Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-13 (section)

==== 13.8.1.1 Poverty and Social Inequality ====

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While climate change is not the main driver of social inequality in Europe, poor households and marginalised groups are affected more strongly by flooding, heat and drought, as well as health risks due to spreading diseases, than other social groups ( ''medium confidence'' ).

Urban poor and ethnic minorities often settle in more vulnerable settlement zones, and are therefore impacted more by flooding ( ''medium confidence'' ) ( [[#Medd--2015|Medd et al., 2015]] ; [[#Župarić-Iljić--2017|Župarić-Iljić, 2017]] ; [[#Efendić--2018|Efendić, 2018]] ; [[#Fielding--2018|Fielding, 2018]] ; [[#Winsemius--2018|Winsemius et al., 2018]] ; [[#Puđak--2019|Puđak, 2019]] ; [[#Inuit%20Circumpolar%20Council--2020|Inuit Circumpolar Council, 2020]] ). Yet, in some Western European residential waterside developments this pattern is reversed by flooding impacting high-income residents more strongly ( [[#Walker--2011|Walker and Burningham, 2011]] ).

The health of the poor is disproportionately affected, for example, during heatwaves in the Mediterranean ( [[#Jouzel--2016|Jouzel and Michelot, 2016]] ). Women, those with disabilities and the elderly are disproportionately affected by heat ( [[#13.7.1|Section 13.7.1]] ). Floods in the Western Balkans in 2014 resulted in heavy metal pollution of water and land threatening the health condition of the poorer rural population ( [[#Filijović--2014|Filijović and Đorđević, 2014]] ). Access to water and sanitation is less available to poorer households and marginalised groups in Europe ( [[#Ezbakhe--2019|Ezbakhe et al., 2019]] ; [[#Anthonj--2020|Anthonj et al., 2020]] ); this effect could be intensified by increasing water scarcity in certain parts of Europe under future climate change ( [[#13.10.3|Section 13.10.3]] ).

Food self-provisioning is a widespread practice in many parts of Europe ( [[#Aleynikov--2014|Aleynikov et al., 2014]] ; [[#Corcoran--2014|Corcoran, 2014]] ; [[#Church--2015|Church et al., 2015]] ; [[#Mustonen--2020|Mustonen and Huusari, 2020]] ), reaching over half of German rural areas ( [[#Vávra--2018|Vávra et al., 2018]] ). While it strengthens resilience for disadvantaged households ( [[#Church--2015|Church et al., 2015]] ; [[#Boost--2017|Boost and Meier, 2017]] ; [[#Promberger--2017|Promberger, 2017]] ; [[#Vávra--2018|Vávra et al., 2018]] ; [[#Ančić--2019|Ančić et al., 2019]] ; [[#Pungas--2019|Pungas, 2019]] ) and renews their local knowledge, it can become a risk in regions with projected crop yield reductions ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Hallegatte--2016|Hallegatte et al., 2016]] ; [[#Quiroga--2016|Quiroga and Suárez, 2016]] ; [[#Myers--2017b|Myers et al., 2017b]] ; [[#Inuit%20Circumpolar%20Council--2020|Inuit Circumpolar Council, 2020]] ), and after extreme weather events ( [[#Filijović--2014|Filijović and Đorđević, 2014]] ).

Energy-poor households often live in thermally inefficient homes and cannot afford air conditioning to adapt to overheating in summer ( [[#Sanchez-Guevara--2019|Sanchez-Guevara et al., 2019]] ; [[#Thomson--2019|Thomson et al., 2019]] ). While energy poverty is much more prevalent in SEU and EEU ( [[#Bouzarovski--2015|Bouzarovski and Petrova, 2015]] ; [[#Pye--2015|Pye et al., 2015]] ; [[#Atsalis--2016|Atsalis et al., 2016]] ; [[#Monge-Barrio--2018|Monge-Barrio and Sánchez-Ostiz Gutiérrez, 2018]] ), climate change will also exacerbate energy poverty in European regions where heating thus far has been the major share of energy costs ( ''medium confidence'' ) ( [[#Sanchez-Guevara--2019|Sanchez-Guevara et al., 2019]] ; [[#Randazzo--2020|Randazzo et al., 2020]] ).

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