditions ( ''robust evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Rogelj--2015|Rogelj et al. 2015]] ; [[#Geels--2017b|Geels et al. 2017b]] ; [[#Hvelplund--2017|Hvelplund and Djørup 2017]] ; [[#Gomez%20Echeverri--2018|Gomez Echeverri 2018]] ; [[#Markard--2018|Markard 2018]] ; [[#Tvinnereim--2018|Tvinnereim and Mehling 2018]] ; [[#O’Brien--2018|O’Brien 2018]] ; [[#Roberts--2018|Roberts et al. 2018]] ; [[#Hess--2019|Hess 2019]] ; [[#Kotilainen--2019|Kotilainen et al. 2019]] ; [[#Victor--2019|Victor et al. 2019]] ; [[#European%20Environment%20Agency--2019|European Environment Agency 2019]] ; [[#Rosenbloom--2020|Rosenbloom and Rinscheid 2020]] ; [[#Newell--2020|Newell and Simms 2020]] ; [[#Otto--2020|Otto et al. 2020]] ; [[#Strauch--2020|Strauch 2020]] ; [[#Burger--2020a|Burger et al. 2020a]] ; [[#Hsu--2020b|Hsu et al. 2020b]] ; [[#Rosenbloom--2020|Rosenbloom et al. 2020]] ).

Strategic targeting, or the identifying of specific intervention points ( [[#Kanger--2020|Kanger et al. 2020]] ), points of leverage ( [[#Abson--2017|Abson et al. 2017]] ), or upward cascading tipping points ( [[#Sharpe--2021|Sharpe and Lenton 2021]] ), broadly means choosing particular actions which will lead to a greater acceleration of climate mitigation across systems. For example, Dorninger et al.(2020) provide a quantitative systematic review of empirical research addressing sustainability interventions. They take ‘leverage points’ – places in complex systems where relatively small changes can lead to potentially transformative systemic changes – to classify different interventions according to their potential for system-wide transformative change. They argue that ‘deep leverage points’ – the goals of a system, its intent, and rules – need to be addressed more directly, and they provide analysis of the food and energy systems.

The strategic choosing of policies and points of intervention is linked to the importance of choosing self-reinforcing actions for acceleration ( [[#Rosenbloom--2018|Rosenbloom et al. 2018]] ; [[#Butler-Sloss--2021|Butler-Sloss et al. 2021]] ; [[#Sharpe--2021|Sharpe and Lenton 2021]] ; [[#Jordan--2020|Jordan and Moore 2020]] ; [[#Bang--2021|Bang 2021]] ). [[#Butler-Sloss--2021|Butler-Sloss et al. (2021)]] explains the types of self-reinforcing actions (or feedback loops) which can encourage or undermine rapid transformation of energy systems.

An example of this first overarching action, the strategic targeting of the challenges to acceleration, is the focus on undermining carbon- intensive systems, thereby reducing opposition to more generalised acceleration policies, including the encouragement of low-carbon systems ( ''robust evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Hvelplund--2017|Hvelplund and Djørup 2017]] ; [[#Rosenbloom--2018|Rosenbloom 2018]] ; [[#Roberts--2019|Roberts and Geels 2019]] ; [[#Victor--2019|Victor et al. 2019]] ; [[#Rosenbloom--2020|Rosenbloom et al. 2020]] ; [[#Rosenbloom--2020|Rosenbloom and Rinscheid 2020]] ). Undermining high carbon systems includes deliberately phasing out unsustainable technologies and systems ( [[#Kivimaa--2016|Kivimaa and Kern 2016]] ; [[#David--2017|David 2017]] ; [[#European%20Environment%20Agency--2019|European Environment Agency 2019]] ; [[#Johnsson--2019|Johnsson et al. 2019]] ; [[#UNEP--2019b|UNEP 2019b]] ; [[#Carter--2020|Carter and McKenzie 2020]] ; [[#Newell--2020|Newell and Simms 2020]] ); confronting the issues of incumbent resistance ( [[#Roberts--2018|Roberts et al. 2018]] ); and avoiding future emissions and energy excess by reducing demand ( [[#Rogelj--2015|Rogelj et al. 2015]] ; [[#UNEP--2019b|UNEP 2019b]] ; [[#Victor--2019|Victor et al. 2019]] ).

Other strategic goals include tackling the equity and justice issues of ‘stranded regions’ ( [[#Spencer--2018|Spencer et al. 2018]] ); paying greater attention to system architecture to enable increased acceleration to low-carbon electricity supply, in this case in the wind industry ( [[#McMeekin--2019|McMeekin et al. 2019]] ); and the importance of maintaining global ecosystem of low-carbon supply chains ( [[#Goldthau--2020|Goldthau and Hughes 2020]] ).

Other strategic goals combine national and global action. For example, global NGO coalitions have formed around strategic policy outcomes such as the ‘Keep it in the Ground’ movement ( [[#Carter--2020|Carter and McKenzie 2020]] ), and are supported via coordinated networks, such as the Powering Past Coal Alliance ( [[#Jewell--2019|Jewell et al. 2019]] ), and with knowledge dissemination, for example, the ‘Fossil Fuel Cuts Database’ ( [[#Gaulin--2020|Gaulin and Le Billon 2020]] ).

The second overarching point highlighted by the literature is the benefits of focusing on a coordinated, cross-economy systemic response. Coordination is central to this. For example, coordination of actions and coherent narratives across sectors and cross economy, including within and between all governance levels and scales of actions, is beneficial for acceleration ( ''robust evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Zürn--2013|Zürn and Faude 2013]] ; [[#Hawkey--2014|Hawkey and Webb 2014]] ; [[#Huttunen--2014|Huttunen et al. 2014]] ; [[#Magro--2014|Magro et al. 2014]] ; [[#Warren--2016|Warren et al. 2016]] ; [[#Köhler--2019|Köhler et al. 2019]] ; [[#Kotilainen--2019|Kotilainen et al. 2019]] ; [[#McMeekin--2019|McMeekin et al. 2019]] ; [[#Victor--2019|Victor et al. 2019]] ; [[#Hsu--2020b|Hsu et al. 2020b]] ). [[#Victor--2019|Victor et al. (2019)]] provide a framework of how to prioritise the most urgent actions for climate mitigation and they give practical case studies of how to improve coordination to accelerate reconfiguration of systems for economy-wide climate mitigation in sectors such as power; cars; shipping; aviation; buildings; cement; and plastics.

However, coordination is a necessary but insufficient condition of acceleration. All enabling conditions are required to deliver systemic transformation ( [[#13.9.2|Section 13.9.2]] ).

Other disciplines argue that social transformation is likely to be as important as the technical challenges in a coordinated, cross-economy approach to acceleration. For example, some argue for social tipping interventions (STI) alongside other technical and political interventions so that they can ‘activate contagious processes of rapidly spreading technologies, behaviours, social norms, and structural reorganisation’ ( [[#Otto--2020|Otto et al. 2020]] ). They argue that these STIs are ''inter alia'' : removing fossil fuel subsidies and incentivising decentralised energy generation; building carbon neutral cities; divesting from assets linked to fossil fuels; revealing the moral implications of fossil fuels; strengthening climate education and engagement; and disclosing information of GHG emissions ( [[#Otto--2020|Otto et al. 2020]] ). Others illuminate the importance of narratives and framings in the take-up (or not) of acceleration actions ( [[#Sovacool--2020|Sovacool et al. 2020]] ). Others are optimistic about the possibilities of transformation but also highlight the importance of political economy for rapid and just transitions ( [[#Newell--2020|Newell and Simms 2020]] ; Newell 2021).

In summary, a synthesis of the multidisciplinary, acceleration literature suggests that climate mitigation is a multifaceted problem which spans cross-economy and society issues, and that solutions to acceleration may lie in coordinated systemic approaches to change and strategic targeting of leverage points. Broadly, this literature agrees on a dual approach of non-incremental systemic change and a targeting of specific acceleration challenges, with tailored actions drawing on enabling conditions. The underlying argument of this is that there is a strategic logic to focusing on actions which undermine high carbon systems at the same time as encouraging low-carbon systems. If high carbon systems are weakened then this may reduce the opposition to policies and actions aimed at accelerating climate mitigation, enabling more support for low-carbon systems. In addition, targeting of actions which may create ‘tipping point cascades’ which increase the rate of decarbonisation may also be beneficial. Finally, new modes of governance may be better suited to this approach in the context of transformative change.

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