Editing IPCC:AR6/SRCCL/Chapter-7 (section)

=== 7.6.2 Integration – Levels, modes and scale of governance for sustainable development ===

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Different types of governance can be distinguished according to intended levels (e.g., local, regional, global), domains (national, international, transnational), modes (market, network, hierarchy), and scales (global regimes to local community groups) (Jordan et al. 2015b <sup>[[#fn:r1298|1298]]</sup> ). Implementation of climate change adaptation and mitigation has been impeded by institutional barriers, including multi-level governance and policy integration issues (Biesbroek et al. 2010 <sup>[[#fn:r1299|1299]]</sup> ). To overcome these barriers, climate governance has evolved significantly beyond the national and multilateral domains that tended to dominate climate efforts and initiatives during the early years of the UNFCCC. The climate challenge has been placed in an Earth System context, showing the existence of complex interactions and governance requirements across different levels, and calling for a radical transformation in governance, rather than minor adjustments (Biermann et al. 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r1300|1300]]</sup> ). Climate governance literature has expanded since AR5 in relation to the sub-national and transnational levels, but all levels and their interconnection is important. Expert thinking has evolved from implementing good governance at high levels (with governments) to a decentred problem-solving approach consistent with adaptive governance. This approach involves iterative bottom- up and experimental mechanisms that might entail addressing tenure of land or forest management through a territorial approach to development, thereby supporting multi-sectoral governance in local, municipal and regional contexts (FAO 2017b <sup>[[#fn:r1301|1301]]</sup> ).

Local action in relation to mitigation and adaptation continues to be important by complementing and advancing global climate policy (Ostrom 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r1302|1302]]</sup> ). Sub-national governance efforts for climate policy, especially at the level of cities and communities, have become significant during the past decades ( ''medium evidence, medium agreement'' ) (Castán Broto 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1303|1303]]</sup> ; Floater et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1304|1304]]</sup> ; Albers et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1305|1305]]</sup> ; Archer et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1306|1306]]</sup> ). A transformation of sorts has been underway through deepening engagement from the private sector and NGOs as well as government involvement at multiple levels. It is now recognised that business organisations, civil society groups, citizens, and formal governance all have important roles in governance for sustainable development (Kemp et al. 2005 <sup>[[#fn:r1307|1307]]</sup> ).

Transnational governance efforts have increased in number, with applications across different economic sectors, geographical regions, civil society groups and NGOs. When it comes to climate mitigation, transnational mechanisms generally focus on networking and may not necessarily be effective in terms of promoting real emissions reductions (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1308|1308]]</sup> ). However, acceleration in national mitigation measures has been determined to coincide with landmark international events such as the lead up to the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference 2009 (Iacobuta et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1309|1309]]</sup> ). There is a tendency for transnational governance mechanisms to lack monitoring and evaluation procedures (Jordan et al. 2015a <sup>[[#fn:r1310|1310]]</sup> ).

To address shortcomings of transnational governance, polycentric governance considers the interaction between actors at different levels of governance (local, regional, national, and global) for a more nuanced understanding of the variation in diverse governance outcomes in the management of common-pool resources (such as forests) based on the needs and interests of citizens (Nagendra and Ostrom 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r1311|1311]]</sup> ). A more ‘polycentric climate governance’ system has emerged that incorporates bottom-up initiatives that can support and synergise with national efforts and international regimes (Ostrom 2010 <sup>[[#fn:r1312|1312]]</sup> ). Although it is clear that many more actors and networks are involved, the effectiveness of a more polycentric system remains unclear (Jordan et al. 2015a <sup>[[#fn:r1313|1313]]</sup> ).

There is ''high confidence'' that a hybrid form of governance, combining the advantages of centralised governance (with coordination, stability, compliance) with those of more horizontal structures (that allow flexibility, autonomy for local decision-making, multi- stakeholder engagement, co-management) is required for effective mainstreaming of mitigation and adaptation in sustainable land and forest management (Keenan 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1314|1314]]</sup> ; Gupta 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1315|1315]]</sup> ; Williamson and Nelson 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1316|1316]]</sup> ; Liniger et al. 2019 <sup>[[#fn:r1317|1317]]</sup> ). Polycentric institutions self- organise, developing collective solutions to local problems as they arise (Koontz et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1318|1318]]</sup> ). The public sector (governments and administrative systems) are still important in climate change initiatives as these actors retain the political will to implement and make initiatives work (Biesbroek et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1319|1319]]</sup> ).

Sustainable development hinges on the holistic integration of interconnected land and climate issues, sectors, levels of government, and policy instruments (Section 7.4.8) that address the increasing volatility in oscillating systems and weather patterns (Young 2017b <sup>[[#fn:r1320|1320]]</sup> ; Kemp et al. 2005 <sup>[[#fn:r1321|1321]]</sup> ). Climate adaptation and mitigation goals must be integrated or mainstreamed into existing governance mechanisms around key land-use sectors such as forestry and agriculture. In the EU, mitigation has generally been well-mainstreamed in regional policies but not adaptation (Hanger et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1322|1322]]</sup> ). Climate change adaptation has been impeded by institutional barriers, including the inherent challenges of multi-level governance and policy integration (Biesbroek et al. 2010 <sup>[[#fn:r1323|1323]]</sup> ).

Integrative polycentric approaches to land use and climate interactions take different forms and operate with different institutions and governance mechanisms. Integrative approaches can provide coordination and linkages to improve effectiveness and efficiency and minimise conflicts ( ''high confidence'' ). Different types of integration with special relevance for the land–climate interface can be characterised as follows:

# '''Cross-level integration:''' local and national level efforts must be coordinated with national and regional policies and also be capable of drawing direction and financing from global regimes, thus requiring multi-level governance. Integration of SLM to prevent, reduce and restore degraded land is advanced with national and subnational policy, including passing the necessary laws to establish frameworks and provide financial incentives. Examples include: integrated territorial planning addressing specific land-use decisions; local landscape participatory planning with farmer associations, microenterprises, and local institutions identifying hot spot areas, identifying land-use pressures and scaling out SLM response options (Liniger et al. 2019 <sup>[[#fn:r1324|1324]]</sup> ).
# '''Cross-sectoral integration:''' rather than approach each application or sector (e.g., energy, agriculture, forestry) separately, there is a conscious effort at co-management and coordination in policies and institutions, such as with the energy–water–food nexus (Biggs et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1325|1325]]</sup> ).
# '''End-use/market integration:''' often involves exploiting economies of scope across products, supply chains, and infrastructure (Nuhoff-Isakhanyan et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r1326|1326]]</sup> ; Ashkenazy et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1327|1327]]</sup> ). For instance, land-use transport models consider land use, transportation, city planning, and climate mitigation (Ford et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1328|1328]]</sup> ).
# '''Landscape integration:''' rather than physical separation of activities (e.g., agriculture, forestry, grazing), uses are spatially integrated by exploiting natural variations while incorporating local and regional economies (Harvey et al. 2014a <sup>[[#fn:r1329|1329]]</sup> ). In an assessment of 166 initiatives in 16 countries, integrated landscape initiatives were found to address the drivers of agriculture, ecosystem conservation, livelihood preservation and institutional coordination. However, such initiatives struggled to move from planning to implementation due to lack of government and financial support, and powerful stakeholders sidelining the agenda (Zanzanaini et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1330|1330]]</sup> ). Special care helps ensure that initiatives don’t exacerbate socio-spatial inequalities across diverse developmental and environmental conditions (Anguelovski et al. 2016b <sup>[[#fn:r1331|1331]]</sup> ). Integrated land-use planning, coordinated through multiple government levels, balances property rights, wildlife and forest conservation, encroachment of settlements and agricultural areas and can reduce conflict ( ''high confidence'' ) (Metternicht 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1332|1332]]</sup> ). Land-use planning can also enhance management of areas prone to natural disasters, such as floods, and resolve issues of competing land uses and land tenure conflicts (Metternicht 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1333|1333]]</sup> ).

Another way to analyse or characterise governance approaches or mechanisms might be according to a temporal scale with respect to relevant events – for example, those that may occur gradually versus abruptly (Cash et al. 2006 <sup>[[#fn:r1334|1334]]</sup> ). Desertification and land degradation are drawn-out processes that occur over many years, whereas extreme events are abrupt and require immediate attention. Similarly, the frequency of events might be of special interest – for example, events that occur periodically versus those that occur infrequently and/or irregularly. In the case of food security, abrupt and protracted events of food insecurity might occur. There is a distinction between ‘hunger months’ and longer-term food insecurity. Some indigenous practices already incorporate hunger months whereas structural food deficits have to be addressed differently (Bacon et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1335|1335]]</sup> ). Governance mechanisms that facilitate rapid response to crises are quite different from those aimed at monitoring slower changes and responding with longer-term measures.

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'''Case study | Governance: Biofuels and bioenergy'''

New policies and initiatives during the past decade or so have increased support for bioenergy as a non-intermittent (stored) renewable with wide geographic availability that is cost-effective in a range of applications. Significant upscaling of bioenergy requires dedicated (normally land-based) sources in addition to use of wastes and residues. As a result, a disadvantageous high land-use intensity compared to other renewables (Fritsche et al. 2017b) that, in turn, place greater demands on governance. Bioenergy, especially traditional fuels, currently provides the largest share of renewable energy globally and has a significant role in nearly all climate stabilisation scenarios, although estimates of its potential vary widely (see Cross-Chapter Box 7 in Chapter 6). Policies and governance for bioenergy systems and markets must address diverse applications and sectors across levels from local to global; here we briefly review the literature in relation to governance for modern bioenergy and biofuels with respect to land and climate impacts, whereas traditional biomass use (see Glossary) (&gt; 50% of energy used today with greater land use and GHG emissions impacts in low- and medium-income countries (Bailis et al. 2015; Masera et al. 2015; Bailis et al. 2017a; Kiruki et al. 2017b)) is addressed elsewhere (Sections 4.5.4 and 7.4.6.4 and Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 7). The bioenergy lifecycle is relevant in accounting for – and attributing – land impacts and GHG emissions (Section 2.5.1.5). Integrated responses across different sectors can help to reduce negative impacts and promote sustainable development opportunities (Table 6.9, Table 6.58, Chapter 6).

It is very likely that bioenergy expansion at a scale that contributes significantly to global climate mitigation efforts (see Cross-Chapter Box 7 in Chapter 6) will result in substantial land-use change (Berndes et al. 2015; Popp et al. 2014a; Wilson et al. 2014; Behrman et al. 2015; Richards et al. 2017; Harris et al. 2015; Chen et al. 2017a). There is ''medium evidence'' and ''high agreement'' that land-use change at such scale presents a variety of positive and negative socio-economic and environmental impacts that lead to risks and trade-offs that must be managed or governed across different levels (Pahl-Wostl et al. 2018a; Kurian 2017; Franz et al. 2017; Chang et al. 2016; Larcom and van Gevelt 2017; Lubis et al. 2018; Alexander et al. 2015b; Rasul 2014; Bonsch et al. 2016; Karabulut et al. 2018; Mayor et al. 2015). There is ''medium evidence'' and ''high agreement'' that impacts vary considerably according to factors such as initial land-use type, choice of crops, initial carbon stocks, climatic region, soil types and the management regime and adopted technologies (Qin et al. 2016; Del Grosso et al. 2014; Popp et al. 2017; Davis et al. 2013; Mello et al. 2014; Hudiburg et al. 2015; Carvalho et al. 2016; Silva- Olaya et al. 2017; Whitaker et al. 2018; Alexander et al. 2015b).

There is ''medium evidence'' and ''high agreement'' that significant socio-economic impacts requiring additional policy responses can occur when agricultural lands and/or food crops are used for bioenergy, due to competition between food and fuel (Harvey and Pilgrim 2011; Rosillo Callé and Johnson 2010b), including impacts on food prices (Martin Persson 2015; Roberts and Schlenker 2013; Borychowski and Czyżewski 2015; Koizumi 2014; Muratori et al. 2016; Popp et al. 2014b; Araujo Enciso et al. 2016) and impacts on food security (Popp et al. 2014b; Bailey 2013; Pahl-Wostl et al. 2018b; Rulli et al. 2016; Yamagata et al. 2018; Kline et al. 2017; Schröder et al. 2018; Franz et al. 2017; Mohr et al. 2016). Additionally, crops such as sugarcane, which are water-intensive when used for ethanol production, have a trade-off with water and downstream ES and other crops more important for food security (Rulli et al. 2016; Gheewala et al. 2011). Alongside negative impacts that might fall on urban consumers (who purchase both food and energy), there is ''medium evidence'' and ''medium agreement'' that rural producers or farmers can increase income or strengthen livelihoods by diversifying into biofuel crops that have an established market (Maltsoglou et al. 2014; Mudombi et al. 2018a; Gasparatos et al. 2018a,b,c; von Maltitz et al. 2018; Kline et al. 2017; Rodríguez Morales and Rodríguez López 2017; Dale et al. 2015; Lee and Lazarus 2013; Rodríguez-Morales 2018). A key governance mechanism that has emerged in response to such concerns, (especially during the past decade) are standards and certification systems that include food security and land rights in addition to general criteria or indicators related to sustainable use of land and biomass (Section 7.4.6.3). There is ''medium evidence'' and ''medium agreement'' that policies promoting use of wastes and residues, use of non-edible crops and/or reliance on degraded and marginal lands for bioenergy could reduce land competition and associated risk for food security (Manning et al. 2015; Maltsoglou et al. 2014; Zhang et al. 2018a; Gu and Wylie 2017; Kline et al. 2017; Schröder et al. 2018; Suckall et al. 2015; Popp et al. 2014a; Lal 2013).

There is ''medium evidence'' and ''high agreement'' that good governance, including policy coherence and coordination across the different sectors involved (agriculture, forestry, livestock, energy, transport) (Section 7.6.2) can help to reduce the risks and increase the co- benefits of bioenergy expansion (Makkonen et al. 2015; Di Gregorio et al. 2017; Schut et al. 2013; Mukhtarov et al.; Torvanger 2019a; Müller et al. 2015; Nkonya et al. 2015; Johnson and Silveira 2014; Lundmark et al. 2014; Schultz et al. 2015; Silveira and Johnson 2016; Giessen et al. 2016b; Stattman et al. 2018b; Bennich et al. 2017b). There is ''medium evidence'' and ''high agreement'' that the nexus approach can help to address interconnected biomass resource management challenges and entrenched economic interests, and leverage synergies in the systemic governance of risk. (Bizikova et al. 2013; Rouillard et al. 2017; Pahl-Wostl 2017a; Lele et al. 2013; Rodríguez Morales and Rodríguez López 2017; Larcom and van Gevelt 2017; Pahl-Wostl et al. 2018a; Rulli et al. 2016; Rasul and Sharma 2016; Weitz et al. 2017b; Karlberg et al. 2015).

A key issue for governance of biofuels and bioenergy, as well as land-use governance more generally, during the past decade is the need for new governance mechanisms across different levels as land-use policies and bioenergy investments are scaled up and result in wider impacts (Section 7.6). There is ''low evidence'' and ''medium agreement'' that hybrid governance mechanisms can promote sustainable bioenergy investments and land-use pathways. This hybrid governance can include multi-level, transnational governance, and private-led or partnership-style (polycentric) governance, complementing national-level, strong public coordination (government and public administration) (Section 7.6.2) (Pahl-Wostl 2017a; Pacheco et al. 2016; Winickoff and Mondou 2017; Nagendra and Ostrom 2012; Jordan et al. 2015a; Djalante et al. 2013; Purkus, A, Gawel, E. and Thrän, D. 2012; Purkus et al. 2018; Stattman et al.; Rietig 2018; Cavicchi et al. 2017; Stupak et al. 2016; Stupak and Raulund-Rasmussen 2016; Westberg and Johnson 2013; Giessen et al. 2016b; Johnson and Silveira 2014; Stattman et al. 2018b; Mukhtarov et al.; Torvanger 2019b).

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