Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-13 (section)

=== 13.2.3 Approaches to National Institutions and Governance ===

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==== 13.2.3.1 The Forms of Climate Institutions ====

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Universal ‘best-practice’ formulations of organisations may not be applicable across country contexts, but institutions that are suited to national context can be ratcheted up over time in their scope and effectiveness ( ''medium evidence'' , ''medium agreement'' ). National climate institutions take diverse forms because they emerge out of country-specific interactions between national climate politics and existing institutional structures. Certain institutional forms tend to be common across countries, such as expert climate change commissions; a review finds eleven such institutions in existence as of mid-2020. Although this institutional form may be common, these commissions vary in terms of expertise, independence and focus ( [[#Abraham-Dukuma--2020|Abraham-Dukuma et al. 2020]] ), reinforcing the important shaping role of national context.

A review of institutions in eight countries suggests three broad processes through which institutions emerge: ‘purpose-built’ dedicated institutions focused explicitly on mitigation; ‘layering’ of mitigation objectives on existing institutions; and ‘latent’ institutions created for other purposes that nonetheless have implications for mitigation outcomes ( [[#Dubash--2021|Dubash 2021]] ). In relatively few countries do new, purpose-built, legally-mandated bodies created specifically for climate mitigation exist although this number is growing; examples include the UK ( [[#Averchenkova--2018|Averchenkova et al. 2018]] ), China ( [[#Teng--2021|Teng and Wang 2021]] ), Australia ( [[#Keenan--2012|Keenan et al. 2012]] ) and New Zealand ( [[#Timperley--2020|Timperley 2020]] ). These cases indicate that dedicated and lasting institutions with a strategic long-term focus on mitigation emerge only under conditions of broad national political agreement around climate mitigation as a national priority ( [[#Dubash--2021|Dubash 2021]] ). However, the specific forms of those institutions differ, as illustrated by the case of the UK’s Climate Change Committee established as an independent agency (Box 13.2) and China, which is built around a top-down planning structure (Box 13.3).

Where economy-wide institutions do not exist, new institutions may still address sub-sets of the challenge. In Australia, while political conditions resulted in the repeal of an overarching Clean Energy Act in 2014, although a Climate Change Authority continued, other institutions primarily focused on the energy sector such as the Clean Energy Regulator, the Clean Energy Finance Corporation, and the Australia Renewable Agency continued to shape energy outcomes ( [[#MacNeil--2021|MacNeil 2021]] ).

Where new dedicated organisations have not emerged, countries may layer climate responsibilities on existing institutions; the addition of mitigation to the responsibilities of the US Environmental Protection Agency is an example ( [[#Mildenberger--2021|Mildenberger 2021]] ). Layering is also a common approach when climate change is embedded within consideration of multiple objectives of policy. In these cases, climate institutions tend to be layered on sectoral institutions for the pursuit of co-benefits or broader development concerns. Examples include India, where energy security was an important objective of renewable energy promotion policy (Pillai and [[#Dubash--2021|Dubash 2021]] ), Brazil’s mitigation approach focused on sectoral forest policy ( [[#Hochstetler--2021|Hochstetler 2021]] ) and South Africa’s emphasis on job creation as a necessary factor in mitigation policy ( [[#Chandrashekeran--2017|Chandrashekeran et al. 2017]] ; [[#Rennkamp--2019|Rennkamp 2019]] ). Prior to this process of layering, sectoral institutions, such as in forest and energy sectors, may play an important latent role in shaping climate outcomes, before climate considerations are part of their formal mandate.

New rules and organisations are not only created, they are also dismantled or allowed to wither away. Cases of institutional dismantling or neglect include the Australian Clean Energy Act ( [[#Crowley--2017|Crowley 2017]] ; [[#MacNeil--2021|MacNeil 2021]] ), the Indian Prime Minister’s Council on Climate Change, which, while formally functional, effectively does not meet (Pillai and [[#Dubash--2021|Dubash 2021]] ), and the weakening of climate units inside sectoral ministries in Brazil ( [[#Hochstetler--2021|Hochstetler 2021]] ). While there is limited literature on the robustness of climate institutions, case studies suggest institutions are more likely to emerge, persist and be effective when institutions map to a framing of climate change that has broad political support ( ''medium evidence'' , ''medium agreement'' ). Thus while mitigation focused framings and institutions may win political support in some countries, in other cases sectorally focused or multiple objectives oriented institutions may be most useful and resilient ( [[#Dubash--2021|Dubash 2021]] ).

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==== 13.2.3.2 Addressing Climate Governance Challenges ====

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Climate governance challenges include ensuring coordination, building consensus by mediating conflict, and setting strategy ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ). Coordination is important because climate change is an all-of-economy and society problem that requires cross-sectoral and cross-scale action; building consensus is needed because large-scale transformations can unsettle established interests; and strategy setting is required due to the transformative and time-bound nature of climate mitigation ( [[#Dubash--2021|Dubash et al. 2021]] ). Yet, climate institutions have a mixed record in addressing these challenges.

Institutions that provide coordination, integration across policy areas and mainstreaming are particularly important given the scope and scale of climate change ( [[#Candel--2016|Candel and Biesbroek 2016]] ; [[#Tosun--2017|Tosun and Lang 2017]] ) ( [[#13.7|Section 13.7]] ). Ministries of environment are often appointed as ''de facto'' agents of coordination, but have been hampered by their limited regulative authority and ability to engage in intra-governmental bargaining with ministries with larger budgets and political heft ( [[#Aamodt--2018|Aamodt 2018]] ).

Creation of a high-level coordinating body to coordinate across departments and mainstream climate into sectoral actions is another common approach ( [[#Oulu--2015|Oulu 2015]] ). For example, Kenya has created a National Climate Change Council, which operates through a climate change directorate in the environment ministry to mainstream climate change at the county level ( [[#Guey--2019|Guey and Bilich 2019]] ). [[#Zhou--2011|Zhou and Mori (2011)]] suggest that well-functioning inter-agency coordination mechanisms require support from heads of government, involvement by industry and environment agencies; and engagement by multiple sectoral agencies. However, coordination mechanisms without a clear authority and basis for setting directions run the risk of ‘negative coordination’, a process through which ministries comment on each other’s proposals, removing any ideas that run counter to the interests of their own ministry, leading to even weaker decisions ( [[#Flachsland--2021|Flachsland and Levi 2021]] ). Countries with dedicated, new climate institutions tend to have a more explicit and authorised body for climate coordination, such as China’s National Leading Group (Box 13.3).

Without explicit coordination with finance ministries, there is a risk of parallel and non-complementary approaches. For example, the South African Treasury pursued a carbon tax without clear indication of how it interfaced with a quantitative sectoral budget approach espoused by the environment ministry (Tyler and [[#Hochstetler--2021|Hochstetler 2021]] ). [[#Skovgaard--2012|Skovgaard (2012)]] suggests that there is an important distinction between finance ministries that bring a limiting ‘budget frame’ to climate action, versus a ‘market failure frame’ that encourages broader engagement by relevant ministries.

Coordination within federal systems poses additional complexities, such as overlapping authority across jurisdictions, multiple norms in place, and approaches to coordination across scales ( [[#Brown--2012|Brown 2012]] ). Multi-level governance systems such as the EU can influence the design and functioning of climate policies and institutions in member states, such as Germany ( [[#Skjærseth--2017|Skjærseth 2017]] ; [[#Jänicke--2019|Jänicke and Wurzel 2019]] ; [[#Flachsland--2021|Flachsland and Levi 2021]] ) and the UK ( [[#Lockwood--2021a|Lockwood 2021a]] ). In some cases, this can result in distinct European modes of governance as has been suggested occurred in the case of wind energy ( [[#Fitch-Roy--2016|Fitch-Roy 2016]] ).

Within countries, institutional platforms allow federal and sub-national governments to negotiate and agree on policy trajectories ( [[#Gordon--2015|Gordon 2015]] ). In Germany, cooperation is channelled through periodic meetings of environment ministers and centre-state working groups ( [[#Weidner--2008|Weidner and Mez 2008]] ; [[#Brown--2012|Brown 2012]] ), and in Canada through bilateral negotiations and side-payments between scales of government ( [[#Rabe--2007|Rabe 2007]] ; [[#Gordon--2015|Gordon 2015]] ). Federal systems might allow for sub-national climate action despite constraints at the federal level, as has occurred in Australia ( [[#Gordon--2015|Gordon 2015]] ; [[#MacNeil--2021|MacNeil 2021]] ) and the United States ( [[#Rabe--2011|Rabe 2011]] ; [[#Jordaan--2019|Jordaan et al. 2019]] ; [[#Bromley-Trujillo--2020|Bromley-Trujillo and Holman 2020]] ; [[#Thompson--2020|Thompson et al. 2020]] ). Where agenda-setting rests with the central government, coordination may operate through targets, as with China ( [[#Qi--2013|Qi and Wu 2013]] ), or frameworks for policy action, as in India ( [[#Vihma--2011|Vihma 2011]] ; [[#Jogesh--2015|Jogesh and Dubash 2015]] ).

Because transition to a low-carbon future is likely to create winners and losers over different time scales; institutions are needed to mediate these interests and build consensus on future pathways ( [[#Kuzemko--2016|Kuzemko et al. 2016]] ; [[#Lockwood--2017|Lockwood et al. 2017]] ; [[#Finnegan--2019|Finnegan 2019]] ; [[#Mildenberger--2020|Mildenberger 2020]] ). Institutions that provide credible knowledge can help support ambition. For example, analysis by the UK Climate Change committee has been harnessed, including by non-state actors, to prevent backsliding on decisions ( [[#Lockwood--2021a|Lockwood 2021a]] ). Institutions can also help create positive feedback by providing spaces in decision-making for low-carbon interests ( [[#Aklin--2013|Aklin and Urpelainen 2013]] ; [[#Roberts--2018|Roberts et al. 2018]] ; [[#Lockwood--2017|Lockwood et al. 2017]] ; [[#Finnegan--2019|Finnegan 2019]] ). For example, a renewable energy policy community emerged in China through key agenda setting meetings ( [[#Shen--2017|Shen 2017]] ), and in India, a National Solar Mission provided a platform for the renewable energy industry (Pillai and [[#Dubash--2021|Dubash 2021]] ). Conversely, institutions can also exert a drag on change through ‘regulatory inertia’, as in the case of the UK energy regulator Ofgem, which has exercised veto powers in ways that may limit a low-carbon transition ( [[#Lockwood--2017|Lockwood et al. 2017]] ).

Institutions can also create spaces to accommodate concerns of other actors ( [[#Upadhyaya--2021|Upadhyaya et al. 2021]] ). Deliberative bodies, such as Germany’s Enquete Commission ( [[#Weidner--2008|Weidner and Mez 2008]] ; [[#Flachsland--2021|Flachsland and Levi 2021]] ) or the Brazilian Forum on Climate Change (Tyler and [[#Hochstetler--2021|Hochstetler 2021]] ) provide a space for reconciling competing visions and approaches to climate change. Many countries are creating deliberative bodies to forge ‘Just Transition’ strategies ( [[#13.9|Section 13.9]] ). a recent innovation is the creation of Citizens’ Assemblies that bring together representative samples of citizens to deliberate on policy questions with the intent of informing them ( [[#Devaney--2020|Devaney et al. 2020]] ; [[#Sandover--2021|Sandover et al. 2021]] ). The ability of institutions to forge agreement also rests on attention to procedural justice (Box 13.4).

Since addressing climate change requires transformative intent and shifting development pathways (Sections 1.6, 3.6, 4.3, 4.4, 13.9, 17.3.2, and Cross-Chapter Box 5 in Chapter 4), institutions that can devise strategies and set trajectories are useful enablers of transformation. Strategy setting often requires an overarching framework such as through framework laws that set targets ( [[#Averchenkova--2017|Averchenkova et al. 2017]] ), or identify key sectors and opportunities for low-carbon transition ( [[#Hochstetler--2015|Hochstetler and Kostka 2015]] ) and innovation ( [[#UNEP--2018|UNEP 2018]] ). Few countries have built deliberate and lasting institutions that provide strategic intent, and those that have, have pursued different approaches. The UK’s approach rests on five-yearly targets (Box 13.2); Germany requires sectoral budgets enforced through the Bundestag ( [[#Flachsland--2021|Flachsland and Levi 2021]] ); and China uses an apex decision-body to set targets ( [[#Teng--2021|Teng and Wang 2021]] ) (Box 13.3).

Addressing all of these governance concerns – coordination, mediating interests, and strategy setting – require attention to institutional capacity. These include the capacity to address ‘upstream’ policy issues of agenda setting, framing, analysis and policy design; pursue goals even while mediating interests ( [[#Upadhyaya--2021|Upadhyaya et al. 2021]] ); identify and manage synergies and trade-offs across climate and development objectives ( [[#Ürge-Vorsatz--2014|Ürge-Vorsatz et al. 2014]] ; [[#von%20Stechow--2015|von Stechow et al. 2015]] ; [[#McCollum--2018|McCollum et al. 2018]] ); identify and choose amongst possible policy options ( [[#Howlett--2010|Howlett and Oliphant 2010]] ); identify areas for transformation and the means to induce innovation ( [[#Patt--2017|Patt 2017]] ; [[#UNEP--2018|UNEP 2018]] ); and developing the ability to monitor and evaluate outcomes ( [[#Upadhyaya--2021|Upadhyaya et al. 2021]] ) (Box 13.5). [[#Domorenok--2021|Domorenok et al. (2021)]] highlight different aspects of the capacity challenge particularly necessary for integrated policy making including: the capacity for horizontal and vertical coordination; implementation capacity including the independence of the state from interests; and administrative capacity required to address compound problems. At a basic level, questions of governmental capacity – the numbers and training of personnel – can shape the choices available for climate institutions and their ability to be strategic ( [[#Richerzhagen--2008|Richerzhagen and Scholz 2008]] ; [[#Harrison--2014|Harrison and Kostka 2014]] ; [[#Kim--2016|Kim 2016]] ). Box 13.5 describes South Africa’s approach to building monitoring and evaluation capacity.

The perceived need for attention to institutional capacity is highlighted by the fact that the NDCs of 113 developing countries out of 169 countries studied list capacity building as a condition of NDC implementation ( [[#Pauw--2020|Pauw et al. 2020]] ). While international support for capacity is widely articulated as essential for many countries ( [[#Khan--2020|Khan et al. 2020]] ), ensuring the form of capacity is appropriate, effective and led domestically remains a challenge ( [[#Nago--2020|Nago and Krott 2020]] ; [[#Sokona--2021|Sokona 2021]] ).

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