Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-5 (section)

=== Box 5.2 | COVID-19, Service Provisioning and Climate Change Mitigation ===

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There is now ''high evidence'' and ''high agreement'' that the COVID-19 pandemic has increased the political feasibility of large-scale government actions to support the services for provision of public goods, including climate change policies. Many behavioural changes due to COVID-19 reinforce sufficiency and emphasis on solidarity, economies built around care, livelihood protection, collective action, and basic service provision, linked to reduced emissions.

COVID-19 led to direct and indirect health, economic, and confinement-induced hardships and suffering, mostly for the poor, and reset habits and everyday behaviours of the well-off too, enabling a reflection on the basic needs for a good life. Although COVID-19 and climate change pose different kinds of threats and therefore elicit different policies, there are several lessons from COVID-19 for advancing climate change mitigation ( [[#Klenert--2020|Klenert et al. 2020]] ; [[#Manzanedo--2020|Manzanedo and Manning 2020]] ; [[#Stark--2020|Stark 2020]] ). Both crises are global in scale, requiring holistic societal response; governments can act rapidly, and delay in action is costly ( [[#Bouman--2020a|Bouman et al. 2020a]] ; [[#Klenert--2020|Klenert et al. 2020]] ). The pandemic highlighted the role of individuals in collective action and many people felt morally compelled and responsible to act for others ( [[#Budd--2020|Budd and Ison, 2020]] ). COVID-19 also taught the effectiveness of rapid collective action (physical distancing, wearing masks, etc.) as contributions to the public good. The messaging about social distancing, wearing masks and handwashing during the pandemic called attention to the importance of effective public information (e.g., also about reducing personal carbon footprints), recognising that rapid pro-social responses are driven by personal and socio-cultural norms ( [[#Bouman--2020a|Bouman et al. 2020a]] ; [[#Sovacool--2020a|Sovacool et al. 2020a]] ). In contrast, low trust in public authorities impairs the effectiveness of policies and polarises society ( [[#Bavel--2020|Bavel et al. 2020]] ; [[#Hornsey--2020|Hornsey 2020]] ).

During the shutdown, emissions declined relatively most in aviation, and absolutely most in car transport ( [[#Le%20Quéré--2020|Le Quéré et al. 2020]] , Sarkis et al. 2020), and there were disproportionally strong reductions in GHG emissions from coal ( [[#Bertram--2021|Bertram et al. 2021]] ) (Chapter 2). At their peak, CO 2 emissions in individual countries decreased by 17% on average ( [[#Le%20Quéré--2020|Le Quéré et al. 2020]] ). Global energy demand was projected to drop by 5% in 2020, energy-related CO 2 emissions by 7%, and energy investment by 18% ( [[#IEA--2020a|IEA 2020a]] ). COVID-19 shock and recovery scenarios project final energy demand reductions of 1–36 EJ yr −1 by 2025 and cumulative CO 2 emission reductions of 14–45 GtCO 2 by 2030 ( [[#Kikstra--2021a|Kikstra et al. 2021a]] ). Plastics use and waste generation increased during the pandemic ( [[#Klemeš--2020|Klemeš et al. 2020]] ; [[#Prata--2020|Prata et al. 2020]] ). Responses to COVID-19 had important connections with energy demand and GHG emissions due to quarantine and travel restrictions ( [[#Sovacool--2020a|Sovacool et al. 2020a]] ). Reductions in mobility and economic activity reduced energy use in sectors such as industry and transport, but increased energy use in the residential sector ( [[#Diffenbaugh--2020|Diffenbaugh et al. 2020]] ). COVID-19 induced behavioural changes that may translate into new habits, some beneficial and some harmful for climate change mitigation. New digitally-enabled service accessibility patterns (videoconferencing, telecommuting) played an important role in sustaining various service needs while avoiding demand for individual mobility. However, public transit lost customers to cars, personalised two wheelers, walking and cycling, while suburban and rural living gained popularity, possibly with long-term consequences. Reduced air travel, pressures for more localised

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food and manufacturing supply chains ( [[#Hobbs--2020|Hobbs 2020]] ; [[#Nandi--2020|Nandi et al. 2020]] ; [[#Quayson--2020|Quayson et al. 2020]] ), and governments’ revealed willingness to make large-scale interventions in the economy also reflect sudden shifts in service provisions and GHG emissions, some likely to be lasting ( [[#Aldaco--2020|Aldaco et al. 2020]] ; Bilal et al. 2020; [[#Boyer--2020|Boyer 2020]] ; [[#Hepburn--2020|Hepburn et al. 2020]] ; [[#Norouzi--2020|Norouzi et al. 2020]] ; [[#Prideaux--2020|Prideaux et al. 2020]] ; [[#Sovacool--2020a|Sovacool et al. 2020a]] ). If changes in some preference behaviours, for example for larger homes and work environments to enable home working and online education, lead to sprawling suburbs or gentrification with linked environmental consequences, this could translate into long-term implications for climate change ( [[#Beaunoyer--2020|Beaunoyer et al. 2020]] ; [[#Diffenbaugh--2020|Diffenbaugh et al. 2020]] ). Recovering from the pandemic by adopting low energy demand practices – embedded in new travel, work, consumption and production behaviour and patterns – could reduce carbon prices for a 1.5°C consistent pathway by 19%, reduce energy supply investments until 2030 by USD1.8 trillion, and lessen pressure on the upscaling of low-carbon energy technologies ( [[#Kikstra--2021a|Kikstra et al. 2021a]] ).

COVID-19 drove hundreds of millions of people below poverty thresholds, reversing decades of poverty reduction accomplishments ( [[#Krieger--2020|Krieger 2020]] ; [[#Mahler--2020|Mahler et al. 2020]] ; [[#Patel--2020|Patel et al. 2020]] ; [[#Sumner--2020|Sumner et al. 2020]] ) and raising the spectre of intersecting health and climate crises that are devastating for the most vulnerable ( [[#Flyvbjerg--2020|Flyvbjerg 2020]] ; [[#Phillips--2020|Phillips et al. 2020]] ). Like those of climate change, pandemic impacts fall heavily on disadvantaged groups, exacerbate the uneven distribution of future benefits, amplify existing inequities, and introduce new ones ( [[#Beaunoyer--2020|Beaunoyer et al. 2020]] ; [[#Devine-Wright--2020|Devine-Wright et al. 2020]] ). Addressing such inequities is a positive step towards the social trust that leads to improved climate policies as well as individual actions. Increased support for care workers and social infrastructures within a solidarity economy is consistent with lower-emission economic transformation ( [[#Shelley--2017|Shelley 2017]] ; [[#Di%20Chiro--2019|Di Chiro 2019]] ; [[#Pichler--2019|Pichler et al. 2019]] ; [[#Smetschka--2019|Smetschka et al. 2019]] ).

Fiscally, the pandemic may have slowed the transition to a sustainable energy world: governments redistributed public funding to combat the disease, adopted austerity and reduced capacity. Of nearly 300 policies implemented to counteract the pandemic, the vast majority are related to rescue, including worker and business compensation, and only 4% of these focus on green policies with potential to reduce GHG emissions in the long term; some rescue policies also assist emissions-intensive business ( [[#Hepburn--2020|Hepburn et al. 2020]] ; [[#Leach--2021|Leach et al. 2021]] ). However, climate investments can double as the basis of the COVID-19 recovery ( [[#Stark--2020|Stark 2020]] ), with policies focused on both economic multipliers and climate impacts, such as clean physical infrastructure, natural capital investment, clean research and development (R&amp;D) and education and training ( [[#Hepburn--2020|Hepburn et al. 2020]] ). This requires attention to investment priorities, including often-underprioritised social investment, given how inequality intersects with, and is a recognised core driver of, environmental damage and climate change ( [[#Millward-Hopkins--2020|Millward-Hopkins et al. 2020]] ).

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