Editing IPCC:AR6/SR15/Chapter-4 (section)

== Box 4.5: How Pricing Policy has Reduced Car Use in Singapore, Stockholm and London ==

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In Singapore, Stockholm and London, car ownership, car use, and GHG emissions have reduced because of pricing and regulatory policies and policies facilitating behaviour change. Notably, acceptability of these policies has increased as people experienced their positive effects.

Singapore implemented electronic road pricing in the central business district and at major expressways, a vehicle quota and registration fee system, and investments in mass transit. In the vehicle quota system introduced in 1990, registration of new vehicles is conditional upon a successful bid (via auctioning) (Chu, 2015) <sup>[[#fn:r1143|1143]]</sup> , costing about 50,000 USD in 2014 (LTA, 2015) <sup>[[#fn:r1144|1144]]</sup> . The registration tax incentivizes purchases of low-emission vehicles via a feebate system. As a result, per capita transport emissions (approximately 1.25 tCO <sub>2</sub> yr <sup>−1</sup> ) and car ownership (107 vehicles per 1000 capita) (LTA, 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r1145|1145]]</sup> are substantially lower than in cities with comparable income levels. Modal share of public transport was 63% during peak hours in 2013 (LTA, 2013) <sup>[[#fn:r1146|1146]]</sup> .

The Stockholm congestion charge implemented in 2007 (after a trial in 2006) reduced kilometres driven in the inner city by 16%, and outside the city by 5%; traffic volumes reduced by 20% and remained constant over time despite economic and population growth (Eliasson, 2014) <sup>[[#fn:r1147|1147]]</sup> . CO <sub>2</sub> emissions from traffic reduced by 2–3% in Stockholm county. Vehicles entering or leaving the city centre were charged during weekdays (except for holidays). Charges were 1–2€ (maximum 6€ per day), being higher during peak hours; taxis, emergency vehicles and buses were exempted. Before introducing the charge, public transport and parking places near mass transit stations were extended. The aim and effects of the charge were extensively communicated to the public. Acceptability of the congestion charge was initially low, but the scheme gained support of about two-thirds of the population and all political parties after it was implemented (Eliasson, 2014) <sup>[[#fn:r1148|1148]]</sup> , which may be related to the fact that the revenues were earmarked for constructing a motorway tunnel. After the trial, people believed that the charge had more positive effects on environmental, congestion and parking problems while costs increased less than they anticipated beforehand (Schuitema et al., 2010a) <sup>[[#fn:r1149|1149]]</sup> . The initially hostile media eventually declared the scheme to be a success.

In 2003, a congestion charge was implemented in the Greater London area, with an enforcement and compliance scheme and an information campaign on the functioning of the scheme. Vehicles entering, leaving, driving or parking on a public road in the zone at weekdays at daytime pay a congestion charge of 8£ (until 2005, 5£), with some exemptions. Revenues were invested in London’s bus network (80%), cycling facilities, and road safety measures (Leape, 2006) <sup>[[#fn:r1150|1150]]</sup> . The number of cars entering the zone decreased by 18% in 2003 and 2004. In the charging zone, vehicle kilometres driven decreased by 15% in the first year and a further 6% a year later, while CO <sub>2</sub> emissions from road traffic reduced by 20% (Santos, 2008) <sup>[[#fn:r1151|1151]]</sup> .

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While providing information on the causes and consequences of climate change or on effective climate actions generally increases knowledge, it often does not encourage engagement in climate actions by individuals (Abrahamse et al., 2005; Ünal et al., 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r1152|1152]]</sup> or organizations (Anderson and Newell, 2004) <sup>[[#fn:r1153|1153]]</sup> . Similarly, media coverage on the UN Climate Summit slightly increased knowledge about the conference but did not enhance motivation to engage personally in climate protection (Brüggemann et al., 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r1154|1154]]</sup> . Fear-inducing representations of climate change may inhibit action when they make people feel helpless and overwhelmed (O’Neill and Nicholson-Cole, 2009) <sup>[[#fn:r1155|1155]]</sup> . Energy-related recommendations and feedback (e.g., via performance contracts, energy audits, smart metering) are more effective for promoting energy conservation, load shifting in electricity use and sustainable travel choices when framed in terms of losses rather than gains (Gonzales et al., 1988; Wolak, 2011; Bradley et al., 2016; Bager and Mundaca, 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r1156|1156]]</sup> .

Credible and targeted information at the point of decision can promote climate action (Stern et al., 2016a) <sup>[[#fn:r1157|1157]]</sup> . For example, communicating the impacts of climate change is more effective when provided right before adaptation decisions are taken (e.g., before the agricultural season) and when bundled with information on potential actions to ameliorate impacts, rather than just providing information on climate projections with little meaning to end users (e.g., weather forecasts, seasonal forecasts, decadal climate trends) (Dorward et al., 2015; Singh et al., 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r1158|1158]]</sup> . Similarly, heat action plans that provide early alerts and advisories combined with emergency public health measures can reduce heat-related morbidity and mortality (Benmarhnia et al., 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r1159|1159]]</sup> .

Information provision is more effective when tailored to the personal situation of individuals, demonstrating clear impacts, and resonating with individuals’ core values (Daamen et al., 2001; Abrahamse et al., 2007; Bolderdijk et al., 2013a; Dorward et al., 2015; Singh et al., 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r1160|1160]]</sup> . Tailored information prevents information overload, and people are more motivated to consider and act upon information that aligns with their core values and beliefs (Campbell and Kay, 2014; Hornsey et al., 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r1161|1161]]</sup> . Also, tailored information can remove barriers to receive and interpret information faced by vulnerable groups, such as the elderly during heatwaves (Vandentorren et al., 2006; Keim, 2008) <sup>[[#fn:r1162|1162]]</sup> . Further, prompts can be effective when they serve as reminders to perform a planned action (Osbaldiston and Schott, 2012) <sup>[[#fn:r1163|1163]]</sup> .

Feedback provision is generally effective in promoting mitigation behaviour within households (Abrahamse et al., 2005; Delmas et al., 2013; Karlin et al., 2015) <sup>[[#fn:r1164|1164]]</sup> and at work (Young et al., 2015) <sup>[[#fn:r1165|1165]]</sup> , particularly when provided in real-time or immediately after the action (Abrahamse et al., 2005) <sup>[[#fn:r1166|1166]]</sup> , which makes the implications of one’s behaviour more salient (Tiefenbeck et al., 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r1167|1167]]</sup> . Simple information is more effective than detailed and technical data (Wilson and Dowlatabadi, 2007; Ek and Söderholm, 2010; Frederiks et al., 2015) <sup>[[#fn:r1168|1168]]</sup> . Energy labels (Banerjee and Solomon, 2003; Stadelmann, 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r1169|1169]]</sup> , visualization techniques (Pahl et al., 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r1170|1170]]</sup> , and ambient persuasive technology (Midden and Ham, 2012) <sup>[[#fn:r1171|1171]]</sup> can encourage mitigation actions by providing information and feedback in a format that immediately makes sense and hardly requires users’ conscious attention.

Social influence approaches that emphasize what other people do or think can encourage climate action (Clayton et al., 2015) <sup>[[#fn:r1172|1172]]</sup> , particularly when they involve face-to-face interaction (Abrahamse and Steg, 2013) <sup>[[#fn:r1173|1173]]</sup> . For example, community approaches, where change is initiated from the bottom-up, can promote adaptation (see Box 4.6) and mitigation actions (Middlemiss, 2011; Seyfang and Haxeltine, 2012; Abrahamse and Steg, 2013) <sup>[[#fn:r1174|1174]]</sup> , especially when community ties are strong (Weenig and Midden, 1991) <sup>[[#fn:r1175|1175]]</sup> . Furthermore, providing social models of desired actions can encourage mitigation action (Osbaldiston and Schott, 2012; Abrahamse and Steg, 2013) <sup>[[#fn:r1176|1176]]</sup> . Social influence approaches that do not involve social interaction, such as social norm, social comparison and group feedback, are less effective, but can be easily administered on a large scale at low costs (Allcott, 2011; Abrahamse and Steg, 2013) <sup>[[#fn:r1177|1177]]</sup> .

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