Editing IPCC:AR6/SR15/Chapter-4 (section)

==== 4.4.3.3 Acceptability of policy and system changes ====

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Public acceptability can shape, enable or prevent policy and system changes. Acceptability reflects the extent to which policy or system changes are evaluated (un)favourably. Acceptability is higher when people expect more positive and less negative effects of policy and system changes (Perlaviciute and Steg, 2014; Demski et al., 2015; Drews and Van den Bergh, 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r1210|1210]]</sup> , including climate impacts (Schuitema et al., 2010b) <sup>[[#fn:r1211|1211]]</sup> . Because of this, policy ‘rewarding’ climate actions is more acceptable than policy ‘punishing’ actions that increase climate risks (Steg et al., 2006; Eriksson et al., 2008) <sup>[[#fn:r1212|1212]]</sup> . Pricing policy is more acceptable when revenues are earmarked for environmental purposes (Steg et al., 2006; Sælen and Kallbekken, 2011) <sup>[[#fn:r1213|1213]]</sup> or redistributed towards those affected (Schuitema and Steg, 2008) <sup>[[#fn:r1214|1214]]</sup> . Acceptability can increase when people experience positive effects after a policy has been implemented (Schuitema et al., 2010a; Eliasson, 2014; Weber, 2015) <sup>[[#fn:r1215|1215]]</sup> ; effective policy trials can thus build public support for climate policy (see Box 4.8).

Climate policy and renewable energy systems are more acceptable when people strongly value other people and the environment, or support egalitarian worldviews, left-wing or green political ideologies (Drews and Van den Bergh, 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r1216|1216]]</sup> , and less acceptable when people strongly endorse self-enhancement values, or support individualistic and hierarchical worldviews (Dietz et al., 2007; Perlaviciute and Steg, 2014; Drews and Van den Bergh, 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r1217|1217]]</sup> . Solar radiation modification is more acceptable when people strongly endorse self-enhancement values, and less acceptable when they strongly value other people and the environment (Visschers et al., 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r1218|1218]]</sup> . Climate policy is more acceptable when people believe climate change is real, when they are concerned about climate change (Hornsey et al., 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r1219|1219]]</sup> , when they think their actions may reduce climate risks, and when they feel responsible to act on climate change (Steg et al., 2005; Eriksson et al., 2006; Jakovcevic and Steg, 2013; Drews and Van den Bergh, 2016; Kim and Shin, 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r1220|1220]]</sup> . Stronger environmental awareness is associated with a preference for governmental regulation and behaviour change rather than free-market and technological solutions (Poortinga et al., 2002) <sup>[[#fn:r1221|1221]]</sup> .

Climate policy is more acceptable when costs and benefits are distributed equally, when nature and future generations are protected (Sjöberg and Drottz-Sjöberg, 2001; Schuitema et al., 2011; Drews and Van den Bergh, 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r1222|1222]]</sup> , and when fair procedures have been followed, including participation by the public (Dietz, 2013; Bernauer et al., 2016a; Bidwell, 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r1223|1223]]</sup> or public society organizations (Bernauer and Gampfer, 2013) <sup>[[#fn:r1224|1224]]</sup> . Providing benefits to compensate affected communities for losses due to policy or systems changes enhanced public acceptability in some cases (Perlaviciute and Steg, 2014) <sup>[[#fn:r1225|1225]]</sup> , although people may disagree on what would be a worthwhile compensation (Aitken, 2010; Cass et al., 2010) <sup>[[#fn:r1226|1226]]</sup> , or feel they are being bribed (Cass et al., 2010; Perlaviciute and Steg, 2014) <sup>[[#fn:r1227|1227]]</sup> .

Public support is higher when individuals trust responsible parties (Perlaviciute and Steg, 2014; Drews and Van den Bergh, 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r1228|1228]]</sup> . Yet, public support for multilateral climate policy is not higher than for unilateral policy (Bernauer and Gampfer, 2015) <sup>[[#fn:r1229|1229]]</sup> ; public support for unilateral, non-reciprocal climate policy is rather strong and robust (Bernauer et al., 2016b) <sup>[[#fn:r1230|1230]]</sup> . Public opposition may result from a culturally valued landscape being affected by adaptation or mitigation options, such as renewable energy development (Warren et al., 2005; Devine-wright and Howes, 2010) <sup>[[#fn:r1231|1231]]</sup> or coastal protection measures (Kimura, 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r1232|1232]]</sup> , particularly when people have formed strong emotional bonds with the place (Devine-Wright, 2009, 2013) <sup>[[#fn:r1233|1233]]</sup> .

Climate actions may reduce human well-being when such actions involve more costs, effort or discomfort. Yet some climate actions enhance well-being, such as technology that improves daily comfort and nature-based solutions for climate adaptation (Wamsler and Brink, 2014b) <sup>[[#fn:r1234|1234]]</sup> . Further, climate action may enhance well-being (Kasser and Sheldon, 2002; Xiao et al., 2011; Schmitt et al., 2018) <sup>[[#fn:r1235|1235]]</sup> because pursuing meaning by acting on climate change can make people feel good (Venhoeven et al., 2013, 2016; Taufik et al., 2015) <sup>[[#fn:r1236|1236]]</sup> , more so than merely pursuing pleasure ''.''

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