Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-6 (section)

==== 6.7.6.2 Acceptability of Policy, Mitigation Options and System Changes ====

<div id="h3-37-siblings" class="h3-siblings"></div>

Public acceptability reflects the extent to which the public evaluates climate policy, mitigation options, and system changes (un)favourably, which can shape, enable, or prevent low-carbon energy system transitions. Public acceptability of policy and mitigation options is higher when people expect these have more positive and less negative consequences for self, others, and the environment ( [[#Perlaviciute--2014|Perlaviciute and Steg 2014]] ; [[#Demski--2015|Demski et al. 2015]] ; [[#Drews--2016|Drews and Van den Bergh 2016]] ). Public opposition may result when a culturally valued landscape is affected by renewable energy development ( [[#Warren--2005|Warren et al. 2005]] ; [[#Devine-Wright--2010|Devine-Wright and Howes 2010]] ), particularly when place-based identities are threatened ( [[#Devine-Wright--2009|Devine-Wright 2009]] , 2013; [[#Boudet--2019|Boudet 2019]] ). Acceptability can increase after a policy or change has been implemented and the consequences appear to be more positive than expected ( [[#Schuitema--2010|Schuitema et al. 2010]] ; [[#Eliasson--2014|Eliasson 2014]] ; [[#Weber--2015|Weber 2015]] ; [[#Carattini--2018|Carattini et al. 2018]] ); effective policy trials can thus build public support.

Next, climate policy and low-carbon options are evaluated as more fair and acceptable when costs and benefits are distributed equally, and when nature, the environment and future generations are protected ( [[#Schuitema--2011|Schuitema et al. 2011]] ; [[#Drews--2016|Drews and Van den Bergh 2016]] ). Compensating affected groups for losses due to policy or systems changes enhanced public acceptability in some cases ( [[#Perlaviciute--2014|Perlaviciute and Steg 2014]] ), but people may disagree on which compensation would be worthwhile ( [[#Aitken--2010b|Aitken 2010b]] ; [[#Cass--2010|Cass et al. 2010]] ), on the distribution of compensation ( [[#Devine-Wright--2019|Devine-Wright and Sherry-Brennan 2019]] ; [[#Leer%20Jørgensen--2020|Leer Jørgensen et al. 2020]] ), or feel they are being bribed ( [[#Cass--2010|Cass et al. 2010]] ; [[#Perlaviciute--2014|Perlaviciute and Steg 2014]] ). Pricing policies are more acceptable when revenues are earmarked for environmental purposes ( [[#Steg--2006|Steg et al. 2006]] ; [[#Sælen--2011|Sælen and Kallbekken 2011]] ) or redistributed towards those affected ( [[#Schuitema--2008|Schuitema and Steg 2008]] ).

Climate policy and mitigation options, such as renewable energy projects, are also perceived as more fair and acceptable when the public ( [[#Dietz--2013|Dietz 2013]] ; [[#Bidwell--2014|Bidwell 2014]] ; [[#Bernauer--2016b|Bernauer et al. 2016b]] ) or public society organisations ( [[#Terwel--2010|Terwel et al. 2010]] ; [[#Bernauer--2016b|Bernauer et al. 2016b]] ) could participate in the decision-making ( [[#Arvai--2003|Arvai 2003]] ; [[#Devine-Wright--2005|Devine-Wright 2005]] ; [[#Terwel--2012|Terwel et al. 2012]] ; [[#Walker--2017|Walker and Baxter 2017]] ; [[#Perlaviciute--2020|Perlaviciute and Squintani 2020]] ). People are more motivated to participate in decision-making on local projects than on national or general policy goals ( [[#Perlaviciute--2020|Perlaviciute and Squintani 2020]] ). Public acceptability is also higher when people can influence major rather than only minor decisions, particularly when trust in responsible parties is low ( [[#Liu--2019a|Liu et al. 2019a]] ). Public participation can enhance the quality and legitimacy of decisions by including local knowledge and views that may otherwise be missed ( [[#Dietz--2013|Dietz 2013]] ; [[#Bidwell--2016|Bidwell 2016]] ).

Public support is higher when people trust responsible parties ( [[#Perlaviciute--2014|Perlaviciute and Steg 2014]] ; [[#Drews--2016|Drews and Van den Bergh 2016]] ; [[#Michaels--2016|Michaels and Parag 2016]] ; [[#Jiang--2018|Jiang et al. 2018]] ; [[#Liu--2019a|Liu et al. 2019a]] ). Public support for unilateral climate policy is rather strong and robust ( [[#Bernauer--2016a|Bernauer et al. 2016a]] ), even in the absence of reciprocal commitments by other states ( [[#Bernauer--2015|Bernauer and Gampfer 2015]] ).

Public acceptability of climate policy and low-carbon options differs across individuals. Climate policy and low-carbon options are more acceptable when people strongly value protecting other people and the environment, and support egalitarian worldviews, left-wing or green political ideologies, while acceptability is lower when people strongly endorse self-centred values, and support individualistic worldviews ( [[#Dietz--2007|Dietz et al. 2007]] ; [[#Perlaviciute--2014|Perlaviciute and Steg 2014]] ; [[#Drews--2016|Drews and Van den Bergh 2016]] ). Similarly, public decision-makers support climate policy more when they endorse environmental values ( [[#Nilsson--2016|Nilsson et al. 2016]] ). Climate and energy policy is more acceptable when people are more concerned about climate change ( [[#Hornsey--2016|Hornsey et al. 2016]] ), when they believe their actions would help mitigate climate change, and feel responsible to mitigate climate change ( [[#Steg--2005|Steg 2005]] ; [[#Eriksson--2006|Eriksson et al. 2006]] ; [[#Jakovcevic--2013|Jakovcevic and Steg 2013]] ; [[#Drews--2016|Drews and Van den Bergh 2016]] ; [[#Kim--2017|Kim and Shin 2017]] ; [[#Ünal--2019|Ünal et al. 2019]] ).

<div id="6.7.7" class="h2-container"></div>

<span id="the-costs-and-benefits-of-low-carbon-energy-system-transitions-in-the-context-of-sustainable-development"></span>