Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Cross-Chapter-Paper-4 (section)

== CCP4.2 Vulnerability of Mediterranean Countries to Climate Change ==

<div id="CCP4.2.1" class="h2-container"></div>

<span id="ccp4.2.1-the-specific-vulnerability-of-mediterranean-countries"></span>
=== CCP4.2.1 The Specific Vulnerability of Mediterranean Countries ===

<div id="h2-5-siblings" class="h2-siblings"></div>

The Mediterranean region is predominantly vulnerable to the impacts of warming, notably prolonged and stronger heat waves, increased drought in an already dry climate and risk of coastal flooding (Section CCP4.1). southern and eastern countries are generally more vulnerable than countries in the north. Several countries (Tunisia, Algeria and Libya) are below the water scarcity threshold set by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO); others (Morocco) are close to the threshold for severe water stress. Uncertainties regarding the timing, duration, intensity and interval between extreme climatic events put some sectors, such as agriculture and tourism, at particular risk in the Mediterranean region (Section CCP4.3; [[#Kallis--2008|Kallis, 2008]] ; [[#Kutiel--2019|Kutiel, 2019]] ).

<div id="CCP4.2.2" class="h2-container"></div>

<span id="ccp4.2.2-economic-vulnerability"></span>
=== CCP4.2.2 Economic Vulnerability ===

<div id="h2-6-siblings" class="h2-siblings"></div>

All Mediterranean countries are vulnerable to climate change across most socioeconomic sectors. In low-income countries of the Basin, a 1.1-point reduction of gross domestic product (GDP) could occur as a consequence of 1°C rise warming ( [[#Radhouane--2013|Radhouane, 2013]] ). In Morocco, GDP impacts of climate change could be -3% to +0.4% by 2050 relative to 2003 ( [[#Ouraich--2018|Ouraich and Tyner, 2018]] ). In Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries, approximately 10–13% of GDP loss is projected for an increase in global mean temperature of 4.8°C by 2100 ( [[#Kompas--2018|Kompas et al., 2018]] ). In Southern Europe, mean labour productivity loss would shrink by approximately 2% under 2°C warming, along with a GDP loss of 0.1% by the 2030s, reaching 0.4% by the 2080s ( [[#Szewczyk--2018|Szewczyk et al., 2018]] ).

Freshwater resources are vulnerable to climate change and growing demand, notably from agriculture ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-4#4.1|Section 4.1.3]] ; [[#Gudmundsson--2017|Gudmundsson et al., 2017]] ; [[#Zabalza-Martínez--2018|Zabalza-Martínez et al., 2018]] ; [[#Masseroni--2020|Masseroni et al., 2020]] ). The share of GDP and population exposed to high or very high water stress in MENA countries is 71% and 61%, respectively, compared to 22% and 36% in the world ( [[#World%20Bank--2018|World Bank, 2018]] ). Freshwater resources are also vulnerable to sea level rise and associated salinisation ( [[#Ali--2016|Ali and El-Magd, 2016]] ; [[#Wassef--2016|Wassef and Schüttrumpf, 2016]] ; [[#Twining-Ward--2018|Twining-Ward et al., 2018]] ). Due to the impact of climate change on water supplies (−14% to −6%), MENA countries are projected to experience high losses in GDP by 2050 ( [[#World%20Bank--2016|World Bank, 2016]] ).

The agricultural sector is important for most Mediterranean economies, both in terms of GDP and employment, with its share of the total GDP in the region at 6.7% in 2016 ( [[#Kutiel--2019|Kutiel, 2019]] ). Water stress in southern countries is largely driven by growing demand from agriculture, with a potential water deficit of 28–47% by 2030 ( [[#Sebri--2017|Sebri, 2017]] ). In Spain, 11 out of 15 river basin districts are under water stress due to demand from agriculture ( [[#Vargas--2019|Vargas and Paneque, 2019]] ). In Greece, the largest agricultural region (Thessaly) where 70% of the irrigation water comes from groundwater, is under water stress ( [[#Gemitzi--2018|Gemitzi and Lakshmi, 2018]] ). Water scarcity and high dependence on rain-fed agriculture make MENA countries vulnerable to warming and reduced rainfall, associated with high irrigation requirements ( [[#Dhehibi--2015|Dhehibi et al., 2015]] ; [[#Fader--2016|Fader et al., 2016]] ; [[#World%20Bank--2016|World Bank, 2016]] ; 2018; [[#Asseng--2018|Asseng et al., 2018]] ). This is exacerbated by poverty and political instability ( [[#Price--2017|Price, 2017]] ). For cropping systems in MENA countries, the Nile Valley and the western parts of North Africa on the Atlas Mountains are classified as the areas with highest vulnerability ( [[#ESCWA--2017|ESCWA, 2017]] ). Grassland and pastoral systems are also vulnerable to increasing drought, notably in the western part of the basin ( [[#Balzan--2020|Balzan et al., 2020]] ). Increased heat stress in summer negatively impacts animal health and welfare, i.e., increased incidence of diseases and mortality or lower fertility (Lacetera 2019).

As MENA countries are net food importers, they are not only vulnerable to the impact of climate change on food production in the Mediterranean region, but also the climate impacts on food production elsewhere, for example, in China and Russia ( [[#Waha--2017|Waha et al., 2017]] ). The agri-food sector in the Mediterranean region is also important for global food security because several large producing countries in the region, such as France, Italy and Morocco, are net exporters of many essential micronutrients to low- and lower-middle-income countries. Changing quantity and quality of production would have direct (availability) and indirect (price signals) impacts on their trade partners.

The economic value of fisheries in the Mediterranean Sea is over USD 3.4 billion ( [[#Randone--2017|Randone et al., 2017]] ), with about 76,250 fishing vessels in 2019 ( [[#FAO--2020|FAO, 2020]] ), most of them (about 62%) in the eastern and central Mediterranean ( [[#FAO--2018|FAO, 2018]] ). Total employment on-board fishing vessels is 202,000 and six countries, Tunisia, Algeria, Turkey, Italy, Greece and Egypt, account for approximately 82% of total employment ( [[#FAO--2020|FAO, 2020]] ). About 78% of the fish stocks in the Mediterranean are currently fished at unsustainable levels ( [[#Galli--2015|Galli et al., 2015]] ). The share of stocks in overexploitation has decreased from 88% in 2012 to 75% in 2018 ( [[#FAO--2020|FAO, 2020]] ). Nearly half of the catches consist of small pelagic species (anchovies, sardines, herrings), which are very vulnerable to increased seawater temperatures ( [[#FAOSTAT--2019|FAOSTAT, 2019]] ). Turkey is particularly sensitive to climate change in the fisheries sector ( [[#Turan--2016|Turan et al., 2016]] ; [[#Hidalgo--2018|Hidalgo et al., 2018]] ). Fisheries in northern countries are less vulnerable because they have a greater capacity to adapt (i.e., more assets, flexibility, learning potential and social organisation), while southern countries are more vulnerable ( [[#Ding--2017|Ding et al., 2017]] ). The reduction of fish availability directly impacts the income of employees, for example, in the Italian fisheries industry ( [[#Tulone--2019|Tulone et al., 2019]] ).

Mediterranean forests are diverse and play a major ecological and social role through significant ecosystem services, including wood, but also their recreational value and production of non-wood goods, such as mushrooms ( [[#Ding--2016|Ding et al., 2016]] ; [[#Peñuelas--2017|Peñuelas et al., 2017]] ; [[#Gauquelin--2018|Gauquelin et al., 2018]] ; [[#Herrero--2019|Herrero et al., 2019]] ). Many forests grow at the dry margin of their distribution area; therefore, projected drier conditions will affect their productivity and health ( [[#Doblas-Miranda--2017|Doblas-Miranda et al., 2017]] ; [[#Dorado-Liñán--2019|Dorado-Liñán et al., 2019]] ; [[#Sangüesa-Barreda--2019|Sangüesa-Barreda et al., 2019]] ). Vulnerability to wildfire is a significant matter of concern, particularly in the northern and southwestern Mediterranean region ( [[#Ager--2014|Ager et al., 2014]] ; [[#Gomes%20da%20Costa--2020|Gomes da Costa et al., 2020]] ). In Córdoba (Spain), for example, fire suppression costs have increased by 66–87% in the last decade ( [[#Molina--2019|Molina et al., 2019]] ).

The Mediterranean region accounts for one-third of global tourism with 330 million tourists in 2016 ( [[#Tovar-Sánchez--2019|Tovar-Sánchez et al., 2019]] ). Before the COVID-19 crisis, international tourist arrivals were assumed to increase by 60% between 2015 and 2030, reaching 500 million. In 2015, tourism supported 15% of the total employment in the region ( [[#Randone--2017|Randone et al., 2017]] ). France, Spain, Italy and Greece are the top tourist destinations ( [[#UNWTO--2016|UNWTO, 2016]] ), but the highest growth was in Turkey, Croatia and Albania during 1995–2015 (MGI, 2017). The tourism industry is vulnerable to climate change, particularly in low-income countries ( [[#Dogru--2016|Dogru et al., 2016]] ; [[#Dogru--2019|Dogru et al., 2019]] ). Coastal tourism in the region generates USD 300 billion annually followed by marine tourism (USD 110 billion) ( [[#Radhouane--2013|Radhouane, 2013]] ; [[#Randone--2017|Randone et al., 2017]] ).

By providing around 550,000 jobs in the Mediterranean region, the maritime transport and trade industry comprises approximately 20–40% of GDP. As a hub for trade, the Mediterranean, with approximately 600 ports of different sizes, accounts for 25% of all international seaborne trade, including 22% of oil trade. In the region, the shift to green energy to combat climate change would significantly influence the structure of foreign trade in terms of commodities and maritime energy transport flows ( [[#Manoli--2021|Manoli, 2021]] ).

<div id="CCP4.2.3" class="h2-container"></div>

<span id="ccp4.2.3-social-and-human-vulnerability"></span>
=== CCP4.2.3 Social and Human Vulnerability ===

<div id="h2-7-siblings" class="h2-siblings"></div>

With population growth, food demand in the region increases and will continue to do so, while regional food production on land and from the sea is threatened by climate change, creating the need for additional import. In MENA countries, livestock production increased by 25% in 1993–2013, causing animal feed imports to increase to about 32% of the total food import in 2014 ( [[#FAO--2018|FAO, 2018]] ), thereby increasing food import dependence of southern countries ( [[#INRA--2015|INRA, 2015]] ; [[#Saladini--2018|Saladini et al., 2018]] ). Sharp increases in international food prices since 2007 have caused inflation, trade deficits, fiscal pressure, increased poverty and political instability, all affecting food supply, notably in the south and east of the region ( [[#Harrigan--2011|Harrigan, 2011]] ; [[#Kamrava--2012|Kamrava and Babar, 2012]] ; [[#Ferragina--2015|Ferragina and Canitano, 2015]] ; [[#Paciello--2015|Paciello, 2015]] ).

Heat waves and other climatic extremes affect densely populated urban centres and coastal regions, causing health risks for vulnerable groups, in particular those who live in poverty with substandard housing ( [[#Paz--2016|Paz et al., 2016]] ; [[#Scortichini--2018|Scortichini et al., 2018]] ; [[#Rohat--2019|Rohat et al., 2019]] ). Nights with temperatures higher than 23°C have been increasing, with a corresponding increase in health risks ( [[#Royé--2017|Royé, 2017]] ). Human health is also vulnerable to other risks altered by climate change, either directly through droughts, floods, fires and so forth or indirectly through impacts on disease vectors, air pollution, water quality and food security ( [[#Negev--2015|Negev et al., 2015]] ). Cases of dengue fever were recently reported from several countries, and there is an apparent threat of outbreaks transmitted by ''Aedes'' mosquitoes in the northern Mediterranean ( [[#Semenza--2016|Semenza et al., 2016]] ; [[#Semenza--2017|Semenza and Suk, 2017]] ). The most vulnerable to climate impacts are the elderly, pregnant women, children, the chronically ill, the obese and people with cognitive impairment ( [[#Linares--2015|Linares et al., 2015]] ; [[#Paravantis--2017|Paravantis et al., 2017]] ).

One-third of the Mediterranean population (about 150 million people) currently lives close to the sea, often in growing urban regions and with infrastructure vulnerable to sea level rise (Cross-Chapter Box SLR in Chapter 3; [[#Briche--2016|Briche et al., 2016]] ; [[#UN%20DESA--2017|UN DESA, 2017]] ). Future exposure to sea level rise is related to demographic growth. All SSPs project an increase of coastal population in the Mediterranean region to 2050. By 2100, coastal population could grow by up to 130%, mostly in the south, but it could also drop by 20% for SSP1 ( [[#Reimann--2018b|Reimann et al., 2018b]] ). Overall, countries in the southeastern Mediterranean are most vulnerable to coastal risks, but the exposure is also high in the northern Mediterranean ( [[#Satta--2017|Satta et al., 2017]] ).

In terms of the number of people, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia are the most exposed countries to sea level rise ( [[#World%20Bank--2014|World Bank, 2014]] ), and this difference is projected to increase under SSP2-4 ( [[#Reimann--2018a|Reimann et al., 2018a]] ). Among MENA countries, Egypt is particularly exposed with several coastal cities at risk of inundation ( [[#Frihy--2010|Frihy et al., 2010]] ; [[#Solyman--2020|Solyman and Abdel Monem, 2020]] ; [[#Elshinnawy--2021|Elshinnawy and Almaliki, 2021]] ). In the Nile Delta, between 1500 and 2600 km 2 of land are projected to be exposed to flooding by 2100 by a sea level rise of 0.75 m (median sea level rise scenario for SSP5-85) and additional subsidence up to 0.25 m, threatening around 6.3 million residents (Figure CCP4.6; [[#Ali--2016|Ali and El-Magd, 2016]] ; [[#Solyman--2020|Solyman and Abdel Monem, 2020]] ). Basin-wide economic losses are estimated at USD 5 billion, assuming a rise of sea levels by 1.26 m in 2100 ( [[#Frihy--2010|Frihy et al., 2010]] ; [[#World%20Bank--2014|World Bank, 2014]] ).

<div id="_idContainer025x" class="Figure"></div>

[[File:ed9ed021c20f432a029105a5fbc4a707 IPCC_AR6_WGII_Figure_CCP4_006.png]]

'''Figure CCP4.6 |''' '''Present-day and projected exposure to sea level rise in the Nile Delta, due to sea level change and land subsidence: (a) current exposure, (b) exposure for 2°C of global warming by 2100, (c) exposure for 3°C of global warming by 2100, (d) exposure for a high-end sea level rise scenario involving additional mass losses from the Antarctica ice sheet (Frihy et al.''' ''', 2010; [[#Ali--2016|Ali and El-Magd, 2016]] ; [[#Kulp--2019|Kulp and Strauss, 2019]] ); sea level scenarios from WG1 AR6 Chapter 9, Fox-Kemper et al., 2021; see [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-4|Chapter 4]] Supplementary Material for additional details.'''

The Mediterranean area is characterised by high human mobility, mostly within countries, but also between them (Cross-Chapter Box MIGRATE in Chapter 7; [[#Charef--2016|Charef and Doraï, 2016]] ; Ben [[#Youssef--2017|Youssef et al., 2017]] ). In 2017, the value of remittances from migrants was about 16% of southern Mediterranean countries’ exports to the European Union (EU) ( [[#Alcidi--2019|Alcidi et al., 2019]] ). Impacts of recent climate change, notably drought and their effects on human livelihoods and vulnerability, may have contributed to migration decisions, although there is debate about the relative importance ( [[#Kelley--2015|Kelley et al., 2015]] ; [[#Fröhlich--2016|Fröhlich, 2016]] ; [[#Hamed--2018|Hamed et al., 2018]] ; [[#Ash--2020|Ash and Obradovich, 2020]] ). One study of five MENA countries estimated that extreme climate events account for about 10–20% of migration, with an expected increase of the role of environmental factors in the future as climatic conditions deteriorate further ( [[#Wodon--2014|Wodon et al., 2014]] ).

Improved sharing and co-production of knowledge can support climate adaptation practices, ensure their implementation and thereby reduce vulnerability ( [[#Nguyen--2019|Nguyen et al., 2019]] ), for example, in the water sector ( [[#Iglesias--2015|Iglesias and Garrote, 2015]] ; [[#Iglesias--2018|Iglesias et al., 2018]] ) and notably river management ( [[#Tàbara--2018|Tàbara et al., 2018]] ). The individual perception of climate risks is also a component of vulnerability ( [[#Nguyen--2016|Nguyen et al., 2016]] ). Understanding the gap between perceptions and scientific evidence, and increasing risk perception and awareness, will be crucial to promote adaptive responses both at the individual and the collective level throughout the Mediterranean Basin ( [[#Macias--2015|Macias et al., 2015]] ; [[#Bodoque--2016|Bodoque et al., 2016]] ; [[#Cramer--2018|Cramer et al., 2018]] ).

<div id="CCP4.3" class="h1-container"></div>

<span id="ccp4.3-projected-climate-risks-in-the-mediterranean-basin"></span>